Adele R. Peters v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 6, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2308 Cir. Ct. No. 2022CV643

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

ADELE R. PETERS (A MINOR), BY HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM,
JOHN D. CLAYPOOL, CONNIE PETERS AND ALEX R. PETERS, IV,

PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,

V.

PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY, JADYN M. PETERS,
JENNIFER L. PETERS, PARTNERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND
MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WISCONSIN HEALTH CARE PLAN,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Outagamie County:
VINCENT R. BISKUPIC, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

¶1 HRUZ, J. Adele Peters appeals an order granting declaratory
judgment to Partners Mutual Insurance Company and dismissing Partners Mutual
from this lawsuit. Adele was injured while riding as a passenger in a vehicle
No. 2023AP2308

driven by Jadyn Peters and owned by Jennifer Peters. 1 After receiving payments
from Jadyn and Jennifer’s liability insurer, Adele sought underinsured motorist
(“UIM”) coverage from her insurer, Partners Mutual, arguing that she was entitled
to a separate $100,000 in UIM limits for Jadyn’s negligent driving and for
Jennifer’s negligent entrustment of the vehicle.

¶2 The circuit court concluded that Adele was entitled to a single
$100,000 UIM limit which, pursuant to a reducing clause in Partners Mutual’s
policy, was reduced to $0 as a result of the two $50,000 payments Adele received
from Jadyn and Jennifer’s liability insurer. Adele argues that the circuit court
erred by reaching this conclusion, and she argues that she is entitled to separate
UIM limits for Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s separate negligent acts pursuant to both
Partners Mutual’s policy and WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3) (2023-24).2

¶3 We conclude that Partners Mutual’s policy unambiguously provides
Adele with a single $100,000 UIM limit. For coverage purposes under Partners
Mutual’s policy, Adele’s injuries resulted from a single accident, rather than the
two negligent acts leading up to the accident. We further conclude that WIS.
STAT. § 632.32(3) does not require Partners Mutual to provide separate UIM limits
to Adele for Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s separate negligent acts. Accordingly, we
affirm.

1
Because Adele, Jadyn and Jennifer share a surname, we refer to them by their first
names throughout the remainder of this opinion. Jennifer is Adele’s aunt and Jadyn’s mother.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise
noted.

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BACKGROUND

¶4 In April 2021, Jadyn lost control of the vehicle she was driving and
in which Adele was riding in the front passenger seat, and it collided head on with
another vehicle, causing injuries to Adele. Jennifer was the owner of the vehicle
Jadyn was driving. At the time of the collision, Jennifer insured the vehicle
through a liability insurance policy issued by Progressive Universal Insurance
Company, which also covered Jadyn.

¶5 In July 2022, Adele initiated this lawsuit against Jadyn, Jennifer,
Progressive, and Partners Mutual. Adele alleged that Jadyn’s negligent operation
of the vehicle caused the accident and that both Jadyn’s negligent operation and
the resulting accident caused Adele’s injuries. Adele also alleged that Jennifer
negligently maintained and entrusted a defective vehicle by allowing Jadyn to
drive the vehicle while it had a defective airbag. Adele further alleged that
Jennifer’s negligent maintenance and entrustment of the vehicle contributed to
Adele’s injuries on the day of the accident. In April 2023, Progressive paid Adele
its liability limits of $50,000 for Jadyn’s negligence and $50,000 for Jennifer’s
negligence, totaling $100,000.

¶6 Because Adele’s expenses for her accident-related injuries exceeded
Progressive’s $100,000 payment, Adele also sought UIM coverage under the
automobile insurance policy that her parents purchased from Partners Mutual (“the
Policy”). The Policy’s declarations page provides the limits of liability for each
type of coverage and states that “[t]he limit of liability for each coverage shall not
be more than the amount stated for such coverage, subject to all the
PROVISIONS of this policy.” As to UIM coverage, the declarations page states
that the limit was “$100,000/Each Person” and “$300,000/Each Occurrence.”

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¶7 The Policy also contains specific provisions for UIM coverage in the
section titled “Part III—Uninsured Motorists and Underinsured Motorists.”
(Formatting altered.) Within that section, the initial grant of UIM coverage states:

We will pay compensatory damages for bodily injury
which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from
the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle.
The bodily injury must be sustained by an insured
person, caused by an accident, and result from the
ownership, maintenance or use of the underinsured motor
vehicle.

….

