Eagle Spring Lake Management District v. Steven Q. Wruck

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 2, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP447 Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV1294

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

EAGLE SPRING LAKE MANAGEMENT DISTRICT,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

STEVEN Q. WRUCK,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
MICHAEL J. APRAHAMIAN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP447

¶1 PER CURIAM. Steven Q. Wruck appeals from an order granting a
motion for summary judgment filed by Eagle Spring Lake Management District
(the “District”) and denying his motion for summary judgment. The circuit court
granted summary judgment to the District after concluding that a settlement
agreement (the “Agreement”) entered into by Wruck and the District to resolve a
prior lawsuit was enforceable and not subject to reformation. In this appeal,
Wruck argues that the Agreement is not enforceable due to a lack of definiteness
in its terms. In addition, Wruck contends that the court erred in declining to
equitably apportion the cost of a study to be performed under the Agreement. For
the reasons explained below, we reject Wruck’s arguments and affirm the order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Wruck owns three parcels of land on or near Eagle Spring Lake in
Waukesha County. A portion of Wruck’s lakefront property forms part of what is
known as the Kroll Dam. The District owns a parcel that abuts Wruck’s land and
forms the other half of the Kroll Dam. Approximately one-quarter mile north of
the Kroll Dam along the lakeshore sits the Wambold Dam. Wruck refers to the
stretch of lakeshore that includes the two dams as the Wambold Milldam
Complex. According to Wruck, “approximately 330 property owners in the
District … enjoy the lake and are subject to taxation by the District.”

¶3 In 2015, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
notified Wruck that his parcels were subject to periodic maintenance and repair
under WIS. STAT. § 31.18 (2023-24).1 Wruck subsequently filed a lawsuit against

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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the District and the DNR asserting various claims, including a claim seeking a
declaratory judgment as to the District’s maintenance obligation with respect to
Wruck’s half of the Kroll Dam. The parties participated in a mediation in
November 2019 that resulted in the Agreement at issue in this case. In addition to
Wruck, Peter Jensen, the District’s President, attended the mediation.

¶4 The Agreement contains the following seven substantive paragraphs:

1. Hold litigation in abeyance only as to Declaratory
judgment/injunctive relief in claim 1; dismissal of
claims 2-10 and withdrawal of sanctions, both w[ith]
prejudice.

2. [Wruck] to have a dam failure analysis performed after
receiving previous dam failure analysis from the Eagle
lake management district.

3. After review of the Dam Analysis by District and its
engineers and DNR parties agree to assess liability of
exposure attributable to the Wruck portion of the dam.

4. If appropriate parties would agree to negotiate in good
faith relative to a purchase or maintenance agreement of
the Wruck land encumbered by the dam.

5. DNR to stake the length of the dam on the Wruck
property within a reasonable period of time from
today’s date to allow for the dam failure analysis to be
performed.

6. Reconvene mediation with [the mediator] as soon as the
above is accomplished.

7. Wruck agrees to work in good faith with his lender to
transfer the “mill race lands” as identified in the
complaint to the District. The cost of preparation and
recording shall be the sole responsibility of FNTIC. In
exchange, the parties agree to review the title/deed for
Wruck and update the same to the extent necessary.

The following language appears at the end of the Agreement: “That this
[A]greement is final and binding upon any and all parties to this matter, as well as

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their heirs, successors, and assigns, and is enforceable in any court of law of
general jurisdiction per [WIS. STAT. §] 904.085[.]”

¶5 Following mediation, the District provided Wruck with the previous
dam failure analysis the DNR had approved in 2002. According to an August 5,
2020 letter from the DNR to Wruck and the District, the parties asked the DNR in
March 2020 to “re-evaluate the Dam Failure Analysis (DFA) on file because it
assumed a failure of the Wambold Dam …. The question at hand was whether the
DFA needed to be revised to also assume a failure of the [Kroll Dam].” In the
August 2020 letter, the DNR informed Wruck and the District that certain data
upon which the 2002 dam failure analysis was based had become outdated in light
of data on “100-year discharges and flood elevations” for Eagle Spring Lake from
a 2014 flood insurance study. “These results,” the DNR wrote,

indicate that flows and flood elevations in the effective
[flood insurance study] are considerably higher than the
results in the DFA, and have invalidated the DFA results
currently on file. As a result, the DFA will need to be
re-studied and the spillway capacity of the Wambold
Dam will need to be re-evaluated.

