St. Claire Q. Lee v. Progressive Universal Insurance Company

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 31, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2421 Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV3492

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

ST. CLAIRE Q. LEE,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

TWIN CITY FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY AND ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY,

INVOLUNTARY-PLAINTIFFS,

V.

PROGRESSIVE UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND SUBHAJIT PAUL,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
J.D. WATTS, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.

Before White, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2421

¶1 PER CURIAM. St. Claire Q. Lee appeals from an order of the
circuit court granting Progressive Universal Insurance Company’s and Subhajit
Paul’s motion to enforce a settlement agreement. For the following reasons, we
reverse the circuit court’s order and remand the cause for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Lee was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Paul. Paul was
insured by Progressive Universal Insurance Company (collectively,
“Progressive”). Lee brought suit against Progressive, and after a jury trial in May
of 2024, Lee was awarded $116,888.82. Following the verdict, counsel for
Progressive, Attorney Ann C. Emmerich, emailed counsel for Lee, Attorney Todd
R. Korb, and asked whether Attorney Korb thought the case could be resolved for
the amount of the verdict by a release and stipulation rather than entry of judgment
for the verdict amount and any statutorily allowed costs. After some discussion
between the two of them over the amount Paul would pay and the various liens
that had to be paid off, Attorney Emmerich stated via email, “I think we’ll be able
to take care of this through release and stip and order for verdict plus the costs.”
Attorney Korb responded, “Wonderful.”

¶3 As relevant to this appeal, on May 28, 2024, Attorney Emmerich
followed up with Attorney Korb via email with a proposed release and a message
stating, “I drafted the attached to resolve satisfaction of the jury verdict and costs.
Will this work?” Attorney Korb responded, “Works for me.”

¶4 On June 4, 2024, Attorney Emmerich sent Attorney Korb a
settlement draft, noting that “a condition of disbursal of these funds is your client
signing the Release that I have forwarded and all parties stipulating to my

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clients[’] dismissal from the matter.” On June 24, 2024, the parties submitted a
Stipulation for Distribution of Settlement Proceeds, and the circuit court signed the
corresponding order. However, a week later, Attorney Korb informed Attorney
Emmerich that Lee would not sign the Release.

¶5 Lee then filed a motion to enforce the Stipulation for Distribution of
Settlement Proceeds. Progressive filed a motion to reopen the judgment for the
purpose of enforcing the requirement in the settlement agreement that Lee sign the
Release. After holding a hearing on the two motions, the court reopened the
judgment and scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the May 28,
2024 email exchange between Attorneys Emmerich and Korb was enforceable as a
settlement agreement. At the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Korb testified that
when he wrote, “Works for me,” he was only communicating that the language of
the Release “worked” for him, not his client. After hearing testimony, the circuit
court concluded that the May 28, 2024 email exchange was an enforceable
settlement agreement under WIS. STAT. § 807.05 (2023-24)1 because it had been
“subscribed” by Lee’s attorney, Attorney Korb.

¶6 Lee appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶7 The issue presented in this case is whether the May 28, 2024 email
exchange between Attorneys Emmerich and Korb constitutes an enforceable
settlement agreement. “Whether a settlement agreement is binding and
enforceable is a question of law we review de novo.” Paul R. Ponfil Trust v.

1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP2421

Charmoli Holdings, LLC, 2019 WI App 56, ¶13, 389 Wis. 2d 88, 935 N.W.2d
308. Moreover, “[s]ettlement agreements entered into while litigation is pending
are governed by WIS. STAT. § 807.05.” Ponfil Trust, 389 Wis. 2d 88, ¶14.
Statutory interpretation presents an issue of law that we review de novo. Citation
Partners, LLC v. DOR, 2021 WI App 86, ¶17, 400 Wis. 2d 260, 968 N.W.2d 734.

¶8 “In construing a settlement agreement, we apply contract-
construction principles.” Ponfil Trust, 389 Wis. 2d 88, ¶16. A valid settlement
agreement requires an offer, an acceptance, and consideration all resulting from
mutual agreement. Id. Additionally, per WIS. STAT. § 807.05, “[n]o agreement,
stipulation, or consent between the parties or their attorneys, in respect to the
proceedings in an action or special proceeding shall be binding unless ... made in
writing and subscribed by the party to be bound thereby or the party’s attorney.”

¶9 The circuit court concluded that when Attorney Korb responded,
“Works for me,” he “subscribed” to the Release attached to Attorney Emmerich’s
email on behalf of Lee, and therefore, Lee was bound by the terms of the Release
and was required to sign it. We disagree for several reasons.

¶10 As an initial matter, an email exchange between attorneys can
constitute a binding settlement agreement under WIS. STAT. § 807.05, “provided
all material terms are in writing and are clearly accepted in a writing subscribed
by the party to be bound or that party’s attorney.” Waite v. Easton-White Creek
Lions, Inc., 2006 WI App 19, ¶7 n.4, 289 Wis. 2d 100, 709 N.W.2d 88 (emphasis
added). In this case, however, Attorney Korb did not clearly accept and agree to
bind Lee to the terms of the Release attached to Attorney Emmerich’s email. At
face value, Attorney Korb’s response of “Works for me” does not constitute a
clear acceptance to bind Lee to the Release. As Attorney Korb explained in his

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unrebutted testimony, Attorney Korb’s response merely confirms that the language
of the release “worked for” Attorney Korb. “Works for me” is, at best, ambiguous
with respect to what works (i.e., the language or substance of the Release) and for
whom it works (i.e., Attorney Korb or Lee). An enforceable contract cannot form
with such significant ambiguities with respect to what is being accepted by whom.

