State v. A. A.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 10, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP1907 Cir. Ct. No. 2025JV59

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE INTEREST OF A.A., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 17:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

A.A.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Racine County:
KRISTIN M. CAFFERTY, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 NEUBAUER, P.J.1 A.A., a juvenile referred to herein by the
pseudonym Adrian, appeals from a nonfinal order granting the State’s petition to
1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(e) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP1907

waive him from juvenile court into adult court.2 Before the circuit court granted
the State’s waiver petition, Adrian had been waived into adult court in a related
matter pending in the Kenosha County Circuit Court. The court in this case relied
on that prior waiver in concluding that waiver was also required here under a
provision in Wisconsin’s juvenile justice code, WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(b), and
the “once waived, always waived” principle articulated in State v. Hinkle, 2019
WI 96, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271. Adrian argues that the court erred in
construing these legal authorities to require waiver into adult court. For the
reasons explained below, this court disagrees and affirms the order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The relevant facts are brief and undisputed. The State filed a
delinquency petition in the Racine County Circuit Court against Adrian on April 3,
2025, alleging counts of (1) armed carjacking (WIS. STAT. § 943.231(1));
(2) armed robbery (WIS. STAT. § 943.32(2)); (3) first-degree recklessly
endangering safety (WIS. STAT. § 941.30(1)); and (4) possession of a dangerous
weapon by a person under 18 years of age (WIS. STAT. § 948.60(2)(a)). These
charges arose out of an incident that began in Racine County the previous day,
April 2, 2025, in which Adrian and another individual allegedly stole a vehicle,
robbed the driver at gunpoint, and then fled from police in the vehicle, and later on
foot, until they were apprehended in Kenosha County.

¶3 Several weeks later, the State filed a delinquency petition against
Adrian in the Kenosha County Circuit Court arising out of the events of April 2

2
This court granted leave to appeal the order. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.50(3).

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No. 2025AP1907

that occurred in Kenosha County. In both the Racine County and Kenosha County
proceedings, the State filed petitions seeking waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction.
Although the Kenosha County proceeding was commenced after the Racine
County proceeding, the Kenosha County Circuit Court was first to act on the
State’s waiver request. According to records from the Circuit Court Access
Program (CCAP) website, the Kenosha County Circuit Court granted the State’s
waiver petition on June 26, 2025, and the State filed a criminal complaint against
Adrian in that court that same day.3 See Kenosha County Circuit Court Case
No. 2025CF905.

¶4 The Racine County Circuit Court held a hearing on the State’s
waiver request on July 14, 2025. Adrian argued that the Kenosha County waiver
did not require waiver in the Racine County juvenile proceeding under WIS. STAT.
§ 938.183(1)(b) and Hinkle. The circuit court disagreed, granted the State’s
waiver petition, and dismissed the delinquency petition so that the charges could
be filed in adult court.

DISCUSSION

¶5 On appeal, Adrian renews his argument that WIS. STAT.
§ 938.183(1)(b) and Hinkle do not mandate adult court jurisdiction over this
proceeding. This court independently interprets the statute and applies it to the
facts here. Hinkle, 389 Wis. 2d 1, ¶14.

3
We can take judicial notice of CCAP records under WIS. STAT. § 902.01. See Kirk v.
Credit Acceptance Corp., 2013 WI App 32, ¶5 n.1, 346 Wis. 2d 635, 829 N.W.2d 522; OLR v.
Hudec, 2019 WI 39, ¶32, 386 Wis. 2d 371, 925 N.W.2d 540 (per curiam).

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¶6 WISCONSIN STAT. § 938.12(1) confers exclusive juvenile court
jurisdiction, “except as provided in [WIS. STAT. §§] 938.17, 938.18, and 938.183,
over any juvenile 10 years of age or older who is alleged to be delinquent.”
Section 938.183(1)(b) provides, as relevant here, that “courts of criminal
jurisdiction have exclusive original jurisdiction over”

[a] juvenile who is alleged to have violated any state
criminal law if … the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction
under this chapter and [WIS. STAT.] ch. 48 has waived its
jurisdiction over the juvenile for a previous violation and
criminal proceedings on that previous violation are still
pending.

Sec. 938.183(1)(b).

¶7 In Hinkle, our supreme court applied this statute in the context of
proceedings commenced against a juvenile in two counties. In that case, the State
filed delinquency petitions against Hinkle in Milwaukee County and Fond du Lac
County arising out of a carjacking and subsequent flight from police that began in
Milwaukee County and ended in Fond du Lac County. Hinkle, 389 Wis. 2d 1,
¶¶5-7. The State also filed petitions in both counties to waive juvenile
jurisdiction. Id., ¶8. The Milwaukee County Circuit Court granted the State’s
petition. Id. The Fond du Lac County Circuit Court also granted the State’s
petition, reasoning that WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(b) required waiver because of the
prior waiver in Milwaukee County. Id., ¶9.