The DNR instructed the parties to resubmit a dam failure analysis which would,
among other things, “need to identify the most probable mode of failure, assessing
both [the Wambold Dam and the Kroll Dam].”

¶6 Wruck did not obtain a new failure analysis, and the parties were
unable to move forward with other aspects of the Agreement. In September 2021,
the District commenced this action against Wruck, asserting quiet title and breach
of contract claims premised on Wruck’s alleged failure to transfer the “mill race
lands” to the District as required under paragraph 7 of the Agreement. In its
complaint, the District alleged that Wruck had not completed the transfer because

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he “hoped that the District would decide to purchase [his lakefront property] to
resolve all claims between the parties.”

¶7 In April 2022, Wruck’s engineer wrote to the District seeking its
“preliminary agreement” to purchase the portion of Wruck’s property that was
ultimately determined to be part of the Kroll Dam. The District declined this
request in a May 9, 2022 letter, noting that Wruck had “failed to complete items
previously agreed to in [the A]greement” which had caused the District to sue him
“to force compliance with the [A]greement.”

¶8 Shortly thereafter, Wruck filed an answer to the District’s complaint.
The answer included, as an affirmative defense, allegations that the Agreement
failed because the parties mistakenly believed that the 2002 dam failure analysis
remained valid and “because of the District’s indefinite and illusory promises that
it would act in good faith toward purchasing Mr. Wruck’s dam parcel” or assume
responsibility for maintaining it. Wruck also asserted a counterclaim, “in the
alternative to the court ruling [that] the … [A]greement is unenforceable as
written,” seeking equitable reformation of the Agreement based upon the parties’
alleged mutual mistake concerning the continuing validity of the 2002 dam failure
analysis. Wruck asked the court to “equitably apportion the dam failure analysis
expense among the property owners affected.”

¶9 In December 2022, Wruck and the District stipulated to the dismissal
of the District’s claims without prejudice in exchange for Wruck delivering to the
District a deed to transfer the “mill race lands.” The stipulation left only Wruck’s
counterclaim seeking equitable reformation and apportionment of the cost of the
dam failure analysis in the case.

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¶10 Both parties filed summary judgment motions. In his motion,
Wruck argued that the parties’ mutual mistake regarding the validity of the 2002
dam failure analysis and Wruck’s ability to “obtain a dam failure analysis solely
over his dam parcel” warranted equitable reformation of the Agreement to “spread
the cost of the dam failure analysis among the 330 lake property owners.” In an
affidavit supporting his motion, Wruck asserted that Jensen made the following
statements at mediation:

Mr. Jensen explained that the District had performed a dam
failure analysis in approximately the year 2000 which the
DNR had approved [in 2002]. Mr. Jensen advised that the
District would not take on the liability of my part of the
dam without the DNR agreeing to extend its year 200[2]
dam failure analysis. Mr. Jensen offered to provide a copy
of the District’s dam failure analysis flood mapping to
allow me to apply to the DNR to extend the failure
analysis over my dam parcel.

(Emphases added.)

¶11 With its motion, the District filed an affidavit from Jensen, who
stated that the District “never contemplated” that Wruck could obtain a new failure
analysis “only in relation [to] that portion of the dam located on property owned
by him.” Jensen stated further that the District was aware that the 2002 dam
failure analysis “would need to be updated” when it signed the Agreement and did
not represent “that the data upon which the [analysis] was prepared was current.”
The District argued that the Agreement was unambiguous and that Wruck had not
offered clear and convincing evidence of a mutual mistake that would justify
reformation.

¶12 In response to the District’s motion and Jensen’s affidavit, Wruck
raised a new argument: he contended that the District had defrauded him into
entering into the Agreement by not disclosing during mediation that a new dam

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No. 2024AP447

failure analysis would be necessary and that Wruck would not be able to limit its
scope to his portion of the Kroll Dam.