We will pay under this coverage only after the limits of
liability under any applicable bodily injury liability
policies or bonds have been exhausted by payment of
judgements or settlements.

Partners Mutual does not dispute that, under the Policy, Adele is an insured
person;3 that she could recover compensatory damages for bodily injuries caused
by an accident with an underinsured motor vehicle; and that Progressive’s limits of
liability have been, or will be, exhausted by settlements.

¶8 Rather, Partners Mutual disputes the amount of UIM coverage that is
available to Adele pursuant to the UIM coverage section’s limits of liability
provision and its reducing clause. The limits of liability provision states:

The limits of liability shown in the Declarations apply,
subject to the following:

1. The limit for “each person” is the maximum for all
persons for bodily injury sustained by one person in
any one accident.

3
The definition of “insured person” in the UIM coverage section includes “[y]ou or a
relative” and “[a]ny other person occupying your insured car.” (Formatting altered.) Adele is a
“relative” pursuant to this definition and therefore is an “insured person” under the Policy.

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2. Subject to the limit for “each person”, the limit for
“each accident” is the maximum payable for all
damages because of bodily injury sustained by two or
more persons in any one accident.

….

We will pay no more than these maximums regardless of
the number of vehicles described in the Declarations,
insured persons, claims, claimants, policies, or vehicles
involved in the accident.

The provision’s reducing clause further states that the limits of liability would be
reduced by:

1. A payment made by the owner or operator of
the … underinsured motor vehicle or organization
which may be legally liable.

2. A payment under Part I liability coverage of this policy.

3. A payment made or amount payable because of bodily
injury under any workers’ compensation law, disability
benefits law or similar law.

¶9 Adele had argued to Partners Mutual that she was entitled to
$200,000 in UIM limits pursuant to the Policy—$100,000 for her claim against
Jadyn and $100,000 for her claim against Jennifer. Following Progressive’s
issuing of its liability limits for each of her claims, Adele argued that she was then
entitled to $100,000 in UIM limits under the Policy. Partners Mutual disagreed
and sought a declaratory judgment stating that, pursuant to the Policy, “there is a
single $100,000.00 UIM coverage limit available to [Adele] in relation to the”
April 2021 accident. Partners Mutual also sought a declaration that Adele’s “UIM
coverage limit has been reduced to $0 by virtue of the Policy’s reducing clause
and the settlement payments [Adele] received from Jadyn and Jennifer Peters’
liability insurer.” Partners Mutual further sought an order dismissing Adele’s
UIM claim against it.

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¶10 In response, Adele argued that Partners Mutual continued to owe her
$100,000 because WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3), often referred to as the “omnibus
statute,” see Thom v. 1st Auto & Cas. Ins., 2021 WI App 33, ¶8, 398 Wis. 2d 273,
961 N.W.2d 79, required Partners Mutual to offer separate UIM limits for separate
acts of negligence, and because there were two occurrences under the Policy.

¶11 The circuit court granted Partners Mutual’s declaratory judgment
motion in an oral ruling, concluding that WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3) applied to the
Policy’s UIM coverage but that “[t]here was only one injury-causing event and
one ‘occurrence’” based on the Policy’s language. In reaching this conclusion, the
court placed “significant weight” on Severude v. American Family Mutual
Insurance, 2002 WI App 33, 250 Wis. 2d 655, 639 N.W.2d 772 (2001), to
conclude that “occurrence” in the Policy “refers to the injury-causing event and
not to ‘each negligent act that may lead to a car accident.’” Because Adele was
not injured until Jadyn lost control of the vehicle, the court determined that there
was one accident that caused Adele’s injuries and that “Jennifer’s negligent
entrustment cannot be a separate occurrence triggering a separate payment of
policy limits.” The court therefore concluded that, upon application of the
reducing clause, “the amount paid by Progressive reduced the UIM benefits
payable to Adele under the” Policy to zero.

¶12 The circuit court subsequently entered a written order granting
Partners Mutual’s declaratory judgment motion and dismissing it as a party to the
lawsuit. Adele now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶13 On appeal, Adele again argues that she remains entitled to $100,000
in UIM limits, $50,000 for Jadyn’s negligence and $50,000 for Jennifer’s

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negligence. First, Adele argues that the Policy’s language entitles her to separate
UIM limits because there were two separate “occurrences.” Second, Adele
contends that WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3) requires Partners Mutual to offer separate
UIM limits for each negligent act. For the following reasons, we conclude that
neither the Policy’s language nor § 632.32(3) require Partners Mutual to offer
separate UIM limits to Adele.

