State v. Anthony W. Smith

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 25, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2245-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CF4123

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

ANTHONY W. SMITH,

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
PAUL R. VAN GRUNSVEN, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

Before White, C.J., Donald, and Geenen, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP2245-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. The State of Wisconsin appeals from an order
suppressing evidence from a search of one of Anthony W. Smith’s vehicles, an
Acura ZDX. The search warrant authorized the search of Smith’s apartment, his
Honda Crosstour, and “vehicles associated with and accessible” to his apartment.
Smith moved to suppress evidence from the Acura because it was not individually
described, arguing the warrant was overbroad. The circuit court granted Smith’s
motion to suppress, then granted the State’s motion for reconsideration, and then
granted Smith’s motion for reconsideration, thereby reinstating the original order
suppressing evidence from the Acura. On appeal, the State argues that (1) the
search of the Acura was covered by the warrant, (2) the good faith exception
applies, or (3) a warrantless search was allowed by the automobile exception. We
conclude that search of the Acura was not an unauthorized “general search,” but
fell within “the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to
search[.]” Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987). Therefore, we reverse
the suppression order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
decision.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This case arises from a police investigation into Smith for drug
trafficking. In September 2021, the police applied for a warrant to search Smith’s
apartment in St. Francis and his Honda Crosstour, identified by license plate and
Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), with the “search to include all storage areas
and vehicles associated with and accessible to” Smith’s apartment.

¶3 In the warrant application affidavit, Robert Gregory, a Milwaukee
Police Department (MPD) officer assigned to the North Central High Intensity
Drug Trafficking Area and attached to the Milwaukee Metropolitan Drug

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

Enforcement Group, attested that, based on his experience and training, certain
facts established probable cause to believe drug trafficking crimes were being
committed by Smith. The officer attested that he observed a woman carrying
currency enter Smith’s Honda, which he was operating, and leave the car minutes
later with a small clear plastic bag. Later, a trained police dog alerted for
controlled substances outside of Smith’s Honda. The officer further observed
Smith appearing to conduct four additional drug transactions with people entering
and exiting his vehicle. Smith also appeared to carry a firearm on his person.

¶4 Officer Gregory further averred that he had five years of experience
as a police officer conducting surveillance operations relating to controlled
substance trafficking, including “mobile vehicle transactions.” The officer
attested that based upon the surveillance of Smith, he believed that Smith was
“trafficking controlled substances from his vehicle.” Officer Gregory averred that
in his training and experience, controlled substances and firearms can be secreted
in “vehicles on and associated with the premises,” as well as in the residence,
storage areas, garages, and attics. The search warrant application, which was
reviewed and approved by an attorney in the Milwaukee County District
Attorney’s Office, was granted by a Milwaukee County Circuit Court
Commissioner on September 24, 2021.

¶5 The police executed the search warrant on September 27, 2021. In
the search of the kitchen of Smith’s apartment, the police found 88 blue pills,
which field tested positive for fentanyl; digital scales with cocaine residue; mail
addressed to Smith; and a Wisconsin vehicle registration for a silver Acura ZDX
in Smith’s name. In a bedroom, the police found more than $16,000 in currency, a
9mm semi-automatic handgun with a 50-round magazine, an AR-15 semi-
automatic handgun, a handgun box containing paperwork signed by Smith, and

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

cell phones. Based on the identifying information recovered, it appeared Smith
was the only adult to occupy the residence.

¶6 Within the search of the apartment, the police found keys to the
Honda and the Acura, which were both registered in Smith’s name. In the Honda,
police found a Wisconsin Correctional letter and state identification card for
Smith, and a 9mm magazine that fit one of the guns found in the bedroom. In the
Acura, the police found 23 corner cuts containing a tan substance, which field
tested positive for heroin and fentanyl, in the amount of 7.47 grams; a plastic bag
containing a white chunky substance, which field tested positive for cocaine, in the
amount of 6.88 grams; a 9mm semi-automatic handgun; mail addressed to Smith;
and Smith’s wallet.

¶7 Smith was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine,
between 5 and 15 grams, with use of a dangerous weapon; possession with intent
to deliver narcotics, with use of a dangerous weapon; and possession with intent to
deliver heroin, between 3 and 10 grams, with use of a dangerous weapon.

