Walworth County v. D. J. F.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 6, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP2522 Cir. Ct. No. 2023ME54

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF D.J.F.:

WALWORTH COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

D.J.F.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Walworth County:
KRISTINE E. DRETTWAN, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 GUNDRUM, J.1 D.J.F. appeals from circuit court orders extending
his involuntary commitment, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 51.20, for twelve months
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This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP2522

and allowing for the involuntary administration of medication and treatment
during that time. He contends Walworth County (the County) failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove he is currently dangerous under § 51.20(1)(a)2. For
the following reasons, we disagree and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The County filed a petition to extend D.J.F.’s commitment for one
year under WIS. STAT. ch. 51. The circuit court held a hearing, during which the
following relevant evidence was presented.

¶3 The expert psychiatrist who had been treating D.J.F. for more than a
year prior to the hearing and who had examined him less than two weeks prior
testified that D.J.F. suffers from schizoaffective disorder and “has been in
treatment at least since 2016.” D.J.F. has paranoia about medications and “things
being added to his—to the water and things like that.” His condition is primarily
treatable through medications, but D.J.F. “believes that he does not have mental
illness” and has made it clear he will not take medication unless court ordered.

¶4 When D.J.F. is taking medication under court order, he
“demonstrates less paranoia, he’s able to function in the community or at his
current group home. When he is off of medications, he becomes paranoid and
delusional.” The psychiatrist was aware of “at least two previous commitments
[of D.J.F.] as well as at least one settlement agreement.” She testified that he
would become a proper subject for commitment if his treatment were withdrawn,
noting that this had occurred with him in the past. She explained that “[h]e shows
no recognition of the pattern between multiple times in the past when he has
stopped medications that he has decompensated, required emergency detention
and then been placed back on commitment.” She added that “if he stops

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medications, he likely will decompensate and require hospitalization [in a locked
inpatient facility].” She testified that he would be a danger to himself if treatment
were withdrawn, stating that “[i]n the past he has become suicidal by not taking
medications. He has tried to strangle himself as a suicide attempt. He also
engages in reckless and impulsive behaviors without prior planning or forethought
when off medications.”

¶5 The circuit court admitted the psychiatrist’s report into evidence.
The report mirrored much of the psychiatrist’s testimony but also indicated that in
connection with the incidents leading to his current commitment, D.J.F. had
informed the psychiatrist that “he was huffing at the time and said he was suicidal
‘so [he] wouldn’t get in trouble.’” D.J.F., however, denied to the psychiatrist that
he really had wanted to kill himself.

¶6 D.J.F.’s mother, who also serves as his guardian, also testified. She
explained that in connection with D.J.F.’s current commitment, D.J.F. had been
hospitalized for approximately six weeks because he had “not [been] drinking any
fluids[, and] [h]e ended up in the ICU with a kidney injury,” which led to his
emergent detention and the commitment.

¶7 During that hospitalization and while in restraints, D.J.F. told her
“he was going to kill” her. Also, when asked if D.J.F. had ever threatened to hurt
her, she stated, “Not directly,” elaborating that “[t]here was a time or two that he
thought I was evil, like something took over me ….” On those occasions, he
expressed to her “[t]hat … I was taken over by something evil that he had to take
care of to end.” She expressed that she did not believe it was “healthy” for D.J.F.
to stop taking medication, indicating that when he is on medication, “he stays safe
… and is less impulsive.”

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¶8 Following the hearing, the circuit court determined that the WIS.
STAT. § 51.20 standards for recommitment had been met. The court determined
that D.J.F. suffers from a treatable mental illness and would be a proper subject for
commitment if treatment were withdrawn.

