Theresa Anne Carey v. Tai P. Seeff

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 23, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP1504 Cir. Ct. No. 2020PR45

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN RE THE ESTATE OF TARYN P. GREENDEER:

THERESA ANNE CAREY,

APPELLANT,

V.

TAI P. SEEFF AND STELLA B. GREENDEER,

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Vernon County:
TIMOTHY J. GASKELL, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, Kloppenburg, and Nashold, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2025AP1504

¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Theresa Anne Carey appeals an order that
awarded her $11,657.05 in fees and costs for her legal work on the estate of Taryn
Greendeer. Carey asks that we reverse and remand for a new hearing at which she
could provide evidence that she is entitled to at least $27,500. Tai Seeff and Stella
Greendeer, personal representatives of Taryn’s estate, argue that Carey’s appeal
lacks record and case law support and have filed a motion seeking attorney fees
and costs for what they assert is a frivolous appeal. We affirm the circuit court
order and deny the motion.1

BACKGROUND

¶2 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

¶3 Taryn died testate on June 26, 2020. Taryn’s will nominated her
daughters Seeff and Stella to be personal representatives of her estate. The will
was admitted into informal administration on October 9, 2020. Carey entered a

1
Because the decedent, one of the personal representatives, and another relevant person
share a surname, we refer to them by their first names.

Carey also appeals the part of the circuit court order that awarded fees and costs to
Attorney Celeste Gibson for Gibson’s work on Taryn’s estate. But, Gibson has not appealed the
award, and the personal representatives argue that Carey lacks standing to do so. In reply, Carey
asserts that the court awarded only a portion of the fees requested for Gibson’s work and
“identif[ied]” the unawarded fees requested for Gibson’s work “as a cost to” Carey, and “[a]s
such, the burden of the cost for services provided by … Gibson … shifted to” Carey. Carey
argues that she is consequently aggrieved by the Gibson award, citing Koller v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 190 Wis. 2d 263, 266, 526 N.W.2d 799 (Ct. App. 1994) (“The right to appeal is
limited to parties aggrieved in some appreciable manner by the judgment. A person is aggrieved
if the judgment bears directly and injuriously upon [the person’s] interests.” (citation omitted)).
However, Carey fails to develop an argument supported by citation to the record that the court’s
award of fees to Gibson shifted “the burden of the cost” of any of Gibson’s services to Carey.
For at least this reason, we reject Carey’s arguments about the fee award to Gibson and do not
further address those arguments or the facts regarding Gibson’s representation of the estate.

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notice of appearance in the matter as legal counsel for the personal representatives
on January 27, 2021.

¶4 The estate consisted of bank accounts, personal property, and two
pieces of real estate. One piece of real estate was titled as survivorship marital
property with Taryn’s ex-husband, William Greendeer, whom she had divorced in
tribal court and who died approximately four months after Taryn. Both pieces of
real estate generated income to the estate after Taryn’s death, but no tax returns
reporting this income were filed for 2020, 2021, 2022, or 2023. Between April
2022 and April 2024, Carey filed three petitions for extension of time to complete
the estate.

¶5 On January 7, 2025, over four and one-half years after Taryn’s
death, Attorney Justin Peterson filed a notice of appearance in the matter as new
counsel for the personal representatives, in place of Carey.

¶6 On January 9, 2025, Carey filed a motion for judgment for fees
earned, along with a proposed final estate account and supporting attachments. In
her motion, Carey asserted that she had entered a notice of appearance in the
matter “with the understanding that [she] would charge a reduced hourly rate of
$100/per hour for work done from January 27, 2021 forward, which was agreed to
by the personal representatives.” Carey also asserted that, “subsequent to [the]
agreement for the reduced hourly rate,” she “offered to cap [her] fees at 2% of the
gross” value of the estate. Carey further asserted that, because her fees as
calculated by the hour ultimately exceeded the 2% amount, she moved the circuit
court to award her attorney fees at the 2% amount. She calculated that 2% amount
to be $16,343.49.

