Gregory Nicholas Geissinger v. Gail Louise Meyer

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 22, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP388 Cir. Ct. No. 2019FA8

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

GREGORY NICHOLAS GEISSINGER,

PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V.

GAIL LOUISE MEYER,

RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Marathon County:
SUZANNE C. O’NEILL, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP388

¶1 PER CURIAM. Gregory Nicholas Geissinger appeals from an
order amending a judgment of divorce, which required him to pay Gail Louise
Meyer an additional $19,057.65 as part of the parties’ property division.
Specifically, Geissinger argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by reopening the judgment under WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(a) (2023-24),1
and by adjusting the property division to provide equitable relief to Meyer in the
amount of the difference between the sale value of certain personal property of the
parties listed in the property division, and its appraised value as listed in the
parties’ marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into the divorce
judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties to this action were married on July 29, 1983.2
Geissinger filed for legal separation on January 7, 2019, and after the matter was
converted to a divorce, the circuit court held a stipulated divorce hearing on
April 8, 2022.

¶3 At the hearing, the parties presented a Marital Settlement Agreement
(“the MSA”) to the circuit court. Pursuant to the MSA, items of personal property

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise
noted.
2
We pause here to note both counsels’ failure to comply with aspects of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Throughout his brief-in-chief, Geissinger frequently fails to include record
citations after each sentence containing a factual proposition. Such a practice does not constitute
“appropriate references to the record” in his statement of facts, as required by WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(d). Meanwhile, Meyer’s response brief fails to include appropriate references to
the record, instead citing only her brief’s appendix. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(d)-(e),
(3)(a)2. The appendix is not the record. See United Rentals, Inc. v. City of Madison, 2007 WI
App 131, ¶1 n.2, 302 Wis. 2d 245, 733 N.W.2d 322. We caution counsel that future violations of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure may result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2).

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that neither party wanted to retain were going to be sold, with the proceeds of the
sale going to Meyer as part of Geissinger’s equalization payment. In particular,
the MSA stated that Meyer would receive: “Property listed which was jointly
owned by the parties, but as part of the property equalization payment in an
amount to be determined, resulting from the sale by [Geissinger] at a cost to be
born[e] by [Meyer]. The appraisal cost of [the] same is $60,538.00.”3 Attached as
Exhibit C of the MSA was a property division worksheet that listed “Marital
Property to be Sold” as having a total value of $60,538, which sum was then put
into Meyer’s column of the property division.4 Including this allocation, the total
value of the property attributed to Geissinger and Meyer was $911,145 and
$897,135, respectively.

¶4 At the April 8, 2022 hearing, both parties testified regarding the sale
of the unwanted personal property. Geissinger specifically testified that it was his
understanding that “those sale proceeds as an equalization payment in this matter
will be all going to [Meyer].” He said this shortly after stating that the numbers in
the property division worksheet attached to the MSA were those to which the
parties had agreed, and shortly before testifying that, given the agreement to the
auction sale, he believed “this property division” is “fair and equal” and

3
The parties agreed to utilize the valuation for the personal property prepared by an
appraiser. According to Geissinger, the appraisal was prepared by Jeremy Wheeler of Appraisals
by Chuilli, LLC, and dated November 20, 2021, and December 2, 2021. As Geissinger notes in
his brief, “This appraisal was the basis for the personal property division and negotiations
concerning same for the final determination on the day of divorce.”
4
There appear to be two versions of the property division worksheet in the record. One
is the version actually attached to the MSA found in the record; the second is a stand-alone
exhibit. The former version includes the line item for the “Marital Property to be Sold,” while the
latter version has no such line item. The parties do not dispute that the property division
worksheet attached to the MSA did, in fact, incorporate this line item with a value of $60,538.

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“reasonable.” For her part, Meyer opined that the values reflected in the property
division worksheet constituted a fair and equitable arrangement. Shortly
thereafter, she testified to her understanding of her entitlement to the sale proceeds
of the unwanted personal property and how that process was part of the parties’
“property division settlement today.” There were no questions or testimony about
what would happen if the personal property sold at auction for a sum different
from its appraised value.