¶9 The circuit court concluded D.J.F. was dangerous under the
standards of both WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. and c. Specifically related to
subpara. (a)2.a., the court found that when D.J.F. is not under commitment, he
stops treatment and “again decompensate[s].” The court was “very concern[ed]”
that he will not take medication if not under court order, specifically noting
D.J.F.’s past suicidal ideations and attempt to strangle himself. “The concern is
that if you go off of treatment, … there’s a substantial likelihood you’d be at risk
to yourself because of that. You engage in reckless and impulsive behaviors when
you’re not under treatment and … on your medications.” The court pointed to the
testimony of D.J.F.’s mother

that you ended up in … the intensive care unit[] with
kidney issues because you weren’t hydrating properly.
That, to me, is substantial evidence of substantial risk to
yourself. People don’t wind up in the ICU level of a
hospital with kidney problems for something that’s minor
or that’s not serious.

In addition to ordering D.J.F.’s recommitment, the court also entered an order for
D.J.F.’s involuntary medication.

¶10 D.J.F. appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶11 An individual is a proper subject for recommitment under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1) if the County proves by clear and convincing evidence that the

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individual is mentally ill, a proper subject for treatment, and dangerous to himself
or others. See Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶29, 391 Wis. 2d 231,
942 N.W.2d 277; § 51.20(1)(a), (13)(e). Of these three, D.J.F. only challenges the
circuit court’s determination that he is dangerous, so that is our focus.

¶12 Whether the County met its burden of proof to support D.J.F.’s
recommitment presents a mixed question of law and fact. See Waukesha County
v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375 Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783. “[W]e will uphold
a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous,” D.J.W., 391
Wis. 2d 231, ¶24, and “we accept reasonable inferences from the facts,”
Winnebago County v. Christopher S., 2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878
N.W.2d 109 (citation omitted). Whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard,
however, is a question of law we review independently. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231,
¶25; Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶39, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833
N.W.2d 607. As the one appealing the circuit court’s orders, D.J.F. has the burden
to show that the court erred. See Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376
Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381.

¶13 D.J.F. contends there was insufficient evidence presented to support
the circuit court’s determination that he is dangerous under the standards of WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. Because we conclude the evidence supports the court’s
determination that D.J.F. met the dangerousness standard of § 51.20(1)(a)2.a., “by
way of the recommitment alternative … § 51.20(1)(am),” we need not consider the
other standards. See Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶¶5, 32, 402 Wis. 2d
379, 975 N.W.2d 162 (“If the government presents clear and convincing evidence
that the committed person remains mentally ill, treatable, and dangerous under one
of the five standards … then the court must order that person recommitted ….”).

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No. 2025AP2522

¶14 WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.a. provides that an individual’s
dangerousness is established if the person “[e]vidences a substantial probability of
physical harm to himself or herself as manifested by evidence of recent threats of
or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm.” Because this is a recommitment, as
opposed to an initial commitment, the County did not need to show “a recent …
attempt or threat to act”; instead, that requirement “may be satisfied by a showing
that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the subject individual’s treatment
record, that the individual would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment
were withdrawn.” Sec. 51.20(1)(am) (emphasis added). As our supreme court has
explained, a recent attempt or threat to act need not be shown for a recommitment
because para. (1)(am) “recognizes that an individual receiving treatment may not
have exhibited any recent overt acts or omissions demonstrating dangerousness
because the treatment ameliorated such behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn,
there may be a substantial likelihood such behavior would recur.” Portage
County v. J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509. In this
case, that means the County had to show that D.J.F. would become dangerous if
treatment were withdrawn, specifically that “there may be a substantial likelihood”
“of physical harm to himself.” The County sufficiently showed this.

¶15 It is undisputed that D.J.F. has a history of refusing to take
medication if not court ordered, subsequently decompensating, and being
rehospitalized and emergently detained. The evidence presented at the
recommitment hearing showed that D.J.F. has attempted to strangle himself and
the psychiatrist’s report indicated he “has a history of suicidal ideation when off
medications.” Additionally, he had not been taking his medication prior to his
hospitalization in the ICU for dehydration, which caused harm to his kidney. The
evidence showed that he has attempted to kill himself and caused serious bodily

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harm to himself, supporting the circuit court’s determination that if he is not under
court-ordered recommitment, D.J.F. will not receive the medication critically
necessary for stabilizing his mental health, will then very likely decompensate
again and, with that, become a significant physical risk to himself.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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