Thousand Oaks MHC LLC v. James Canfield

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 14, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP658 Cir. Ct. No. 2023SC608

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

THOUSAND OAKS MHC LLC,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JAMES CANFIELD,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Wood County:
GEGORY J. POTTER, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

¶1 TAYLOR, J.1 James Canfield appeals a judgment of eviction
entered by the Wood County Circuit Court in favor of Thousand Oaks MHC, LLC

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(a) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2024AP658

(“Thousand Oaks”). Thousand Oaks operates a manufactured home community in
which it rents sites for the placement of manufactured homes. Following the
expiration of a one-year written lease between Canfield and Thousand Oaks for
the rental of a site on which Canfield placed his manufactured home, Thousand
Oaks delivered a 28-day notice terminating Canfield’s tenancy, alleging that
Canfield was violating various lease terms. When Canfield did not remove his
manufactured home within the timeframe provided in the notice, Thousand Oaks
initiated this eviction action, and the circuit court eventually entered a judgment of
eviction in favor of Thousand Oaks.

¶2 Canfield alleges on appeal that the circuit court’s judgment of
eviction in favor of Thousand Oaks was in error because Canfield was not
permitted to cross-examine Thousand Oaks’s sole witness or to present a defense.
I agree that the court erred on these grounds. Accordingly, I reverse the opinion of
the circuit court, vacate the judgment of eviction, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶3 The following facts are undisputed. Canfield and Thousand Oaks
entered into a written lease agreement from April 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023
for the rental of a manufactured home site upon which Canfield placed his
manufactured home which served as his residence. The terms of the lease
incorporated “Community Rules” that were enumerated in a separate document
and limited tenants to maintaining two domestic house pets, including cats, which
I refer to as the “pet rule.” In addition to signing the lease, Canfield returned a
signed receipt indicating that he had received a copy of the Community Rules.
Canfield indicated in the signed lease that he did not have any pets by writing his

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No. 2024AP658

initials next to a line in the lease that read “I have 0 pets,” and his lease did not
include any monthly pet fee.

¶4 The dispute between the parties arose when Canfield’s lease expired
on March 31, 2023, and he did not sign a lease for the 2023-2024 year. Canfield
continued to make monthly rent payments, which Thousand Oaks accepted. On
April 13, 2023, Thousand Oaks delivered to Canfield by certified mail a “5 Day
Notice to Remedy Default or Vacate” based on Canfield’s alleged violation of the
pet rule. On May 9, 2023, citing to WIS. STATS. §§ 704.17 and 710.15([5]m),
Thousand Oaks delivered to Canfield by certified mail a “28 Day Notice of Non-
Renewal of Rental Agreement” (the “28-day notice”), alleging that Canfield
breached the terms of the rental agreement; violated community rules that
endangered the health or safety of others; and refused to sign a lease agreement.
Specifically, Thousand Oaks alleged that Canfield violated the pet rule and failed
to sign a lease agreement. The 28-day notice required that Canfield vacate the
manufactured home site by June 30, 2023. When Canfield did not vacate the site
by that date, Thousand Oaks filed the eviction action, alleging the same specific
grounds for eviction that were set forth in the 28-day notice.

¶5 Both parties appeared pro se for the eviction hearings, with Kathy
Meyer appearing as the representative and sole witness for Thousand Oaks. On
the court’s questioning, Meyer and Canfield agreed that the written lease for a
one-year term had expired and Canfield was a month-to-month tenant. Meyer was
then sworn in, and the entirety of Meyer’s testimony about the basis for the
eviction consisted of the following:

Court: All she has to do is file a 28[-]day eviction
and she can have you removed for that alone.

Meyer: Which is what we did.

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No. 2024AP658

Court: So then she has the right to evict you if
you’re on a month-to-month lease and she only has
to give you 28 days advance notice.

Canfield: There’s more to it than that, Your Honor.

Court: No, there isn’t. You’re on a month-to-
month lease.

