Kelly Ann Lewis v. Travis Michael Lewis

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 27, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP1143 Cir. Ct. No. 2023FA41

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

KELLY ANN LEWIS,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

TRAVIS MICHAEL LEWIS,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Bayfield County:
JOHN P. ANDERSON, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP1143

¶1 PER CURIAM. Travis Michael Lewis appeals a judgment of
divorce from his former spouse, Kelly Ann Lewis.1 Travis argues that the circuit
court erred in two respects when dividing the parties’ property: (1) the court
erroneously concluded that Kelly had “adequately traced the identity” of vacant
property that she had acquired by gift or inheritance; and (2) the court erred by
awarding a dog that was acquired during the parties’ marriage to Kelly. We reject
these arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 1994, prior to the parties’ marriage, Kelly’s parents transferred to
her, as a gift, an approximately 1.85-acre vacant parcel of property in
Bayfield County. The property was titled solely in Kelly’s name at the time of
transfer and has remained titled solely in her name at all times relevant to this
appeal. Later on in 1994, Kelly purchased a manufactured home, using a
mortgage loan, and placed it on the 1.85-acre parcel. At the time of the contested
divorce hearing, the 1.85-acre parcel and improvements had an assessed value of
$151,700.

¶3 In 1997, Kelly’s parents gifted her a 43-acre parcel of vacant land
adjacent to the 1.85-acre parcel. Again, the 43-acre parcel was transferred to
Kelly alone and has been titled solely in her name at all times relevant to this
appeal.

1
Because the parties share a surname, we will refer to them by their first names
throughout the remainder of this opinion.

2
No. 2024AP1143

¶4 Kelly and Travis were married in 2002, after cohabitating for several
years. In 2017, Kelly’s mother, as trustee of the “Kelly A. Lewis Irrevocable
Trust Dated April 6, 2005,” deeded to Kelly several additional parcels of
unimproved land, comprising approximately 130 acres. All of those parcels were
adjacent to or near the original 1.85-acre parcel that Kelly’s parents had gifted to
her. These additional parcels were transferred to Kelly alone and have remained
titled solely in her name at all times relevant to this appeal.

¶5 Kelly filed for divorce from Travis on September 22, 2023, and a
contested divorce hearing took place on March 1, 2024.2 As relevant to this
appeal, at the hearing, Kelly conceded that the 1.85-acre homestead property on
which the manufactured home sat should be treated as marital property subject to
division. Kelly argued, however, that the remainder of the property that she
acquired from her parents by gift or inheritance should be treated as her individual
property and excluded from the property division.

¶6 Conversely, Travis argued that all of the land should be included in
the property division. He elicited testimony from Kelly that the parties had used
the vacant land surrounding the homestead parcel for walking, cutting firewood,
and riding horses. Kelly also conceded that the parties “store[d] stuff” on the
vacant land, “probably 300 yards from the house.” Kelly also testified that, at
some point, the parties put in a driveway and cleared part of the land because they
were planning to sell an unspecified portion of it. Kelly further conceded that
portions of the property were logged in 2020 and 2022 and that the checks for the

2
Travis represented himself at the contested divorce hearing, but he is represented by
counsel on appeal.

3
No. 2024AP1143

lumber were made out to Travis. She also testified that, at some point, the parties
“were trying to” put in a “gravel pit” on the property.

¶7 The other disputed issue at the contested divorce hearing, as relevant
to this appeal, pertained to the ownership of a dog named Heidi that was acquired
during the parties’ marriage. Kelly testified that Heidi was purchased for $800 in
2020 using Kelly’s “inheritance money”; that Kelly would like to be awarded
Heidi; and that Kelly was willing to pay Travis $800 for Heidi. On
cross-examination, Kelly clarified that Heidi was one of two dogs purchased in
2020 and that the other dog had died. She maintained that both dogs belonged to
both parties, and she denied gifting one of the dogs to Travis. Travis, however,
asserted that Kelly had purchased one dog for each of them; that Kelly had given
Heidi to Travis; and that the dog who died was Kelly’s dog.