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¶7 The personal representatives filed a response to Carey’s motion in
May 2025, requesting judicial review under WIS. STAT. § 851.40(2) (2023-24) to
determine the reasonableness of Carey’s requested fees.2 They argued that,
because Carey had allegedly made misleading statements and engaged in delays
throughout the course of her representation, “the personal representatives are
uncomfortable paying the demanded attorney’s fees without judicial review … to
determine if they are reasonable.” The personal representatives acknowledged
that Carey was required to address “issues clearing the title to the [e]state’s land
relating to [Taryn’s] divorce from William,” but they asserted that William’s
“estate … and its attorney … were cooperative [in] resolving the issue,” and that
Taryn’s estate otherwise lacked any complex or novel issues.

¶8 The personal representatives supported their request with a sworn
declaration by Seeff, in which she averred as follows. Carey told the personal
representatives “that her fees would be the lesser of an hourly rate or 2% of the
[e]state’s value,” but the personal representatives never received a fee agreement
from Carey. Nor, before filing her motion for fees, did Carey ever provide an
itemized bill or invoice during the course of her representation, despite the fact
that the personal representatives and beneficiaries had requested itemized bills or
invoices. Throughout Carey’s representation, the estate “suffered unnecessary
delays and setbacks despite [the personal representatives’] repeated requests for …
Carey … to complete tasks in a timely manner and to meet the [circuit] [c]ourt’s
administrative deadlines.” The personal representatives “requested numerous

2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2025AP1504

times to change attorneys and accountants,” but Carey told them “that it was too
late to change counsel and that the [c]ourt would likely not approve it.”

¶9 Carey filed a reply in which she asserted that she mailed Seeff a
written fee agreement when she filed her notice of appearance, but that Carey
never received a signed copy back. Carey further asserted that there were
numerous reasons that Taryn’s estate “took significant time and effort” for Carey
to resolve, including: William’s death and the need to negotiate with his estate
regarding land division; resolving distribution of assets from Taryn’s father’s
estate; addressing a Medicare lien; dealing with burial paperwork; working with
authorities in Italy regarding the bequest of an antique shawl to Taryn’s sister;
dealing with a GoFundMe matter and mishandling of funds;3 “dealing with”
Taryn’s small business; managing the personal representatives’ request to set up
an LLC; communicating with individuals that Seeff asked her to speak to; and
difficulty with obtaining complete and accurate documentation from the personal
representatives. Carey also described difficulties that she encountered working
with Seeff regarding the estate.

¶10 The day before the scheduled June 25, 2025 circuit court hearing on
attorney fees, Carey submitted a “corrected” invoice to the court requesting
approximately $27,500 in attorney fees and costs, which she represented was
based on her work calculated at a rate of $100 per hour.

3
“GoFundMe is a company that offers an online platform for individuals to raise funds
for an objective by ‘crowdfunding’ their campaigns via individual donations from a vast network
of people across the internet.” State v. Cotton, 13 N.W.3d 412, 415 n.2 (Minn. 2024).

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¶11 At the hearing, the circuit court asked Carey how she would like to
proceed. Carey and the personal representatives’ attorney both said that they
would not present testimony or evidence, but that they would answer any
questions that the court might have. The court proceeded with its questions and
consideration of the factors set forth in WIS. STAT. § 851.40(2) to determine what
is a just and reasonable attorney fee. Noting that no signed fee agreement was
presented to the court, the court found that “Carey’s fee agreement with the estate
was that she was going to either bill at $100 an hour or her fee would be 2[%] of
the gross estate, whichever was less,” and that the 2% rate results in the lesser of
the numbers. We provide the details of the court’s consideration of the
§ 851.40(2) factors in the discussion that follows.

¶12 The circuit court offered Carey and the personal representatives’
attorney an opportunity “to say anything in summary based upon the [c]ourt’s
comments.” We summarize Carey’s comments in the discussion below. After
hearing those comments and taking a brief recess, the court ruled that, based on its
consideration of the statutory factors, it was awarding Carey attorney fees in the
amount of 1.5% of the gross value of the estate. The court stated that it
determined this number to be “fair and reasonable for … Carey’s fees in this
matter.” The court entered a written order consistent with its oral ruling, awarding
Carey $11,657.05 in fees and costs.

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¶13 Carey appeals.4

DISCUSSION

¶14 Carey argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion in awarding her attorney fees and costs in an amount that equaled 1.5%
of the gross value of the estate.

¶15 An “attorney performing services for the estate of a deceased person
in any proceeding under [WIS. STAT.] chs. 851 to 879 … shall be entitled to just
and reasonable compensation for such services.” WIS. STAT. § 851.40(1). The
circuit court “shall consider the following factors in determining what is a just and
reasonable attorney’s fee” for such services:

(a) The time and labor required.

