Alexis Fecteau v. Kevin Bowman, Jr.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 19, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP801 Cir. Ct. No. 2023CV229

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

ALEXIS FECTEAU,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

KEVIN BOWMAN, JR.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Oneida County:
PATRICK F. O’MELIA, and MICHAEL H. BLOOM, Judges. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Kevin Bowman appeals from a harassment
injunction prohibiting him from contacting or making social media posts about his
No. 2024AP801

former neighbor, Alexis Fecteau, for a period of four years and from an order
denying reconsideration of the injunction.1 Bowman contends that the circuit
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, the evidence was insufficient to
support the injunction, and the court violated his due process rights by preventing
him from presenting testimony and evidence. We conclude that Bowman waived
his objection to jurisdiction by agreeing to proceed at the injunction hearing, there
was sufficient evidence to support the injunction, and Bowman has not shown that
his additional testimony or other evidence would have affected the outcome of the
proceeding. Accordingly, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Fecteau filed a harassment injunction petition against Bowman on
December 27, 2023. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 813.125(3)(c) (2023-24),2 the
circuit court adjourned an initially scheduled hearing because Fecteau had not
served Bowman with the petition and notice of the hearing.

¶3 On the second hearing date, Fecteau informed the circuit court that a
sheriff’s deputy in Iron County, Michigan, where Bowman then lived, still had not
served Bowman because the deputy had been on vacation. Bowman asked the
court to dismiss the matter with prejudice based upon the lack of service. The
court told Bowman: “We can take the issue up today regardless of the
service … or we can put the matter off until an officer goes to your business or to

1
The Honorable Patrick F. O’Melia entered the harassment injunction while serving as a
reserve judge. The Honorable Michael H. Bloom entered the order denying reconsideration.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP801

your home and serves you.” Bowman responded: “We can do it today, Your
Honor. I’m fine with that.”

¶4 The circuit court then proceeded with the hearing. Fecteau testified
that she had lived in Eagle River, Wisconsin, since October 2021 and that she
operated a pet grooming business from her home. Bowman had lived next door to
Fecteau until a few months before Fecteau filed the injunction petition.

¶5 On June 6, 2023,3 law enforcement responded to a report that
Bowman had stopped his truck in front of Fecteau’s house and had gotten into an
altercation with Fecteau’s fiancé, David Peterson (against whom Bowman
subsequently sought his own injunction). Fecteau testified that Bowman had also
sped past her house on that occasion, although that fact was not reflected in the
police report. Shortly thereafter, Bowman posted on Facebook, which stated in
relevant part:

I got some real winners for neighbors. Lived in my rental
for 4 years of peaceful times. These assholes move in, run
into self[-]inflicted financial problems, and try to take it out
on me.

…

Last year, I paid him to mow my lawn (while I waited for
parts for my mower to arrive) he didn’t even have the
courtesy to inform me his mower was broken. Just took
payment and left it alone. Then whines out loud, as my
wife drove by, because I didn’t plow him out this winter.
Apparently, it’s my responsibility to buy a plow truck to
plow HIS driveway. Not to mention, I borrowed him my
generator, when power went out for 5 days, and he brought
it back broken (no spark).

3
Although Fecteau testified that the incident occurred on June 3, 2023, the police report
stated that it occurred on June 6, 2023. Because the police report was a contemporaneously
created document, we will accept June 6 as the more accurate date.

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No. 2024AP801

Funny watching him fly around like a rag doll when he
tried to match strength with me. Bean pole! Then his
grotesque girlfriend tries her hand at insults. Calling me fat
is useless!... I can always lose weight. She can’t lose ugly
or stupid!

They are losers! Stay away from Pet Grooming by Lexi.
They are disgusting!

¶6 Bowman moved out of state in October 2023. Fecteau testified that
on December 17, 2023, Bowman returned to the neighborhood and drove past
Fecteau’s house at a slow pace, and he then slammed on the gas when she went
outside, making a very loud noise. Fecteau claimed that Bowman drove past her
house again on December 24, 2023. Fecteau asserted that Bowman was
“purposely spooling his turbo in his diesel truck so [Fecteau would] know he’s
there.”

¶7 On December 21, 2023, Bowman also made another post about
Fecteau and Peterson on Facebook. It stated, “Anyone who is thinking of going to
‘Pet Grooming by Lexi,’ beware of what you’re getting involved with! Personal
experience, she’s a nut! I’d go anywhere else or do it yourself. Also check recent
reviews on [Y]ahoo. Her true colors are shining!” Bowman attached screenshots
from CCAP to his post showing that Fecteau had been the defendant in several
criminal cases and that she had been convicted of four drug charges over a decade
earlier.

