Racine County v. C. D. B.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 12, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2078-FT Cir. Ct. No. 2015ME143

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF C.D.B.:

RACINE COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

C.D.B.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Racine County:
WYNNE P. LAUFENBERG, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2024AP2078-FT

¶1 GUNDRUM, P.J.1 C.D.B., referred to herein by the pseudonym
“Calvin Banks,” appeals from an order extending his involuntary commitment
under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 and a related order allowing for the involuntary
administration of medication and treatment.2 Banks contends Racine County
(County) failed to present sufficient evidence in support of the orders and the
circuit court erred when it permitted the case manager to testify over Banks’
hearsay objection. For the following reasons, we affirm.

Background

¶2 In November 2015, Banks was emergently detained after he fled
from police while operating a stolen vehicle. Racine County v. C.B.,
No. 2023AP2018-FT, unpublished slip op. ¶2 (Mar. 20, 2024). He was committed
under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 for six months at Winnebago Mental Health Institute, and
he has been under continuous ch. 51 commitment since. On April 2, 2024, the
County filed a petition to again extend his commitment and seek another
involuntary medication and treatment order. The circuit court held a hearing on
the petition on May 17, 2024, at which the following relevant evidence was
presented.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
2
On March 20, 2024, this court issued an opinion affirming the circuit court’s May 9,
2023 involuntary recommitment and medication orders related to Banks. See Racine County v.
C.B., No. 2023AP2018-FT, unpublished slip op. (Mar. 20, 2024). While this court gives
individual consideration in this opinion to the circuit court’s May 17, 2024 involuntary
recommitment and medication orders, because historical facts remain unchanged and much of the
procedural posture of this appeal mirrors that of the prior appeal, we utilize herein some of the
same language from the March 20, 2024 opinion.

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

¶3 Psychologist Dr. William Bjerregaard testified that he had performed
an in-person recommitment evaluation of Banks on April 29, 2024, and prepared a
related report that same day, which report was submitted as evidence at the final
hearing. Bjerregaard had examined Banks at least three times before, related to
prior recommitments. C.B., No. 2023AP2018-FT, ¶3.

¶4 Bjerregaard testified that Banks is “on three different antipsychotic
medications”: “Invega Hafyere,” “Risperidone and Quetiapine [Seroquel].”3
When asked about discussing with Banks “the circumstances that led to the
original commitment,” Bjerregaard responded that Banks “recalls being accused of
speeding and driving into oncoming traffic in a car that he had stolen. And that
the police fought him and beat him up, brought [him] to the [emergency room
(ER)] and then to jail.” Banks further told Bjerregaard that “he thought he could
elude them, so he sped up and tried to elude the police and hide from them.” In
his April 29, 2024 report, Bjerregaard wrote that Banks stated, “I did run from the
police but they caught me [and] handcuffed me [and] then beat me up with my
hands behind my back. They brought me to the ER [and eventually to] jail.”

¶5 Bjerregaard testified that Banks has “been hospitalized at least twice
at Mendota and four times at Winnebago State Hospital. Although he has been
hospitalized for a number of years now and he’s been under court-ordered
medication.” Banks had previously informed Bjerregaard that he “spent four years
in prison in the early 1990’s.”

3
Bjerregaard’s April 29, 2024 report identifies the third medication as Seroquel.
Seroquel is a brand name of quetiapine. See DRUGS.COM,
https://www.drugs.com/quetiapine.html (last updated Aug. 22, 2023).

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

¶6 Bjerregaard testified that Banks suffers from chronic paranoid
schizophrenia, “demonstrated with his thought disorder and grandiose delusions”
that involve “him having many college degrees from many different universities
and having a large sum of money, more than he needs, so that he can buy whatever
he wants.” While Banks complies with the medication order, Bjerregaard stated
that Banks “has no intention of continuing medication if he’s not under a court
order for medication.” Medication has therapeutic value for Banks as he has
“maintained himself outside the hospital under the current court order,”
Bjerregaard explained, adding his hope that Banks “can develop some insight into
why he’s receiving treatment.” Bjerregaard noted that Banks’ “only complaint
with the medication is that it’s painful when he gets the [Invega Hafyere] injection
and that’s every six months.”