¶8 Following the contested divorce hearing, the circuit court issued a
written decision and order regarding the division of the parties’ property. The
court found that Kelly had acquired the 43-acre and 130-acre properties by gift or
inheritance and that those properties had never been retitled in Travis’s name. The
court further found that, at the time of the hearing, the 43-acre parcel had an
assessed value of $73,000, while the 130-acre parcels had a combined assessed
value of $167,500. The court also found that Kelly had used her “inheritance”
money, which was kept in a separate bank account titled in her name only, “to pay
the real estate taxes on her inherited property, as well as the parties’ marital
residence.”

¶9 The circuit court rejected Travis’s assertion “that all the inherited
land was given to the parties together,” stating that Travis had provided “no proof
of [that] assertion.” The court further explained that Travis

4
No. 2024AP1143

made a rather odd statement that, after [Kelly] took his
surname after marriage, that this somehow entitled him to
half of [Kelly’s] gifted or inherited property. This
argument and assertion is unsupported by evidence nor is it
supported with any legal authority. [Travis] did testify that
some of the vacant land surrounding the marital residence
was used to store personal property. There also was
testimony that the parties had contemplated using some of
the gifted land as a gravel and sand pit and that some years
back they started the process of having the property
rezoned, but the attempt ultimately failed. This was
confirmed by [Kelly’s] testimony. There was no evidence
that the property was ever converted into some type of joint
venture or other business enterprise, or that it was retitled
to joint ownership.

¶10 The circuit court next addressed Travis’s argument that he
“maintained all of the property, including the gifted land, because walking trails
were created throughout the property[,] and that somehow commingled and
converted the property into a marital asset subject to division.” The court
explained:

[Travis’s] testimony about occupying more than the
1.85 acres with personal property implied that the marital
homestead exceeded the 1.85 acres. In this regard, [Kelly]
somewhat acquiesced that some of the personal property
items located at or near the homestead may be outside the
boundaries of the original 1.85 acres, but to an unknown
extent. She also agreed additional driveways were created
outside the 1.85 acres. In this regard the Court finds there
is sufficient evidence to conclude the property constituting
the marital residence (which [Kelly] concedes is subject to
division as marital property) is larger than the 1.85 acres.
However, [Travis] failed to provide much, if any, evidence
as to what value should be assigned to the marital residence
or how much land was actually occupied. Therefore, the
Court will adopt as the best evidence the real estate tax
statements and in particular Exhibit 1, which indicates the
1.85 acres of land has an assessed value, without
improvements, of $8,600. Based on the evidence, the
Court will estimate that the marital homestead and curtilage
encompasses more tha[n] 1.85 acres and that the total
curtilage of the property is perhaps three times the 1.85
acres. With that finding the Court believes the marital
residence has a higher value, because it enjoys the benefit

5
No. 2024AP1143

of using additional land. The Court, therefore, believes the
land value without improvements is really $17,200 rather
than $8,600.

¶11 The circuit court then clarified that, “[i]n making this finding, the
Court is not concluding that the vacant land has lost its character as separate gifted
property, but rather, that the existence of the adjoining land enhances the value of
the marital homestead.” Because the record did not establish “the extent of the
boundaries of the marital residence,” the court stated that “[t]he only equitable
way to handle this is to increase the value of the homestead property.” The court
then found that “the marital residence has a value of $168,900,” rather than the
assessed value of $151,700, “which incorporates the Court’s belief that the use of
the inherited land enhances the value of the marital home.” However, the court
specifically found that “[t]he real estate that was gifted or inherited, other than the
marital residence, has kept its separate status and was never retitled to include”
Travis’s name.