¶13 The circuit court held a hearing on the parties’ motions on
December 22, 2023. Wruck’s counsel identified two issues for the court’s
attention at the start of the hearing: (1) whether the Agreement “is … an
agreement to agree or is it an agreement that can be enforced or modified”; and
(2) “whether there is a mutual mistake or misrepresentation” that would support
equitable reformation. In response to questioning by the court, Wruck’s counsel
acknowledged that Wruck had not raised misrepresentation as a ground for
reformation in his counterclaim.

¶14 After hearing argument from the parties, the circuit court granted the
District’s motion and denied Wruck’s motion. The court rejected Wruck’s
arguments that the parties had agreed that the 2002 dam failure analysis remained
valid or that the District would defray some of the expense of obtaining an updated
analysis:

The [A]greement is clear. It doesn’t state that the dam
failure analysis provided by the [D]istrict has to be recent,
timely. It just says they’re going to provide what they
have. It doesn’t say that they have to pay any portion of the
dam failure analysis that the defen[dant] Mr. Wruck is
obliged to perform under the [A]greement. It doesn’t say
it’s limited to just his portion. That doesn’t make any
sense. And for all the reasons outlined by the [District],
they’re entitled to summary judgment.

There is no basis for a mutual mistake. There is no basis
for fraud. Mr. Wruck made apparently a bad agreement
that he doesn’t want to live by but that’s life in the big city
as my dad would say. He negotiated this [A]greement. He
was obliged to do what he promised to do. And in my
equitable discretion I’m not going to reform it because the
language of the [A]greement is clear and he hasn’t
identified a sufficient basis which is a high standard to

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reform the [A]greement to get him out of what he promised
to do.

¶15 Following the court’s ruling, Wruck’s counsel asked whether the
court had ruled “on the enforceability of the [A]greement.” The court disagreed
with Wruck’s assertion that his motion had raised the enforceability of the
Agreement as an issue, noting that Wruck had “already complied with [the] terms
of the [A]greement by transferring a portion of the parcel.” When Wruck’s
counsel told the court that Wruck’s motion had asked the court to “either reform it
or hold that the … [A]greement is unenforceable,” the court stated that
enforceability “certainly wasn’t briefed. If that’s what you’re claiming, I’m not
finding it unenforceable.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶16 Our review of the circuit court’s summary judgment decision is de
novo. Schabelski v. Nova Cas. Co., 2022 WI App 41, ¶25, 404 Wis. 2d 217, 978
N.W.2d 530. Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2).

DISCUSSION

I. Indefiniteness

¶17 Wruck first contends that the circuit court erred in concluding that
the Agreement was enforceable. He argues that the Agreement is unenforceable
under Paul R. Ponfil Trust v. Charmoli Holdings, LLC, 2019 WI App 56, 389
Wis. 2d 88, 935 N.W.2d 308, because two of its provisions are indefinite.
Specifically, Wruck points to paragraph three, in which the parties “agree to assess

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liability of exposure attributable to the Wruck portion of the dam,” and paragraph
four, which states that “[i]f appropriate, [the] parties would agree to negotiate in
good faith relative to a purchase or maintenance agreement of the Wruck land
encumbered by the dam.” Wruck contends that these provisions contain the same
type of “agreement to agree” language that we deemed too indefinite to create an
enforceable settlement in Ponfil.

¶18 The District disagrees with Wruck’s reading of these paragraphs, but
it also argues that Wruck forfeited his indefiniteness argument because he did not
raise it in the summary judgment briefing below. See McKee Fam. I, LLC v. City
of Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, ¶32, 374 Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12 (“Generally,
issues not raised or considered by the circuit court will not be considered for the
first time on appeal.”). Wruck responds that he cited Ponfil in his summary
judgment brief and also asserted an affirmative defense in his answer that the
Agreement was not enforceable “because of the District’s indefinite and illusory
promises.” Wruck also notes that the circuit court concluded at the summary
judgment hearing that the Agreement was enforceable.