¶14 The circuit court’s decision granting declaratory judgment to
Partners Mutual is a discretionary decision, which we normally review for an
erroneous exercise of discretion. See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee
County, 2001 WI 65, ¶36, 244 Wis. 2d 333, 627 N.W.2d 866. “When the exercise
of discretion turns on a question of law, however, our review is de novo.” Talley
v. Mustafa, 2018 WI 47, ¶13, 381 Wis. 2d 393, 911 N.W.2d 55. Here, the circuit
court’s declaratory judgment decision involved interpreting the Policy and
applying WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3), both of which are questions of law that we
review de novo. See Talley, 381 Wis. 2d 393, ¶13; Marotz v. Hallman, 2007 WI
89, ¶15, 302 Wis. 2d 428, 734 N.W.2d 411. Thus, we review the circuit court’s
declaratory judgment decision de novo. See Talley, 381 Wis. 2d 393, ¶13.

I. The Policy’s language provides a single $100,000 UIM limit.

¶15 Adele argues that the Policy does not define the terms “accident” or
“occurrence” and that we must apply those terms’ commonly understood
definitions. She contends that, according to the common definition of
“occurrence,” “Jennifer’s act of allowing Jadyn and Adele to ride in the vehicle is
an ‘occurrence,’” “something which ‘occurred,’” and “an event” or “an incident.”
Accordingly, Adele concludes that Jennifer’s entrustment of the vehicle to Jadyn
was a wholly separate act from Jadyn’s operation of the vehicle, such that both

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acts should be considered separate occurrences providing two UIM limits under
the Policy. For these reasons, Adele asserts that the circuit court incorrectly
concluded that “occurrence” referred to an injury-causing event rather than a
negligent act.

¶16 We apply the general rules of contract construction when
interpreting insurance policies. See Marotz, 302 Wis. 2d 428, ¶34. When
interpreting a policy, we seek to determine and give effect to the contracting
parties’ intent. American Fam. Mut. Ins. v. American Girl, Inc., 2004 WI 2, ¶23,
268 Wis. 2d 16, 673 N.W.2d 65. We construe policies “as they would be
understood by a reasonable person in the position of the insured,” id., and by
giving policy language its common, ordinary meaning, Marotz, 302 Wis. 2d 428,
¶34. If a policy’s terms “are clear and unambiguous on their face, the policy must
not be rewritten by construction.” Severude, 250 Wis. 2d 655, ¶13. If a policy’s
terms are ambiguous—meaning they are reasonably susceptible to more than one
construction—then those ambiguities are construed in favor of the insured.
Marotz, 302 Wis. 2d 428, ¶34.

¶17 We conclude that the Policy provides a single $100,000 UIM limit
for Adele’s injuries, regardless of the number of negligent acts leading to the
accident that caused those injuries. The Policy’s language unambiguously states
that $100,000 is the most Partners Mutual will pay for Adele’s injuries resulting
from a single accident. This interpretation is further supported by our holding in
Severude, in which we rejected the same argument Adele makes in this instance.

¶18 To explain, the Policy’s UIM limits are provided in the declarations
page and are addressed more substantively in the Policy’s specific section
regarding UIM coverage. The declarations page states the limits of liability for

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No. 2023AP2308

UIM coverage are “$100,000/Each Person” and “$300,000/Each Occurrence.”
Although Adele focuses on the term “occurrence,” we agree with Partners Mutual
that the definition of “occurrence” is irrelevant because the Policy’s UIM coverage
section uses the term “accident” rather than “occurrence” in its relevant
provisions. Given that the limits of liability provision in that section specifically
refers to the “limits of liability shown in the Declarations,” the “each accident”
limit in the limits of liability provision—which follows, and is “[s]ubject to the
limit for ‘each person’” in that provision—is the “Each Occurrence” limit on the
declarations page. Otherwise, the “Each Occurrence” limit in the declarations
page and the “each accident” limit in the limits of liability provision would have
no effect.

¶19 Given the foregoing, our focus is necessarily on the “each person”
provisions in the limits of liability, not on the number of occurrences. Stated
another way, and as Partners Mutual contends, the issue in this case is the
application of the “$100,000/Each Person” limit in the declarations page and the
“each person” limit in the UIM coverage section, given that Adele is the sole
claimant under the Policy. The “Each Person” limit is addressed in the Policy’s
UIM coverage section’s limits of liability provision. Importantly, it states that the
“Each Person” limit shown in the declarations page “is the maximum for all
persons for bodily injury sustained by one person in any one accident.”
(Formatting altered.) The Policy further provides that Partners Mutual will not
pay more than the provided maximums “regardless of the number of vehicles
described in the Declarations, insured persons, claims, claimants, policies, or
vehicles involved in the accident.” (Formatting altered.)