¶7 Bjerregaard confirmed that he explained to Banks “the advantages,
disadvantages, and alternatives to the recommended medication,” noting that
while Banks is “able to discuss the medication and its uses with me,” he “has no
insight and would hope to stop the medication as soon as possible.” More
specifically, Bjerregaard noted in his report that he explained to Banks the
advantages to the recommended medication, specifically that they “[d]ecrease
fears, anxiety, [and] confusion,” the disadvantages, specifically that they can cause
“[s]edation, weight gain, movement disorder,” and alternatives, specifically
“[o]ther antipsychotics.” Bjerregaard agreed that Banks’ inability to apply an
understanding of the medications to his own situation was because of his mental
illness. In his report, Bjerregaard wrote that Banks denied having schizophrenia
and stated, “I have nothing wrong with me and don’t need any medicine.”

¶8 As to Banks’ dangerousness, Bjerregaard also wrote in his report,
“Dangerous driving[,] eluding police [and] travelling at high speeds[,] possibly

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

into oncoming traffic when off medicine—now hopes to stop medicine ASAP
which would place him at risk for again engaging in dangerous behavior.” He
wrote that Banks’ “[h]istory of dangerous driving”4 supported his opinion that
Banks evidenced a “substantial probability” of physical harm to himself and/or
other persons.

¶9 Bjerregaard testified that Banks “is very vague and superficial in
providing information. He also is rather paranoid about the police, believing that
they’re monitoring him regularly.” Banks is “vague and also somewhat disjointed
in terms of how his thought processing develops.” Banks “has essentially no
insight into having a mental illness and because of that, his judgment is impaired.”
Bjerregaard agreed that Banks “would be a proper subject for commitment if his
treatment were withdrawn

¶10 Bjerregaard testified that Banks “is dangerous to others.”
Expounding, Bjerregaard stated,

[I]f he stops his medication, I believe he will become more
disorganized in his thinking and engage in dangerous
behavior again. Possibly stealing another car, since he
seems to have an interest in taking cars. And if he drives
recklessly, he’s impairing not only himself but other people
in the community.

Bjerregaard agreed “there’s a substantial probability of physical harm to [Banks]
himself and to others.”

4
In C.B., No. 2023AP2018-FT, ¶14, we noted that at the final hearing related to that
recommitment, Banks’ case manager since 2015, Angela Townsend, testified that Banks had
“tak[en] and driv[en] cars without permission” and agreed that such had happened “on at least
three occasions.” The same circuit court judge presided over the final hearing related to the
March 20, 2024 orders.

5
No. 2024AP2078-FT

¶11 Bjerregaard agreed Banks is “a proper subject for treatment” and
recommended “[o]ngoing antipsychotic medication … and attempts to educate
[Banks] regarding his … having a mental illness and its features, such as his
grandiosity.” Bjerregaard stated that there have been “ongoing attempts [to
educate Banks in this manner], but his lack of insight is very resistant to any
intervention.” When asked if Banks had “express[ed] any interest in any
treatment,” Bjerregaard responded, “Not really, since he says he has no mental
illness and there’s no reason for him receiving any treatment.”

¶12 On cross-examination, Bjerregaard agreed Banks had displayed no
incidents of dangerousness since his commitment began but added that this was
“[b]ecause he’s under court-ordered medication.”

¶13 Angela Townsend, Banks’ case manager, testified, following a
hearsay objection by Banks’ counsel that was overruled by the circuit court, that
approximately ten years earlier Banks “had stolen [a] vehicle and when police
tried to stop him, he drove into oncoming traffic.” She further testified that during
a conversation with Banks in January 2024, he “denied having a mental illness and
said that medications weren’t helpful because he didn’t have a mental illness. And
that if the order was to end, he would no longer take medications.” She agreed
this has been his position “since 2015.” Townsend opined that if Banks failed to
take his medication, it “would result in him becoming symptomatic, which would
most likely result in him engaging in behaviors that put himself and the
community at risk.”

