State v. Jasmine C. Daniels

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 31, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP74-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF2541

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JASMINE C. DANIELS,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: DAVID L. BOROWSKI, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.

¶1 WHITE, C.J. Jasmine C. Daniels appeals her judgment of
conviction entered after she pled guilty to neglecting a child where the
consequence is death. She argues that the circuit court erred when it denied her
motion to suppress her custodial statements, which were made after she invoked
No. 2025AP74-CR

her right to counsel but was erroneously informed by police detectives that an
attorney was not available.

¶2 We conclude that the circuit court’s findings of fact regarding this
issue were clearly erroneous, and that Daniels’ waiver of her right to counsel was
not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. We therefore reverse the order denying
her motion to suppress, and remand this matter with directions to grant the motion.

BACKGROUND

¶3 The charge against Daniels stemmed from the shooting death of her
two-year-old daughter, Z.M.S., in July 2020, at a Milwaukee residence. A
neighbor heard a gunshot inside the residence, and then observed Daniels run
outside holding a small child who was covered in blood. That neighbor also
observed a male with a gun in his waistband exit the residence and get into a silver
vehicle. The police and paramedics were called and life-saving measures were
performed on Z.M.S., but she was pronounced dead while she was being
transported to the hospital.

¶4 Daniels provided different versions of the incident to police. First,
she said that Z.M.S. had been shot during a drive-by shooting. However, the
officers who secured the scene observed a trail of blood leading into the residence
and down to the basement where Daniels lived, where there was a pool of blood.
When confronted with this information, Daniels changed her story, instead stating
that her three-year-old son, J.D., had accidentally shot Z.M.S. with a gun that
Daniels had found in the park. The officers asked to enter the residence to search
for the gun, but Daniels refused, saying “you won’t find it.” Daniels was arrested
for obstruction.

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¶5 The police obtained a search warrant for the basement of the
residence. No gun was found. Additionally, officers reviewed surveillance video
of the outside of the residence from just after the shooting. The video showed
Trayell Nettles, the father of Daniels’ youngest child, exiting the residence with a
gun as Daniels carried out a bleeding Z.M.S. Nettles left the scene and was in a
car accident approximately five minutes after the shooting; he brandished the
firearm at the people in the other vehicle, telling them not to report the accident,
before fleeing that scene.

¶6 The police conducted several custodial interviews of Daniels. In the
first interview, she again stated that J.D. had accidently shot Z.M.S., and
maintained that she and the children were the only people in the basement at the
time of the shooting. During a second custodial interview, approximately thirteen
hours later, Daniels said that it was not J.D. who had shot Z.M.S., but rather an
unknown man who had come into the basement and started cleaning a gun, and
then fled after firing the gunshot. During a third interview, in the early morning
hours the following day, Daniels said that a person named Eddie, who was
wearing all black, had shot Z.M.S. However, no one matching either of those
descriptions was seen on the surveillance video. Furthermore, Daniels denied that
Nettles was at the residence, even though he was seen on video leaving the
residence after the shooting. Daniels also had no explanation of where the gun
had gone.

¶7 Finally, Daniels confessed during the third interview that she had
accidentally shot Z.M.S. while “playing with the rack on the gun.” Daniels was
charged with first-degree reckless homicide.

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¶8 Daniels filed a motion to suppress her custodial statements, arguing
that she had invoked her right to counsel, and that her statements were coerced and
therefore involuntary. The record indicates that Daniels requested an attorney at
the beginning of her first custodial interview, at approximately 3:00 a.m. She was
informed by the detectives that an attorney would not be available until about
9:00 a.m. She then agreed to speak with the detectives.

¶9 At the suppression hearing, Daniels argued that the detectives
misinformed her about the availability of an attorney during her first interview.
She asserted that a public defender is on call twenty-four hours a day and seven
days a week to provide representation at custodial interviews. The State argued
that the detectives were not aware of the availability of an on-call public defender.
The detectives did not testify at the hearing, however, so the State instead offered
to provide affidavits from the detectives regarding their knowledge on public
defender availability. No affidavits were ever filed.

¶10 In contrast, Daniels filed an affidavit from the Regional Attorney
Manager for the Milwaukee Trial Office of the State Public Defender (SPD)
regarding the availability of a public defender for custodial interviews. The
affidavit stated that an attorney is “available on a 24/7 basis,” and the SPD had
provided a contact phone number to the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) for
this service when it was implemented in 1978. The affidavit furthers avers that the
MPD regularly calls that number several times each month.

¶11 Daniels also argued that her confession was coerced based on her
“cognitive abilities, education, and mental health at the time of the interrogations.”
She indicated that she lost another child to SIDS a few months prior to this
incident, had limited education and cognitive difficulties, and had been sexually

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No. 2025AP74-CR

assaulted as a teenager. Daniels thus alleged the tactics used by the detectives
during the first custodial interview were coercive, such as telling her that she was
a “horrible person,” and that although she had given birth to her children she was
“no mother.”

¶12 In its findings on the motion to suppress, the circuit court agreed
with the State that the detectives likely did not know about the availability of a
public defender. The court indicated it found the State’s assertion that the
detectives lacked knowledge of the on-call SPD attorney to be credible because
the court itself was not aware of this policy.

¶13 The circuit court further found that the detectives likely were not
aware of Daniels’ cognitive, educational, and mental health issues. The court
acknowledged that the detectives were a “bit rough” at times and “pretty forceful”
during the first interview, but stated it believed that conduct was due to their being
“frustrated” and “pissed off” about Daniels’ lack of cooperation, and because they
clearly believed she was lying.