¶20 Reading the “$100,000/Each Person” limit in the declarations page
together with the UIM coverage section’s limits of liability provision, a reasonable

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No. 2023AP2308

insured would understand the “Each Person” limit to mean that $100,000 is the
most the Policy will provide for all of an individual’s injuries resulting from “any
one accident,” regardless of the number of claims arising out of that one accident.

¶21 Here, Adele’s injuries were the result of a single accident—the
collision between the vehicle driven by Jadyn and the other vehicle. It does not
matter that both Jadyn’s negligent operation of the vehicle and Jennifer’s negligent
entrustment of the vehicle to Jadyn may have led to that accident. The Policy also
accounts for the possibility of multiple claims arising from a single accident, as is
the case here, given the language that the $100,000 limit applies regardless of the
number of vehicles, insured persons, or claims. Thus, even though Jadyn’s and
Jennifer’s separate negligent acts allegedly led to the collision, for coverage
purposes under the Policy, Adele’s injuries resulted from the collision itself and
not those two acts. Because Adele sustained injuries in a single accident, the
Policy unambiguously states that $100,000 is the most Partners Mutual will pay in
UIM coverage for those injuries.

¶22 Our interpretation is consistent with, if not compelled by, the
interpretation of a substantially similar provision in Severude. There, we
interpreted a limit of liability provision stating that the “each person” liability limit
in the declarations page was “the maximum for all damages sustained by all
persons as the result of bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence.”
Severude, 250 Wis. 2d 655, ¶10. In Severude, the plaintiff’s 12-year-old daughter
died in a rollover accident after the plaintiff’s 16-year-old daughter allowed her
unlicensed 15-year-old friend to drive the plaintiff’s vehicle. Id., ¶¶2-3. The
plaintiff’s automobile insurer paid its $100,000 Uninsured Motorist (“UM”)
coverage limits to the plaintiff based on the 15-year-old friend’s negligent
operation of the vehicle. Id., ¶¶4-5. The plaintiff then filed a wrongful death suit

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against her insurer seeking $100,000 in bodily injury liability based on her
16-year-old daughter’s negligent entrustment of the vehicle to her friend. Id., ¶5.

¶23 The insurer’s policy contained the above-quoted limits of liability
provision, which further stated that “[a]ny amount payable under this coverage to
or for an injured person will be reduced by any payment made to that person under
the [UM] coverage of this policy.” Id., ¶10. Just as Adele does here, the plaintiff
in Severude argued that there were two “occurrences” under the insurer’s policy—
the friend’s negligent operation of the vehicle and the 16-year-old daughter’s
negligent entrustment of the vehicle—and that the reducing clause did not apply to
her negligent entrustment claim because the $100,000 UM benefits she received
were for a separate occurrence based on the friend’s negligent operation of the
plaintiff’s vehicle. Id., ¶¶7, 11.

¶24 We rejected the plaintiff’s conclusion that “a reasonable construction
of the term ‘occurrence’ as it appears in this policy refers to each negligent act that
may lead to a car accident.” Id., ¶15. Because the insurer’s policy provided
“coverage for ‘bodily injury to one person in any one occurrence,’” we concluded
that the reasonable interpretation of “occurrence” was that it referred to the event
of injury. Id., ¶16. We explained that the event of injury itself occurred when the
vehicle rolled, even though two negligent acts led to that event. Id. As a result,
we held that there was a single occurrence with a $100,000 liability limit
available, which was reduced to $0 by virtue of the policy’s reducing clause. Id.,
¶¶16-17.

¶25 The same reasoning from Severude applies here: the event of injury
occurred when Jennifer’s vehicle, driven by Jadyn, collided with the other vehicle,
regardless of whether both Jennifer’s and Jadyn’s negligent acts led to the

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collision. Adele attempts to distinguish Severude by arguing that the policy
language in that case was different from the Policy’s language in this case. Rather
than comparing the limits of liability provisions in the two policies, however,
Adele compares only Severude’s limits of liability provision (the “any one
occurrence” language) with the limits in the Policy’s declarations page (the “Each
Occurrence” and “Each Person” language). She then asserts that this “difference
in wording could change what a reasonable insured would have understood the
terms of the [P]olicy to mean” and that “[i]t is reasonable to think that a policy
providing coverage for ‘each’ occurrence means each separate act of negligence
would be covered.”