¶14 On cross-examination, Townsend acknowledged that Banks told her
that even if he was not recommitted, he would nonetheless meet with his case

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

manager. She further acknowledged that Banks has not had any incidents of
dangerousness since the driving incident in 2014.

¶15 The circuit court found that “clearly the medications assist [Banks]
in being able to maintain in the community … and not engage in the extremely
dangerous activity that he was arrested for back in 2014, 15, where he stole a
vehicle, fled police, and was driving into oncoming traffic.” The court stated that
“the entire … community [is put] at risk that’s in or around the area where the
fleeing car is” and noted that Banks is “still aware of that behavior,” pointing out
that “[h]e’s recently, at the evaluation, discussed it with Dr. Bjerregaard again.”
The court pointed out that Bjerregaard and Townsend are concerned “that if
[Banks] does not stay on the medications, that type of extremely dangerous
criminal activity will and could occur again because he will decompensate.” The
court was “convinced … that based on [Banks’] consistent position, as expressed
to his case manager, as expressed to Dr. Bjerregaard, that he does not have a
mental health disorder[, Banks] will not take medications if there’s not a court
order.” The court found that due to his mental illness, Banks “lacks the insight …
to fully appreciate and be able to apply an understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of medication for his diagnoses. Again, because his position is, [‘]I
don’t need medications.[’]” The court noted that it was “the procedural history”
that Banks was “charged” in relation to his 2014 driving incident, he “entered a
not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect [plea] in those criminal
proceedings,” and the matter was ultimately converted to this WIS. STAT. ch. 51
commitment. The court found, based on the 2014 driving incident, that there was
clear and convincing evidence that if his treatment were withdrawn, Banks “would
be a danger to himself and others.”

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

¶16 The circuit court entered orders extending Banks’ involuntary
commitment and involuntary medication and treatment, and Banks appeals.

Discussion

¶17 An individual is a proper subject for recommitment under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1) if the County proves by clear and convincing evidence that the
individual is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous. See
Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶31, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277;
§ 51.20(13)(e). Banks does not dispute he is mentally ill and a proper subject for
treatment. He insists, however, the court erred in concluding the County met its
burden to prove he is dangerous. We do not disturb a circuit court’s findings of
fact “unless they are clearly erroneous,” and we accept all reasonable inferences
from those facts. Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶38, 349
Wis. 2d 148, 833 N.W.2d 607. We review de novo, however, whether the
statutory standard of dangerous has been met. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶47 (“A
determination of dangerousness is not a factual determination, but a legal one
based on underlying facts.”).

¶18 Banks also claims the circuit court erred in concluding the County
met its burden under WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4.b. to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he is incompetent to refuse medication. See WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(13)(e). “In evaluating whether the County met its burden of proof, a court
must apply facts to the statutory standard in ... § 51.61(1)(g)4.b. and interpret the
statute. Applying facts to the standard and interpreting the statute are questions of
law that this court reviews independently.” Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶39.

¶19 Lastly, Banks claims the circuit court erred when it permitted case
manager Townsend to testify over Banks’ hearsay objection. We will uphold a

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

circuit court’s evidentiary ruling unless it erroneously exercised its discretion.
State v. Reinwand, 2019 WI 25, ¶17, 385 Wis. 2d 700, 924 N.W.2d 184.