(b) The experience and knowledge of the attorney.

(c) The complexity and novelty of the problems involved.

(d) The extent of the responsibilities assumed and the
results obtained.

(e) The sufficiency of assets properly available to pay for
the services, except that the value of the estate may not be
the controlling factor.

4
In her initial appellant’s brief, Carey cites a per curiam opinion of this court. In her
response to the personal representatives’ motion for fees and costs for a frivolous appeal, Carey
cites a published opinion, but the language that she purports to quote is not found in that
published opinion. Instead, we find it in another per curiam opinion of this court. Per curiam
opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or for persuasive authority except
for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3), which are not applicable here.
In addition, attorneys are obligated to provide accurate case law citations as part of their duty of
candor to this court. Opposing counsel and this high-volume court are hindered through such
improper and inaccurate citations.

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No. 2025AP1504

§ 851.40(2). The attorney seeking payment of fees bears the burden to
demonstrate that the amount of fees submitted is reasonable. Standard Theatres,
Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 748, 349 N.W.2d 661 (1984); Kolupar v. Wilde
Pontiac Cadillac, Inc., 2004 WI 112, ¶34, 275 Wis. 2d 1, 683 N.W.2d 58.

¶16 The “decision of what fees are reasonable for an attorney providing
services for an estate under WIS. STAT. § 851.40” is committed to the circuit
court’s discretion. Bell v. Neugart, 2002 WI App 180, ¶35, 256 Wis. 2d 969, 650
N.W.2d 52. The circuit court “‘properly exercises its discretion if it employs a
logical rationale based on the appropriate legal principles and facts of record.’”
Huehne v. Huehne, 175 Wis. 2d 33, 42, 498 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoted
source omitted). Moreover, “‘we may search the record to determine if it supports
the court’s discretionary decision.’” State v. Osornio, 2025 WI App 53, ¶15, 418
Wis. 2d 174, 25 N.W.3d 645 (quoted source omitted). “When an issue of law
arises while we are reviewing a circuit court’s exercise of discretion,” we review
that issue de novo. McReath v. McReath, 2011 WI 66, ¶22, 335 Wis. 2d 643, 800
N.W.2d 399. When an exercise of discretion involves findings of fact, we accept
the circuit court’s findings unless clearly erroneous. Id.

¶17 We now present pertinent details from the fees hearing and then
analyze the circuit court’s ruling considering the factors set forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 851.40(2).

¶18 Before issuing its ruling, the circuit court emphasized that the court
was “not going to get into all of the back and forth that went on between the
parties,” and that it was not “interested in the finger pointing and why one party is
responsible or the other party is responsible.” The court also indicated that the

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administration of the estate appeared to be relatively straightforward and not
complex.

¶19 When the circuit court gave Carey the opportunity to respond to the
court’s comments before issuing its ruling, Carey said the following. Her written
fee agreement indicated that her fee would be $100 per hour, and she was
accordingly requesting approximately $27,500 based on that rate. After she had
worked on the case further, Carey discussed with the personal representatives
reducing that amount to a flat fee of 2% of the gross value of the estate, but
“technically, we’re not permitted to do a percentage of … an estate,” and “there
has been no agreement about” the flat fee. She did not think the personal
representatives had “relied upon” her offer of a flat fee. “[W]e had a lot of
complications … with the William Greendeer estate,” including a lack of
cooperation by William’s heirs, and Taryn’s estate “didn’t get the land division
agreement [with William’s estate] finalized until late in 2023,” which “was one of
the biggest causes of the delay.” “Once we got that finalized and started really
focusing in on finalizing the inventory and whatnot, it wasn’t that much longer
past that that we were able to at least relatively get close to having that done.” The
requests for extensions of time to close the estate were not attributable to a “lack
of work” on Carey’s part, but instead they arose from logistical issues.

¶20 The circuit court found that the estate did not “have a lot of moving
parts” and should not have required over four years of time and labor. See WIS.
STAT. § 851.40(2)(a) (court shall consider the “time and labor required”);
§ 851.40(2)(c) (court shall consider the “complexity and novelty of the
problems”). Specifically, the court found that “the issues that the estate presented
… do not seem to be complex or novel at all,” and that, “if there is complexity
involved in this, it was simply communication or lack thereof between the

9
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parties.” The court also implicitly found that the problems that Carey described
did not appreciably add to the work required by such a relatively straightforward
estate. These findings are supported by the undisputed facts that: the will was not
contested; there were only two claims filed against the estate and no disputes
among the beneficiaries; and there was no litigation.