¶5 At the end of the hearing, the circuit court approved the MSA,
finding it to be fair and equitable. In particular, the court stated:

I find that the parties have divided their marital property as
close to a 50/50 division as they wish to make it and that it
is fair and reasonable to both. In making that finding, I do
understand that the personal property will be subject to an
estate sale, that the proceeds will then go to [Meyer].

The court incorporated the MSA into its “Findings of Fact, Conclusion[s] of Law,
and Judgment of Divorce” (“the judgment”) which states, in part: “The parties’
[MSA] is found to be fair and reasonable as to all of its terms. This was found to
be fair and reasonable under the circumstances presented to the Court.” The court
signed the judgment later that same day.

¶6 A few weeks thereafter, the unwanted personal property was sold at
auction.5 While the value of that property had been appraised at $60,538, the total
5
The transcript from the April 8, 2022 hearing includes testimony establishing that some
of the unwanted personal property was gifted—albeit outside the terms of the MSA—to the
parties’ children, all of whom were adults by that time. However, there does not appear to be
anything in the record (at a minimum, neither party cites to any such information) reflecting
which items of personal property were gifted or their value, either individually or in the
aggregate. While Geissinger makes passing reference to these gifts in his brief-in-chief, he does
not develop any appellate argument based on them. Accordingly, we discuss these gifts no
further.

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No. 2023AP388

sale price was only $39,360.25. Once the costs of the auction were deducted, the
net proceeds paid to Meyer were $31,234.08. Due to the lower-than-expected
proceeds from the sale, Meyer filed a motion on July 26, 2022, seeking, in part,
“readjustment of the property division equalization.”

¶7 The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on this motion on
November 29, 2022. Meyer testified that her understanding of the MSA was that
the $60,538 figure from the appraisal was being used to compute the property
division, including Geissinger’s equalization payment to her, and to “make it fair.”
She further stated that “it was not explained to me at the time that I was taking a
risk by saying that I would take the monies from the auction. Had I known that
was a risk, we would have rearranged who got what.” On cross-examination,
Meyer further testified that her understanding was that the appraised value of the
items “was used as a value on the papers,” referring to the attachments to the
MSA. Furthermore, when asked whether she was told that she would receive the
entire value of the personal property sold, regardless of whether that value was
high or low, Meyer responded, “I was told that it was put on there as a figure to
equalize and make it fair.”

¶8 After hearing the parties’ testimony and argument by counsel, the
circuit court issued an oral ruling. First, the court made the following findings of
fact: (l) there was an appraisal of the personal property to be sold and the
appraised value of that property was $60,538; (2) the appraisal was conducted
fairly; (3) there was a fair sale at auction, and the gross proceeds equated to
$39,360.25; and (4) the total loss to Meyer from the sale was $19,057.65. In
addition, the court ruled as follows:

So when the Court does review the [MSA] and … the
transcript [of the April 8, 2022 hearing], the Court

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No. 2023AP388

approved the [MSA] based upon the representation that the
likely amount that [Meyer] ... would receive from the sale
of the personal property was over 60,000. She ultimately
netted from that sale just over 31,000. When the Court
found that the division of the personal property was
equitable, it was fair and that it was as close to a 50/50
division as the parties wished to make it, the Court was
relying upon that appraisal.

¶9 While the circuit court recognized that “appraisals often are mere
estimates … that may not, in fact, come to fruition,” the court further stated:

So in relying upon the appraisal, the Court inferred that
Ms. Meyer would be receiving something close to 60,000.
Ultimately she [received] 31,000 so that is a significant
difference so the Court does believe [this] causes the
property division to become inequitable. This court is a
court of equity and in approving an agreement despite the
fact that both parties agreed to this, that both parties knew
that there was some risk, it was agreed to because parties
were fairly relying upon an appraisal which was to divide
the property equally and in making those calculations, both
parties relied upon the property division worksheet. Both
parties assumed that the value of the personal property
would be something close to 60,000 and both parties then
acted in good faith in trying to come up with a fair and
equitable division of the property [and] awarded certain
items to Mr. Geissinger in light of the anticipated proceeds
from that sale. That sale did not happen in the way that it
was anticipated to happen and again, Ms. Meyer ultimately
lost approximately—well, over 20,000 from the lack of
proceeds of that sale.