¶19 We need not determine whether Wruck forfeited his indefiniteness
argument because even if we concluded that the argument was preserved, it fails
on its merits. In Ponfil, we examined a settlement agreement which included a
provision in which the parties to a property dispute agreed “to sign a separate
substantive agreement covering things such as liability & indemnity in usual
form.” Ponfil, 389 Wis. 2d 88, ¶3. The parties exchanged detailed drafts of the
separate agreement but were ultimately unable to reach an agreement as to its
terms. Id., ¶¶4-5. On appeal, we concluded that the settlement agreement was not
enforceable because the terms regarding “liability and indemnity … were never
agreed to in writing, rendering this provision incapable of enforcement for lack of

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definiteness.” Id., ¶27. To be enforceable, we explained, “the material terms of
the settlement must be addressed with a reasonable degree of certainty and
definiteness.” Id., ¶22. The settlement agreement in Ponfil did not meet that
standard because the terms regarding liability and indemnity were material, but the
parties had been unable to reach an agreement on them. Id., ¶¶21-22.

¶20 Wruck argues that paragraphs three and four of the Agreement do
not meet the standard of reasonable certainty and definiteness that we articulated
in Ponfil because they specify “nothing definite or certain about what the District
or Wruck would be required to do once liability exposure of Wruck’s land to dam
failure was assessed.” We do not agree. Though the paragraphs leave the parties’
ultimate course of action with respect Wruck’s portion of the dam open-ended,
that was by necessity, and it does not render those paragraphs indefinite, or the
Agreement unenforceable.

¶21 At the time of the mediation the parties could not, in the words of
paragraph three, “assess liability of exposure attributable to the Wruck portion of
the dam” because they needed, but did not have, the dam failure analysis Wruck
agreed to have performed in paragraph two. Paragraph three thus imposes a more
limited, but nonetheless reasonably certain and definite, obligation on the parties:
to make the liability assessment once they have the analysis in hand. Paragraph
four, which immediately follows paragraph three, likewise imposes a reasonably
certain and definite obligation once the parties receive and review the analysis: if
they deem it appropriate, they are to “negotiate in good faith relative to a purchase
or maintenance agreement of the Wruck land encumbered by the dam.” That the
parties limited their obligation in paragraph four to a good faith negotiation and
did not commit themselves to any specific action or obligation beyond that does
not render the Agreement unenforceable.

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¶22 Wruck’s analogy to Ponfil falls short because the facts in that case
are materially distinguishable from those here. Nothing in Ponfil suggests that the
parties in that case needed information they did not possess in order to finalize the
limitation of liability and indemnity provisions in their settlement agreement.
They were simply unable to agree on those provisions. In contrast, Wruck and the
District needed the dam failure analysis before they could “assess liability of
exposure attributable to the Wruck portion of the dam” and determine whether it
would be appropriate to “negotiate … a purchase or maintenance agreement”
relative to “the Wruck land encumbered by the dam.” Ponfil therefore does not
compel a conclusion that the Agreement is indefinite.

II. Equitable Reformation

¶23 Wruck’s second argument is that the circuit court erred in failing to
reform the Agreement to apportion the cost of the new dam failure analysis
between the parties, or across the more than 300 property owners “benefited by the
dam complex.” He contends that the court did not “apply the proper legal
standard” and “that it is inequitable and unjust for Wruck, whose lake parcels are
less than 5% of the dam complex,” to bear all of the cost of the failure analysis.
He asks us to remand the case to the circuit court and direct it “to determine an
equitable apportionment of the expenses between the parties related to the
completion and approval” of the new failure analysis.

¶24 We decline to do so for several reasons. First, Wruck does not
support his reformation argument with any citation to legal authority. See WIS.
STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(e) (requiring arguments in briefs to include citations to
applicable legal authorities). His argument is also undeveloped, as he does not
explain why the circuit court erred in concluding that he had not established either

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of the two legal grounds for which reformation is a remedy—a mutual mistake of
both parties or a mistake by one party and fraudulent conduct by the other. See
Russ ex rel. Schwartz v. Russ, 2007 WI 83, ¶37, 302 Wis. 2d 264, 734 N.W.2d
874; see also Mid-States Underwriters, Inc. v. Leonhard, 48 Wis. 2d 176, 182,
179 N.W.2d 914 (1970). As the party seeking reversal of the circuit court’s order,
it was Wruck’s burden to do so. See Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36,
376 Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381. For these reasons alone, we could reject his
reformation argument without further comment. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d
627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (stating that we need not consider
arguments that are unsupported by adequate factual and legal citations or are
otherwise undeveloped). Nonetheless, we will further address it briefly to explain
why the circuit court did not err in granting the District summary judgment.

