State v. Demetrius Lee Gohre

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 19, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2218-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF1667

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

DEMETRIUS LEE GOHRE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and orders of the circuit court for
Milwaukee County: MARK A. SANDERS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Donald, C.J., Colón, P.J., and Geenen, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2218-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Demetrius Lee Gohre appeals from a judgment
convicting him of one count of first-degree reckless homicide with the use of a
dangerous weapon and one count of possession of a firearm by an adjudicated
delinquent. Gohre also appeals from the orders denying his postconviction
motions for relief. Upon review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On May 14, 2020, the State filed an amended criminal complaint
charging Gohre with one count of first-degree reckless homicide with the use of a
dangerous weapon and one count of possession of a firearm by an adjudicated
delinquent. The charges stemmed from the shooting death of Norman Baker.
According to the charging documents, in the early morning hours of April 17,
2020, Milwaukee police were dispatched to 5156 North 39th Street, where they
found Baker lying on the street suffering from several gunshot wounds. Baker
ultimately died from his wounds. The complaint states that Detective Jake
Puschnig spoke with one witness, K.W., who stated that he was with Baker prior
to the shooting. K.W. stated that Baker and an unknown man got into an
argument, and the man pulled out what appeared to be a nine-millimeter handgun
and threatened to shoot Baker, but did not actually shoot. Surveillance video from
the corner store confirmed K.W.’s statement, and K.W. later identified Gohre in a
photo array. Gohre is also visible in the surveillance video. Another witness, K.J.,
told Detective Sean Lesniewski that when he saw Baker at 5:00 a.m. on the
morning of the shooting, Baker was agitated and trying to find a cell phone.
While they were walking, K.J. heard Baker say, “You just gonna shoot me?” K.J.
then saw a man point a firearm at Baker and two muzzle flashes from the gun.
Baker fell and the man stood over Baker, and shot him one or two more times.
K.J. identified Gohre in a photo array.

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

¶3 Prior to trial, Gohre filed a notice of alibi, claiming he could not
have shot Baker because at the time of the shooting he was with Adante Grier.
The State asked Detective Lesniewski to interview Grier about the alibi claim.
Detective Lesniewski and another detective conducted an interview with Grier.
Detective Lesniewski reported that Grier initially did not want to speak with the
detectives, but when the detectives told Grier that Gohre listed him as an alibi,
Grier responded “Hell no.” Detective Lesniewski reported that Grier stated he
was with Gohre earlier in the day but he was not with Gohre at the time of the
shooting.

¶4 Also prior to trial, and as relevant to this appeal, the trial court asked
the State at the final pretrial hearing whether Gohre made any Mirandized1
statements that the State planned to use at trial. The State responded in the
negative. Defense counsel told the court that a Mirandized statement by Gohre
did exist, but that counsel assumed the State would not use the statement because
it was not inculpatory.

¶5 The matter proceeded to trial where numerous witnesses, including
K.W., K.J., multiple law enforcement officers, including Detective Lesniewski,
medical personnel, and a forensics expert all testified. The jury also viewed the
surveillance video from outside of the corner store, which showed Gohre and
Baker arguing and Gohre pulling out a firearm. The jury found Gohre guilty of
both charges. The trial court sentenced Gohre to 26 years of initial confinement
and 10 years of extended supervision on the first-degree reckless homicide count,

1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

and a consecutive sentence of three years of initial confinement and three years of
extended supervision on the possession of a firearm count.

¶6 Gohre filed a postconviction motion for a new trial. Gohre alleged
that his defense counsel was ineffective for not investigating Grier as an alibi
witness and for not calling Grier to testify. The postconviction court denied the
motion without a hearing. Gohre appealed, but moved to voluntarily dismiss the
appeal and file a supplemental postconviction motion because “counsel’s
investigator uncovered new evidence warranting a supplemental postconviction
motion.” This court dismissed Gohre’s appeal.

¶7 Gohre filed a supplemental postconviction motion arguing that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence of allegedly
inculpatory statements Gohre made to police. He also incorporated the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim regarding the alibi witness that he raised in his first
postconviction motion. Alternatively, Gohre argued that the trial court
erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion by imposing an unduly harsh
sentence. The postconviction court again denied the motion without a hearing.
This appeal follows.