¶26 Adele’s foregoing arguments are illogical. The limits of liability
provision in Severude uses the term “occurrence” instead of the term “accident”
used in the Policy’s UIM coverage section’s limits of liability provision. But other
than the difference in terms and in coverage types,4 the provisions are exactly the
same. We conceive no reason why such a difference in wording would change
what a reasonable insured would understand the Policy’s UIM coverage section’s
limits of liability provision to mean. Rather, Severude’s interpretation of
“occurrence” to mean the event of injury equally applies to our interpretation of
the term “accident” in the Policy’s UIM coverage section’s limits of liability
provision.

4
Adele does not argue that Severude v. American Family Mutual Insurance, 2002 WI
App 33, 250 Wis. 2d 655, 639 N.W.2d 772 (2001), is distinguishable because it involved the
interpretation of UM and liability coverage limits rather than UIM coverage limits. We agree
with Partners Mutual that despite this difference, the analysis remains the same.

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¶27 Adele then turns to the Policy’s initial grant of UIM coverage
provision to argue that because both Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s negligent acts
separately trigger coverage under that provision, each act must invoke separate
UIM limits. As noted above, Partners Mutual does not dispute that, pursuant to
the initial grant of UIM coverage provision, Adele is an insured person that can
recover compensatory damages for bodily injuries caused by an accident with an
underinsured motor vehicle. Adele focuses on the part of the UIM provision
stating that the bodily injury must be “caused by an accident” and “result from the
ownership, maintenance or use of the underinsured motor vehicle.” (Formatting
altered.) Adele further contends that Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s negligent acts
separately trigger coverage under the initial grant of UIM coverage provision
because her injuries resulted from both “the ownership and maintenance of the
underinsured vehicle by Jennifer” and “the use of the underinsured vehicle by
Jadyn.”

¶28 We agree with Adele’s understanding that both acts triggered UIM
coverage, but that conclusion does nothing to alter our foregoing analysis
regarding the effect of the Policy’s language as a whole. Adele engages with only
a portion of the UIM coverage section rather than with the entire section. There is
no dispute that she is entitled to UIM coverage under the section’s initial grant of
coverage, but that coverage is still subject to the other provisions in that section—
including the limits of liability provision, which Adele ignores. Policy provisions
must be interpreted with reference to the policy as a whole and not in isolation, as
Adele does here. See Folkman v. Quamme, 2003 WI 116, ¶24, 264 Wis. 2d 617,
665 N.W.2d 857. In short, Adele’s argument in this regard conflates limits of
liability with an initial grant of coverage.

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¶29 Adele next turns to the underlying “theory” of UIM coverage to
argue that she purchased “a predetermined level of coverage from an underinsured
motorist,” but that, in this case, there were two underinsured motorists. Because
there were two underinsured motorists, Adele contends that a “reasonable insured
would assume that the predetermined level of coverage would apply to each
underinsured motorist that contributed to the injuries sustained in an accident.”
We disagree with Adele’s contention.

¶30 It is true that UIM coverage “is intended to protect motorists against
inadequately insured tortfeasors,” Pitts v. Revocable Tr. of Knueppel, 2005 WI
95, ¶28, 282 Wis. 2d 550, 698 N.W.2d 761, by putting the insured “in the same
position as he [or she] would have occupied had the tortfeasor’s liability limits
been the same as the underinsured motorist limits purchased by the insured,”
Badger Mut. Ins. v. Schmitz, 2002 WI 98, ¶18, 255 Wis. 2d 61, 647 N.W.2d 223
(alteration in original; citation omitted). Pursuant to this theory of UIM coverage,
our supreme court has stated that UIM coverage operates “as a predetermined,
fixed level of insurance coverage including payment from both the at-fault driver’s
liability insurance and the insured’s own UIM coverage.” Schmitz, 255 Wis. 2d
61, ¶18. Stated another way, by acquiring UIM coverage, an insured purchases “a
predetermined, fixed level of UIM recovery that is arrived at by combining
payments from all sources.” Marotz, 302 Wis. 2d 428, ¶23 (citation omitted).