¶8 Fecteau also introduced a third Facebook post Bowman made on an
unspecified date that reposted a meme photograph Bowman had first posted in
December 2014. The photograph showed a woman with hair sticking out in all
directions under the caption, “Maybe She’s Born With It.” The third post did not
mention Fecteau by name, but it included a statement that the picture reminded
Bowman of an old neighbor.

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¶9 Bowman testified that his problems with his neighbors began with
the lawn mowing dispute. Bowman claimed that on one occasion after that
dispute, Peterson attacked his car in the street and threatened to break his jaw. 4
Bowman claimed that on other occasions, Fecteau took down a sign Bowman had
placed on her yard asking drivers to slow down and Peterson pointed a gun at
Bowman. Bowman informed the circuit court that he had a timeline, video
evidence, and a whole list of police reports he had filed about Fecteau and
Peterson “physically doing stuff” to him, but the court did not allow Bowman to
introduce or testify about those things.

¶10 Bowman acknowledged making the two Facebook posts advising
people not to use Fecteau’s business. The posts were visible only to Bowman’s
friends—which did not include either Fecteau or Peterson, whom he had blocked.
Bowman testified that he wanted to warn his friends to stay away from Fecteau
and her business because he considered her “crazy” and “dangerous” based on his
personal experience with her, and he did not want his friends to “end up in the
same situation” that he had with her. Bowman said the post with the unflattering
photograph was referring to a prior neighbor in Green Bay, not Fecteau.

¶11 Bowman testified that he drove past Fecteau’s house on
December 17, 2023, “at a decent pace” because he had friends who still lived on
the same street.5 Bowman said that Fecteau came out of her house, raised her

4
Bowman asserts in his brief that this was the June incident in front of Fecteau’s house,
but his trial testimony did not clearly state when the incident occurred.
5
Although Bowman did not explicitly testify that he was driving to visit friends on
December 17, 2023, that is a fair inference from his other testimony. It appears that the circuit
court may have accepted that testimony because the court asked whether there were other routes
Bowman could take to visit his friends without driving past Fecteau’s house in the future.

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No. 2024AP801

middle finger, and screamed at him, after which Bowman “took off” before his
vehicle could be attacked again. He said that incident was the one time that he
drove quickly past Fecteau’s house. Bowman claimed that it was his wife who
drove by Fecteau’s house on December 24, 2023, when she went to visit a friend
on the same street. Bowman’s wife was present in the courtroom to testify
regarding both of the December drive-by incidents, but she was not allowed to
testify.

¶12 Fecteau continuously interrupted Bowman’s testimony, despite the
circuit court admonishing her to stop over a dozen times. The court eventually cut
off Bowman’s testimony without asking whether he was finished.

¶13 The circuit court did not resolve the parties’ disputes over whether
Bowman had driven past Fecteau’s house on June 6, 2023, at a fast pace; whether
Bowman had driven past the house at a slow pace on December 17, 2023, before
gunning his truck’s engine; or whether it was Bowman’s wife who drove past the
house on December 24, 2023. The court concluded that the Facebook posts alone
met the criteria for harassment because they adversely affected Fecteau’s
livelihood and served “no legitimate purpose.” Bowman had previously advised
the court that he had not himself used Fecteau’s grooming service. The court
issued an injunction requiring Bowman to avoid contact with Fecteau and to cease
harassing her, including by “Internet Attacks.”

¶14 Bowman moved for reconsideration. He alleged that: (1) the circuit
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him; (2) the court denied him his due
process right to present a defense; and (3) the injunction violated his First
Amendment right to express his personal opinion of Fecteau and warn others
about her based on his personal interactions with her.

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¶15 The circuit court did not hold an evidentiary hearing on the
reconsideration motion because it viewed the issues presented as being legal in
nature. The court concluded that Bowman had waived any objection to personal
jurisdiction by agreeing to proceed with the injunction hearing and that attempting
to persuade people not to patronize another’s business based upon personal
animosity rather than knowledge of the business was not protected speech because
it served no legitimate purpose. The court did not address Bowman’s due process
claim. Bowman now appeals the injunction and the order denying
reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

¶16 Bowman argues that the injunction petition should have been
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction6 based upon Fecteau’s undisputed
failure to serve the petition upon Bowman. As the circuit court properly
explained, however, any objection to personal jurisdiction is waived if it is not
raised in a responsive pleading or by motion. See WIS. STAT. § 802.06(8)(a).
Bowman, therefore, waived his objection to personal jurisdiction when he
informed the court that he was willing to proceed, effectively withdrawing his
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

¶17 Bowman asserts that he only agreed to proceed with the hearing after
the circuit court misinformed him about his options. Specifically, Bowman
contends that the court’s statement that the matter could be put off until an officer
could serve Bowman at his home or business conflicted with WIS. STAT.