¶21 Carey argues that the circuit court “did not appear to” consider the
detailed invoice she provided to the court, which she asserts demonstrates the
extensive time and labor that the administration of the estate required. However,
Carey did not submit an affidavit averring that the hours billed were accurate or
that the issues involved required the work reflected in the invoice. While the court
did not explicitly discuss Carey’s invoice, it was within the court’s discretion to
determine that the hours billed in the invoice did not reflect the amount of time
and labor that the estate actually required, given what the court found were the
very limited issues involved. Put differently, Carey fails to show that the court
clearly erred in making an implicit finding that the invoice contained entries for
unnecessary or inefficient work.

¶22 Carey also argues that the circuit court erroneously disregarded the
information included in a different document that she submitted to the court,
which explained “the multiple complexities and novel issues encountered” in the
case. However, the document cited by Carey is not an affidavit or other sworn
statement, and Carey declined to present evidence supporting the explanations in
the document at the hearing. Nor, beyond directing our attention to that document,
does Carey on appeal provide an explanation, supported by citations to the record,
of what complexity and novelty the estate presented.

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No. 2025AP1504

¶23 The circuit court implicitly found that Carey’s probate-related
experience and knowledge were limited. See WIS. STAT. § 851.40(2)(b) (court
shall consider the “experience and knowledge of the attorney”). The court
acknowledged that Carey asserted that she had some probate experience in
California, but the court noted that she had been the attorney for the probate of
only one estate in Vernon County—Taryn’s. Carey agreed that this was accurate
and generally agreed that she lacked experience, adding only that she was also
“involved in” William’s estate. Carey argues that the court did not take testimony
or evidence on the issue of her experience and knowledge. But, as the party
bearing the burden to show that her fees were reasonable, it was Carey’s burden to
adduce evidence on this issue, and she did not do so. See Kolupar, 275 Wis. 2d 1,
¶34 (attorney seeking fees has the burden to show fees are reasonable and
introduce relevant evidence).

¶24 The circuit court noted that, “four years into this, … the estate had
not closed out.” See WIS. STAT. § 851.40(2)(d) (court shall consider the “extent of
the responsibilities assumed and the results obtained”). Regarding the failure to
exercise responsibilities and obtain results, the court found that no tax returns had
been filed for the estate for the years of 2020 through 2024 and that no extensions
were requested. Carey makes the broad assertion that she “had significant
responsibilities that [she] handled professionally, and successfully.” But she cites
no record evidence for this assertion, and we reject it on that basis. Carey also
asserts that there was “little discussion on this factor at the hearing,” but she does
not show that the court’s comments summarized above do not suffice to support
its implicit finding that the responsibilities that Carey actually undertook and the

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results that she obtained during her representation of the estate did not justify the
amount of fees she requested.5

¶25 The circuit court concluded by reiterating its finding that Carey’s
agreement with the personal representatives was to cap her fees at 2% of the gross
value of the estate. However, the court determined that it was appropriate to
reduce Carey’s fee from 2% to 1.5% of the gross value of the estate, based on the
court’s consideration of the statutory factors. The court determined that it was
relevant that the personal representatives “had to and decided to hire Attorney
Peterson’s firm” because the estate was not yet closed. We conclude that, based
on the evidence before the court and its factual findings, which Carey fails to show
are clearly erroneous, and its consideration of the statutory factors, the court made
a reasoned determination that 1.5% of the gross value of the estate is a reasonable
reflection of the work that Carey had performed on the estate.

¶26 In addition to making the arguments and assertions regarding the
specific statutory factors that we have rejected above, Carey more generally argues
that the circuit court erred when it failed to take testimony and evidence or make
findings of fact on the record. However, as noted above, Carey did not support her
motion for fees either with evidence submitted by affidavit or other sworn
statement before the hearing, and Carey specifically declined to introduce
testimony or evidence at the hearing. In addition, as also explained above, the
court did make factual findings on the record based on the evidence before it.

