Tracy Dinkmeyer v. Shawn Force

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 3, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP145 Cir. Ct. No. 2023CV437

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

TRACY DINKMEYER,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

SHAWN FORCE,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Wood County:
NICHOLAS J. BRAZEAU, JR., Judge. Affirmed.

Before Graham, Nashold, and Taylor, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Shawn Force appeals a harassment injunction
issued on the petition of Tracy Dinkmeyer. The main issue is whether Force had
No. 2024AP145

sufficient contact with the State of Wisconsin for the circuit court to have personal
jurisdiction over him. We conclude that there was sufficient contact, and we
affirm.

¶2 Dinkmeyer petitioned on November 6, 2023, for the harassment
injunction under WIS. STAT. § 813.125 (2023-24).1 The petition provided an
Arizona address for Force. The petition alleged that on November 4, 2023, a
police officer showed Dinkmeyer a transcript of a telephone call Force made to the
county human services agency, during which he stated that he would be coming to
Wisconsin with his gun to get their son.

¶3 The circuit court granted a temporary restraining order, to be served
on Force in Arizona. Force moved to dismiss the petition due to lack of personal
jurisdiction. In the motion, he argued, among other things, that it would violate
due process for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, because he
lacked sufficient contacts with Wisconsin.

¶4 At the harassment injunction hearing, the circuit court heard
testimony by Dinkmeyer and considered her exhibits. As relevant to the issue on
appeal, she testified, consistently with the above allegation, as to what she was
told about Force’s call to the county agency, although she said that November 3,
2023, was the date that she was shown the description of the call. She testified
that, at 3:00 p.m. on November 6, 2023, the day she filed the petition, Force texted
her asking for her address. She also testified that on the day after she filed the
petition, the principal of their child’s school told her that Force “had called the

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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school a number of times between Saturday, November 4, and Tuesday,
November 7.”

¶5 The circuit court granted the harassment injunction against Force. In
doing so, the court concluded that it had personal jurisdiction on the ground that
Force’s action of contacting the county agency was part of an ongoing pattern of
harassment of the petitioner, who currently resided in Wisconsin, and that in doing
so Force had indirect communication with the petitioner through the agency and
the police officer, in which Force indicated a threat to the physical health or safety
of the petitioner. Force appeals.

¶6 Determination of personal jurisdiction is a two-part test. In the first
part, the court determines whether the state’s long-arm jurisdiction statute has
been satisfied. CITGO Petrol. Corp. v. MTI Connect, LLC, 2020 WI App 57,
¶16, 394 Wis. 2d 126, 949 N.W.2d 577. In the second part of the test, if the long-
arm statute has been satisfied, the court considers whether it is constitutional to
exercise personal jurisdiction on these facts. Id. This part of the test has
additional subparts that we will describe below.

¶7 In this case, the circuit court found that the long-arm statute was
satisfied. Although the court’s conclusion as to personal jurisdiction that we
described above did not identify any specific law that the court was applying, its
language shows that it was applying the long-arm statute that relates specifically to
harassment injunctions, WIS. STAT. § 801.05(11m).2

2
WISCONSIN STAT. § 801.05(11m) provides:

(11m) CERTAIN RESTRAINING ORDERS OR INJUNCTIONS.

(continued)

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¶8 This statute provides for specific personal jurisdiction, based on the
facts related to the claim, rather than general jurisdiction based on, for example,
the defendant’s residency in the state. See CITGO, 394 Wis. 2d 126, ¶17

(a) Subject to subch. II of [WIS. STAT.] ch. 822, and in
addition to personal jurisdiction under [WIS. STAT. §§ 801.05(1)
and 801.06], in any action filed pursuant to [WIS. STAT.
§§ ] 813.12, 813.122, 813.123 or 813.125, if any of the following
apply:

1. Subject to par. (b), an act or threat of the respondent
giving rise to the petition occurred outside the state and is part of
an ongoing pattern of harassment that has an adverse effect on
the petitioner or a member of the petitioner’s family or
household, and the petitioner resides in this state.

