State v. R. L. S.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 23, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal Nos. 2026AP735-CR Cir. Ct. Nos. 2022CF1322
2022CF1323
2026AP736-CR 2023CF1026
2026AP737-CR

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

R. L. S.,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from orders of the circuit court for Brown County:
SAMANTHA WAGNER, Judge. Reversed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
Nos. 2026AP735-CR
2026AP736-CR
2026AP737-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. In these consolidated appeals, Ryan1 challenges
circuit court orders authorizing his involuntary medication for the purpose of
restoring him to competency in three criminal cases. Ryan argues, among other
things, that the circuit court failed to make the requisite findings under WIS. STAT.
§ 971.14(3)(dm) to order his involuntary medication. For the following reasons,
we agree with Ryan on this point, and we reverse the involuntary medication
orders accordingly.2

BACKGROUND

¶2 The State charged Ryan with five crimes in three Brown County
cases. In Brown County Case No. 2022CF1322, the State charged Ryan in
July 2022 with driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent after Ryan allegedly
requested to test drive a vehicle at an automotive dealership and did not return the
car until the following day. That same month, in Brown County Case
No. 2022CF1323, the State charged Ryan with second-degree sexual assault of a
child under 16 years of age. In that case, the State alleged that Ryan “came up
behind” a 15-year-old girl at a mall and “grabbed her butt and lifted it” before

1
Pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.81(8) (2023-24), we use a pseudonym when referring
to R.L.S. in these confidential matters.

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
2
Ryan also argues on appeal that, irrespective of the circuit court’s failure to make the
requisite factual findings, the State failed to prove the requirements set forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 971.14(3)(dm) and that the State failed to establish the first factor under Sell v. United States,
539 U.S. 166 (2003). Because we reverse the involuntary medication orders on the ground that
the circuit court failed to make the requisite findings of fact under WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm),
we do not address the merits of Ryan’s remaining arguments. See Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI
App 256, ¶1 n.1, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716 (explaining that this court need not address
all issues raised if one is dispositive).

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“quickly … walking in the opposite direction.” Finally, in Brown County Case
No. 2023CF1026, the State charged Ryan in June 2023 with disorderly conduct,
resisting an officer, and felony bail jumping. Those charges arose from allegations
that Ryan asked to speak to a manager at an events center, claiming his locks were
stolen after his locker had been cleaned out. Law enforcement was called after
Ryan refused to leave, and he allegedly resisted arrest

¶3 A jury found Ryan guilty of the second-degree sexual assault charge
in May 2025.3 Before sentencing in that case, and while Ryan’s remaining two
cases were still pending, Ryan’s competency was again raised as an issue.
Following a hearing, the circuit court entered orders on August 15, 2025, finding
that Ryan was incompetent to proceed in all three cases but likely to become
competent within twelve months, and it shortly thereafter entered written orders
for his commitment. In December 2025, Ryan was transferred from the Brown
County Jail to an inpatient hospital setting.

¶4 On January 9, 2026, the Department of Health Services (DHS) filed
a motion for an involuntary medication order. Accompanying the DHS’s motion
was an individualized treatment plan prepared by Dr. Jacqueline Landess and Dr.
Molly Kadlec.

3
Ryan’s competency had been raised in the three cases before 2025. To briefly
summarize, Ryan’s competency was initially raised in these cases in December 2023. In March
2024, Ryan was found not competent but likely to become competent, and he was committed for
treatment. In June 2024, the circuit court found that Ryan’s competency had been restored.
Ryan’s competency was again raised in September 2024, and, following a court-ordered
evaluation, Ryan was found competent to proceed in October 2024.

The Honorable Kendall Kelley presided over the March 2024 and June 2024 competency
proceedings, and the Honorable William Atkinson presided over the September 2024 and October
2024 competency proceedings.

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¶5 The individualized treatment plan detailed Ryan’s previous
treatment as a result of the competency proceedings in these three cases. The
doctors noted that Ryan was treated in April 2024 with risperidone after
“express[ing] delusional beliefs, including claims of being an undercover secret
service agent.” The risperidone improved Ryan’s anxiety and reduced his
delusional thoughts.

