Aaron Dalton v. City of Westover

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

AARON DALTON,
Petitioner Below, Petitioner

v.) No. 25-ICA-132 (Cir. Ct. of Monongalia Cnty. Case No. CC-31-2023-AA-1)

CITY OF WESTOVER, FILED
Respondent Below, Respondent December 4, 2025
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Aaron Dalton appeals the February 26, 2025, order from the Circuit Court
of Monongalia County, denying petitioner’s administrative appeal and upholding the
decision of the Westover Police Civil Service Commission to terminate Mr. Dalton’s
employment as a police officer for Respondent City of Westover (“City”). The City filed a
response.1 Mr. Dalton filed a reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Prior to his termination, Mr. Dalton was employed by the City as a Lieutenant with
the Westover Police Department (“Westover PD”). In August 2021, Mr. Dalton was
suspended pending investigation of several misconduct allegations made against him in a
petition submitted by eleven coworkers. Following a lengthy investigation, on October 13,
2021, Westover PD Chief, Joseph Adams (“Chief Adams”), and former City Mayor,
Cranston David Johnson (“Mayor Johnson”), provided Mr. Dalton with statutory notice of
their recommendation to terminate his employment with the City based upon a statement
of charges, which cited violations of Westover PD’s rules and regulations, provisions of
the City’s personnel policy manual, and other violations of law. Relevant to this appeal,
Mr. Dalton was accused of creating a hostile work environment by engaging in acts of
sexual harassment and verbal abuse and threats towards his coworkers, including the use
of ethnic slurs and other offensive remarks and gestures towards his coworkers. These
violations also related to several Facebook posts made by Mr. Dalton after his August 2021
suspension, which contained derogatory statements and inflammatory allegations

1
Mr. Dalton is represented by Christian J. Riddell, Esq. The City is represented by
Peter T. DeMasters, Esq.

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regarding the Westover PD and certain current and former employees. In one post, Mr.
Dalton accused a department lieutenant of theft; another claimed that a fellow Westover
PD officer was unfit, mentally unstable, and had failed a psychological examination; and a
third post claimed that another Westover PD officer was a pedophile and rapist who was
terminated from another police department for those acts.

In response to the notice of termination, Mr. Dalton exercised his statutory right to
a predisciplinary hearing before a hearing board. See W. Va. Code § 8-14a-3 (1997);2 Syl.
Pt. 4, Alden v. Harpers Ferry Police Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 209 W. Va. 83, 543 S.E.2d 364
(2001) (holding that pursuant to West Virginia Code § 8-14A-3(b), “before a civil service
officer may be disciplined through discharge . . . he/she must be afforded a predisciplinary
hearing before a hearing board. . . .”).

A hearing board heard the matter on January 14, 2022, and on February 28, 2022, it
issued a decision sustaining the statement of charges and adopting the recommendation to
terminate Mr. Dalton’s employment. Mr. Dalton appealed the hearing board’s decision on
March 11, 2022, and requested a hearing before the Commission pursuant to West Virginia
Code § 8-14-20 (1996). Also, on September 26, 2022, Mr. Dalton filed a motion requesting
an amended statement of charges, contending that the October 13, 2021, statement of
charges did not state the allegations against him with specificity as required by West
Virginia Code § 8-14-20. The Commission granted the motion by order entered on
November 1, 2022. It is undisputed that the City complied and provided an amended
statement with more detailed factual allegations for the violations contained in the original
statement of charges. After the Commission granted the motion, Mr. Dalton filed a second

2
West Virginia Code § 8-14A-3 provides in relevant part:

(a) Before taking any punitive action against an accused officer, the police
or fire department shall give notice to the accused officer that he or she is
entitled to a hearing on the issues by a hearing board or the applicable
civil service commission. The notice shall state the time and place of the
hearing and the issues involved and shall be delivered to the accused
officer no later than ten days prior to the hearing.

(b) When a civil service accused officer faces a recommended punitive action
of discharge, suspension or reduction in rank or pay, but before such
punitive action is taken, a hearing board must be appointed and must
afford the accused civil service officer a hearing conducted pursuant to
the provisions of article fourteen, section twenty, or article fifteen, section
twenty-five of this chapter: Provided, That the punitive action may be
taken before the hearing board conducts the hearing if exigent
circumstances exist which require it.