¶8 Smith moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrant
stated insufficient probable cause to search Smith’s apartment because the police
surveillance observed him in the Honda and the police never witnessed a crime,
much less a crime connected to the apartment. He also asserted that the search of
the Acura was warrantless because the police did not add the Acura to the warrant,
the vehicle was parked in the apartment complex’s parking lot among many
vehicles, and no police surveillance linked this vehicle to a crime.

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

¶9 After the circuit court addressed and denied suppression of the
evidence found in the apartment and Honda, the court conducted an evidentiary
hearing on the search of the Acura.1 The State argued that the Acura was covered
by the language in the warrant for all “vehicles associated with and accessible to”
Smith’s apartment.2 It contended that after the warrant was issued on
September 24, but before the warrant was executed on September 27, the police
learned Smith was the registered owner of the Acura. The police only proceeded
to search the Acura after they found the registration and the keys in the apartment.

¶10 Smith argued that the police needed to have a warrant to search the
Acura and that they failed to add this vehicle to the existing warrant or apply for a
new warrant.

¶11 The State called Officer Gregory, the affiant in the search warrant
application. The officer testified that he had been part of 200-300 warrant
executions and the affiant of over 100 affidavits for search warrants. He stated
that the language for “vehicles associated with and accessible to” the address or
target residence was commonly included in drug trafficking warrant applications,
because in his experience investigating mobile drug trafficking, those dealers
utilized multiple vehicles for a variety of reasons. He testified that Smith had been
observed dealing only from the Honda, but the police suspected it was possible he
had multiple vehicles.

1
The Honorable Carolina Stark ruled on the suppression of evidence related to the
apartment and Honda. The Honorable Paul Van Grunsven ruled on the suppression of the
evidence from the Acura and the remaining issues in this case. We refer to either judge as the
circuit court.
2
The State also argued that the good faith exception would apply, because the police
reasonably believed they were searching the Acura under the terms of the warrant.

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

¶12 Officer Gregory testified that, in surveillance before the warrant
execution, the police observed that Smith’s Honda had a flat tire, and then ran the
license plates on the silver Acura parked next to the Honda through Department of
Transportation (DOT) records. DOT records showed the Acura was registered to
Smith as well. He stated they did not seek a separate warrant for the Acura
because it was parked next to the vehicle named in the warrant, the registration
and keys were in the apartment, and the search of the apartment showed only
Smith lived there.3 He stated the police concluded that the Acura was directly
associated with and accessible to Smith’s apartment, as well as being owned by
Smith.

¶13 The circuit court suppressed the evidence from the Acura on the
basis that the State had not shown that the Acura was associated with Smith’s
apartment, which was fatal to the analysis and meant the search exceeded the
scope of the warrant. The court stated that after seeing the Acura, the police
should have gotten a warrant prior to any search. The court concluded that the
officer only testified that the vehicle belonged to Smith, not that the vehicle was
associated with Smith’s apartment.

¶14 The State moved the circuit court to reconsider, arguing that a
review of the evidentiary hearing testimony would change the court’s decision.4
At the hearing, Smith’s attorney conceded that after reviewing the transcript, the

3
Upon cross-examination and viewing photographs of the scene, Officer Gregory
amended his description to state that the Acura was in close vicinity to the Honda, not in the next
parking space.
4
Alternatively, the State asserted that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
would apply or that the Acura was lawfully searched under the automobile exception for
warrantless searches.

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

court likely misheard Officer Gregory’s testimony associating the Acura with
Smith’s apartment and if the court had heard it correctly, it would not have
suppressed the evidence. The court stated that having reviewed the hearing
transcript, it did mishear the evidence and therefore the basis for granting
suppression was not legally and factually sound. The court vacated its prior order
and denied Smith’s motion to suppress evidence from the Acura.

¶15 By new counsel, Smith moved the court to reconsider the denial of
the motion to suppress. Smith argued that the circuit court erred when it granted
the State’s motion to reconsider because the search of the Acura failed to satisfy
the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment and the language was
overbroad and ambiguous. He also asserted that Smith’s prior attorney’s
concession was contrary to Smith’s interests.

¶16 At the reconsideration hearing, the circuit court concluded that it was
right initially, it was shocked that Smith’s attorney conceded, and it suppressed the
evidence from the Acura. The court concluded that the good faith exception did
not apply, because the police had the Acura under their control and “easily could
have gotten a second warrant” before searching it.