5
The circuit court did not explicitly address the fifth statutory factor: whether the estate
had sufficient assets to pay for Carey’s services. See WIS. STAT. § 851.40(2)(e) (court shall
consider the “sufficiency of assets properly available to pay for the services, except that the value
of the estate may not be the controlling factor”). However, neither Carey nor the personal
representatives argue that the sufficiency of the estate’s assets is an issue on appeal.

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No. 2025AP1504

Accordingly, Carey fails to show that the court erroneously exercised its discretion
by failing to take testimony and evidence or to make findings of fact on the record.

¶27 Carey argues that the circuit court did not apply the proper legal
standard when it awarded her attorney fees in the amount of a percentage of the
gross value of the estate. In support of this argument, Carey cites Lontkowski
Law Office v. Estate of Konopka, 175 Wis. 2d 100, 498 N.W.2d 853 (Ct. App.
1993). However, as we now explain, this case does not prohibit using a
percentage of the estate as a factor in determining attorney fees, so long as the
court does not use the percentage of the estate as the controlling factor, and the
court did not do that here.

¶28 In Konopka, Lontkowski and the personal representative of the
estate signed a contract “providing fees at a rate of 4% of the gross inventory of
the estate.” Id. at 101. When Lontkowski presented his bill, the personal
representative told the circuit court “that he was ‘not satisfied with the amount of
attorney fees.’” Id. The court made detailed factual findings “relevant to the
statutory factors that control attorney fees,” and Lontkowski did not contest those
findings. Id. at 102 and n.1. Lontkowski also “declined to give either an estimate
of the hours he spent on the estate, or an opinion as to a reasonable hourly rate.”
Id. at 103. Instead, he argued only that the court should enforce the 4% fee
agreement in the contract. Id. The court reduced Lontkowski’s fees from
approximately $23,000 to $7,500. Id. at 101.

¶29 This court affirmed, explaining that the contract, which determined
fees solely based on the value of the estate, was “contrary to legislatively declared
standards.” Id. at 103; see also WIS. STAT. § 851.40(2)(e) (“the value of the estate
may not be the controlling factor”). This court also concluded that Lontkowski’s

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fee was “unreasonable,” based on the circuit court’s factual findings and
consideration of the statutory factors. Konopka, 175 Wis. 2d at 103. Contrary to
Carey’s assertion, this court did not conclude that considering the gross value of
the estate in calculating attorney fees, in combination with the other factors in
§ 851.40(2), is prohibited. Rather, in both Konopka and this case, the circuit court
rejected the percentage fee agreed to by the parties and reduced the fee based on
its consideration of the statutory factors. Carey does not show that the court here
acted contrary to Konopka or § 851.40(2)(e) when it reduced the award to a lower
percentage fee given the factual record before it and its consideration of the
statutory factors. Said differently, the court here did not apply an improper legal
standard because it did not use the value of the estate as the controlling factor in its
award of attorney fees. See § 851.40(2)(e) (“the value of the estate may not be the
controlling factor”).

¶30 In sum, we conclude that Carey fails to show that the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion in awarding Carey $11,657.05 in fees and
costs.

¶31 As stated, the personal representatives have filed a motion in this
court for attorney fees and costs based on a claim that Carey’s appeal is frivolous
under WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3). “Whether an appeal is frivolous is a question
of law.” Kraemer v. Traun, 2025 WI App 8, ¶55, 415 Wis. 2d 125, 17 N.W.3d 49
(2024). “Sanctions for a frivolous appeal will be imposed if the court concludes
that the party ‘knew, or should have known, that the appeal … [had no] reasonable
basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.’” Id. (quoted source omitted);
RULE 809.25(3)(c). We “‘resolve all doubt in favor of finding the claim

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nonfrivolous.’” Dietscher v. Pension Bd. of Emps.’ Ret. Sys. of Milwaukee, 2019
WI App 37, ¶56, 388 Wis. 2d 225, 932 N.W.2d 446 (quoted source omitted).

¶32 Although we reject Carey’s arguments for the reasons discussed
above, we are not persuaded that the entire appeal had no “reasonable basis in law
or equity.” See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.25(3)(c)2. Accordingly, we deny the
motion for attorney fees and costs under RULE 809.25(3).

CONCLUSION

¶33 For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s award of
attorney fees and costs to Carey, and we deny the personal representatives’ motion
for attorney fees and costs for a frivolous appeal.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

15