Recommitment Order

¶20 Banks first asserts the County failed to prove a substantial likelihood
he would “become dangerous” if treatment were withdrawn. He so claims
because the County provided “no direct witnesses” to his conduct of engaging in a
high speed chase with police in 2014. We are unmoved, as according to
Bjerregaard’s accepted testimony, Banks himself admitted to the conduct, telling
Bjerregaard he “thought he could elude them, so he sped up and tried to elude the
police and hide from them.” And Bjerregaard noted in his report that Banks told
him, “I did run from the police but they caught me [and] handcuffed me,”
eventually taking him to jail. Further related to Banks’ dangerousness,
Bjerregaard also wrote in his report, “Dangerous driving eluding police [and]
travelling at high speeds possibly into oncoming traffic when off medicine—now
hopes to stop medicine ASAP which would place him at risk for again engaging in
dangerous behavior.” Bjerregaard also noted that Banks is “paranoid about the
police.” Bjerregaard testified that Banks “is dangerous to others,” expounding that
“if he stops his medication, … he will become more disorganized in his thinking
and engage in dangerous behavior again” and agreed “there’s a substantial
probability of physical harm to [Banks] himself and to others.” Moreover, we
note the following from our March 20, 2024 opinion related to Banks’ last
recommitment:

[T]he [circuit] court made clear that the substantial
probability of harm to Banks himself and others was
Banks’ “extremely dangerous” precommitment conduct of
“[d]riving a vehicle, fleeing from police” that “puts not
only [Banks] in danger but also everybody in the
community that happens to be on the road in the area where

9
No. 2024AP2078-FT

somebody is fleeing.” Engaging in a high speed chase with
police is unquestionably dangerous conduct that places
Banks and others in danger.

C.B., No. 2023AP2018-FT, ¶22 (third and fourth alterations in original; emphasis
added). Thus, we have already determined that Banks’ 2014 conduct—the very
conduct underpinning the current recommitment; conduct which is historical and
incapable of changing—was “unquestionably dangerous.”5 Banks’ questioning as
to whether the 2014 high speed chase with police incident was dangerous goes
nowhere.

¶21 Banks also suggests the circuit court’s order for recommitment is
wanting because there is no “proof of dangerousness before or after that single act
of criminal misconduct.” But, Banks points to no law and develops no legal
argument supporting his suggestion that the recommitment order is infirm because
there are purportedly no subsequent acts of dangerousness. Indeed, as thoroughly
recognized by our statutes and case law, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am) takes into
account that a committee may not have exhibited dangerousness since receiving
medication under commitment specifically because the commitment and
medication orders are working. See Portage County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶19,
386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509 (“[Paragraph 51.20(1)(am)] recognizes that an
individual receiving treatment may not have exhibited any recent overt acts or
omissions demonstrating dangerousness because the treatment ameliorated such
behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn, there may be a substantial likelihood

5
We further noted in our March 20, 2024 opinion that “at Banks’ prior recommitment
hearing, held one year earlier and with the same judge presiding, Banks stipulated to his
recommitment—which necessarily means he stipulated to his dangerousness—and the circuit
court determined Banks dangerous pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b., concluding he
evidenced “a substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals.” C.B.,
No. 2023AP2018-FT, ¶24 n.7.

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

such behavior would recur.”). That is precisely what Bjerregaard testified to in
this case, agreeing that Banks had displayed no incidents of dangerousness since
his commitment began but adding “[b]ecause he’s under court-ordered
medication.”

¶22 Lastly, Banks asserts the recommitment order is founded on
“speculative inferences.” For example, he calls it speculation that Banks “would
probably cease taking his medication” if his commitment lapsed and would then
“potentially decompensate.” The evidence provided the circuit court much more
certainty on these points.

¶23 Both Bjerregaard and Townsend testified to near certainty that
Banks would “cease taking his medication” if the commitment was not extended.
Bjerregaard stated that Banks “has no intention of continuing medication if he’s
not under a court order for medication,” “hope[d] to stop the medication as soon as
possible,” and unambiguously expressed his firm belief that he has no mental
illness and relatedly stated, “I don’t need any medicine.” And Townsend stated
Banks “said that medications weren’t helpful because he didn’t have a mental
illness” and “if the order was to end, he would no longer take medications.” She
agreed that this has been his position “since 2015.”