¶31 Here, that predetermined, fixed level of UIM recovery was
$100,000, which Adele has received by combining payments from all sources—
i.e., the two $50,000 liability limits she received from Progressive, the liability
insurance for both of the tortfeasors. Consequently, Adele was provided with the
predetermined level of coverage she purchased. Given our reading of the Policy,
no reasonable insured would understand that the predetermined level of coverage

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No. 2023AP2308

applies to each underinsured motorist contributing to Adele’s injuries. Rather,
because $100,000 is the most the Policy will provide for all injuries resulting from
a single accident, a reasonable insured would understand that the predetermined
level of coverage is meant to cover those injuries, regardless of the number of
underinsured motorists.

¶32 In sum, Adele’s injuries resulted from a single accident, which,
pursuant to the Policy, entitles her to a single $100,000 UIM limit. We deem this
interpretation plain and clear.

II. WISCONSIN STAT. § 632.32(3) does not require Partners Mutual to provide
separate UIM coverage limits for each separate act of negligence.

¶33 Adele next argues that, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3), she is
entitled to separate $100,000 UIM limits for Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s negligent acts.
Citing Miller v. Amundson, 117 Wis. 2d 425, 345 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1984),
and Iaquinta v. Allstate Insurance, 180 Wis. 2d 661, 510 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App.
1993), Adele contends that § 632.32(3) requires Partners Mutual “to extend
separate $100,000 limits of liability to Jadyn and Jennifer Peters, notwithstanding
the contrary policy language.” Addressing Adele’s argument requires us to
interpret and apply § 632.32(3).

¶34 Our review of WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3) begins with its language.
See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271
Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. We give statutory language its “common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words
or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning.” Id. We also
interpret statutory language “in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but
as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related

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statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id., ¶46. “If
the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.” Id., ¶45.

¶35 Except as otherwise provided, WIS. STAT. § 632.32 applies to every
insurance policy “issued or delivered in this state against the insured’s liability for
loss or damage resulting from accident caused by any motor vehicle, whether the
loss or damage is to property or to a person.” Sec. 632.32(1). With exceptions not
relevant here, § 632.32(3) requires every insurance policy subject to § 632.32 to
include provisions stating that: (1) “Coverage provided to the named insured
applies in the same manner and under the same provisions to any person using any
motor vehicle described in the policy when the use is for purposes and in the
manner described in the policy”; and (2) “Coverage extends to any person legally
responsible for the use of the motor vehicle.” Sec. 632.32(3)(a)-(b).

¶36 This court has stated that the purpose of WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3) “is
to make sure that insurance coverage obtained for ‘a vehicle listed in the policy’
also provides coverage ‘for individuals’ who ‘use it with permission and are
responsible for using it.’” Thom, 398 Wis. 2d 273, ¶18 (citation omitted). We
have interpreted § 632.32(3) “broadly so as to increase rather than to limit
coverage.” Thom, 398 Wis. 2d 273, ¶41 (citation omitted). However, “we are not
permitted to stretch the statute’s application beyond its language, its purpose, and
the case law interpreting it.” Id.

¶37 Coverage under WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3) “is imputed to every motor
vehicle insurance policy,” and its “requirements supersede contrary policy terms.”
Thom, 398 Wis. 2d 273, ¶17. Thus, Wisconsin courts have interpreted
§ 632.32(3) to require an insurer “to extend separate limits of liability to each
insured involved in an accident despite policy language to the contrary.”

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Thom, 398 Wis. 2d 273, ¶20. This rule applies in circumstances “where both the
named insured and the additional insured are actively negligent.” Id., ¶22 (citation
omitted).

¶38 For example, in Miller, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from
the back of a pickup truck driven by his grandmother and in which his mother was
a passenger. Miller, 117 Wis. 2d at 426-27. We concluded that a previous version
of WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3)(a) required the grandmother’s liability insurer to
provide separate $100,000 liability limits to both the grandmother and the mother
as tortfeasors,5 both of whom were found negligent, despite the insurer’s single
$100,000 liability limit. Miller, 117 Wis. 2d at 427, 430. We based our
conclusion on the statute’s language that entitled the mother to coverage “in the
same manner and under the same provision” as applicable to the grandmother, and
on the statute’s policy that “omnibus coverage should not subtract from the named
insured’s coverage.” Id. at 429-30 (citation omitted).