¶25 With respect to mutual mistake, our review of the record reveals no
reason to set aside the circuit court’s conclusion that there was “no basis” for such
a claim. A mutual mistake exists if the parties “agreed on facts that were different
than those set forth [in] the [contract]” or were mistaken “as to the contents or
effect of the writing.” Chandelle Enters., LLC v. XLNT Dairy Farm, Inc., 2005
WI App 110, ¶18, 282 Wis. 2d 806, 699 N.W.2d 241 (first quotation); Ivancevic v.
Reagan, 2013 WI App 121, ¶15, 351 Wis. 2d 138, 839 N.W.2d 416 (second
quotation; citation omitted). The mistake must be “reciprocal and common to both
parties” to justify reformation. Chandelle Enters., 282 Wis. 2d 806, ¶20.

¶26 Although Wruck averred in his summary judgment affidavit that he
believed the 2002 dam failure analysis remained valid and that he would only have
to obtain an analysis covering his parcel, Jensen’s affidavit indicates that the
District did not share those beliefs. To the contrary, Jensen averred that the
District knew the 2002 failure analysis “would need to be updated” and denied

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“represent[ing] that the data upon which [that analysis] was prepared was current.”
He also stated that the District “never contemplated … that Wruck could have the
[dam failure analysis] required by the … Agreement performed only in relation
[to] that portion of the dam located on property owned by him.” Thus, the
summary judgment record showed that any mistaken belief of Wruck concerning
the 2002 failure analysis was not shared by the District. Because Wruck would be
unable to establish a mutual mistake, the circuit court correctly granted the
District’s motion as to that ground for reformation.2

¶27 Once it became apparent in the summary judgment briefing that no
mutual mistake had occurred, Wruck pivoted to unilateral mistake, arguing that
Jensen misled him into believing that he could obtain a failure analysis covering
only his portion of the Kroll Dam because the 2002 dam failure analysis remained
valid. Again, other than pointing to his averments, Wruck utterly fails to develop
any argument as to reformation based on a unilateral mistake accompanied by
fraud. Nevertheless, we address this argument as well.

¶28 A unilateral mistake only furnishes a basis to reform an agreement
where the mistake concerns a past or present fact that is material to the parties’
agreement. See Lundin v. Shimanski, 124 Wis. 2d 175, 192, 368 N.W.2d 676
(1985) (misrepresentation “must relate to present or pre-existing facts” (citation
omitted)); Gielow v. Napiorkowski, 2003 WI App 249, ¶24, 268 Wis. 2d 673, 673
N.W.2d 351 (analyzing unilateral mistake claim premised on home seller’s

2
Wruck does not argue that the circuit court’s ruling with respect to mutual mistake was
erroneous in his briefs to this court.

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No. 2024AP447

awareness that family room was improperly built and violated building codes at
time of sale).

¶29 Even if Wruck could establish that Jensen represented to him that he
could obtain a failure analysis covering only his portion of the Kroll Dam because
the 2002 dam failure analysis remained valid, Wruck’s unilateral mistake claim
would fail as a matter of law. The reason is that Jensen’s purported representation
was not a statement of present or past fact. It was instead “a prediction as to
events to occur in the future,” which “is to be regarded as a statement of opinion
only, on which the adverse party has no right to rely.” See Lundin, 124 Wis. 2d at
192 (citation omitted). As Wruck acknowledged, his ability to “extend” the 2002
dam failure analysis to his parcel depended on the DNR’s agreement. Wruck
averred in his summary judgment affidavit that Jensen told him (1) the DNR “had
approved” the 2002 analysis; (2) the District would need DNR’s agreement to
extend the 2002 analysis before assuming liability for Wruck’s portion of the dam;
and (3) the District would provide the 2002 analysis to Wruck so that he could
“apply to the DNR to extend the failure analysis over [his] dam parcel.”