¶6 However, in July 2025, Ryan’s “rational productivity was
significantly impaired by his preoccupation with persecutory and grandiose
delusional beliefs.” At that time, Ryan “denied any current or past mental health
diagnoses, denied [his] current psychotropic medications, and stated that he d[id]
not believe he need[ed] medication based on his belief that he d[id] not have a
mental illness.” In November 2025, Ryan was found to be presenting paranoid
thoughts and delusional thinking. The doctors further stated that “[r]ecords from
Brown County Jail indicate[d] that [Ryan] was refusing most doses of
risperidone,” having “accepted only 2 doses … in October 2025, and in November
2025 he refused ‘to take his risperidone for over a month, refusing to talk to
mental health staff since May.’”

¶7 Upon Ryan’s transfer from the jail to the inpatient hospital in
December 2025, Ryan exhibited “symptoms of untreated mental illness,
specifically schizophrenia.” Ryan “denied [having] any current psychotropic
medications,” and he “presented as disorganized, tangential, paranoid, and with
delusional thought content.” Ryan “was informed of the advantages and
disadvantages of risperidone” upon his admission to the inpatient hospital, but
Ryan responded by “repeatedly [telling] psychiatric providers that he has not taken
risperidone previously, does not believe that he has schizophrenia, and that he is

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unwilling to take any medication while at” the hospital. Several days later, Ryan
again “refused medications,” stating he “could get in trouble for that because it’s
not medication for [him].”

¶8 On January 8, 2026, the doctors again met with Ryan and “discussed
[the] recommendation of risperidone for treatment of schizophrenia. The
advantages and disadvantages were explained once more,” but Ryan refused to
take “any medications.” According to the doctors, Ryan “was able to convey a
partial understanding of the risks and benefits of antipsychotic medication such as
risperidone, however he was unable to apply this to himself and his condition.”
Ryan was then “provided with a[n] information print-out regarding risperidone.”

¶9 Toward the end of the individualized treatment plan, the doctors
checked a box next to the following statement: “The defendant is substantially
incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and
alternatives” of the proposed medication “to his … mental illness … in order to
make an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or
treatment.” The doctors did not check the box next to the following statement:
“The defendant is incapable of expressing an understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives.” The
doctors made these two assessments based on their opinions “to a reasonable
degree of medical certainty.”

¶10 Beneath the checked box, the doctors stated that while Ryan “is able
to express an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of medication,”
he is “unable to apply this understanding to his mental illness.” The doctors
further explained:

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When discussing advantages and disadvantages of
medication with [Ryan], he could recall some previous
discussions about risperidone. Specifically he stated, “it
improves cognitive functioning… helps with sleep and if
you are hearing or seeing things then it’d help that.” When
asked if he recalls any possible side effects he says “yeah it
might not work like it might not take away the voices or the
seeing things.” The risks of risperidone including weight
gain, metabolic changes, dizziness, sedation, and potential
movement disorders were explained to [Ryan] again. The
potential benefits including treatment of hallucinations,
delusions and paranoia, thought organization, mood and
sleep stability, were also explained. He was also informed
that there is no alternative to psychotropic medications such
as antipsychotic medications for the treatment of
schizophrenia. Afterwards he was asked to repeat these
back to demonstrate his understanding and he replied “I’m
not gonna repeat them all back to you but basically you
said it could make me gain weight and movement stuff,” in
regards to risks, and “improve cognitive functioning and
help with paranoia,” in regards to benefits.… Throughout
this conversation, and in previous encounters during his
admission, [Ryan] has repeatedly declined psychotropic
medications, asserted that he does not believe he has a
mental illness, and denies a history of previous treatment
with psychotropic medications. He currently appears
incapable of understanding why he is currently considered
incompetent to stand trial, and unable to appreciate that in
2024 when receiving treatment with risperidone his
competency was subsequently restored.

(First ellipsis in original.)