¶10 In all, the circuit court determined that the sale caused the property
division to become inequitable and that it was appropriate to address these
unexpected circumstances. The court specifically found that “everyone was acting
under a misunderstanding and there was a mistake.” The court iterated that it, too,
had assumed the figures used in calculating the property division were accurate,

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No. 2023AP388

explaining: “[T]he Court as well was acting under the assumption that these
numbers were all correct and they were not correct.”6

¶11 After accounting for other changes in the parties’ anticipated
financial circumstances, the circuit court ultimately attributed a loss of $19,057.65
to Meyer resulting from the sale of the unwanted personal property. Based in part
on the court’s view that “Meyer really is out from the original property division
and equalization based again upon the discrepancy of … the property sale at
auction,” the written order entered after the hearing directed Geissinger to pay
Meyer $19,057.65 to accomplish an equitable property division. In that order, the
court explained:

[I]n light of the substantial shortfall in the sale proceeds,
combined with [Meyer]’s filing of her motion very shortly
after that [shortfall] was discovered, in the opinion of the
Court, it would create an[] inequitable result in treating the
actual received net sale proceeds of the sale as being the
equivalent of their appraised value, which had been utilized
for property division purposes in the Property and Debt
Division Spreadsheet that was introduced at time of trial.
Said spreadsheet placed the figure of $60,538 in [Meyer’s]
property division column, with the title “Marital Property to
Be Sold”.… The Court finds in the interest of equity, that
[Meyer] should be provided with additional moneys from
[Geissinger] … to mitigate th[e] shortfall [from the auction
sale].

Geissinger now appeals.7

6
The circuit court also ruled that Meyer’s motion was timely, stating, “[T]he Court does
note that this motion again was filed relatively quickly after the stipulated divorce.”
7
Geissinger simultaneously filed a motion to reconsider along with his notice of appeal.
The circuit court never ruled on this motion, and no further evidence was admitted into the circuit
court record. Accordingly, we do not further discuss that motion, except as noted in ¶23, n.9 of
this opinion.

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No. 2023AP388

DISCUSSION

¶12 The Wisconsin Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that a circuit
court

has authority to modify a property division under [WIS.
STAT. §] 806.07. Although a property division in a divorce
is not subject to the court’s continuing jurisdiction and may
not be modified based on a change of circumstances under
[WIS. STAT. §] 767.32(1), [§] 806.07 gives the court
discretionary authority to grant relief from the judgment.

Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, ¶21, 268 Wis. 2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832 (quoting
Spankowski v. Spankowski, 172 Wis. 2d 285, 290, 493 N.W.2d 737 (Ct. App.
1992) (citing Thorpe v. Thorpe, 123 Wis. 2d 424, 426, 367 N.W.2d 233 (1985))).8
Relevant here, § 806.07(1)(a) gives a court discretionary authority to grant relief to
a party on the ground of mistake. Appellate courts review a circuit court’s use of
§ 806.07 to reopen a divorce judgment as to property division only to determine
whether the court erroneously exercised its discretion in doing so. See Tozer v.
Tozer, 121 Wis. 2d 187, 189, 358 N.W.2d 537 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Conrad v.
Conrad, 92 Wis. 2d 407, 413-14, 284 N.W.2d 674 (1979).

¶13 “[A] discretionary determination must be the product of a rational
mental process by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and are
considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned and reasonable
determination.” LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663
N.W.2d 789 (alteration in original) (quoting Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58,
66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981)). As long as the circuit court “reaches a rational,

8
WISCONSIN STAT. § 767.32 (2001-02), was renumbered to WIS. STAT. § 767.59 by
2005 Wis. Act 443, §§ 148-159.

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reasoned decision based on the application of the correct legal standards to the
record facts,” we will affirm the court’s exercise of discretion on appeal. Sellers
v. Sellers, 201 Wis. 2d 578, 585, 549 N.W.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1996).

¶14 Geissinger argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by reopening the judgment and adjusting the parties’ property division
to account for the difference in the sale value of the unwanted personal property
and its appraised value. His argument is premised on two related contentions.
First, he asserts that the parties—by their testimony at the April 8, 2022 stipulated
divorce hearing—chose to be bound by the terms of the MSA, which has no
language directing what would happen if the unwanted personal property sold for
a sum different from the appraised value. Second, Geissinger asserts that, in
structuring their MSA as they did, the parties agreed that the risk of the sale price
being more or less than the appraised value would be shared between them—i.e.,
if the property sold for more than the appraised value, Meyer would receive a
windfall; if it sold for less, Geissinger would benefit.