Canfield’s attempt to address issues in dispute concerning the eviction were not
entertained. The court asked the parties to return the following morning after
Canfield received information about the timing of removing his manufactured
home from the site.

¶6 During the continued hearing the next morning, Canfield stated that
it would take between ten and twelve weeks to secure a moving company to
remove his manufactured home from the site. Although there had been no
testimony by either party regarding the presence or number of cats Canfield
allegedly maintained in his manufactured home, the circuit court proposed two
resolutions to the parties, provided Canfield continued to pay rent: Canfield could
remove his manufactured home earlier than the ten to twelve weeks he estimated
he needed and keep “the 12 cats”; or “we can allow you to stay longer and you
remove a number of the cats until you’re able to move the trailer…. Do you have
a place where you could take nine of those cats?” Canfield agreed to think about
different homes for some of the cats, and the court again continued the hearing.

¶7 At the continued hearing five days later, the circuit court
summarized on the record a stipulation that the parties had reached whereas
Canfield agreed to remove some of the cats and Thousand Oaks agreed to give
Canfield ninety days to remove his manufactured home from the site. No written
judgment of eviction was issued at that time. Nonetheless, Canfield subsequently
filed an appeal of the court’s eviction decision, which was dismissed by this court

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No. 2024AP658

for lack of jurisdiction due to the absence of a final written eviction order by the
circuit court.2 On March 28, 2024, following the dismissal of Canfield’s first
appeal, the circuit court entered a written judgment of eviction in favor of
Thousand Oaks from which Canfield now appeals.3

¶8 I reference additional facts below as needed.

DISCUSSION

¶9 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred
when it entered the judgment of eviction in favor of Thousand Oaks without

2
See Thousand Oaks MHC LLC v. James Canfield, No. 2023AP2172, op. and order
(WI App Mar. 25, 2024).
3
Although the circuit court signed two separate writs of restitution, both were returned
unsatisfied, and it does not appear from the record that a writ of restitution was ever executed.
The writ of restitution issue is not raised on appeal, and I do not address it further.

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No. 2024AP658

Canfield having an opportunity to cross-examine Meyer and to present a defense.4
I conclude the court erred in both respects.5

¶10 Application of a set of undisputed facts to a legal standard is a
question of law reviewed de novo. See State v. Brandt, 226 Wis. 2d 610, 618, 594
N.W.2d 759 (1999). Generally, in an eviction action, the landlord bears the
burden to prove a lease violation by the greater weight of the credible evidence.
See WIS JI—CIVIL 3094.

¶11 This case also requires that I interpret and apply the small claims
statutes that govern eviction actions, namely WIS. STAT. § 799.209. Our supreme
court has repeatedly held that statutory interpretation “‘begins with the language
of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the
inquiry.’” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citations omitted).

4
I note that both parties fail to comply with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(8)(bm), which
addresses the pagination of appellate briefs. See RULE 809.19(8)(bm) (providing that, when
paginating briefs, parties should use “Arabic numerals with sequential numbering starting at ‘1’
on the cover”). This rule has been amended, see S. CT. ORDER 20-07, 2021 WI 37, 397 Wis. 2d
xiii (eff. July 1, 2021), and the reason for the amendment is that briefs are now electronically filed
in PDF format, and are electronically stamped with page numbers when they are accepted for
eFiling. As our supreme court explained when it amended the rule, the new pagination
requirements ensure that the numbers on each page of a brief “will match … the page header
applied by the eFiling system, avoiding the confusion of having two different page numbers” on
every page of a brief. Supreme Court Note, 2021, RULE 809.19.
5
On appeal, Canfield additionally disputes certain lease terms and alleges that he was
evicted in retaliation. See WIS. ADMIN. CODE § ATCP 134 (through July 2025) (regulating
residential rental practices, including the identification of prohibited rental agreement provisions
and prohibited practices). Because I reverse and remand for further proceedings on other
grounds, I do not address Canfield’s additional arguments for reversal. See Lamar Cent.
Outdoor, LLC v. DHA, 2019 WI 109, ¶41, 389 Wis. 2d 486, 936 N.W.2d 573 (“‘An appellate
court need not address every issue raised by the parties when one issue is dispositive.’” (quoted
source omitted)).