¶11 The individualized treatment plan identified all of the medications
the doctors requested to use to medicate Ryan, both orally and by injection, and it
listed the maximum daily dosages of those medications. The doctors explained in
the plan that Ryan would “first be offered risperidone given the historic benefit of
this medication. If he does not tolerate this medication, or it is not deemed to be
beneficial for treating current psychiatric symptoms, alternative treatment options
will be discussed.” The doctors further stated that Ryan “may be offered any of
the oral antipsychotic medications (risperidone, aripiprazole, olanzapine,

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quetiapine, haloperidol) …, as each could provide treatment for his symptoms of
psychosis.” In addition, the doctors reported that Ryan would “[i]nitially” “be
administered a single antipsychotic medication. If he fails to respond to an initial
antipsychotic or experiences intolerable side effects, we will switch him to an
alternative. If he fails two therapeutic trials of antipsychotics, he may benefit from
taking antipsychotics in combination.” According to the doctors, Ryan might also
be prescribed lorazepam “[i]f he experiences severe agitation.”

¶12 Ryan contested the DHS’s motion for an involuntary medication
order, and the circuit court held a hearing on January 16, 2026. Doctor Kadlec
was the sole witness at the hearing, and the court admitted the individualized
treatment plan into evidence.

¶13 Following oral arguments from the parties, the circuit court granted
the DHS’s motion, stating:

Based on the record that’s before me and I look at the
totality of this case dating all the way back to prior to
myself taking the bench, prior to the trial, the issues that
there has been with competency with [Ryan], how his
competency was previously restored and then what brings
us to today’s date, I reviewed the documents and request
that were filed by the doctors …, I am going to order the
involuntary administration of medication.

The court made the following findings of fact: that Dr. Kadlec was “qualified” to
make the involuntary medication request and “provide the testimony that she did”;
that Ryan is “mentally ill,” having been diagnosed with schizophrenia; that the
second-degree sexual assault of a child charge is a “serious crime”; that the
involuntary administration of medication will render Ryan competent to stand trial
or assist his attorney at sentencing; that it is “substantially unlikely” Ryan will
suffer “side effects that undermine the fairness” of his trial or sentencing; that

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there are no other available “alternative or less-intrusive treatments” that will
achieve “substantially the same results”; and that “the involuntary administration
of medication or treatment is medically appropriate.”

¶14 Thereafter, the circuit court issued written involuntary medication
orders in each of the three cases. Each order included checked boxes next to
statements indicating that the factors set forth in Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166 (2003), had been proven. However, neither the court’s oral ruling nor its
written orders included language addressing the requirements of WIS. STAT.
§ 971.14(3)(dm).

¶15 Ryan now appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Forfeiture

¶16 Before reaching the merits of Ryan’s appeal, we must address the
State’s argument that Ryan “forfeited all of his claims” because “he did not raise
or develop any of them at” the January 16, 2026 hearing. (Formatting altered.)

¶17 We conclude that the forfeiture rule does not apply to Ryan’s
challenges on appeal. First, as a general matter, the State and the circuit court
were on notice that Ryan objected to the DHS’s motion for involuntary
medication. See State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶¶29-30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761
N.W.2d 612. In fact, the parties held the January 16, 2026 evidentiary hearing
because Ryan objected to the involuntary medication motion.

¶18 Relatedly, two of Ryan’s challenges on appeal—particularly, his
arguments pertaining to the State’s failure to meet its burden under WIS. STAT.

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§ 971.14(3)(dm) and the first Sell factor—are properly characterized as
sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges, which cannot be forfeited under these
circumstances. See Waukesha County v. M.A.C., 2024 WI 30, ¶67, 412 Wis. 2d
462, 8 N.W.3d 365 (citing WIS. STAT. § 805.17(4)); WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.109(2)(h) (stating that when appealing from an order entered pursuant
to § 971.14, “[t]he person shall file a motion for postdisposition relief in the circuit
court before a notice of appeal is filed unless the grounds for seeking relief are
sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously raised” (emphasis added)).