¶15 Conversely, Meyer contends that, at both the stipulated divorce
hearing and the hearing on her postdivorce motion, she testified to her
understanding that the fairness of the parties’ overall property division was tied to
the specific values the parties had stated in their property division worksheet,
including the $60,538 appraised value of the unwanted personal property. Given
that the parties used a specific number for the anticipated value of that property,
Meyer contends that the parties did rely on that number in setting the property
division that they deemed to be fair and equitable. As such, Meyer argues that the
circuit court did not err by deeming it inequitable to allow the parties’ mistake as
to the actual value of the property to stand.

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¶16 We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion because, given its factual findings supported by the record, it reasonably
relied upon WIS. STAT. § 806.07(1)(a) to correct a material mutual mistake by the
parties regarding the actual value of the unwanted personal property. The court, in
its discretion, adopted Meyer’s view of the facts and the corresponding impact on
the equitable circumstances.

¶17 In particular, the circuit court made specific factual findings,
including that the parties (and the court itself) tied the fairness of the sums
allocated in the MSA to the notion that the unwanted personal property would be
sold close to a particular value. In other words, the court found, based on the
parties’ testimony, that they did, in fact, rely on the appraised value to set their
“fair” property division. As noted above, Meyer testified multiple times to this
effect, and even Geissinger’s testimony at the stipulated divorce hearing was
consistent with this view. Moreover, the court’s finding represents a reasonable
reading of the MSA, given that the MSA omits any language stating what would
happen if the unwanted personal property sold for a sum different from the
appraised value.

¶18 The circuit court’s findings in this regard are further supported by
the fact that the MSA itself referenced an express appraised value of $60,538 for
the unwanted personal property. It did not, for example, state merely that Meyer
would receive whatever (unstated) sum resulted from the sale of the personal
property. Although the MSA stated that the personal property would be included
as part of the total property division “in an amount to be determined,” the specific
appraised value was then included in the property division worksheet attached to
the MSA. In fact, that value was then put into Meyer’s column of the property
division in order to accomplish a calculated total property division of $911,145 to

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Geissinger and $897,135 to Meyer. These facts further support the court’s finding
that the parties’ overall agreement included an expectation that the sale value of
the unwanted personal property would be at least relatively close to the appraised
value.

¶19 From the foregoing, the circuit court’s additional finding—that the
parties’ and the court’s reliance on the appraised sum constituted a mistake—
flowed naturally. And based on all of the court’s factual findings, none of which
are clearly erroneous, it was well within the circuit court’s discretion to conclude
that it would be inequitable not to order Geissinger to make a payment to Meyer to
remedy the large difference.

¶20 To be sure, the circuit court could have found, in its exercise of that
same discretion, that Geissinger’s view of the parties’ expectations—including
their use of the appraised value in the MSA and related documents—was the
factually accurate one. In doing so, it could have found that the parties only used
the appraised value as a means to inform their respective risk assessments of what
the unwanted personal property would actually sell for. And by not including any
specific terms regarding what would happen in the event of a deviation from that
value upon the actual sale, they intended to accept any such deviation, regardless
of whom it benefited. That the court chose not to make findings of fact and
conclusions consistent with this view does not mean it erroneously exercised its
discretion. See LeMere, 262 Wis. 2d 426, ¶13.

¶21 None of Geissinger’s appellate arguments overcome our conclusion
that the circuit court did not reversibly err. First, Geissinger’s comments
regarding the events leading up to the auction—including what should have been
Meyer’s expectations regarding the sale of the unwanted personal property and

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whether she assumed the risk of a lesser value being obtained—were factors for
the circuit court to consider, which it did. Again, they do not provide a basis for
us to conclude that the court erroneously exercised its discretion in its treatment of
those facts. The key point that Geissinger misses is that the court ordered the
modification not merely because the appraised and sale values of the property
were different. Rather, the court did so because the values were substantially
different, and for no apparent reason, thereby causing the property division to
become inequitable.