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No. 2024AP658

¶12 Before I discuss the parties’ arguments on appeal, there were several
general agreements between the parties in the circuit court proceedings that are
relevant to the discussion here. First, the court and the parties agreed that because
Canfield’s written lease had expired and he was paying rent on a monthly basis,
which was accepted by Thousand Oaks, Canfield was on a month-to-month
periodic tenancy at the time the eviction action was commenced.6 Therefore, I
assume without deciding that Canfield was a holdover periodic tenant pursuant to
WIS. STAT. § 704.25, and subject to the same terms and conditions of the original
lease that are at issue here. Second, with the exception of the grounds for eviction
alleged in the 28-day notice, Canfield did not challenge the sufficiency of the 28-
day notice he received regarding the termination of his tenancy.7 Therefore, I
additionally assume without deciding that the 28-day notice was proper.

¶13 However, as pertinent here and as overlooked by the circuit court,
Thousand Oaks not only had to deliver proper notice of the termination of
Canfield’s tenancy, but had to establish by the greater weight of the credible
evidence the grounds for the eviction. As the operator of the manufactured home

6
A “periodic tenancy” may be created if the tenant holds over after the expiration of a
lease, the tenant continues to pay rent, and the landlord accepts the rent on a periodic basis. WIS.
STAT. § 704.25(2). In such a case, the tenancy is generally governed by the same terms and
conditions as those of the original lease. See § 704.25(3).
7
Although the 28-day notice Thousand Oaks delivered to Canfield stated that it was for
a non-renewal of a rental agreement, Canfield’s lease had already expired at the time the notice
was delivered. As noted, the parties agreed in the circuit court proceedings that Canfield was a
month-to-month periodic tenant, and they have treated this case as involving the termination of
Canfield’s month-to-month tenancy rather than as a non-renewal of Canfield’s lease. I follow the
parties’ lead and do the same.

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No. 2024AP658

community,8 Thousand Oaks bore the burden of proof for terminating the tenancy
of a resident of a manufactured home site which is governed by additional
statutory provisions set forth, in pertinent part, in WIS. STAT. § 710.15(5m):

[T]he tenancy of a resident or occupant in a [manufactured
home] community may not be terminated, nor may the
renewal of the lease be denied by the community operator,
except upon any of the following grounds:

….

(d) A breach of any term of the lease.

(e) Violation of community rules that endangers the
health or safety of others or disrupts the right to the
peaceful enjoyment and use of the premises by
others, after written notice to cease the violation has
been delivered to the resident or occupant.

….

(i) Refusal to sign a lease.

….

(k) Other good cause.

§ 710.15(5m)(d), (e), (i), and (k). Accordingly, an operator of a manufactured
home community seeking to terminate a periodic tenancy with a resident must not
only provide appropriate notice, but must also prove by the greater weight of the
credible evidence that statutory grounds exist for doing so. See WIS JI—
CIVIL 3094; see Logterman v. Dawson, 190 Wis. 2d 90, 102, 526 N.W.2d 768 (Ct.

8
An “Operator” is defined by statute to mean “a person engaged in the business of
renting plots of ground or mobile homes or manufactured homes in a community to mobile home
or manufactured home owners or occupants.” WIS. STAT. § 710.15(1)(d). A “manufactured
home community” is defined as “a tract of land containing 3 or more plots of ground upon which
mobile homes or manufactured homes are located in exchange for the payment of rent or any
other fee pursuant to a lease.” § 710.15(1)(ad).

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No. 2024AP658

App. 1994) (a mobile home site tenancy may be terminated under § 710.15(5m)
on grounds that include a failing septic system).