¶8 Hinkle challenged the Fond du Lac County waiver, arguing that
WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(b) “mandat[ed] automatic adult-court original
jurisdiction only within the county in which a previous waiver occurred.” Hinkle,
389 Wis. 2d 1, ¶23. Thus, because the first waiver occurred in Milwaukee
County, it did not require a waiver in Fond du Lac County. Id. Our supreme court

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No. 2025AP1907

disagreed, concluding that the statute “does not impose a county-specific
limitation for the ‘once waived, always waived’ rule.” Id., ¶31. Instead, the court
construed the statute to mean that

[w]henever a juvenile court … has previously waived a
juvenile—who is alleged to be in violation of any state law
and that juvenile is either convicted or the criminal
proceeding is still pending—courts of criminal jurisdiction
anywhere in Wisconsin have exclusive original jurisdiction.
The waiver by the juvenile court means that any pending or
future violations by that juvenile must begin in adult
criminal court pursuant to the exclusive original
jurisdiction assigned to courts of criminal jurisdiction under
WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1). Once waived, always waived.

Id., ¶30.

¶9 Adrian argues that Hinkle’s “once waived, always waived” principle
does not control here because WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(b) only mandates
adult-court jurisdiction if a prior waiver is for a “previous violation.” He contends
that the phrase “previous violation” in paragraph (1)(b) is limited to circumstances
in which the underlying conduct in the proceeding in which the first waiver is
granted occurs before the conduct underlying the proceeding in which the
subsequent waiver is sought. Applying that interpretation here, he notes that the
first waiver occurred in the Kenosha County proceeding but the conduct
underlying the charges there occurred after the conduct underlying the charges in
the Racine County proceeding. Thus, in his view, the Kenosha County waiver was
not “for a previous violation” under § 938.183(1)(b), and the circuit court was
wrong to conclude that that provision required a waiver in this case.

¶10 When interpreting statutory language, this court’s task “is to
determine what the statute means so that it may be given its full, proper, and
intended effect.” State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58,

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No. 2025AP1907

¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. To do so, this court gives the language
“its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional
meaning.” Id., ¶45. This court interprets statutory language “in the context in
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language
of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or
unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46.

¶11 Adrian’s argument focuses on the phrase “previous violation” in
WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(b). Neither that phrase nor its components are defined in
WIS. STAT. ch. 938. Thus, we may look to dictionary definitions to ascertain their
common and ordinary meaning. See Cree, Inc. v. LIRC, 2022 WI 15, ¶16, 400
Wis. 2d 827, 970 N.W.2d 837. “Previous” has similar definitions in several
well-known dictionaries:

 “[G]oing before in time or order.” Previous, Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/previous (last
visited Nov. 6, 2025).

 “Coming or going before (in time or order); foregoing, preceding,
antecedent.” Previous, The Oxford English Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/previous_adj?tab=meaning_and_use#2
8278024 (last visited Nov. 6, 2025).

 “Existing or occurring before something else in time or order[.]”
Previous, The American Heritage Dictionary,
https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=previous (last visited
Nov. 6, 2025).

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No. 2025AP1907

“Violation” refers to “[a]n infraction or breach of the law.” Violation, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024). Drawing on these definitions to give meaning
to “previous violation” in § 938.183(1)(b), the phrase refers to an infraction or
breach of the law that comes or occurs before another violation for which waiver
is sought, either in time or order.

¶12 Adrian’s proffered interpretation of “previous violation” would
restrict the scope of that phrase beyond that suggested by the definitions of its
components set forth above. In his view, WIS. STAT. § 938.183(1)(b) would only
mandate adult court jurisdiction if a prior waiver pertained to a violation that
occurred earlier in time. But he points to no language in paragraph (1)(b) or
elsewhere in § 938.183 that supports this narrower interpretation of “previous
violation.” He asserts that “subsequent” conduct cannot logically be a “previous
violation.” This court disagrees: a “previous violation” can simply be one for
which a waiver has already been granted, regardless of the chronological order of
the underlying conduct.

¶13 This interpretation of “previous violation” accords with the Hinkle
court’s description of the statutory language. In Hinkle, the court agreed that WIS.
STAT. § 938.183(1)(b) “give[s] circuit courts across Wisconsin original adult-court
jurisdiction over crimes committed by juveniles who have been previously waived
into adult court when those prior proceedings are still pending or when the prior
proceedings resulted in conviction.” Hinkle, 389 Wis. 2d 1, ¶3. It stated that
“[p]aragraph (1)(b) places a juvenile under adult court jurisdiction when the
juvenile is ‘alleged to have violated any state criminal law’ … [and] when the
juvenile court waived its jurisdiction on a violation where criminal proceedings
are still pending.” Id., ¶29 (quoting § 938.183(1)(b)). Neither Hinkle nor the
language in paragraph (1)(b) limit its applicability to situations in which a juvenile

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No. 2025AP1907

has already been waived for conduct that occurred before the conduct for which a
subsequent waiver is sought.

¶14 The conditions for exclusive adult court jurisdiction set forth in WIS.
STAT. § 938.183(1)(b) are satisfied here. Adrian was charged with multiple
violations of Wisconsin’s criminal laws in the Racine County proceeding. At the
time the circuit court considered the State’s waiver request, the Kenosha County
Circuit Court had already waived Adrian into adult court with respect to the
charges filed against him in that county, and proceedings on those charges were
still pending. Under these circumstances, the circuit court correctly granted the
State’s petition and waived Adrian into adult court.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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