6
Bowman also mentions a loss of competency, but that would have occurred only if the
hearing had not proceeded.

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No. 2024AP801

§ 813.125(3)(c). We construe this as an argument that Bowman’s waiver of
personal jurisdiction was not knowingly made. We are not persuaded that the
court actually misinformed Bowman, however.

¶18 It is true that WIS. STAT. § 813.125(3)(c) allows only one extension
of the time to hold an injunction hearing based upon a lack of service. Therefore,
if Bowman had not effectively withdrawn his motion to dismiss the injunction
petition, the court would have had to dismiss the injunction petition for lack of
personal jurisdiction.

¶19 The dismissal of an action for lack of personal jurisdiction is
ordinarily without prejudice, however, because it occurs before the merits of the
action have been addressed. Giese v. Giese, 43 Wis. 2d 456, 464, 168 N.W.2d 832
(1969). Dismissal with prejudice prior to the adjudication on the merits is a
drastic sanction that generally would be appropriate only where there was
misconduct or inexcusable neglect. Haselow v. Gauthier, 212 Wis. 2d 580, 591,
569 N.W.2d 97 (Ct. App. 1997). Here, Fecteau’s failure to serve Bowman before
the second hearing date was the result of a deputy’s vacation, not any misconduct
by Fecteau. It follows then that if the circuit court had dismissed this action, the
dismissal would have been without prejudice, and Fecteau would have been free to
refile her injunction petition. In that context, the court’s statement that the matter
could be put off until an officer could serve Bowman was an accurate statement of
what would happen if the court dismissed the action and Fecteau refiled it. We
conclude that the court had personal jurisdiction over Bowman.

¶20 Bowman next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the injunction. A circuit court may grant a harassment injunction if there are
“reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent [to an injunction petition] has

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No. 2024AP801

engaged in harassment with intent to harass or intimidate the petitioner.” WIS.
STAT. § 813.125(4)(a)3. The injunction statute defines “harassment” as
“[e]ngaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts which harass or
intimidate another person and which serve no legitimate purpose.”
Sec. 813.125(1)(am)4.b. Case law further adopts common dictionary definitions
that “harass” means “to worry and impede by repeated attacks, to vex, trouble or
annoy continually or chronically, to plague, bedevil or badger,” while “intimidate”
means “to make timid or fearful.” Bachowski v. Salamone, 139 Wis. 2d 397, 407,
407 N.W.2d 533 (1987) (citation omitted).

¶21 The analogous criminal harassment statute defines a “[c]ourse of
conduct” as a “pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of
time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose.” WIS. STAT.
§ 947.013(1)(a); Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI App 67, ¶25, 312 Wis. 2d 435,
752 N.W.2d 359 (applying the definition in § 947.013(1)(a) to the predecessor
injunction statute). A course of conduct or repetitive acts that are intended, even
in part, to harass or intimidate do not serve a legitimate purpose. Board of
Regents-UW Sys. v. Decker, 2014 WI 68, ¶38, 355 Wis. 2d 800, 850 N.W.2d 112.

¶22 We will uphold the circuit court’s findings of fact as to what
occurred so long as they are not clearly erroneous, but we will independently
determine whether those facts establish reasonable grounds for an injunction.
Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶23. The court must make a determination as to
whether conduct served a legitimate purpose based upon the actor’s intent at the
time of the conduct. Id., ¶30. Intent is a fact to be inferred from a person’s acts
and statements, taking into account the surrounding circumstances. Id., ¶26. If
more than one reasonable inference about intent may be drawn from the evidence,
we must accept the inference drawn by the circuit court. Id., ¶27. Once grounds

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No. 2024AP801

have been established, the decision whether to grant an injunction lies within the
court’s discretion. Id., ¶24. We will independently consider, however, whether an
injunction that is based upon speech complies with the First Amendment.
Kindschy v. Aish, 2024 WI 27, ¶9, 412 Wis. 2d 319, 8 N.W.3d 1.

¶23 Here, Bowman contends there are no reasonable grounds to believe
that he engaged in harassment with the intent to harass or intimidate Fecteau
because his posts were placed on a Facebook account to which Fecteau did not
have access and were not “directed” toward her. Bowman cites an outdated
version of Black’s Law Dictionary for the proposition that harassment must be
“directed at a specific person.” Harassment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). We note that the “directed” language in the cited definition appears to be
based upon the federal harassment injunction statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514(d)(1).
As discussed above, however, the definition of harassment adopted by the
Wisconsin statute and case law does not include a provision that harassment must
be “directed” at a person.