¶17 The State now appeals.

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

DISCUSSION

¶18 The State argues that the evidence from the Acura should not be
excluded and the circuit court erred when it granted the motion to suppress.5
Smith argues that the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement was violated
when the search warrant authorized the search of general or non-specific vehicles;
therefore, the circuit court’s decision to suppress evidence from the Acura was
reasonable.

¶19 We review an order to suppress evidence using a two-step process.
State v. Pender, 2008 WI App 47, ¶8, 308 Wis. 2d 428, 748 N.W.2d 471. “First,
we uphold the circuit court’s findings of historical fact unless clearly erroneous.”
Id. Second, “‘[t]he question of whether police conduct violated the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is a question of
constitutional fact’ that we review independently.” State v. Sveum, 2010 WI 92,
¶16, 328 Wis. 2d 369, 787 N.W.2d 317 (citation omitted).

¶20 “Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶16, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629

5
Additionally, the State renews its alternative arguments that if the warrant was invalid
to search the Acura, the automobile or good faith exception would apply. Because we conclude
that the search warrant was valid and the search was reasonable, we do not address the State’s
alternative theories. Further, we decline to address any arguments about reconsideration
standards because the order appealed was the order to suppress the evidence from the search of
the Acura, not the reconsideration motions. See State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442
N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that “cases should be decided on the narrowest possible
ground”).

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

N.W.2d 625.6 “Whether a search was reasonable depends on the particular
circumstances of the case and requires a balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance
of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” Sveum, 328
Wis. 2d 369, ¶54 (citation and one set of quotation marks omitted).

¶21 For a search to be constitutionally valid, the warrant must be issued
validly and executed reasonably. Id., ¶19. A valid search warrant is issued only
upon a finding of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. State v.
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991). A valid search
warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.” State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 450, 343 N.W.2d 391 (1984)
(quoting U.S. CONST., amend IV). The reasonable execution of a search warrant
requires that the search “be conducted reasonably and appropriately limited to the
scope permitted by the warrant.” Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶53 (citation and two
sets of quotation marks omitted).

¶22 The issue in this appeal is whether the warrant was sufficiently
particular to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.7 “The manifest purpose of this
6
Wisconsin courts look to “federal cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment and the
federal exclusionary rule to interpret [Wisconsin Constitution] Article I, Section 11, and
Wisconsin’s exclusionary rule.” State v. Eason, 2001 WI 98, ¶42, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d
625. For the issues in this appeal, no party has asserted a reliance on Wisconsin constitutional
protections in place of federal ones, and we rely upon guidance from both federal and Wisconsin
cases.
7
We note that Smith’s original motion asked the court to suppress evidence from all
searched locations; however, the circuit court determined that no evidence from the apartment
and the Honda needed to be excluded, leaving the evidence from the search of the Acura for later
proceedings. This initial suppression ruling was not further contested before the circuit court and
is not raised on appeal. Accordingly, we do not interpret Smith to contest the first two factors in
a valid warrant—neutrality of the magistrate and the determination of probable cause—and
instead confine our analysis to particularity.

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

particularity requirement was to prevent general searches.” Garrison, 480 U.S. at
84. “In order to satisfy the particularity requirement, the warrant must enable the
searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be
seized.” Noll, 116 Wis. 2d at 450-51. “The use of a generic term or general
description is constitutionally acceptable only when a more specific description of
the items to be seized is not available.” Id. However, “[t]he particularity
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is to be applied with a practical measure of
flexibility and only requires reasonable specificity.” United States v. Shoffner,
826 F.2d 619, 631 (7th Cir. 1987).

¶23 We begin with whether the language in the warrant was so generic
or generalized that it would authorize a prohibited general search. See Sveum, 328
Wis. 2d 369, ¶28. The warrant described parts of the premises very specifically—
referring to Smith’s apartment by address and building description, and Smith’s
Honda by model, license plate, and VIN. However, it also included within the
premises to be searched “all storage areas and vehicles associated with and
accessible to Smith’s apartment.” These descriptions are more generic, but “a
warrant need not be more specific than knowledge allows.” United States v.
Bishop, 910 F.3d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 2018).

