State v. Sir Grant

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 11, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2543-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2023CF366

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

SIR GRANT,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County:
PAUL BUGENHAGEN, JR., Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, Grogan, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2543-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Sir Grant challenges his judgment of conviction
entered upon his no contest plea to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and
his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a felon. He contends the circuit court
erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a pat-down
search conducted during a traffic stop. For the following reasons, we conclude the
court did not err, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 At the evidentiary hearing on Grant’s suppression motion, the
following relevant evidence was presented.

¶3 A City of Waukesha police officer agreed that he had received training
“in detecting individuals who may be involved in drug sales or drug purchases” and
had gained experience in stopping cars that he “suspected of being engaged in drug
deliveries or drug purchases.” On March 4, 2023, at approximately 11:19 p.m., the
officer was conducting surveillance of the area around the parking lot of a particular
apartment building, which was an area of significant drug activity. The officer
explained:

Based on prior information and observation from other
fellow officers, we believed this area was a known drug area,
as well as the house in specific to be a known drug house
with frequent drug activities.

….

… Based on other officers’ observations there w[as]
traffic that was being monitored that would be consistent
with drug activity on prior dates.

....

… [Specifically, there were] short-term contacts as well
as people that don’t live there coming in and out of the

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

buildings or other subjects loitering within parking lots and
having short-term contacts in the parking lots as well.

….

… [Other officers] previously have seen short-term
contacts within the parking lot as well as short-term contacts
of subjects going in and out very quickly of the apartment
building.

The officer further explained that based on his training and experience, “a short-term
contact would be indicative of drug activity or drug sales.” When asked if he
himself previously had conducted a traffic stop following observation of such a
short-term vehicular contact and discovered in the suspect vehicle “either drugs or
money that could have come from a drug sale,” he confirmed that he had.

¶4 At the time he was conducting surveillance of the area around the
parking lot, the officer observed a vehicle that “was continuously running … ma[k]e
a short-term contact with another subject.” After the vehicle quickly exited the
parking lot, the officer followed it and, after determining it was speeding, performed
a traffic stop.

¶5 The officer explained to the circuit court the correlation he has
observed between illegal drugs and the presence of weapons, stating that persons
who “carry [illegal] narcotics as well as money … are found to carry firearms or
other weapons for not only their … personal protection, but for the protection of
their drugs as well as the monies from the proceeds of the drugs.” The officer further
added that he had been involved in “probably over 10” drug investigations related
to a traffic stop “in which the person had drugs and a firearm on their person or in
their vehicle.”

¶6 The officer testified that upon approaching the vehicle, he knocked on
the back passenger-side window and asked the driver, Grant, to roll down the

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

windows. He initially did not do so, and when he finally did roll the windows down,
“he only rolled [them] down … about 2 or 3 inches.” When asked if this was
“normal” or “unusual,” the officer stated it was unusual, adding that “[t]he vast
majority of people who are stopped by police roll their windows all the way down
… without asking.” This raised concerns for the officer because based upon his
training and experience, “those that only roll their windows down a short amount,
about approximately 2 to 3 inches, they are doing that for a reason, for either
concealing or trying to hide smells,” which can include the smell of drugs, “or trying
to have an evasive contact with the police.” The officer asked Grant for his driver’s
license or identification card, and Grant “took an excessive amount of time” to
provide his license and, in fact, failed to do so before exiting the vehicle.

¶7 A backup officer approached the vehicle on the driver’s side, and the
first officer noticed that Grant “was very fixated on my partner[’s] position as well
as what we were doing.” The first officer asked Grant “multiple times to speak with
me and only to me.” The officer observed Grant to be “very nervous,” with his
hands shaking and “looking around him, trying to be very fixated on my position
outside the vehicle as well as my partner’s position, kept asking questions, felt that
he was unsafe and overall[,] just very uncooperative, which is not normal for a
routine traffic stop.” Noting that he had performed thousands of traffic stops during
his law enforcement career, the officer agreed that Grant’s level of nervousness was
unusual for a normal traffic stop. Reiterating the various observations he had made
of Grant, the officer explained that these factors raised concerns about his and the
other officer’s security.