¶22 Second, Geissinger’s declaration that the circuit court “did not rely
on any language of the MSA or any procedure set forth in the MSA to arrive at the
amended property division” is of no help to him. Geissinger sits in no better of a
position (or worse of one) than Meyer in light of the fact that the MSA was silent
on what would happen if the sale value of the personal property differed from the
appraised value, either at all or substantially so. Neither party opted to include
language in the MSA clearly governing such circumstances. In any event, as
explained earlier, the property division worksheet was part of the MSA, and its use
of the $60,538 appraised value supports the parties’ and the court’s reliance on
that value. This situation does not represent a court rewriting an agreement
between the parties, as Geissinger contends but, rather, a court exercising its
discretion to enforce the agreement in an equitable manner under particular
circumstances.

¶23 Third, Geissinger contends that Meyer must have known that the
amount to be awarded to her from the sale of the personal property was not a fixed
sum because of a letter her attorney sent to Geissinger’s counsel dated April 6,
2022—prior to the stipulated divorce hearing. In that letter, Meyer’s counsel
simply stated, at one point, that “[t]he total value of what you are offering as a

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total settlement of all issues is $786,443, understanding that that number may vary
depending upon the success of the auction.” Even assuming it is proper for us to
consider this letter (which is dubious),9 the letter and its one sentence on which
Geissinger relies are not an admission that any and all results of the auction were a
known risk to Meyer. As we have already explained, the parties plainly could
have both expected that the actual sale value would not be equal to the appraised
value (indeed, that would have been a remarkable outcome) but at the same time
expected that any such difference would be relatively small—not the roughly
40 percent deviation here. In any event, based on Meyer’s testimony during the
two relevant evidentiary hearings, the circuit court made a contrary finding
regarding Meyer’s understanding, which, again, is not clearly erroneous, even with
the noted language in counsel’s letter.

¶24 Finally, Geissinger argues that the circuit court’s reopening of the
judgment undermines the finality of divorce judgments that are freely and properly
entered into by the parties and accepted by the circuit court, and it would lead to
absurd results. Relatedly, he contends that the court improperly revalued the
parties’ property after the date of the final divorce. These arguments fail for
multiple reasons. First, at the stipulated divorce hearing, everyone knew the
auction sale was to happen at a later date and that the accomplishment of the
auction was a material term for the MSA and its equitable property division.

9
The letter from Meyer’s counsel was sent in response to a letter dated a day earlier
from Geissinger’s counsel. The correspondence was apparently done as an effort at settlement.
Beyond the problems inherent with relying on such attorney settlement discussions generally,
neither counsel’s correspondence was presented to Meyer at the evidentiary hearing on
November 29, 2022, nor were they considered by the circuit court at that hearing or in its ruling
on Meyer’s postdivorce motion. Indeed, the letters are only attached as exhibits to Geissinger’s
March 6, 2023 Motion to Reconsider, which was filed the same day as his notice of appeal and
was never addressed by the circuit court.

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No. 2023AP388

Second, and relatedly, once the sale yielded a much lower total value for the
unwanted personal property, Meyer promptly filed her motion to address that
outcome; she certainly did so well within the one-year period required under WIS.
STAT. § 806.07(2). Finally, each case regarding motions to reopen a divorce
judgment must, like this case, be closely tied to its particular facts. What the
circuit court did here, and why it did so, does not reflect the kind of slippery slope
context of which Geissinger warns.

¶25 Our conclusion is also consistent with governing case law. Suffice it
to say, none of the cases cited by the parties have circumstances that are
sufficiently on point to those here, and no holding in any of those cases compels a
different result than what we reach here. See Doheny v. Kohler, 78 Wis. 2d 560,
254 N.W.2d 482 (1977); Conrad, 92 Wis. 2d 407; Taylor v. Taylor, 2002 WI App
253, 258 Wis. 2d 290, 653 N.W.2d 524; Winkler v. Winkler, 2005 WI App 100,
282 Wis. 2d 746, 699 N.W.2d 652; Hottenroth v. Hetsko, 2006 WI App 249, 298
Wis. 2d 200, 727 N.W.2d 38; Pulkkila v. Pulkkila, 2020 WI 34, 391 Wis. 2d 107,
941 N.W.2d 239.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

14