Sarah Yacoub v. St. Croix County

CourtListener 10864776WisctappMay 27, 2026

Full text

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 27, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos. 2023AP758 Cir. Ct. Nos. 2022JC67
2022JC68
2023AP759 2022JC69
2023AP760 2022JC70
2022JC71
2023AP761
2023AP762

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

NO. 2023AP758

IN THE MATTER OF THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT IN
IN THE INTEREST OF B. J. C., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

SARAH YACOUB,

APPELLANT,

V.

ST. CROIX COUNTY,

RESPONDENT,

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

OTHER PARTY-RESPONDENT.
Nos. 2023AP758
2023AP759
2023AP760
2023AP761
2023AP762

NO. 2023AP759

IN THE MATTER OF THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT IN
IN THE INTEREST OF D. E. C., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

SARAH YACOUB,

APPELLANT,

V.

ST. CROIX COUNTY,

RESPONDENT,

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

OTHER PARTY-RESPONDENT.

NO. 2023AP760

IN THE MATTER OF THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT IN
IN THE INTEREST OF V. E. C., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

SARAH YACOUB,

APPELLANT,

V.

ST. CROIX COUNTY,

RESPONDENT,

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

OTHER PARTY-RESPONDENT.

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Nos. 2023AP758
2023AP759
2023AP760
2023AP761
2023AP762

NO. 2023AP761

IN THE MATTER OF THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT IN
IN THE INTEREST OF L. R. C., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

SARAH YACOUB,

APPELLANT,

V.

ST. CROIX COUNTY,

RESPONDENT,

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

OTHER PARTY-RESPONDENT.

NO. 2023AP762

IN THE MATTER OF THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT IN
IN THE INTEREST OF A. D. C., A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF 18:

SARAH YACOUB,

APPELLANT,

V.

ST. CROIX COUNTY,

RESPONDENT,

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

OTHER PARTY-RESPONDENT.

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Nos. 2023AP758
2023AP759
2023AP760
2023AP761
2023AP762

APPEALS from a judgment of the circuit court for St. Croix County:
EDWARD F. VLACK III, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 GILL, J.1 In these consolidated appeals, Attorney Sarah Yacoub
appeals from a judgment requiring her to pay $4,663.03 in costs and attorney fees
as a remedial sanction, after the circuit court found her in contempt, pursuant to
WIS. STAT. chs. 48 and 785, for intentionally disclosing confidential information
from five child in need of protection or services (CHIPS) cases. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2022, Sally2 and Fred jointly signed petitions for
protection or services under WIS. STAT. ch. 48 for each of their five children.
Yacoub represented Sally in each CHIPS case. The circuit court awarded Sally
and Fred shared physical placement of the children in October 2022. In early
December 2022, the St. Croix County Department of Family Services filed a
notice of change in placement and, shortly thereafter, removed Sally’s children
from her care and custody. The children were placed with Fred.

¶3 On December 16, 2022, Attorney Yacoub filed, on behalf of Sally, a
complaint and request for injunctive relief in federal court against St. Croix
County, three St. Croix County employees, and the guardian ad litem (GAL)

1
These appeals are decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(h)
(2023-24). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
For ease of reading, we refer to the parties involved in the underlying confidential
CHIPS proceedings using pseudonyms, rather than their initials.

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2023AP762

appointed in the five CHIPS cases. The complaint alleged that the children were
unlawfully removed from Sally’s home and placed with their father, who, prior to
the children’s removal, abused them and sexually assaulted and abused Sally.
Yacoub disclosed in the complaint that there were open CHIPS cases involving the
five children (without naming the children), disclosed confidential information
about the children, and disclosed detailed information related to the CHIPS
proceedings.