¶24 As to the likelihood of decompensation, Bjerregaard testified that
Banks has been able to “maintain[] himself outside the hospital” and has not done
anything dangerous since the original incident in 2014 “[b]ecause he’s under
court-ordered medication.” (Emphasis added.) Bjerregaard stated that “if [Banks]
stops his medication,” he “will become more disorganized in his thinking and
engage in dangerous behavior again” and relatedly agreed “there’s a substantial
probability of physical harm to himself and to others.” (Emphasis added.)

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

Townsend also testified that if Banks failed to take his medication, it “would result
in him becoming symptomatic, which would most likely result in him engaging in
behaviors that put himself and the community at risk.”6

¶25 As we have stated, neither WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a) nor case law

requires an expert or circuit court to speculate on the
precise course of an individual’s impending
decompensation by identifying specific future dangerous
acts or omissions the individual might theoretically
undertake without treatment…. Dangerousness in an
extension proceeding can and often must be based on the
individual’s precommitment behavior, coupled with an
expert’s informed opinions and predictions.

Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶13, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d
761. The circuit court relied on far more than “speculative inferences.” The
evidence before the court firmly supports its finding that if the commitment and
medication and treatment orders are not extended, Banks would cease taking the
necessary medications, creating a substantial probability he would decompensate
and again engage in dangerous conduct.

Medication Order

¶26 Banks additionally contends the evidence presented at the hearing
was insufficient to support the involuntary medication order under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.61(1)(g)4. because he did not receive from Bjerregaard a “sufficient” or
“reasonable” “explanation of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to
psychotropic medication.” We conclude the County provided sufficient evidence
in support of the medication order.
6
While Banks’ counsel objected to this testimony on grounds of “[s]peculation,” the
circuit court overruled that objection, and Banks does not challenge that ruling on appeal.

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

¶27 “[U]nder WIS. STAT. § 51.61, a person has the right to refuse
medication unless a court determines that the person is incompetent to make such
a decision.” Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148, ¶53. As relevant to this case, the
County establishes a person’s incompetency to refuse medication by proving by
clear and convincing evidence that due to mental illness

and after the advantages and disadvantages of and
alternatives to accepting the particular medication ... have
been explained to the individual, …:

….

b. The individual is substantially incapable of applying
an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and
alternatives to his ... mental illness ... in order to make an
informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse
medication or treatment.

See § 51.61(1)(g)3., 4.; WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(e). Banks claims the evidence was
insufficient to support the medication order because Bjerregaard failed to identify
in his testimony “a specific medication” and because the evidence did not provide
“explanatory detail as to what side effects, what alternatives, and when and how
that conversation [between Banks and Bjerregaard] had occurred.” Banks’ claims
fail.

¶28 As to not identifying “a specific medication,” Banks apparently
missed where Bjerregaard explained in his testimony that Banks is “on three
different antipsychotic medications. One is an injectable, Invega Hafyere, that he
gets every six months. Then he’s on two oral antipsychotics, Risperidone and
[Seroquel].”

¶29 As to “explanatory detail” on “side effects,” “alternatives” and
“when and how the conversation had occurred,” we look to the requirements of the
statute, not the stricter bar Banks would like to impose. The statute allows for a

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

medication order if “after the advantages and disadvantages of and alternatives to
accepting the particular medication … have been explained to the individual …
[t]he individual is substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the
advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his ... mental illness ... in order to
make an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or
treatment.” See WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4. The circuit court here found by clear
and convincing evidence that Bjerregaard had explained the advantages,
disadvantages and alternatives to Banks and that due to his mental illness, Banks
was substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the same to his mental
illness so as to be able to make an informed choice on accepting or refusing
medication. The evidence supports these findings.