¶12 The circuit court also rejected Travis’s argument that “because some
of the vacant land was logged several years ago by Santikko Logging and a check
was written by Santikko to [Travis] for $25,000, the vacant land became a marital
asset.” The court cited Kelly’s testimony that she was not aware the check was
written to Travis alone, and it noted that “[n]o other evidence was presented on
this issue.” The court also stated it was “unclear” whether Travis had arranged for
the logging and whether Santikko “knew or cared if the property belonged to
[Kelly] alone or if it was co-owned.” The court further observed that “[n]o
meaningful evidence was presented regarding how or why the timber sale
proceeds would change the character of the gifted land.”

6
No. 2024AP1143

¶13 Applying the relevant legal principles to its factual findings, the
circuit court then concluded that Kelly’s gifted and inherited property surrounding
the homestead remained Kelly’s individual property and would not be included in
the property division. The court stated it was “relatively easy to trace the
properties in question to an indivisible asset” because “[a]ll the land gifted to
[Kelly] has remained in her name alone and has not been retitled to include
[Travis’s] name.” Addressing the property’s character, the court stated that none
of Kelly’s actions “showed a donative intent to convert … the unimproved land to
property subject to division.”

¶14 Next, the circuit court noted that “[n]either party seriously argues
that the marital estate subject to division should not be divided equally,” but that
the parties did disagree as to “[w]ho should be awarded the marital home.” The
court observed that “[w]hoever is awarded the marital home will have to pay the
other party a significant sum of money to equalize the property division,” and
while Kelly had “the ability to obtain money from her trust to buy out [Travis],”
there was no evidence that Travis would be able to make an equalization payment
to Kelly. The court also noted that the home was surrounded by Kelly’s individual
property and that it did not appear the parties would be able to “coexist as
adjoining landowners,” given that they had reciprocal restraining orders against
each other. The court further stated that Kelly had invested “far more” into the
marital residence than Travis and that the property was “generationally tied to”
Kelly’s family. Given these considerations, the court concluded that the equities
favored awarding the marital residence to Kelly.

¶15 Finally, with respect to the ownership of the dog, the circuit court
found that Kelly had acquired two dogs with her inherited money, but one of the
dogs had died. The court then concluded that the surviving dog, Heidi, “is at the

7
No. 2024AP1143

marital home and will be awarded to the party who will be awarded the marital
home”—i.e., Kelly. The court noted that Kelly had agreed to pay Travis $800 for
Heidi, and it ordered Kelly to pay Travis that amount, in addition to the
equalization payment that she was required to make under the property division.

¶16 The circuit court ultimately entered a final judgment of divorce on
April 29, 2024. Travis now appeals from that judgment.3

DISCUSSION

¶17 The division of property at divorce is entrusted to the circuit court’s
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an erroneous exercise of
discretion. LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶13, 262 Wis. 2d 426, 663 N.W.2d
789. We will uphold a discretionary decision as long as the court “examined the
relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational
process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.” Id. (citation
3
After filing his notice of appeal, Travis filed a motion for reconsideration in the circuit
court. The court denied that motion on July 12, 2024. Travis has not filed a notice of appeal
from the July 12 order. As such, that order is not before us in this appeal, and we will not address
it further.

We also pause to note two deficiencies in Travis’s appellate briefs. First, the briefs do
not comply with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(8)(bm) (2023-24), which requires a brief to “have page
numbers centered in the bottom margin using Arabic numerals with sequential numbering starting
at ‘1’ on the cover.” Our supreme court has explained that this pagination requirement “will
match the page number to the page header applied by the eFiling system, avoiding the confusion
of having two different page numbers.” S. CT. ORDER 20-07, 2021 WI 37, 397 Wis. 2d xiii (eff.
July 1, 2021).

Second, throughout his appellate briefs, Travis repeatedly refers to the parties by party
designation, rather than by name, in violation of WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(i) (2023-24).