¶14 The circuit court denied Daniels’ motion to suppress.
Approximately one week later, Daniels entered a guilty plea to an amended charge
of neglecting a child where the consequence is death. The circuit court imposed
an evenly bifurcated sixteen-year sentence. This appeal follows.1

1
Appellate counsel for Daniels initially filed a no-merit report in this matter. Upon
review of that report and the record, we rejected the no-merit report because we were unable to
conclude that further proceedings to challenge the circuit court’s denial of the motion to suppress
would be wholly frivolous. See State v. Daniels, No. 2023AP1490-CRNM, unpublished op. and
order (WI App Nov. 26, 2024).

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No. 2025AP74-CR

DISCUSSION

¶15 On appeal, Daniels asserts that the circuit court erred in not
suppressing her custodial statements. It is undisputed that she invoked her right to
counsel during the first interview which took place at 3:00 a.m., when the
detectives erroneously told her that an SPD attorney would not be available until
around 9:00 a.m. Based on that misinformation, she argues that her waiver of her
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was not knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary.

¶16 This court reviews the circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress
“under a two-part standard of review: we uphold the [circuit] court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but review de novo whether those facts
warrant suppression.” State v. Conner, 2012 WI App 105, ¶15, 344 Wis. 2d 233,
821 N.W.2d 267. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Anderson, 2019 WI 97,
¶20, 389 Wis. 2d 106, 935 N.W.2d 285.

¶17 Here, the circuit court’s findings regarding the detectives’ lack of
knowledge of the availability of an SPD attorney are not supported by the
evidence in the record. The court relied on the State’s assertion that the detectives
were not aware of the SPD’s policy providing an on-call attorney. However, there
is no testimony from either detective to corroborate that assertion; neither
detective testified during the suppression hearing, nor did the State file affidavits
from the detectives regarding their knowledge of the policy. Instead, the circuit
court seemed to rely on its own knowledge, or lack thereof, regarding the on-call
attorney policy through the SPD.

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¶18 Furthermore, these purported findings stand in direct contrast to the
information in the affidavit from the SPD regarding this long-standing availability
policy. Moreover, the affidavit avers that MPD regularly utilizes this service.
Therefore, as the circuit court’s findings regarding the detectives’ lack of
knowledge of the availability of an SPD attorney are not supported by the
evidence, they are clearly erroneous.2 See id.

¶19 Continuing with our suppression review analysis, it was only after
being erroneously told she was not able to consult with an attorney during the first
interview that Daniels agreed to speak with detectives. She asserts that this does
not demonstrate a voluntary waiver of her right to counsel. Whether a defendant’s
waiver of the right to counsel was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent is a question
of law that we review de novo. State v. Rejholec, 2021 WI App 45, ¶16, 398
Wis. 2d 729, 963 N.W.2d 121.

¶20 Determining whether a waiver is voluntary “has two distinct
dimensions.” Id., ¶29 (citation omitted). “First, the relinquishment of the right
must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. (citation
omitted). And “[s]econd, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness
of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” Id. (citation omitted). “Only if the ‘totality of the

2
We observe that the circuit court’s findings relating to Daniels’ argument regarding the
detectives’ tactics used during the first interview are also clearly erroneous. As previously noted,
Daniels argued in her suppression motion that the tactics were coercive based on her cognitive
abilities, education, and mental health issues related to her life experiences. The circuit court
found that the detectives likely were not aware of these issues at the time of Daniels’ interview;
however, the record clearly indicates that at the beginning of the first interview, Daniels discussed
those specific issues.

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No. 2025AP74-CR

circumstances surrounding the interrogation’ reveals both an uncoerced choice and
the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the
Miranda rights have been waived.” Rejholec, 398 Wis. 2d 729, ¶29 (citation
omitted).

¶21 The record shows that the detectives provided misinformation to
Daniels about the availability of an attorney when she invoked her right to
counsel. There is no evidence to support the credibility findings by the circuit
court that this misinformation was not intentionally given. Furthermore, the
affidavit from the SPD directly contradicts those credibility findings. Therefore,
the totality of the circumstances here does not reflect both an uncoerced choice
and a “requisite level of comprehension” on the part of Daniels when she agreed to
speak to the detectives. See id. As a result, her waiver of her right to counsel was
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See id.

¶22 Nevertheless, the State asserts that even if we conclude that Daniels’
statements from her first interview should be suppressed, her statements from her
second and third interviews should not be suppressed because she reinitiated those
interviews with the detectives, rendering them voluntary. However, in considering
the totality of the circumstances, in conjunction with our conclusion that Daniels’
waiver of counsel during the first interview was involuntary, we observe there is
no evidence that in the time between the first and second interviews—
approximately thirteen hours, over regular business hours—that any attempt was
made to contact the SPD to honor Daniels’ invocation of her right to counsel.

¶23 “[A]ny evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled
into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his
[or her] privilege.” Id., ¶34 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476). Given the record

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No. 2025AP74-CR

here, under the totality of the circumstances, we are unable to conclude that
Daniels had the requisite level of comprehension to render her waiver of counsel
voluntary in any of the interviews. See Rejholec, 398 Wis. 2d 729, ¶29.
Therefore, Daniels’ waiver of her right to counsel during all of her custodial
interviews was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See id.

CONCLUSION

¶24 As a result, all of Daniels’ custodial statements must be suppressed.
We therefore reverse the order denying Daniels’ motion to suppress, and remand
this matter with directions to enter an order granting that motion.3

By the Court.—Judgment reversed and cause remanded with
directions.

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.

3
Upon Daniels’ judgment of conviction being reversed, see WIS. STAT. § 808.03(3)(b),
WIS. STAT. RULE 809.10(4), we note, and the State points out, that after entry of the order
granting the motion to suppress, Daniels may file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea for the
circuit court to entertain. See State v. Rejholec, 2021 WI App 45, ¶35 & n.14, 398 Wis. 2d 729,
963 N.W.2d 121.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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