¶30 In his report, Bjerregaard identified that he “explain[ed] [to Banks]
the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to the recommended medication.”
Bjerregaard handwrote that he “explained” that the advantages were
“[d]ecrease[d] fears, anxiety, [and] confusion,” the disadvantages were
“[s]edation, weight gain, [and] movement disorder,” and the alternatives were
“[o]ther antipsychotics.” As to an additional disadvantage of which Banks was
obviously aware, Bjerregaard testified that Banks’ “only complaint with the
medication is that it’s painful when he gets the injection and that’s every six
months.” In further support of the circuit court’s findings, Bjerregaard testified
that Banks is “able to discuss the medication and its uses” but “has no insight,”
believes he has no mental illness and therefore no need for any medication, and he
would stop taking the medication as soon as possible. Banks asserts that
Bjerregaard did not say “when and how” his medication conversation with Banks
had occurred, but Bjerregaard did make this clear, as he stated at the start of his

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

testimony that he was testifying with regard to his in-person interaction with
Banks on April 29, 2024.

¶31 As he similarly claimed in connection with his prior recommitment,
C.B., No. 2023AP2018-FT, ¶33, Banks states that Bjerregaard’s explanation of the
disadvantages to Banks was “woefully insufficient” because it did not include
additional side effects purportedly associated with Invega Hafyera, Risperdal and
Seroquel. Related to Invega Hafyera, Banks refers us to a website for the drug
manufacturer that provides a laundry list of potential side effects. For Risperdal
and Seroquel, he directs us to a Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS)
form that lists various potential side effects.

¶32 To begin, Banks’ complaint in this regard goes nowhere as he raises
it for the first time on appeal. See Brooks v. Hayes, 133 Wis. 2d 228, 241, 395
N.W.2d 167 (1986) (“[We] will not consider arguments raised for the first time on
appeal.”). Banks could have, but did not, argue these points to the circuit court at
the final hearing—particularly in light of the fact that our March 20, 2024 opinion,
issued two months before the May 17, 2024 hearing underpinning the instant
orders, rejected this very argument in part because he failed to raise it before the
circuit court. See C.B., No. 2023AP2018-FT, ¶33. Moreover, Banks directs us to
no legal support and develops no legal argument for his apparent contention that a
doctor’s explanation of disadvantages—or advantages or alternatives for that
matter—related to medications is legally insufficient if it does not address every
possible side effect identified by a drug company, DHS, or some other source a
committee might refer a court to.

¶33 Somewhat relatedly, Banks also complains that as to alternatives,
Bjerregaard testified to only explaining to Banks alternatives of “other”

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

antipsychotics, and not discussing “[c]ounseling or other forms of therapy.” First,
we do not consider this argument either, as it is insufficiently developed—only
two sentences address it, see Clean Wisconsin, Inc. v. PSC, 2005 WI 93, ¶180
n.40, 282 Wis. 2d 250, 700 N.W.2d 768 (“We will not address undeveloped
arguments.”)—and Banks provides no legal support for his apparent position that a
discussion of “[c]ounseling or other forms of therapy” is required for a sufficient
explanation of alternatives. Moreover, he also raises this argument for the first
time on appeal and therefore has forfeited it as well. It would have taken little for
Banks to question Bjerregaard about this at the hearing or raise it in argument to
the circuit court to contend the County had not met its burden, but he did neither.
As for sufficiency of the evidence, Bjerregaard testified that he explained to Banks
that “other antipsychotics” were the “alternatives to accepting the recommended
medication[s]” he is on, and that is sufficient. See WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)4.
Additionally, because Banks did not raise this issue during the final hearing, there
is no evidence in the record to suggest there were any other realistic treatment
alternatives for Banks, especially in light of his complete and consistent denial that
he even has a mental illness.