¶14 As noted, Thousand Oaks’s 28-day notice and eviction complaint
alleged two specific grounds for termination under WIS. STAT. § 710.15(5m): a
violation of the pet rule and a refusal to sign the lease agreement. See
§ 710.15(5m)(d), (e), and (i). Yet the record is devoid of any sworn testimony in
support of these allegations. Rather, the circuit court’s eviction determination was
rooted solely in its conclusion that proper notice of termination was provided. As
noted, Meyer presented minimal testimony, confirming only that Thousand Oaks
sent Canfield the required notice terminating his tenancy. Canfield was not
afforded an opportunity to challenge the grounds alleged by Thousand Oaks for
terminating his tenancy by questioning Meyer under oath or to present evidence,
which Canfield asserts contravenes the statutory rights of parties in eviction
actions. I agree.

¶15 Eviction actions are governed by Chapter 799 of the Wisconsin
Statutes. WIS. STAT. § 799.01(1)(a); WIS. STATS. §§ 799.40-.45. In the absence
of a jury demand, eviction trials are to the court. WIS. STAT. § 799.21(1)-(2).
While eviction trials are conducted informally, each party is allowed “to present
arguments and proofs and to examine witnesses to the extent reasonably required
for full and true disclosure of the facts.” WIS. STAT. § 799.209(1). The statutory
procedure dictates that the court “shall endeavor to ensure that the claims or
defenses of all parties are fairly presented[.]” § 799.209(3) (emphasis added); see
also Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970) (a
defendant opposing an eviction action arising from a periodic tenancy may raise a
defense of retaliatory eviction); Bullen v. Fellner, 86 Wis. 2d 116, 121, 271
N.W.2d 673 (1978) (non-payment of rent cannot form the basis of an eviction

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No. 2024AP658

where defendants-tenants raise landlord’s breach of an express contract to make
repairs as a defense).

¶16 Although eviction trials are less formal proceedings, I do not
interpret the referenced statutory provisions governing eviction actions, absent an
agreement between the parties, as allowing the circuit court to dispense entirely
with the taking of evidence, including affording the parties the right to cross-
examine witnesses.

¶17 Although Canfield attempted to dispute the grounds for the eviction
at the initial hearing, including an assertion to the circuit court that there was
“more to it” than Thousand Oaks merely providing proper notice to him
terminating his tenancy, he was not afforded the opportunity to challenge the
grounds alleged in support of the termination through the cross-examination of
Meyer or through his own presentation of evidence. Canfield’s ability to do so
was particularly important in this case because, as noted, Thousand Oaks had to
establish grounds beyond providing adequate notice to terminate his tenancy and
obtain a judgment of eviction against Canfield. Canfield’s initial attempts to make
his arguments were largely rebuffed by the court’s sole determination that because
Canfield received proper notice of the termination of his tenancy, the eviction
action should be granted.

¶18 Thousand Oaks does not meaningfully dispute Canfield’s assertions
that he was entitled to, and deprived of, an eviction trial and the opportunity to
examine witnesses and present a defense, and it cites to no facts or legal authority
that contradict such assertions. See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI
App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578 (lack of response may be taken
as a concession); Schlieper v. DNR, 188 Wis. 2d 318, 322, 525 N.W.2d 99 (Ct.

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No. 2024AP658

App. 1994) (“respondents cannot complain if propositions of appellants are taken
as confessed which respondents do not undertake to refute.”). Further, a contrary
position would have been rejected as violating the plain statutory language in WIS.
STAT. § 799.209, which, as noted, states that in small claims actions, parties are
entitled to a trial and to present a defense. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“‘In
construing or interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain,
clear words of the statute.’” (citation omitted)). Rather, Thousand Oaks argues
that the circuit court properly granted the eviction in its favor because:
(1) Canfield’s true dispute is with the lease terms, particularly the pet rule, which
Thousand Oaks argues is beyond the scope of an eviction proceeding; and
(2) Canfield acknowledged that Thousand Oaks had a right to reclaim their
property and evict him. Neither argument is persuasive for the following reasons.