¶39 Similarly in Iaquinta, we concluded that the current version of WIS.
STAT. § 632.32(3) required a vehicle owner’s liability insurer to provide $25,000

5
In Miller v. Amundson, 117 Wis. 2d 425, 429, 345 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1984), this
court applied WIS. STAT. § 632.32(2)(b) (1977-78), which required automobile insurance policies
to contain a provision stating:

The coverage provided by this policy applies, in the same
manner and under the same provision as it is applicable to the
named insured, to any person while riding in or operating any
automobile described in this policy when the automobile is being
used for purposes and in the manner described in the policy.
Such coverage also extends to any person legally responsible for
the operation of the automobile.

In 1979, the legislature repealed and recreated WIS. STAT. § 632.32, which changed the
numbering of § 632.32(2)(b) (1977-78) to § 632.32(3) and changed the wording of the subsection
to what it is today. See 1979 Wis. Laws, ch. 102, § 171.

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No. 2023AP2308

liability limits for two negligent tortfeasors, despite the insurer’s contrary policy
language. Iaquinta, 180 Wis. 2d at 663. In that case, the plaintiff was injured
when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by an intoxicated driver and in
which the vehicle’s owner was a passenger. Id. at 664. Relying on Miller and
subsequent cases, we explained that “separate coverage must be provided only in
cases where both the named insured and the additional insured are actively
negligent.” Iaquinta, 180 Wis. 2d at 666. Because the intoxicated driver’s
negligent operation of the vehicle was a separate act from the vehicle owner’s
negligent entrustment of the vehicle, and because both were actively negligent, we
held that the vehicle owner’s insurer had to provide liability limits to both for their
separate acts of negligence. Id. at 669.

¶40 In both Miller and Iaquinta, we held that WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3)
required a tortfeasor’s liability insurer to provide separate liability limits to that
tortfeasor and a separate tortfeasor when both were actively negligent and despite
contrary policy language.

¶41 Adele seeks to extend this reasoning to her own liability insurer, not
to Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s liability insurer, by arguing that because Jadyn and
Jennifer were both negligent, Adele’s own, first-party UIM coverage extends to
Jennifer and “applies in the same manner and under the same provisions to any
person using any motor vehicle described in the policy.” She further asserts that
Jadyn is entitled to the same “coverage” as Jennifer pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 632.32(3) because Jadyn was “using” Jennifer’s vehicle.

¶42 Our supreme court has determined that it is appropriate to apply
some of the provisions of WIS. STAT. § 632.32 to UIM coverage, “at least when
that coverage is part of a liability policy.” Progressive N. Ins. v. Hall, 2006 WI

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No. 2023AP2308

13, ¶21, 288 Wis. 2d 282, 709 N.W.2d 46. Adele appears to claim that under
Hall, § 632.32(3) requires Partners Mutual to provide separate UIM coverage
limits to Adele for Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s separate negligent acts. But Hall does
not compel the outcome Adele suggests. Rather, Hall merely concluded that the
distinction between liability and indemnity coverage did not matter for purposes of
determining whether § 632.32 applied to UM and UIM coverage.6 Instead, that
determination turned on whether UM and UIM coverage were part of a liability
insurance policy subject to § 632.32. See Hall, 288 Wis. 2d 282, ¶¶13, 21-23.

¶43 In Hall, our supreme court determined whether WIS. STAT.
§ 632.32(3)(a) applied to UM coverage. Hall, 288 Wis. 2d 282, ¶2. Rather than
relying on the difference between liability coverage and indemnity coverage, the
court instead relied on the language of other provisions in § 632.32 requiring
policies “insuring against liability” to include UM coverage. Hall, 288 Wis. 2d
282, ¶¶13-14; see also § 632.32(1), (4). Because “every policy insuring against
liability under § 632.32 must include [UM] coverage” and because § 632.32(3)(a)
“plainly applies to every policy subject to § 632.32,” the court concluded that
§ 632.32(3)(a) applied to UM coverage, “regardless of whether such coverage is
categorized as liability or indemnity insurance.” Hall, 288 Wis. 2d 282, ¶15.

¶44 It was in the above context that our supreme court noted it was
“appropriate to apply provisions of [WIS. STAT.] § 632.32 to [UIM] coverage, at

6
Our supreme court described the difference between liability and indemnity coverage in
Mau v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, 2001 WI 134, ¶30 n.13, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, 637
N.W.2d 45. The court described liability coverage as requiring an insurer “to shield the insured
from making payment on a claim for which the insured is liable.” Id. (citation omitted). In
contrast, indemnity coverage, such as UM or UIM coverage, “seeks to compensate the insured
after the insured has sustained an actual loss.” Id. (citation omitted).