We admonish Travis’s counsel that future violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure
may result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2) (2023-24).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

8
No. 2024AP1143

omitted). Our review of a discretionary decision may involve underlying
questions of law and fact. Covelli v. Covelli, 2006 WI App 121, ¶13, 293 Wis. 2d
707, 718 N.W.2d 260. We review any questions of law independently, but we will
not disturb the circuit court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.
Id.

I. Kelly’s gifted or inherited property

¶18 “The general rule is that assets and debts acquired by either party
before or during the marriage are divisible upon divorce.” Derr v. Derr, 2005 WI
App 63, ¶10, 280 Wis. 2d 681, 696 N.W.2d 170. However, property acquired by
gift or by reason of the death of another—i.e., by inheritance—is generally not
subject to division. See WIS. STAT. § 767.61(2)(a).4 Determining whether
property is subject to division is a mixed question of fact and law. See Derr, 280
Wis. 2d 681, ¶45.

¶19 “When a party to a divorce asserts that property, or some part of the
value of property, is not subject to division, that party has the burden of showing
that the property is non-divisible at the time of the divorce.” Id., ¶11. To do so,
that party must establish: “(1) the original gifted or inherited status of the property;
and (2) that the character and identity of the property [have] been preserved.”
Wright v. Wright, 2008 WI App 21, ¶12, 307 Wis. 2d 156, 747 N.W.2d 690
(2007). “Once the recipient of [gifted or] inherited property has met these
requirements, the opposing party has the opportunity to establish by sufficient

4
Property acquired by gift or inheritance may be divided at divorce “if the court finds
that refusal to divide the property will create a hardship on the other party or on the children of
the marriage.” WIS. STAT. § 767.61(2)(b). The circuit court in this case made no such finding,
and Travis does not argue that § 767.61(2)(b) is applicable here.

9
No. 2024AP1143

countervailing evidence the property is not [gifted or] inherited, or has otherwise
lost its exempt status because its character or identity has not been preserved.”
Krejci v. Krejci, 2003 WI App 160, ¶32, 266 Wis. 2d 284, 667 N.W.2d 780.

¶20 In this case, it is undisputed that Kelly acquired the property in
question—that is, the vacant parcels surrounding the parties’ homestead—by gift
or inheritance. We therefore proceed to the second step of the analysis and
consider whether the parcels’ character and identity have been preserved.

¶21 On appeal, Travis argues that the circuit court “failed in the identity
portion of the analysis.”5 “Identity,” which is also called “tracing,” “addresses
whether the gifted or inherited asset has been preserved in some present
identifiable form so that it can be meaningfully valued and assigned.” Derr, 280
Wis. 2d 681, ¶15 (citation omitted).

¶22 At the contested divorce hearing, Kelly submitted deeds that clearly
identified the relevant parcels and showed that they had been transferred to her
and were titled solely in her name. As such, the parcels have been preserved in a
present, identifiable form. Furthermore, the evidence showed that the 43-acre
parcel had an assessed value of $73,000 at the time of the contested divorce
hearing, while the 130-acre parcels had a combined assessed value of $167,500.
Thus, the parcels were capable of being meaningfully valued and assigned.

5
Travis does not develop any argument on appeal regarding the property’s “character”—
i.e., whether Kelly intended to donate the parcels in question to the marriage. See Derr v. Derr,
2005 WI App 63, ¶23, 280 Wis. 2d 681, 696 N.W.2d 170. “[W]e will not abandon our neutrality
to develop arguments” for a party. Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, Inc.,
2009 WI App 62, ¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82. We therefore limit our analysis to the
property’s identity and do not further address its character.

10
No. 2024AP1143

Consequently, the circuit court properly determined that the parcels’ identity had
been preserved.

¶23 In arguing to the contrary, Travis asserts that the parcels’ identity
was not preserved because “the parties did not use the properties as seven separate
parcels.” However, Travis cites no legal authority in support of the proposition
that the parties’ use of the parcels affected the parcels’ identity. We need not
consider arguments that are unsupported by citations to legal authority. See State
v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).