¶24 While the affidavit detailed multiple drug transactions involving the
Honda, the Acura was unknown at the time of search warrant application. “If
officers knew which vehicles were associated with the drug-dealing activities,
‘failure to identify [them] in the warrant would have violated the constitutional
particularity requirement.’” United States v. Miles, 86 F.4th 734, 743 (7th Cir.
2023) (quoting Bishop, 910 F.3d at 337-38). Here, Officer Gregory did not have
more specific information on any other vehicles Smith used, but instead attested
that he had knowledge and experience surveilling mobile drug traffickers; that in

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

his experience, drug dealers commonly secret drugs in their vehicles; and that he
believed Smith was “trafficking controlled substances from his vehicle.” Based on
the information presented to the neutral magistrate, it was reasonable to find
probable cause to authorize the search of a limited subset of other vehicles that
could be connected to Smith through his apartment.

¶25 Our examination of the record shows that the circuit court was
primarily concerned that the police had not added the Acura to the existing
warrant or sought a second warrant for it during or after the execution of the
existing warrant.8 We might agree with the court if the police had specific
knowledge of the Acura being used in mobile drug dealing prior to applying for
the search warrant. Instead, the Acura fell within the subset of vehicles associated
with and accessible to Smith’s apartment. It was only after police observed the
Acura parked in Smith’s apartment complex’s parking lot, reviewed DOT records
showing the Acura registered to Smith, and found the registration documentation
and keys inside Smith’s apartment, that the police conducted the search. We
conclude there was no constitutional requirement to seek another or an amended
warrant.

¶26 We conclude that the warrant’s authorization to search “vehicles
associated with and accessible to” Smith’s apartment identified the places to be
searched to a reasonable degree of specificity based on the knowledge at the time
of the warrant application. See Noll, 116 Wis. 2d at 450-51. Generalized

8
Our examination of the transcripts from the suppression and reconsideration hearings
shows that the circuit court’s initial finding that Officer Gregory’s testimony only tied the Acura
to Smith, but did not associate it with his apartment, was clearly erroneous, and the first
reconsideration of that issue was reasonable. Although it may be curious for Smith’s first
attorney to concede the suppression issue, the attorney’s performance is not before us.

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

descriptions such as storage areas, attics, garages, and vehicles are considered
acceptable under the Fourth Amendment when the descriptions are based on the
information known about the places to be searched (and objects to be seized) and
provide reasonable guidance to identify the scope of the permitted search. See id.
at 451.9 We conclude that the warrant was not facially defective or invalid. Cf.
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 554, 557 (2004) (concluding a warrant was
invalid when it described the person or property to be seized as the target’s house,
rather than describing a stockpile of weapons or incorporating the more detailed
description in the affidavit).

¶27 Finally, we conclude that the search warrant was reasonably
executed with regard to the Acura. See Sveum, 328 Wis. 2d 369, ¶53 (requiring
warrant execution to be conducted reasonably and limited to the scope provided in
the warrant). Officer Gregory testified that after the warrant was issued, but
before the warrant was executed, the police observed the Acura in the parking lot
near Smith’s Honda, ran the plates, and found it was registered to Smith. During
the search of the apartment, the police found the registration documentation and
keys to the Acura. Only then did the police proceed to search the Acura, resulting
in them finding heroin, cocaine, and a 9mm handgun. We conclude that the search

9
The determination of particularity depends on the facts known about the places or
objects. For example, our supreme court concluded that the portion of a search warrant that
authorized the seizure of “various long-play phonograph record albums, and miscellaneous vases
and glassware items,” was constitutionally defective because “[a] more particular description of
those items could have been provided” because the police were searching for a list of specific
items stolen from an auction. State v. Noll, 116 Wis. 2d 443, 451, 343 N.W.2d 391 (1984). In
contrast, our supreme court upheld a search of a suspect’s vehicle, which was not specifically
described in the warrant, because the court concluded the vehicle, parked next to an outbuilding
200 feet from the suspect’s house was in the curtilage of the premises described in the warrant.
State v. O’Brien, 223 Wis. 2d 303, 316, 588 N.W.2d 8 (1999).

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No. 2023AP2245-CR

warrant was constitutionally valid and the search was constitutionally executed.
Therefore, we reverse the order suppressing evidence from the Acura.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We conclude that the Acura was searched in accordance with a valid
warrant. We reverse the order suppressing evidence from the Acura and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2023-24).

13