¶8 After asking Grant multiple times to provide his driver’s license and
Grant failing to do so, the officer asked him to step out of the vehicle. Grant initially
did not do so, and the officer had to ask him “numerous, numerous times” before he

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

finally exited the vehicle. Grant continued exhibiting nervousness upon exiting the
vehicle. Concerned about Grant’s behavior and the fact that they were “in close
contact with” him, “an unknown person,” the officers conducted a pat-down search
of Grant for weapons. They did so because they feared “he may be possibly
involved in narcotics or drug sales[ and] that he would possibly be armed.” During
the pat down, the officer located in Grant’s waistband a “fully loaded semiautomatic
pistol” with a round chambered.

¶9 On cross-examination, the officer acknowledged he had not
“personally observe[d] any actual drug transaction or any drug use that night in th[e]
parking lot” nor smelled any suspicious odors emanating from the vehicle, even
when his face was “pretty close to [the two to three inch] opening in the window.”
The officer quantified that it took Grant “between 10 and 20” seconds to find his
driver’s license when asked for it and agreed Grant handed it to the officer after
exiting the vehicle. The officer acknowledged that prior to exiting the vehicle, Grant
had expressed he felt “unsafe.”

¶10 After specifically finding the testifying officer credible, the circuit
court denied the suppression motion. Thereafter, Grant pled guilty to felon in
possession of a firearm, and in relation to other evidence discovered, pled no contest
to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver with use of a dangerous weapon, with
charges of maintaining a drug trafficking place with use of a dangerous weapon,
possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of an electronic weapon being
dismissed and read in. Following his sentencing, Grant initiated this appeal,
challenging the officer’s decision to conduct the pat-down search.

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

DISCUSSION

¶11 Grant contends the circuit court erred in determining the officer had
the reasonable suspicion necessary to lawfully conduct the pat-down search. We
conclude the court did not err.

¶12 “When we review a circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress
evidence, we apply the clearly erroneous standard to the circuit court’s findings of
fact. However, we review the circuit court’s application of constitutional principles
to the findings of fact de novo.” State v. Smiter, 2011 WI App 15, ¶9, 331 Wis. 2d
431, 793 N.W.2d 920 (2010) (citation omitted).

¶13 A police officer’s pat-down search for weapons is reasonable, and
thus constitutional, if the officer’s suspicion that the person “may be armed and
dangerous” is objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances and in
light of the officer’s training and experience. State v. Nesbit, 2017 WI App 58, ¶6,
378 Wis. 2d 65, 902 N.W.2d 266 (emphasis added; citation omitted) (“A protective
frisk to search for weapons is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
if it is supported by ‘reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous
to the officer or others.’” (citation omitted)); State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 56,
556 N.W.2d 681 (1996); State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 96, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992)
(“Officers can draw reasonable inferences from the facts in light of their
experience.”). The circuit court correctly determined that the officer’s decision to
pat down Grant met that standard.

¶14 Based on observations of his fellow officers, the area where the officer
was conducting surveillance was a “known drug area” and the specific apartment
building was “a known drug house with frequent drug activities.” The officer
detailed the prior observations of fellow officers that led to this conclusion,

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

specifically “subjects loitering within parking lots” and “short-term contacts within
the parking lot as well as short-term contacts of subjects going in and out very
quickly of the apartment building.” When asked, the officer confirmed he
personally had received training “in detecting individuals who may be involved in
drug sales or drug purchases” and had gained experience in stopping cars “suspected
of being engaged in drug deliveries or drug purchases.” The officer also agreed he
personally had experience with conducting a traffic stop following observation of a
short-term vehicular contact, like the contacts previously observed at this area by
fellow officers, and had learned that the vehicle he stopped did in fact contain “drugs
or money that could have come from a drug sale.”

¶15 In this case, the officer observed Grant’s vehicle to be continuously
running in the parking lot when another subject made a short-term contact with it.
Moments later, the officer stopped Grant for speeding. When the officer asked him
to roll down the windows, he initially did not do so, and when he eventually did roll
down the windows, he rolled them down only two to three inches. The officer found
this “unusual” as “[t]he vast majority of people who are stopped by police roll their
windows all the way down … without asking.” Not only did Grant’s resistance to
rolling down his window indicate a lack of cooperation, it further suggested an
attempt by him to be evasive and limit the extent to which the officer would be able
to make observations as to the inside of the vehicle.

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

¶16 The officer also testified that Grant took an abnormally long time to
provide his driver’s license1 and did not readily exit his vehicle when requested
“numerous, numerous times,” indicating further resistance and a lack of
cooperation. Additionally, the officer stated that he had performed thousands of
traffic stops, and based on his experience, Grant’s level of nervousness was
excessive for a routine traffic stop,2 further suggesting Grant was concerned officers
would discover something illegal.