¶30 There are no facts to show that either party could be certain, at the
time of mediation, what the DNR would require. Whether the DNR would deem
the 2002 analysis to be valid and allow Wruck to obtain an analysis limited to his
parcel was not within either party’s control. Nothing in the Agreement suggests
otherwise. Thus, any belief by Wruck as to whether he could extend the 2002
analysis to his parcel was, at the time of the mediation, necessarily a matter of
conjecture, and Wruck assumed responsibility for the possibility that he might not
be able to do so. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Wisconsin Patients Comp. Fund,
164 Wis. 2d 110, 118, 473 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1991); see also State v.
Bougneit, 97 Wis. 2d 687, 694, 294 N.W.2d 675 (1980) (“[A]n act done with

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knowledge that a fact cannot be determined with certainty until some future date is
not done under a mistake of fact but is instead a mistake of judgment.”). Indeed, it
was not until August 2020, nine months after the mediation, that the DNR
informed the parties that the data underlying the 2002 analysis was outdated and
that a new analysis covering the entire dam would be needed.

¶31 In the end, Wruck’s argument rests on the purported inequity and
unfairness in requiring him to bear all of the cost for a new dam failure analysis,
which may be more expensive and extensive than he thought it would be. Wruck
may regret his bargain, but he has not established sufficient legal grounds to set
aside or reform the Agreement.

CONCLUSION

¶32 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Wruck has not shown
that the circuit court erred in granting the District’s motion for summary judgment
and denying his motion. The court’s order is thus affirmed.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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No. 2024AP447(C)

¶33 GROGAN, J. (concurring). Steven Wruck filed a lawsuit against
the Eagle Spring Lake Management District because he believed the District
should be responsible for the costs associated with maintaining the small part of
the dam1 that was located on his property. That lawsuit was settled via mediation,
and the settlement agreement arising from that mediation is the subject of this
appeal. Here, Wruck asserts that he understood the agreement as requiring him to
pay for a dam failure analysis solely on his property. He later discovered,
however, that the DNR required an updated analysis of the entire dam—that is,
both his small portion and the entire portion on the District’s property—and the
District has taken the position that pursuant to the settlement agreement, Wruck is
solely responsible for financing the updated analysis of the entire dam. The
obvious question is why would Wruck settle a lawsuit he brought—that he
initiated to make the District pay for his portion of the dam—by agreeing to pay
for the entire dam failure analysis? Clearly, something is amiss.

¶34 In reviewing the settlement agreement as a whole, I am not
convinced that it is clear and unambiguous. For example, why would the
settlement agreement require that the DNR stake only Wruck’s property “to allow
for the dam failure analysis to be performed” if Wruck was obligated to obtain,
and pay for, a full-dam analysis? Why would Wruck need to obtain the District’s
prior full-dam analysis if he was required to start fresh and redo the entire thing?

1
Wruck asserts that his portion of the dam constituted only five percent of the total dam.
This fact is undisputed.
No. 2024AP447(C)

These two questions alone cast doubt on what it is the parties actually agreed to in
the settlement agreement.

¶35 However, any argument that the terms of the settlement agreement
were ambiguous on this point—and that summary judgment in the District’s favor
was therefore inappropriate at this juncture—was not raised below and is not
sufficiently developed on appeal. As we have repeatedly stated, this court does
not develop arguments for the parties on appeal. See Schonscheck v. Paccar,
Inc., 2003 WI App 79, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 769, 661 N.W.2d 476 (explaining that it
is “[a] fundamental appellate precept … that we ‘will not … blindside trial courts
with reversals based on theories which did not originate in their forum’” (second
omission in original)); State v. Gee, 2019 WI App 31, ¶40, 388 Wis. 2d 68, 931
N.W.2d 287 (explaining that the appellate court does not act as an advocate or
abandon its neutrality to develop arguments for litigants). Likewise, appellate
courts need not address undeveloped arguments. See, e.g., State v. Pettit, 171
Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Accordingly, although I do
not join the Majority’s analysis, I join the mandate and respectfully concur.

2