¶19 Thousand Oaks asserts that Canfield’s “arguments” to the circuit
court would have been beyond the scope of an eviction action because no cause
for the termination of a periodic tenancy needed to be provided. This position
ignores the requirements in WIS. STAT. § 710.15(5m) regarding the grounds for
terminating a resident’s tenancy in a manufactured home site. A citation to this
statute appears in the 28-day notice, and the statutory grounds for the termination
of the tenancy and eviction is referenced in each document.9

¶20 Thousand Oaks’s reliance on Scalzo v. Anderson, 87 Wis. 2d 834,
275 N.W.2d 894 (1979), in support of its position that no grounds beyond

9
Thousand Oaks’s 28-day notice also cites to WIS. STAT. § 704.17, which is another
statute that requires the landlord establish cause to terminate a tenancy. Section 704.17 focuses
on failure to pay rent, damage to the property, and law enforcement involvement with nuisances
on the property; however, neither the parties nor the circuit court relied on § 704.17 in the
proceedings before the court or before me here, so I do not address it.

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No. 2024AP658

providing proper notice need to be found for the circuit court to grant the eviction
in its favor is also misplaced. Our supreme court decided Scalzo in 1979, before
the Wisconsin Legislature enacted WIS. STAT. § 710.15(5m) to require grounds for
the termination of the tenancy for a manufactured home site. Compare Scalzo, 87
Wis. 2d 834, 846; 1985 Wis. Act 235; WIS. STAT. § 710.15. Consequently, Scalzo
had no occasion to consider or apply § 710.15. See also Logterman, 190 Wis. 2d
90, 102 (applying § 710.15 to terminate a tenancy in a mobile home community).

¶21 Additionally, Scalzo considered a termination of a tenancy with a
28-day notice provided pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 704.19, which does not require
additional grounds for termination.10 See Scalzo, 87 Wis. 2d at 846. As noted,
Thousand Oaks’s 28-day notice terminating Canfield’s tenancy is also subject to
WIS. STAT. § 710.15, which affirmatively requires Thousand Oaks to provide a
statutory ground for terminating the tenancy with Canfield, “[n]otwithstanding”
the notice requirements of WIS. STAT. §§ 704.17 or 704.19. Although Thousand
Oaks did allege statutory grounds for the termination, no evidence was introduced
at trial to support the grounds alleged, and Canfield was provided no opportunity
to challenge the grounds alleged through cross-examination or by the presentation
of his own evidence. Further, outside of the finding that Canfield received proper
notice of the termination of his tenancy, the circuit court made no findings of any
ground to support the termination of Canfield’s tenancy pursuant to § 710.15(5m).

¶22 In regard to Thousand Oaks’s argument that Canfield acknowledged
grounds for his eviction, Thousand Oaks fails to provide a record cite in support of

10
The operative statute analyzed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Scalzo is
substantially the same as the 2023-24 version. Compare WIS. STAT. § 704.19 (1973-74) and WIS.
STAT. § 704.19 (2023-24).

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No. 2024AP658

this assertion. I need not consider arguments that are unsupported by adequate
factual citations or are otherwise undeveloped. See Dieck v. Unified Sch. Dist. of
Antigo, 157 Wis. 2d 134, 148 n.9, 458 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1990) (unsupported
factual assertions need not be considered without a record cite). Thousand Oaks
may have intended to reference the following exchange between Canfield and the
circuit court:

Court: But they should have the right to reclaim
their property and rent it out.

Canfield: I can’t argue with that logic.

This exchange occurred after the court had concluded that Thousand Oaks’s
28-day notice alone was sufficient to terminate Canfield’s tenancy and evict him.
Within this context, it appears that Canfield was attempting to secure favorable
terms for the removal of his manufactured home. To the extent that Thousand
Oaks’s attributes significance to Canfield’s response, it is overstated and cannot be
reasonably construed as negating Canfield’s central argument that he was denied
the right to an eviction trial where he had the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses and to present a defense.

¶23 In sum, I conclude that Canfield is entitled to an eviction trial that
includes an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present a defense.

CONCLUSION

¶24 The judgment of eviction in favor of Thousand Oaks is reversed, and
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

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No. 2024AP658

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

14