2. Subject to par. (b), the petitioner or a member of the
petitioner’s family or household has sought safety or protection
in this state as a result of an act or threat of the respondent giving
rise to the petition.

3. Personal jurisdiction is permissible under the
constitution of the United States or of the state of Wisconsin.

(b) Paragraph (a)1. or 2. applies if, while the petitioner
or a member of the petitioner’s family or household resides or is
temporarily living in this state, the respondent has had direct or
indirect communication with the petitioner or a member of the
petitioner’s family or household or if the respondent has
indicated a threat to the physical health or safety of the petitioner
or of a member of the petitioner’s family or household. A
communication or indication for the purpose of this paragraph
includes communication through mail, telephone, electronic
message or transmittal, and posting on an electronic
communication site, web page, or other electronic medium.
Communication on any electronic medium that is generally
available to any individual residing in this state is sufficient to
exercise jurisdiction under par. (a)1. or 2.

(c) If a court has personal jurisdiction pursuant to
para. (a) and a respondent has been served but does not appear or
does not file a response or motion asserting the defense of lack
of personal jurisdiction, the court shall hear the action. This
paragraph does not limit the respondent’s right to challenge
personal jurisdiction on appeal.

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(explaining that there are two types of personal jurisdiction, and that specific
jurisdiction exists when the action before the court arises from or relates to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state and only exists when the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state directly relate to the challenged conduct or
transaction).

¶9 On appeal, Force argues that the long-arm statute was not satisfied
because Dinkmeyer did not prove that there was an “adverse effect on the
petitioner or a member of the petitioner’s family or household,” as required by
WIS. STAT. § 801.05(11m)(a)1. Although the circuit court did not expressly find
that an adverse effect occurred, it is reasonable to infer from the undisputed
circumstances that Force’s threat caused Dinkmeyer to have fear and anxiety.
Force did not argue in the circuit court, and does not argue now, that these feelings
were not present, or that they were not an “adverse effect.”

¶10 Force also addresses the second part of the test, which, as stated, is
whether it is constitutional to exercise personal jurisdiction on these facts.
CITGO, 394 Wis. 2d 126, ¶16. This is a question of law that we review de novo.
Id. Here, the circuit court did not perform a constitutional analysis or otherwise
address Force’s due process argument.

¶11 When addressing whether personal jurisdiction is constitutional in
the context of specific personal jurisdiction, the inquiry focuses on the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Id., ¶20. For a state to
exercise this jurisdiction consistently with due process, the defendant’s suit-related
conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum state. Id. Such a
determination involves three steps:

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(1) identify the contacts the defendant has with the
forum; (2) analyze whether these contacts meet
constitutional minimums and whether exercising
jurisdiction on the basis of these minimum contacts
sufficiently comports with fairness and justice; [and]
(3) determine whether the sufficient minimum contacts, if
any, arise out of or are related to the causes of action
involved in the suit.

Id., ¶21 (alteration in original).

¶12 Applying the first step here, we identify the following contacts. The
circuit court found that Force made one telephone call to a county agency in
Wisconsin. In addition, petitioner Dinkmeyer testified that Force texted her
asking for her address on the day that she filed the injunction petition, and that she
was told by a school official that Force contacted the school over a period of
several days before and after Dinkmeyer filed the petition.

¶13 We pass over the second step for the moment and turn next to the
third step, whether these contacts are related to the cause of action in the suit. This
is easily answered in the affirmative, because it is the content and nature of these
telecommunication contacts on which the injunction claim is based.

¶14 As for the second step of the test, this is the core of the constitutional
analysis. This core itself has two parts, the first of which is whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts in the forum. Salfinger v. Fairfax
Media, Ltd., 2016 WI App 17, ¶22, 367 Wis. 2d 311, 876 N.W.2d 160. To have
minimum contacts, the defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state
must be such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there. Id.,
¶23. There must be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws, and this requirement has become the primary

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focus of the minimum contacts analysis. Id. The “‘purposeful availment’
requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as
a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” CITGO, 394 Wis. 2d
126, ¶19 (quoted source omitted).