1
Grant contends the circuit court’s finding that he “did not get his license out right away”
is “clearly erroneous, as [the video] reflects that Mr. Grant did produce [his license] while in the
vehicle.” Grant maintains that when the officer asked him, “Do you have a driver’s license or ID
card on you?,” he was not asking Grant to “produce it or hand it over.” This defies common sense.
By asking if Grant had a license or ID card on him, the officer was clearly communicating to Grant
to produce his driver’s license or ID card if he had one. Moreover, as the State points out, even
after the officer repeated himself, “Grant took his time retrieving his driver’s license from his
wallet, held it in his hand for some time, and never even offered it to either officer until the officers
opened his doors to remove him from his vehicle.”
2
As indicated, the circuit court found the officer’s testimony credible, and it also stated
that it had watched the video and found that it “corroborated what the officer testified to.” Based
upon the presented evidence, the court found that Grant’s hands were shaking and he “appeared
nervous.”

Relying on the recording from the officer’s body camera, Grant challenges the circuit
court’s finding that Grant’s “hands were shaking.” He maintains that “[a]t no time does the video
reflect that Mr. Grant’s hands were shaking.” We cannot say from our own review of the video
that the court clearly erred in its factual finding that Grant’s hands were shaking. See State v. Walli,
2011 WI App 86, ¶17, 334 Wis. 2d 402, 799 N.W.2d 898 (“[W]hen evidence in the record consists
of disputed testimony and a video recording, we will apply the clearly erroneous standard of review
when we are reviewing the … court’s findings of fact based on that recording.”)

To begin, the video does not show Grant’s hands at all times during which it appears the
officer would have been in a position to personally view his hands. Thus, the officer may have
observed Grant’s hands shaking (as he testified) at a time when the video simply does not show his
hands at all. Additionally, the quality of the video is not so crisp as to allow us to confidently
conclude that his hands were not shaking even during the times they are visible in the video. And
lastly, we note that at one point during the two officers’ engagement with Grant before removing
him from the vehicle, one of the officers (it appears to be the second officer, who is in closest
physical proximity to Grant) explains to Grant that one of the reasons he wants Grant to step out of
the car is that Grant is “very shaky.” In the video, Grant makes no response to the officer that in
any way suggests he does not agree with the officer’s assessment in this regard.

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

¶17 The officer explained that he has observed a correlation between
illegal drugs and the presence of firearms, stating that persons who “carry [illegal]
narcotics as well as money … also are found to carry firearms or other weapons for
not only their … personal protection, but for the protection of their drugs as well as
the monies from the proceeds of the drugs.” The officer added that he had been
personally involved in “probably over 10” traffic-stop drug investigations “in which
the person had drugs and a firearm on their person or in their vehicle.” The officer’s
own experience correlates strongly with a long-held recognition of our supreme
court, that “weapons are often ‘tools of the trade’ for drug dealers,” Guy, 172
Wis. 2d at 96, and “[t]he violence associated with drug trafficking … places law
enforcement officers in extreme danger,” State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 984,
485 N.W.2d 42 (1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d
410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994). Our supreme court has further noted that “[s]everal
cases have found that drug dealers and weapons go hand in hand, thus warranting a
Terry[3] frisk for weapons.” State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 144, 456 N.W.2d
830 (1990). Indeed, in Guy, the court even “assume[d]” that the officer in that case,
who was executing a search warrant for cocaine, “knew that those who deal drugs
often keep weapons on their person or nearby.” Guy, 172 Wis. 2d at 96.

¶18 In light of the totality of the circumstances, Grant having brief contact
in the parking lot of a known drug area, his lack of cooperation with law
enforcement, unusual nervousness for a routine traffic stop, and appearance that he
had something to hide, including rolling down the windows only a few inches and
resistance to providing his driver’s license, the officer had reasonable suspicion
Grant had just been involved in an illegal drug transaction. The officer’s related

3
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

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No. 2024AP2543-CR

concerns for his safety and that of the other officer were likewise reasonable,
because, as our supreme court has noted and this officer had personally experienced,
drug dealing and weapons “go hand in hand.” See Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d at 144.
And Grant’s demonstrated lack of cooperation raised the specter that he may
continue to display his lack of cooperation, perhaps by utilizing a weapon. The
circuit court did not err in concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion that
Grant may have been armed and dangerous, thereby justifying the brief pat-down
search.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5 (2023-24).

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