¶24 Travis also asserts that the “boundary lines were uncertain, and the
use of the homestead property extended [onto the vacant land] to some unknown
amount.” This argument is unpersuasive because Travis does not explain why the
so-called “extension” of the homestead onto the vacant parcels prevented those
parcels from being either identified or meaningfully valued and assigned. Travis
emphasizes that the circuit court assigned an increased value to the homestead
based on the parties’ use of the vacant parcels. That determination, however, does
not demonstrate that the identity of the vacant parcels had changed. Rather, the
court determined, in equity, that when valuing the homestead, it was appropriate to
assign an increased value to the land based on the parties’ ability to use the
neighboring parcels during their marriage.6 That determination regarding the
value of the homestead does not compel a conclusion that the surrounding, vacant
parcels could not be identified or meaningfully valued and assigned at the time of
divorce.

6
On appeal, neither party argues that the circuit court erred in its valuation of the
homestead.

11
No. 2024AP1143

¶25 Travis next asserts that the parties “planned to sell their property” at
some unspecified point in time, but “the extent of what they intended to sell is not
clear on the record.” Travis fails to explain the relevance of this fact. It is
undisputed that no sale of any portion of the property took place during the
parties’ marriage. Thus, the identity of the gifted or inherited parcels remained
unchanged. The fact that the parties may have contemplated selling an
unspecified portion of the property at some point in time is immaterial.

¶26 Travis also argues that the circuit court improperly shifted the
burden of proof to him to show a change in the identity of the gifted or inherited
parcels. As set forth above, Kelly had the initial burden to show that the
property’s identity had been preserved. See Wright, 307 Wis. 2d 156, ¶12. Once
she did so, however, it became Travis’s burden “to establish by sufficient
countervailing evidence” that the property’s “identity ha[d] not been preserved.”
See Krejci, 266 Wis. 2d 284, ¶32. The record shows that Kelly met her burden,
and Travis failed to present the requisite countervailing evidence. Accordingly,
the court did not err by determining that the gifted or inherited parcels remained
Kelly’s individual property and would not be included in the property division.

II. Heidi

¶27 Travis next argues that the circuit court erred in its treatment of the
dog, Heidi, that was acquired during the parties’ marriage. Travis contends that
Heidi “legally would be considered separate property because she was purchased
with [Kelly’s] inherited property.” Thus, according to Travis, “the court needed to
consider whether [Heidi’s] identity was properly traced” and “whether Heidi’s
character remained a gift.”

12
No. 2024AP1143

¶28 This argument ignores the basis for the circuit court’s ruling. The
court did not award Heidi to Kelly because Heidi had been purchased using
Kelly’s inherited funds. Instead, the court determined that Heidi lived at the
marital home and that, as a result, it was appropriate to award Heidi to the party
who received the marital home. The court then awarded the marital home to Kelly
because: (1) Kelly had the ability to make an equalization payment to Travis;
(2) the home was surrounded by Kelly’s individual property, and it was unlikely
the parties would be able to coexist as neighboring landowners; (3) Kelly had
invested “far more” than Travis into the marital residence; and (4) the homestead
property was “generationally tied to” Kelly’s family.

¶29 Travis does not develop any argument on appeal that the circuit
court erred by awarding the marital home to Kelly. Nor does Travis explain why
it was an erroneous exercise of discretion to award Heidi to the party who received
the marital home, given that Heidi resided at the marital home. On its face, that
ruling does not appear to be an erroneous exercise of the court’s discretion. We
therefore reject Travis’s argument that the court erred by awarding Heidi to Kelly.

¶30 In his reply brief, Travis argues for the first time that he “was never
provided an opportunity to say how he might care for the dog” and that the circuit
court erroneously exercised its discretion by “assigning an arbitrary value without
testimony to the dog.” We need not address these arguments because they were
raised for the first time in a reply brief. See A.O. Smith Corp. v. Allstate Ins.
Cos., 222 Wis. 2d 475, 492, 588 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1998).

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

13