¶15 Force argues that minimum contacts are not present because he did
not communicate with Dinkmeyer directly, but through a third party, and personal
jurisdiction cannot be based solely on his contact with persons who reside in
Wisconsin. He relies on the following passage from Wisconsin case law:

At the outset of our due process analysis, we note
that the United States Supreme Court has recently reiterated
that when addressing minimum contacts in the context of
specific jurisdiction, the inquiry of whether a state may
exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
focuses on the relationship between the defendant, the
forum State, and the litigation. Walden v. Fiore, [571 U.S.
277, 283] (2014). More specifically, Walden confirms that
the relationship between the defendant and the forum State
“must arise out of contacts that the ‘defendant himself’
creates with the forum State,” and also notes that the
United States Supreme Court has “consistently rejected
attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum
contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the
plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.” Id. [at
284]. “Put simply, however significant the plaintiff’s
contacts with the forum may be, those contacts cannot be
‘decisive in determining whether the defendant’s due
process rights are violated.’” Id. [at 285]. Moreover, the
“‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the defendant’s
contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s
contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. “[T]he
defendant’s conduct … must form the necessary connection
with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction
over him.” Id.

Salfinger, 367 Wis. 2d 311, ¶24 (last alteration in original).

¶16 Regarding third parties, Force misapplies this passage. The case
states that personal jurisdiction cannot be based on contact between the plaintiff or

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third parties and the forum state, here, Wisconsin. This passage means that
personal jurisdiction over Force cannot be based on the contacts between
Dinkmeyer or the agency and Wisconsin. In other words, even if the plaintiff or a
third party has a close connection with Wisconsin, that is not decisive in deciding
whether the nonresident defendant has sufficient contacts. This passage does not
say that personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant cannot be obtained
based on contacts that the defendant has with the plaintiff or a third party in
Wisconsin.

¶17 We conclude that Force also misinterprets the statement in Salfinger
that the analysis looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state itself, and
not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there. We acknowledge that,
on its face, this appears to say that personal jurisdiction cannot be based on a
nonresident defendant’s contacts with persons who reside in the forum state,
which is the sole basis claimed here for personal jurisdiction over Force.
However, a review of the Walden case being discussed in Salfinger suggests that
this would be too broad an interpretation.

¶18 The United States Supreme Court itself summarized and applied
Walden in a later case:

In that case, a Georgia police officer working at an Atlanta
airport searched, and seized money from, two Nevada
residents before they embarked on a flight to Las Vegas.
The victims of the search sued the officer in Nevada,
arguing that their alleged injury (their inability to use the
seized money) occurred in the State in which they lived.
This Court held the exercise of jurisdiction in Nevada
improper even though “the plaintiff[s] experienced [the]
effect[s]” of the officer’s conduct there. According to
[petitioner], our ruling shows that a plaintiff’s residence
and place of injury can never support jurisdiction. See
Brief for Petitioner 32. And without those facts,

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[petitioner] concludes, the basis for jurisdiction crumbles
here as well.

But Walden has precious little to do with the cases
before us. In Walden, only the plaintiffs had any contacts
with the State of Nevada; the defendant-officer had never
taken any act to “form[] a contact” of his own. The officer
had “never traveled to, conducted activities within,
contacted anyone in, or sent anything or anyone to
Nevada.” So to use the language of our doctrinal test: He
had not “purposefully avail[ed himself] of the privilege of
conducting activities” in the forum State.

Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 370-71
(2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Walden 271 U.S. 289-90; and then
quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In summary, the Walden
plaintiffs may have been residents of the forum state of Nevada, but the
defendant’s actions against them, which occurred in a different state, were not
alleged to have had any other connection to Nevada.