¶11 Additionally, as all Wisconsin attorneys well know, “the general rule
is that an attorney has no authority to enter into a binding settlement agreement
without his or her client’s consent.” D&D Carpentry, Inc. v. U.S. Bancorp, 2010
WI App 122, ¶8, 329 Wis. 2d 435, 792 N.W.2d 193. “If a client believes that an
attorney has acted without authority to settle a case, it is the client’s burden to
prove it.” Id., ¶9.

¶12 Our supreme court’s decision in Balzer v. Weisensel, 258 Wis. 566,
46 N.W.2d 763 (1951) is instructive in this case. Balzer involved a written
stipulation for settlement made after the case was called for trial. Id. at 566-67.
Weisensel’s attorney signed a written settlement agreement that was executed in
open court despite Weisensel not being present in court or signing the agreement.
Id. at 567. After the agreement was put on the record, the circuit court dictated an
order dismissing the claims on their merits. Id. Weisensel objected to his
attorney’s actions after the fact. Id. The circuit court ordered Weisensel to show
why the settlement judgment should not be entered. Id. However, although the
order was served upon Weisensel personally and upon his attorney, Weisensel
neither appeared in person nor filed an affidavit to show that his attorney’s actions
were unauthorized. Id. The circuit court ruled, based on the record before it, that
Weisensel had “clothed his attorney with apparent authority” to settle the case. Id.
at 569. Our supreme court affirmed, stating that if a client believes their attorney
did not have the authority to settle the case which the client wished to litigate, then

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the client has the burden of demonstrating this to the circuit court upon learning of
such unauthorized action. Id.

¶13 In this case, there is unrebutted testimony that Attorney Korb did not
intend, and did not have authority from Lee, to bind Lee to the Release attached to
Attorney Emmerich’s email. Because this testimony is undisputed, there is only
one conclusion to draw: Lee did not authorize Attorney Korb to bind him to the
Release, a document that Lee did not see until after Attorney Korb responded to
Attorney Emmerich’s email.

¶14 Progressive cites several cases for the proposition that attorneys can
bind their clients to settlement agreements, but that is not the issue before us. In
those cases, the acceptance of the settlement offer by an attorney was clearly and
unambiguously on behalf of the client. For example, in Kocinski v. Home Ins.
Co., 147 Wis. 2d 728, 433 N.W.2d 654 (Ct. App. 1988), aff’d as modified by
Kocinski v. Home Ins. Co., 154 Wis. 2d 56, 452 N.W.2d 360 (1990), the
plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to opposing counsel bearing the attorney’s rubber-
stamped signature that included an affirmation of the terms of the settlement in
addition to the following statement: “Upon receipt of this money from the parties,
[the plaintiff] will execute the required Releases.” Id. at 732. Later, the plaintiff
changed her mind about accepting the settlement, but this court held that the
attorney’s rubber-stamped signature satisfied the “subscribed” requirement of
WIS. STAT. § 807.05. Kocinski, 147 Wis. 2d at 736. Similarly, in Waite, the
communication at issue was a faxed letter stating: “my client accepts the

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settlement as outlined in your letter[.]” Id., 289 Wis. 2d 100, ¶3. The federal
cases cited by Progressive also follow this pattern.2

¶15 Unlike Attorney Korb’s response email in this case, the
communications in Kocisnki and Waite were clearly and unambiguously
communications that the attorney’s client agreed to be bound by the proposed
release or settlement offer.

¶16 In sum, an attorney is allowed to bind a client to a settlement
agreement under WIS. STAT. § 807.05 provided that the acceptance is clear and the
attorney has authority from the client to bind them. If the client believes that their
attorney’s actions were unauthorized, it is their burden to show it, and in this case,
there was not a clear and unambiguous acceptance by Attorney Korb, and the
undisputed evidence in the record shows that Lee did not authorize Attorney Korb
to agree on his behalf to be bound by the Release sent by Attorney Emmerich.3

2
Iliadis v. Four Lakes Educ., Inc., 19-CV-232-WMC, 2020 WL 429139 at *2-3 (W.D.
Wis. Jan. 28, 2020); HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Daya, No. 16-CV-80-JPS, 2016 WL 7156551
at *9-10 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 7, 2016).
3
Before concluding, we make one observation. Progressive asserts that the issue on
appeal is whether there was a “meeting of the minds” between the parties, and that determination
is a factual one subject to review under the “clearly erroneous” standard. We disagree that the
clearly erroneous standard applies to the issue presented in this case, but even if we are mistaken,
we would conclude that finding a “meeting of the minds” on this record is clearly erroneous. The
language of Attorney Korb’s email is ambiguous with respect to who is agreeing to what, and the
only evidence in the record to resolve that ambiguity is Attorney Korb’s testimony that his
“works for me” response email to Attorney Emmerich was intended only to convey Attorney
Korb’s approval of the language used in the Release drafted by Attorney Emmerich and not
intended to convey that Lee agreed to be bound by that language.

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CONCLUSION

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the May 28, 2024 email
exchange between Attorneys Emmerich and Korb does not constitute an
enforceable settlement agreement.

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded for further
proceedings.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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