¶4 On January 3, 2023, Attorney Yacoub sent an email with an
attachment to 19 members of the St. Croix County Board of Supervisors and the
president of the St. Croix County Court Appointed Special Advocate program,
outlining Sally’s complaints regarding a social worker involved with the removal
of her children and their placement with Fred. The email and accompanying
attachment identified the parties to the CHIPS cases, including some of the names
of the children, and provided specific details related to the children and documents
filed in the CHIPS cases.

¶5 Afterward, a St. Croix County deputy district attorney and an
attorney for the three youngest children filed separate motions for contempt
against Yacoub, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.299(1)(b) and WIS. STAT. ch. 785,
based on her disclosure of confidential information in the email and the federal
lawsuit.3 The attorney for the three children requested that Yacoub pay the actual
costs incurred by St. Croix County to purge all records of Yacoub’s email, pay

3
St. Croix County’s corporation counsel, on behalf of the St. Croix County Department
of Health and Human Services—Children Services, submitted a brief in support of the State’s
motion for contempt.

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2023AP761
2023AP762

reasonable attorney fees “incurred by St. Croix County in the appointment of
counsel to represent these children,” and forfeit $5,000 “by reason of her
intentional disclosure of confidential information.” Yacoub moved to dismiss
both contempt motions.

¶6 The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on January 20, 2023, to
address the parties’ motions.4 In an 83-page decision and order, the court found
Yacoub in contempt and issued remedial sanctions. In particular, the court found
that Yacoub’s email and the federal lawsuit divulged confidential information
about the family and the CHIPS cases, in violation of WIS. STAT. § 48.299(1)(b).
Moreover, the court rejected Yacoub’s arguments that WIS. STAT. § 48.981(7)(a)
is an exception to § 48.299(1)(b), that it allows the disclosure of confidential
information, and that it contains an exception for good faith actions. The court
explained that § 48.299(1)(b) provides only two exceptions, WIS. STAT.
§§ 48.375(7) and 48.396, and that § 48.981(7)(a) is limited to “[r]eports and
records” “made under” that “section.”

¶7 In addition, the circuit court found that Yacoub’s disclosure of the
confidential records in both her email and the federal lawsuit was intentional.
See WIS. STAT. § 785.01(1)(b). According to the court, Yacoub filed the federal
lawsuit to advance Sally’s interests because Sally was at “odds with the county’s
social workers and the former GAL for the children. By intentionally breaching
the confidentiality, Atty. Yacoub resisted the authority of the Court to maintain

4
The transcript of the January 20, 2023 hearing is not in the record.

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confidentiality of these proceedings in furtherance of advancing the best interests
of the children.”

¶8 Given the foregoing, the circuit court ordered several remedial
sanctions against Yacoub: (1) removal of Yacoub as Sally’s attorney; (2) payment
of reasonable attorney fees incurred by St. Croix County “for the work performed”
by the three youngest children’s attorney “with regard to” the motions for
contempt; (3) payment of actual costs incurred by St. Croix County to “purge all
records of the email dissemination related to these proceedings”; and (4) payment
of attorney fees incurred by St. Croix County for the appointment of counsel if
Sally submits “an application for the appointment of counsel” and is approved.
The court later entered a final judgment requiring Yacoub to pay $4,663.03 for the
attorney fees and costs.

¶9 Yacoub now appeals.5

DISCUSSION

I. We need not address several issues raised by Yacoub on appeal.

¶10 Before turning to the merits of the substantive issues before this
court, we address three sets of arguments raised by Yacoub that we ultimately

5
We pause here to note that Yacoub cites to three unpublished opinions in her
brief-in-chief. While each case is authored by one judge, one of the cases was issued before
July 1, 2009, see WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(a), and Yacoub failed to file and serve copies of the
two other opinions with her brief, see RULE 809.23(3)(c), or otherwise indicate that the opinions
are unpublished. As a high-volume appellate court, we expect briefing by an attorney to follow
the basic Rules of Appellate Procedure. We caution Yacoub that future violations of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure may result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2).