DISCUSSION

¶8 On appeal, Gohre reiterates the arguments made in his previous two
postconviction motions. Specifically, he contends that defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to an inculpatory statement Gohre made to police
which placed him at the corner store one hour before the shooting. He contends
that the State committed a discovery violation by introducing the statement at trial
and counsel should have objected and moved for a mistrial. He also contends that
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his alibi witness.

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

Alternatively, Gohre argues that the trial court imposed an unduly harsh sentence
and that he is entitled to a sentence reduction. We address each issue.

¶9 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, “the defendant
must prove (1) that [defense] counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that
this deficiency prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶85, 358
Wis. 2d 543, 859 N.W.2d 44. An attorney is deficient if he or she “made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶26, 274 Wis. 2d 568,
682 N.W.2d 433 (citations omitted). Prejudice is “defined as a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 85, ¶43, 273 Wis. 2d 250, 682
N.W.2d 12. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id. (citation omitted). The movant must prevail on
both prongs to secure relief. Allen, 274 Wis. 2d 568, ¶26.

¶10 Gohre contends that the State committed a discovery violation by
failing to notify the defense that it intended to elicit testimony from a detective
who conducted a custodial interview with Gohre in which Gohre admitted to being
at the corner store about an hour before the shooting while arguing with Baker.
Gohre told the detective that he was too high to remember anything else. Gohre
contends that defense counsel should have objected to this testimony and moved
for a mistrial because the State indicated at the pretrial hearing that it would not
use any inculpatory statements at trial. Gohre contends that the statement placing
himself at the corner store was inculpatory because that was the location where he
possessed a firearm and argued with Baker. Gohre is mistaken.

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

¶11 Gohre’s argument centers on his contention that the State violated
the discovery obligations contained in WIS. STAT. § 971.23(1)(b) (2023-24),2
which states:

Upon demand, the district attorney shall, within a
reasonable time before trial, disclose to the defendant or his
or her attorney and permit the defendant or his or her
attorney to inspect and copy or photograph all of the
following materials and information, if it is within the
possession, custody or control of the state:

…

(b) A written summary of all oral statements of the
defendant which the district attorney plans to use in the
course of the trial and the names of witnesses to the
defendant’s oral statements.

Gohre argues that the State had a “duty to disclose” its intent to use the statement
at trial, and, after the pretrial conference, the State had a duty “to advise the
defense that [it] had changed [its] mind.” We note first, that the State did not
violate § 971.23(1)(b) because the State provided the defense with police reports
containing summaries of the statements Gohre made to police, including the
statement Gohre complains of. Defense counsel knew of the statement and
indicated at the pretrial hearing that she did not believe the statement was
inculpatory. We note that Gohre’s presence at the corner store an hour before the
shooting was clearly established by surveillance footage. Thus, defense counsel
could not have rendered ineffective assistance for failing to object to a discovery
violation that did not exist and for failing to object to testimony that was clearly
verified by surveillance footage presented to the jury. It follows that defense
counsel was not ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial. In short, Gohre

2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

cannot establish a discovery violation or that he was prejudiced by the detective’s
testimony when surveillance video unequivocally shows an armed Gohre at the
corner store arguing with Baker an hour before the shooting.

¶12 Gohre next contends that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to investigate his alibi witness. We agree with the postconviction court’s analysis
on this issue:

[W]hen detectives asked [the witness] if he was with the
defendant at the time of the homicide, he responded, “Hell
no.” A police report memorializing that conversation was
turned over to counsel in advance of the … trial. Counsel
cannot be deemed deficient for failing to call an “alibi
witness” who, just 19 days before trial, emphatically denied
being with the defendant at the time of the homicide.

We also agree with the postconviction court that Gohre was not prejudiced by
counsel’s failure to investigate the alibi witness. The evidence presented at trial
was overwhelmingly sufficient for the jury to convict Gohre. The jury heard
testimony from multiple eyewitnesses, saw surveillance footage showing an armed
Gohre arguing with Baker an hour before the shooting, and heard about cell phone
evidence placing Gohre near the scene of the shooting. The lack of an alibi
witness does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial. See
Guerard, 273 Wis. 2d 250, ¶43.