¶19 With this understanding of the reasoning in Walden, we return to the
Court’s statement in that opinion that “‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with
persons who reside there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. In Walden, the officer’s
actions in Georgia did not create jurisdiction in Nevada merely because the officer
was interacting with persons who resided in Nevada. Instead, “[a] forum State’s
exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state intentional tortfeasor must be based on
intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the necessary contacts with the
forum.” Id. at 286. As applied to our current case, we understand this to mean
that Dinkmeyer’s and the agency’s residence in Wisconsin are not enough to give
Wisconsin jurisdiction. However, more is present here, because Force directed his
communications to them while they were in Wisconsin, thus establishing a
substantial contact with the state. This is in contrast to Walden, in which the

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plaintiffs were not in their home state of Nevada when the defendant engaged in
the acts that were the source of the claim.

¶20 Accordingly, we conclude that Force’s telephone and text contacts
were sufficient minimum contacts. The nature of the contacts was such that he
could reasonably have anticipated being haled into court in Wisconsin. The
telephone call to the agency was not random, fortuitous, or attenuated, but was
instead an intentional act of communication conveying a threat to a person who
both resided in, and was actually located in, Wisconsin, through the medium of a
local government agency. And in the text message to Dinkmeyer, Force’s contact
was seeking to obtain information that could be used in following through on the
threat.

¶21 If minimum contacts exist, we then consider the defendant’s forum-
state contacts in light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.
Salfinger, 367 Wis. 2d 311, ¶22. There are five factors to this analysis:

(1) the quantity of the defendant’s contacts with the State;
(2) the nature and quality of the defendant’s contacts with
the State; (3) the source and connection of the cause of
action with those contacts; (4) the interests of Wisconsin in
the action; and (5) the convenience to the parties of
employing a Wisconsin forum.

Id.

¶22 In this case, the quantity of Force’s contacts with the state were few,
and this factor is arguably in his favor. However, the nature and quality of the
contacts are that Force contacted an agency in the state and made a statement
about his future conduct in the state that included an implied threat of violence in
the state for the purpose of taking custody of his child who resided in the state.

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Although this contact was from a distance, and without a physical presence in the
state, this was not casual contact, but was very specifically directed. And, the
contact is very closely connected to the source of the claim.

¶23 In addition, Wisconsin has a strong interest in protecting its residents
from threats made by nonresidents, especially when the threat is for the
nonresident to come to the state to act. Finally, the factor of convenience to the
parties does not point in either direction. It is inconvenient for either party to
litigate in the other state, but the inconvenience was reduced by Force making his
appearance in this case by telecommunications rather than in person. Viewing all
of these factors together, we are satisfied that it comports with fair play and
substantial justice for the court to have personal jurisdiction over Force.

¶24 We turn next to the remainder of Force’s arguments. Force’s brief
contains several references to the First Amendment, and asserts that his speech in
this case was protected by that amendment. However, beyond that, the brief does
not cite any applicable case law or otherwise develop a legal argument that is
specific to the facts of this case. This court need not address undeveloped
arguments, and we do not further address this point. See State v. Pettit, 171
Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶25 Force’s brief also contains passages asserting that the circuit court
and the police officer improperly assisted Dinkmeyer by advocating on her behalf
in this case. These arguments are not sufficiently supported by the record or
applicable law. Other passages discuss whether Dinkmeyer is in violation of child
custody orders in New York. These are also not well supported and, moreover,
are not relevant to the issues on appeal.

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¶26 In Dinkmeyer’s brief, she asks for a finding that this appeal is
frivolous under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3). However, we are not permitted to
grant that relief unless the respondent files a separate motion seeking that relief,
which Dinkmeyer has not done. Howell v. Denomie, 2005 WI 81, ¶19, 282
Wis. 2d 130, 698 N.W.2d 621. Therefore, we do not consider the request further.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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