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2023AP761
2023AP762

need not adjudicate. To begin, Yacoub argues on appeal, for the first time in this
case, that the State was not aggrieved by the confidential disclosures and,
therefore, lacked standing to bring its contempt motion against her. She also
asserts that St. Croix County is not entitled to receive payment as a sanction
because it lacks standing.6 Because Yacoub raised these issues for the first time
on appeal, we conclude that she has forfeited a challenge to any of the parties’
standing, and we decline to address these issues further. See Schonscheck v.
Paccar, Inc., 2003 WI App 79, ¶11, 261 Wis. 2d 769, 661 N.W.2d 476 (“A
fundamental appellate precept is that we ‘will not … blindside trial courts with
reversals based on theories which did not originate in their forum.’” (citation
omitted)).

¶11 Next, Yacoub argues that the circuit court erred by finding her in
contempt because several exceptions to WIS. STAT. § 48.299 applied to her
confidential disclosures in the email and in the federal lawsuit. The State replies
by asserting that, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 48.981 and the holdings in State ex rel.
Herget v. Circuit Court of Waukesha County, 84 Wis. 2d 435, 267 N.W.2d 309
(1978), and State v. Bellows, 218 Wis. 2d 614, 582 N.W.2d 53 (Ct. App. 1998), no
exceptions in § 48.299 applied to the disclosures. Yacoub never addresses these
arguments or authorities, either in her brief-in-chief or her reply brief, despite the
State raising them in the circuit court and on appeal. Accordingly, we deem these
arguments conceded and do not address the potential exceptions further.

6
Yacoub does not argue that the three youngest children, whose attorney also filed a
motion for contempt, lacked standing.

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Nos. 2023AP758
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2023AP761
2023AP762

See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750,
738 N.W.2d 578.

¶12 Yacoub further contends that the circuit court erred by finding that
she intentionally violated WIS. STAT. § 48.299(1)(b). She argues only the
following in support of this position:

The circuit court asserted no evidentiary basis upon which
to conclude that [she] intentionally violated state law,
instead presenting circular logic that she intentionally
violated state law. In this case, the circuit court filings of
Attorney Yacoub which are not before the Court make
clear the good faith reliance on statutory authority for her
confidential disclosures.

¶13 We deem Yacoub’s argument that the circuit court erred in this
respect as undeveloped. Yacoub cites no factual basis to support her position that
she relied in good faith on any statutory authority or attempted to comply with
WIS. STAT. § 48.299(1)(b), and we will not develop an argument on her behalf.
See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992)
(declining to address undeveloped arguments). The circuit court found that
Yacoub, as an attorney, “is presumed to know the law, including the
confidentiality requirements” contained in WIS. STAT. ch. 48. Absent citation to
factual evidence to the contrary, we affirm the court’s finding.

II. The circuit court did not err by issuing remedial sanctions.

¶14 Turning to the merits of the remaining issues, Yacoub raises several
arguments related to the circuit court’s remedial sanctions against her, and we
address each in turn.

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2023AP760
2023AP761
2023AP762

A. Yacoub’s violations of WIS. STAT. § 48.299(1)(b) constituted continuing
contempt.

¶15 First, Yacoub argues that the circuit court had no lawful basis to
impose remedial sanctions because “there was no continuing contempt” of court.
She also asserts that the sanctions were punitive in nature because the court failed
to afford her the “opportunity to purge” the contempt.

¶16 WISCONSIN STAT. § 785.02 provides that a court of record “may
impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt of court under this chapter.”
A punitive sanction is “a sanction imposed to punish a past contempt of court for
the purpose of upholding the authority of the court.” WIS. STAT. § 785.01(2).
Conversely, a remedial sanction is “a sanction imposed for the purpose of
terminating a continuing contempt of court.” Sec. 785.01(3). WISCONSIN STAT.
§ 785.04 lists the sanctions available to a court of record.