¶13 As an alternative to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
Gohre seeks a sentence reduction on the grounds that the trial court erroneously
exercised its sentencing discretion. Specifically, he contends that the trial court’s
sentencing decision “failed to take into account the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant, as required by statute, and [was] unduly harsh or unconscionable, and
should be modified to a lesser total sentence.” We disagree.

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

¶14 We review a trial court’s sentencing determination for an erroneous
exercise of discretion. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶17, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678
N.W.2d 197. “In exercising discretion, sentencing courts must individualize the
sentence to the defendant based on the facts of the case by identifying the most
relevant factors and explaining how the sentence imposed furthers the sentencing
objectives.” State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶29, 326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409.
In determining a sentence, the trial court must consider the protection of the
public, the gravity of the offense, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, and any
applicable mitigating or aggravating factors. WIS. STAT. § 973.017(2); see also
Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶40.

¶15 A trial court’s sentencing decisions “‘are generally afforded a strong
presumption of reasonability because the [trial] court is best suited to consider the
relevant factors and demeanor of the convicted defendant.’” Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d
535, ¶18 (citation omitted). The defendant has the burden to show
unreasonableness from the record. State v. Haskins, 139 Wis. 2d 257, 268, 407
N.W.2d 309 (Ct. App. 1987). We may “‘search the record for reasons to sustain’”
the court’s exercise of sentencing discretion. State v. Salas Gayton, 2016 WI 58,
¶20, 370 Wis. 2d 264, 882 N.W.2d 459 (citation omitted).

¶16 A trial court erroneously exercises its sentencing discretion if it
imposes an unduly harsh or unconscionable sentence. Haskins, 139 Wis. 2d at
268. A sentence is unduly harsh or unconscionable only if it is “‘so excessive and
unusual and so disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public
sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right
and proper under the circumstances.’” State v. Cummings, 2014 WI 88, ¶72, 357
Wis. 2d 1, 850 N.W.2d 915 (citation omitted). “A sentence well within the
statutory limits is unlikely” to be considered unduly harsh or unconscionable. Id.,

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

¶74 (citation modified). “Near maximum sentences are not ... automatically
suspect.” Id.

¶17 Gohre has not met his burden of showing that the trial court
erroneously exercised its sentencing discretion. The record reflects that the court
considered the appropriate sentencing factors, focusing on the gravity of the
offense, the need to protect the public, and Gohre’s character. The record also
reflects that the court did consider Gohre’s rehabilitative needs. The court ordered
a mental health evaluation related to Gohre’s history of depression and ADHD,
and explained its reasons for finding Gohre ineligible for the Substance Abuse
Program and the Earned Release Program. While the court did not place heavy
emphasis on rehabilitation, the court has the discretion to determine how much
weight to assign to each sentencing factor. Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶41. The
record establishes that the trial court did appropriately consider Gohre’s
rehabilitative needs and considered the appropriate sentencing factors.

¶18 We also disagree that Gohre’s sentence was unduly harsh. Gohre
was convicted of first-degree reckless homicide, which carries a maximum
sentence of 60 years of imprisonment. See WIS. STAT. §§ 940.02(1), 939.50(3)(b).
He was also convicted of possession of a firearm by an adjudicated delinquent,
which carries a maximum imprisonment term of 10 years. WIS. STAT.
§§ 941.29(1m), 939.50(3)(g). The sentence imposed here was well within the
maximum Gohre faced and, given the facts of this case, was not unduly harsh or
excessive. See State v. Stenzel, 2004 WI App 181, ¶21, 276 Wis. 2d 224, 688
N.W.2d 20 (stating that a sentence is unduly harsh or excessive “only where the
sentence is so excessive and unusual and so disproportionate to the offense
committed as to shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable
people concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.” (citation

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No. 2024AP2218-CR

omitted)). We conclude that the trial court appropriately exercised its sentencing
discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and
the orders denying Gohre’s postconviction motions.

By the Court.—Judgment and orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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