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No. 2023AP2308

least when that coverage is part of a liability policy,” and despite prior case law
suggesting the contrary. Hall, 288 Wis. 2d 282, ¶21. The court noted that
American Hardware Mutual Insurance v. Steberger, 187 Wis. 2d 682, 523
N.W.2d 187 (Ct. App. 1994), and Peabody v. American Family Mutual
Insurance, 220 Wis. 2d 340, 582 N.W.2d 753 (Ct. App. 1998), abrogated by,
Vieau v. American Family Mutual Ins., 2006 WI 31, 289 Wis. 2d 552, 712
N.W.2d 661, suggested that § 632.32 applied only to liability coverage, but it
explained that Mau v. North Dakota Insurance Reserve Fund, 2001 WI 134, 248
Wis. 2d 1031, 637 N.W.2d 45, had called that suggestion into question. Hall, 288
Wis. 2d 282, ¶¶19-21.

¶45 The court stated that Mau concluded the distinction between liability
and indemnity coverage did not matter for purposes of applying WIS. STAT.
§ 632.32 because the excess policy in that case, which included UM and UIM
coverage, was a liability policy that fell within the scope of the statute. Hall, 288
Wis. 2d 282, ¶22 (citing Mau, 248 Wis. 2d 1031, ¶30 n.13). The court explained
that its determination in Mau was consistent with its determination that
§ 632.32(3)(a) applied to UM coverage, regardless of whether UM coverage was
categorized as indemnity or liability coverage, because “every policy insuring
against liability under § 632.32 must include [UM] coverage.” Hall, 288 Wis. 2d
282, ¶23. In other words, § 632.32(3)(a) applied to UM coverage because the
coverage was part of a policy insuring against an insured’s liability, which brought
the coverage within the scope of § 632.32, and because every policy was required
to include UM coverage. See § 632.32(1), (4).

¶46 Here, the Policy falls within the scope of WIS. STAT. § 632.32
because the Policy is a liability policy that contains UIM coverage. But simply
because § 632.32 applies to the Policy does not mean that § 632.32(3)(a) requires

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No. 2023AP2308

Partners Mutual to provide separate UIM limits to Adele. In fact, the Policy
complies with that provision by defining an “insured person” as “[y]ou or a
relative” and “[a]ny other person occupying your insured car.” (Formatting
altered.) By providing coverage to “[a]ny other person occupying your insured
car,” the Policy provides UIM coverage “in the same manner and under the same
provisions to any person using any motor vehicle described in the policy.” See
§ 632.32(3)(a). Thus, consistent with § 632.32(3)(a), any other person in Adele’s
vehicle would have had the same UIM coverage as Adele herself.

¶47 The problem for Adele, as Partners Mutual aptly notes, is that, in this
case, “no person other than Adele is entitled to UIM coverage under the [P]olicy.”
Adele is not seeking separate liability limits from Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s liability
insurer, Progressive, as the plaintiffs sought from the tortfeasors’ liability insurers
in Miller and Iaquinta. Indeed, it is because of WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3), Miller,
and Iaquinta that Progressive paid separate $50,000 liability limits to Adele for
Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s separate negligent conduct. Adele is instead seeking
additional, otherwise unbargained-for liability limits from her own insurer, but
Partners Mutual does not provide liability or UIM coverage to Jadyn and Jennifer,
and nothing in the language of § 632.32(3), Miller, Iaquinta, or Hall requires
Partners Mutual to do so. Partners Mutual, as Adele’s UIM insurer, does not step
in as Jadyn’s and Jennifer’s liability insurer.

¶48 In sum, the Policy complies with WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3)(a), and,
pursuant to that section, there is no additional insured to whom the Policy’s UIM
coverage would apply “in the same manner and under the same provisions” as
applicable to Adele. Thus, we see no reason to conclude that § 632.32(3)(a)
requires Partners Mutual to provide Adele with separate UIM limits.

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No. 2023AP2308

CONCLUSION

¶49 Because neither the Policy’s language nor WIS. STAT. § 632.32(3)
require Partners Mutual to provide separate $100,000 UIM limits to Adele, we
conclude that Adele is entitled to a single $100,000 UIM limit. Given that Adele
does not dispute that the Policy’s reducing clause reduces the $100,000 UIM limit
by the separate $50,000 payments made by Progressive, the remaining available
UIM limit for Adele is $0.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

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