¶19 As to Ryan’s remaining challenge on appeal, the State fails to
provide any authority to support its position that Ryan was required, in order to
preserve the issue for appeal, to notify the circuit court and the State that, in his
view, the court failed to make the requisite findings of fact under WIS. STAT.
§ 971.14(3)(dm). The State, not the defense, bears the burden to ensure that the
statutory and constitutional requirements for an involuntary medication order are
met. As Ryan argues, the defense “is not required to do the [S]tate’s job” by
eliciting testimony that would establish those requirements or by ensuring the
circuit court makes all of the necessary findings to issue an involuntary medication
order.

¶20 We are unpersuaded by the State’s reliance on State v. D.E.C., 2025
WI App 9, 415 Wis. 2d 161, 17 N.W.3d 67 (2024), to support its position that
Ryan forfeited all of his arguments on appeal. In D.E.C., the defendant argued on
appeal that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof on the fourth Sell factor
(that the planned forced administration of medication was medically appropriate)
because certain medications recommended in the treatment plan, and/or the
proposed dosages of those medications, were inappropriate. D.E.C., 415 Wis. 2d

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161, ¶¶68, 70-72. To support his arguments, the defendant cited statements from
FDA labels, a “prescriber’s guide,” and a scholarly article. See id. (formatting
altered).

¶21 We explained on appeal that while defense counsel “asked probing
questions” of the doctor at the evidentiary hearing concerning some of these
issues, counsel did not ask the testifying doctor for her opinions on the statements
from the FDA labels, the “prescriber’s guide,” or the scholarly article. See id.,
¶¶66, 69-71, 73. Therefore, we concluded that without a record of the testifying
doctor having an opportunity to “explain her view” of the statements from those
materials, we lacked the necessary context or factual basis to consider the
defendant’s arguments on appeal. See id., ¶¶69-71, 73.

¶22 Here, Ryan is not challenging the medical accuracy of the testifying
doctor’s opinions based on evidence that was not presented in the circuit court.
Rather, Ryan raises legal arguments rooted in the State’s failure to meet its burden
as to the first Sell factor (based on the nature of the charges and the length of his
incarceration), the State’s failure to meet its burden of proof as to the elements of
WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm), and the circuit court’s failure to make the necessary
factual findings to satisfy the standards in § 971.14(3)(dm). Accordingly,
D.E.C.’s forfeiture holding is entirely inapplicable to this appeal, and we now turn
to the merits of Ryan’s arguments.

II. WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm)

¶23 Before a circuit court orders the involuntary administration of
medication in Wisconsin, the State must “make a double showing” under WIS.
STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm). State v. J.D.B., 2026 WI 5, ¶51, 419 Wis. 2d 383, 31
N.W.3d 314. First, the State must prove that the “advantages and disadvantages of

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and alternatives to accepting the particular medication or treatment” were
explained to the defendant. Sec. 971.14(3)(dm); J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d 383, ¶51.
Second, the State must demonstrate that the defendant is “incapable of expressing
an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or
treatment and the alternatives” or that the defendant is “substantially incapable of
applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages and alternatives to his
or her mental illness … in order to make an informed choice as to whether to
accept or refuse medication or treatment.” Sec. 971.14(3)(dm)1.-2.; J.D.B., 419
Wis. 2d 383, ¶51. The State must make these showings by clear and convincing
evidence. Sec. 971.14(4)(b), (5)(am).

¶24 We review a circuit court’s statutory findings made pursuant to WIS.
STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm) under the clearly erroneous standard. J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d
383, ¶49. “‘[A]s long as the evidence would permit a reasonable person to make
the same finding,’ it will be affirmed on appeal.” J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d 383, ¶35
(citation omitted).

¶25 Ryan contends that the circuit court never found, either in its oral
ruling or its written orders, that Ryan is not competent to refuse medication or
treatment under WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm). The State does not seriously dispute
this fact.4 Based upon our independent review of the transcript of the January 16,

4
Without directly addressing Ryan’s arguments to the contrary, the State does assert that
“the ‘medically informed record’ supports the circuit court’s conclusion that the State met its
burden under WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm)2.” But the State fails to directly address Ryan’s
arguments by explaining where, precisely, in the record this “conclusion” was made, and our
independent review of the transcript of the January 16, 2026 evidentiary hearing and the circuit
court’s involuntary medication orders leads us to conclude that there is no factual basis for the
State’s assertion: the court did not conclude that the State met its burden under § 971.14(3)(dm).