¶17 We must interpret and apply statutes to determine whether the circuit
court had the statutory authority to employ remedial sanctions under these
circumstances. See Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, ¶29, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736
N.W.2d 85. Statutory interpretation and application present issues of law that we
review de novo. Id.

¶18 In support of her position that the disclosure of confidential
information was not a continuing contempt of court, Yacoub contends that she
“recalled the confidential email the same day it was sent, … none of the recipients
opened the attachment, … the body of the email contained no confidential
information, and … only one [Board member] read the body of the email.”
Yacoub’s factual assertions appear to be based on testimony from the January 20,

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2023 hearing, but, as noted above, the transcript of that hearing is not in the record
before this court. We therefore assume that the missing transcript supports the
circuit court’s ruling. See Fiumefreddo v. McLean, 174 Wis. 2d 10, 27, 496
N.W.2d 226 (Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]hen an appellate record is incomplete in
connection with an issue raised by the appellant, we must assume that the missing
material supports the trial court’s ruling.”).

¶19 Regardless, we disagree with Yacoub’s claim that there was no
continuing contempt of court when the circuit court issued the remedial sanctions.
As the circuit court noted below, Yacoub cited no authority for the proposition that
a “purported recall of the e-mail changes the fact that confidential
information … was divulged.” Nor does Yacoub cite such authority on appeal.
Additionally, Yacoub fails to cite any evidence in the record that when she
recalled the email, the confidential information somehow disappeared from
St. Croix County’s records or the records of anyone else to whom the email was
sent. In fact, the court ordered that Yacoub pay the actual costs incurred by
St. Croix County to purge all records of the email. Yacoub does not seriously
dispute that such records existed even after she allegedly recalled the email.
Furthermore, Yacoub does not allege that the disclosure of confidential
information in the federal lawsuit was not ongoing. Therefore, Yacoub’s
contempt of court was ongoing, and the court’s sanctions were consistent with the
principal objective of remedial sanctions, which is to “force the contemnor into
compliance.” See Christensen v. Sullivan, 2009 WI 87, ¶55, 320 Wis. 2d 76, 768
N.W.2d 798.

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¶20 We further disagree with Yacoub that the circuit court erred by
failing to afford her the “opportunity to purge” the contempt. WISCONSIN STAT.
ch. 785 “has been consistently interpreted to allow the circuit court to establish an
alternate purge condition to purge a party’s contempt.” Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1,
¶60. “An alternative ‘purge condition’ may be the sanction authorized under WIS.
STAT. § 785.04(1)(a) or (e) ….” Id. (citation omitted). “[W]hen dealing with
payment to compensate a party for a loss suffered as a result of contempt, it is
possible for there to be a purge condition without a sanction or, in the alternative,
for the purge condition to be the same as the sanction.” Id., ¶63.

¶21 The State analyzes each remedial sanction in its brief, arguing and
explaining how each sanction is consistent with WIS. STAT. ch. 785 and Frisch.
Yacoub never addresses these arguments, and we deem them conceded.
See United Coop., 304 Wis. 2d 750, ¶39.

B. Yacoub was not denied due process of law.

¶22 Lastly, Yacoub contends that the circuit court failed to afford her
“any opportunity to participate in its determination of monies ordered paid,
leaving [her] no due process opportunity to argue the factual findings or
conclusions of law as it relates to the monetary sanctions.”

¶23 Again, we reject Yacoub’s arguments, which appear to be premised
on her contention that the sanctions were punitive in nature. As we have
explained, the circuit court issued remedial sanctions, not punitive sanctions.
Yacoub fails to explain how the parties or the circuit court failed to comply with
the remedial sanction procedures set forth in WIS. STAT. § 785.03(1)(a). The State
and the attorney for the three youngest children filed motions for contempt in the

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CHIPS proceedings, and the court, after notice and an evidentiary hearing,
imposed remedial sanctions authorized by statute based on detailed findings.
See id.; Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶24, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 671 N.W.2d
304. These procedures complied with due process.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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