¶24 We agree that whether Bowman could anticipate that Fecteau would
see his posts is relevant to a determination of his intent. That fact alone is not
dispositive, however. Based upon all the circumstances, including the timing of
the posts shortly following incidents between the parties, the circuit court could
reasonably draw two inferences about Bowman’s intent: (1) that he wanted to
warn his friends about Fecteau out of concern that they might have negative
interactions with her (as Bowman claimed); or (2) that he wanted to harm Fecteau
economically out of spite because he was angry with her (as Fecteau claimed).
The posts would serve a legitimate purpose if motivated by the first intent but not
the second. Because the circuit court was in the best position to observe the
parties and judge their relative credibility, we accept the court’s determination that

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No. 2024AP801

Bowman’s posts served no legitimate purpose, along with its implicit finding that
Bowman’s intent was to economically harm Fecteau because he was angry with
her.

¶25 Bowman points out that Fecteau did not present any evidence
showing that she actually suffered any loss of business. However, the statute does
not require Fecteau to show that she sustained damages in order to prove
harassment. The mere attempt to harm Fecteau’s business would be sufficiently
worrisome or vexing to constitute harassment when done for no legitimate
purpose.7 See Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶¶16, 31 (explaining that a course of
conduct that included disseminating true negative information about a competing
attorney’s past disciplinary proceeding formed part of the valid basis for a
harassment determination when motivated by a desire for revenge rather than
consumer protection); cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909-
11 (1982) (holding that nonviolent boycott activity, including urging others to join
in a boycott, is constitutionally protected when done for the legitimate purpose of
bringing about political or social change). We conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to provide grounds for the injunction.

¶26 Bowman’s final argument on appeal is that the circuit court violated
his due process rights by the manner in which it conducted the injunction hearing.
Specifically, Bowman complains that the court refused to accept his timeline,

7
We agree with Bowman that the circuit court’s suggestion that it would have been okay
for Bowman to make the same boycott suggestions in telephone calls to his friends rather than by
Facebook posts improperly drew a distinction between oral and written communication that does
not exist. However, the court made that erroneous statement as part of a hypothetical. It does not
affect the actual factual basis for the court’s decision.

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No. 2024AP801

video, exhibits, and other testimony and that it failed to control Fecteau’s repeated
interruptions, which left Bowman’s presentation in “disarray.”

¶27 We will assume, for the sake of argument, that the circuit court
violated Bowman’s due process rights by refusing to allow Bowman to present at
least some of his materials and additional testimony. A due process violation is
subject to the harmless error doctrine, however. State v. Kramer, 2006 WI App
133, ¶26, 294 Wis. 2d 780, 720 N.W.2d 459. Under the harmless error doctrine,
this court will not reverse a judgment based upon “error as to any matter
of … procedure” unless “after an examination of the entire action or proceeding, it
shall appear that the error complained of has affected the substantial rights of the
party seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to secure a new trial.” WIS.
STAT. § 805.18(2). This court will independently determine as a question of law
whether an error is harmless. State v. Beamon, 2011 WI App 131, ¶7, 336
Wis. 2d 438, 804 N.W.2d 706.

¶28 Bowman did not present either the circuit court on his motion for
reconsideration or this court with an offer of proof explaining exactly what his
timeline, video, or police reports would have shown, much less has he explained
how they would have affected the circuit court’s determination that there were
grounds for an injunction. We therefore cannot conclude that Bowman’s
substantial rights were affected based upon his claimed inability to present this
additional evidence.

¶29 As to Bowman’s wife’s proposed testimony, we agree that the
testimony had the potential to undermine Fecteau’s allegation that Bowman was
deliberately revving his engine while driving past Fecteau’s house. However, in
ordering the injunction, the circuit court did not make or rely upon any finding that

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Bowman had been deliberately revving his engine while driving past Fecteau’s
house. Rather, the court based its determination that Bowman had harassed
Fecteau upon those portions of Bowman’s Facebook posts in which he urged his
friends not to utilize her business.

¶30 We have already determined that repeatedly urging people not to
patronize Fecteau’s business, for no legitimate reason, was itself sufficient to
support the issuance of the injunction. Because Bowman has not shown how he
was prejudiced by the lack of any of the evidence that he contends he should have
been allowed to present, we conclude that any error in excluding that evidence was
harmless.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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