¶34 In asserting that Bjerregaard’s explanation to Banks was insufficient,
Banks directs us to our recent decision in State v. J.D.B., 2024 WI App 61, ___
Wis. 2d ___, 13 N.W.3d 525. But our determination in that case that the doctor’s
explanations to J.D.B. of the advantages of, disadvantages of, and alternatives to
medications were inadequate was largely driven by “our conclusion that Jared’s
treatment plan [to restore him to competency for trial on a criminal charge] was
not adequately individualized to him.” Id., ¶71. There is no such circumstance
here. Banks further points to our statements in J.D.B. that it was the doctor’s
“responsibility to explain how he probed the issue of why Jared did not believe he

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

needed medication. Probing this issue was necessary for the circuit court to
determine if Jared’s lack of understanding was ‘because of mental illness’ as
required by the statute and not some other cause.” Id., ¶70. Banks claims the
record here does not show sufficient “probing”; however, Bjerregaard and
Townsend both made abundantly clear “why [Banks] d[oes] not believe he need[s]
medication,” testifying that it is because he does not believe he has a mental
illness, and that Banks directly and continuously restates this position. Moreover,
Townsend testified that this has been Banks’ position since his commitment began
in 2015. And as to whether Banks’ inability to apply an understanding was
“because of mental illness,” Bjerregaard made clear in both his testimony and his
report that the “cause” of this inability was Banks’ “mental illness.” No additional
probing was needed here.

Hearsay

¶35 Banks claims the commitment order should be reversed if for no
other reason than the circuit court permitted Townsend to present hearsay
testimony, over Banks’ objection, related to Banks’ underlying 2014 conduct that
led to his initial commitment; specifically, that she was allowed to testify that
Banks’ original commitment was because he “had stolen the vehicle and when
police tried to stop him, he drove into oncoming traffic.” We need not decide if
the court erred, because even if it did, such error was harmless.

¶36 In his testimony, Bjerregaard agreed that he “discuss[ed] with
[Banks] the circumstances that led to the original commitment,” and Bjerregaard
immediately thereafter testified that Banks “recalls being accused of speeding and
driving into oncoming traffic in a car that he had stolen. And that the police
fought him and beat him up, brought [him] to the ER and then to jail.” When

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

asked if Banks “mention[ed] … what occurred when the police tried to apprehend
him,” Bjerregaard responded, “[Y]eah, he recalls that he thought he could elude
them, so he sped up and tried to elude the police and hide from them.” When
testifying about his concern that Banks would be dangerous if he stopped taking
medication, Bjerregaard testified to his belief that Banks “will … engage in
dangerous behavior again. Possibly stealing another car.”

¶37 Additionally, Bjerregaard’s report indicates Banks’ dangerous
behavior was “[d]angerous driving eluding police [and] travelling at high speeds
possibly into oncoming traffic when off medicine,” and includes Bjerregaard’s
notations of “[h]istory of dangerous driving” and a “[h]istory of driving into
oncoming traffic.” The report states that Banks recalled to Bjerregaard “police
‘saying I drove into oncoming traffic—I did run from the police but they caught
me [and] handcuffed me.[’]” The circuit court had no concerns regarding
Bjerregaard’s credibility, and Bjerregaard stated essentially the same factual
background of Banks’ dangerous driving conduct that Townsend testified to.
Thus, Townsend’s testimony added nothing consequential in this regard—
Bjerregaard explained that the underlying allegations of dangerousness by Banks
in 2014 related to him stealing a car, attempting to elude police through a high
speed chase, and driving into oncoming traffic.

¶38 Further, in our March 20, 2024 decision, we noted that in discussing
Banks’ 2014 driving behavior at the final hearing related to that 2024 decision, the
circuit court—the same judge presiding as at the final hearing in the instant case—
stated that Banks’ 2014 “[d]riving a vehicle, fleeing from police … puts not only
[Banks] in danger but also everybody in the community that happens to be on the
road in the area where somebody is fleeing” and thus was “extremely dangerous”
conduct. C.B., No. 2023AP2018-FT, ¶22 (alterations in original). We added that

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No. 2024AP2078-FT

“[e]ngaging in a high speed chase with police is unquestionably dangerous
conduct that places Banks and others in danger.” Id. Thus, whether Banks
actually drove into oncoming traffic was not a fact necessary for the circuit
court’s, or our, conclusion that Banks’ 2014 driving conduct was dangerous.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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