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2026 evidentiary hearing and the circuit court’s involuntary medication orders, it
is clear that the court never found that Ryan is not competent to refuse medication
or treatment under § 971.14(3)(dm). Indeed, the court never referenced the statute
or otherwise discussed Ryan’s competency to refuse medication or treatment.

¶26 Ryan further argues that we may not affirm the circuit court’s orders
even if the record supports a finding that the requirements in WIS. STAT.
§ 971.14(3)(dm)2. were met. Ryan explains that § 971.14 mandates that a circuit
court must make the requisite findings therein before ordering the administration
of involuntary medication. Specifically, he cites to § 971.14(5)(am), which states,
in pertinent part, that “the court shall, under the procedures and standards specified
in sub. (4)(b), determine the defendant’s competency to refuse medication or
treatment for the defendant’s mental condition.” In turn, § 971.14(4)(b) provides
that if

the defendant is found incompetent and if the state proves
by evidence that is clear and convincing that the defendant
is not competent to refuse medication or treatment, under
the standard specified in sub. (3)(dm), the court shall make
a determination without a jury and issue an order that the
defendant is not competent to refuse medication or
treatment for the defendant’s mental condition and that
whoever administers the medication or treatment to the
defendant shall observe appropriate medical standards.

(Emphasis added.)

¶27 In addition, Ryan notes that in “actions tried upon the facts without a
jury …, the court shall find the ultimate facts and state separately its conclusions
of law thereon.” WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2). “Ultimate facts” are the elements that
must be proven. See State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶16, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604
N.W.2d 552. Ryan argues that while § 805.17(2) provides that “[i]f an opinion or

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memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of ultimate
fact and conclusions of law appear therein,” the circuit court’s written involuntary
medication orders in this case do not include any language addressing the
requirements of WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm).

¶28 Ryan further emphasizes the importance of following statutory
requirements in the involuntary medication context, arguing that “[a]llowing an
involuntary medication order to stand—despite [a circuit court] failing to address
the mandated statutory requirements—would be far more egregious than simply
being perfunctory. It would render judicial oversight utterly meaningless.”
See Outagamie County v. Melanie L., 2013 WI 67, ¶94, 349 Wis. 2d 148, 833
N.W.2d 607 (stating, in the WIS. STAT. ch. 51 context, that the government “bears
the burden of proof on the issue of competency in a hearing on an involuntary
medication order. These hearings cannot be perfunctory under the law. Attention
to detail is important.”).

¶29 For its part, the State does not respond to Ryan’s arguments. Rather,
it seemingly assumes, without providing supporting authority, that we may affirm
the circuit court’s orders—notwithstanding the court never making the necessary
findings under WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm) or even referencing the statute or
Ryan’s competency to refuse medication or treatment—if the record supports a
finding that the statutory requirements were met. Accordingly, we deem any
arguments in support of affirming the court’s involuntary medication orders,
despite the lack of factual findings under § 971.14(3)(dm), as undeveloped, and
we interpret the State’s failure to respond to Ryan’s substantive arguments to the
contrary as a concession. See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App
197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578; State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-

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47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (declining to address undeveloped
arguments).

¶30 Independently, this court observes no basis, statutory or otherwise,
under which we may affirm the involuntary medication orders absent the circuit
court finding that the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
“advantages and disadvantages of and alternatives to accepting the particular
medication or treatment” were explained to Ryan and, importantly here, that Ryan
is “incapable of expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages
of accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives” or that he is
“substantially incapable of applying an understanding of the advantages,
disadvantages and alternatives to his … mental illness … in order to make an
informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment.” See
WIS. STAT. § 971.14(3)(dm)1.-2.; see also J.D.B., 419 Wis. 2d 383, ¶53 (affirming
a circuit court’s involuntary medication order because, in part, the “court made
sufficient findings on [§ 971.14(3)(dm)], and the evidence supports the finding
that the statutory standards were met”). Given the foregoing, we conclude that we
cannot affirm the involuntary medication orders.

By the Court.—Orders reversed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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