2
motion seeking reinstatement to administrative leave and backpay. Mr. Dalton maintained
that the amended statement of charges superseded the original charges; therefore, he argued
that his termination and removal from administrative leave was not effective until
November 16, 2022. The Commission held the motion in abeyance pending the hearing on
the charges.

Mr. Dalton’s Commission hearing was held over several days: February 20, 2023,
February 22, 2023, March 24, 2023, and May 8, 2023. During the hearing, the Commission
heard testimony from numerous witnesses, including the eleven petitioning coworkers who
each testified that they witnessed Mr. Dalton’s conduct, were the victims of Mr. Dalton’s
conduct, or had conversations with Mr. Dalton in which he boasted about his misconduct.
Chief Adams and his predecessor, Richard Eugene Panico, Jr. (“Chief Panico”), Mayor
Johnson, and Mr. Dalton, among others also testified.

Namely, Chief Adams’ testimony detailed his investigation into Mr. Dalton’s
Facebook posts and the accusations Mr. Dalton made in those posts against other officers,
which were determined to be unfounded. Chief Adams opined that Mr. Dalton made the
Facebook posts in retaliation for his suspension. He also testified that the violations were
based upon the same policies and regulations that Mr. Dalton was subject to during Chief
Panico’s tenure, that Chief Panico used those authorities to discipline other officers in the
past, and that the policies and regulations were in full force and effect for Westover PD
employees because every petitioning officer Chief Adams interviewed readily identified
the policies and regulations. Chief Adams believed all of Mr. Dalton’s established
violations were substantial and affected the rights and interests of the public, and that there
was sufficient cause to terminate Mr. Dalton’s employment. Lastly, Chief Adams indicated
that he made the recommendation to terminate Mr. Dalton’s employment, and Mayor
Johnson endorsed his recommendation.

Although not directly addressed by Commission’s or circuit court’s order, Mr.
Dalton relies on Chief Panico’s testimony on appeal. Chief Panico testified that he was the
commanding officer who suspended Mr. Dalton in August 2021.3 However, Chief Panico
stated that the initial suspension was not for inappropriate workplace conduct; instead,
those complaints arose once he was no longer chief. Mr. Dalton relies on Chief Panico’s
testimony that while he was chief, there were no formal policies in place, and he did not
enforce any type of restrictions on office unprofessionalism or inappropriate comments
during his tenure. According to Mr. Dalton, Chief Panico’s testimony “quite literally
disparaged the various complaints among the officers regarding inappropriate workplace
comments as matters beneath his concern.”

Similarly, Mr. Dalton relies on Mayor Johnson’s testimony on appeal, which is not
discussed in the Commission’s decision. Specifically, Mr. Dalton notes that Mayor

3
The record indicates that Chief Adams assumed his position in October 2020.
3
Johnson acknowledged that he was the removing officer who signed off on Chief Adams’
recommendation to terminate Mr. Dalton’s employment but testified in hindsight he did
not think Mr. Dalton should have been terminated. However, it is undisputed that Mayor
Johnson took no action to rescind his recommendation or Mr. Dalton’s termination while
he was mayor.

Mr. Dalton testified and offered explanations for each of the violations and his
failure to comply with the City’s and Westover PD’s policies and regulations. The
Commissioner’s order expressly found that Mr. Dalton’s testimony was not credible.

On September 13, 2023, the Commission entered its final order finding that the City
had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Dalton’s conduct was
unbecoming of a police officer, created a hostile work environment, and established just
cause for his termination.

Particularly, the Commission found that the record established that Mr. Dalton
harassed a department secretary by walking by her desk, holding his fist in the air and
exclaiming “white power,” knowing that she had biracial grandchildren. Mr. Dalton then
bragged about the gesture to a fellow officer. One Westover PD officer testified that they
witnessed Mr. Dalton, in the presence of that secretary, point to photographs of the
coworkers’ grandchildren, refer to her daughter as a “n***er lover,” and raise his fist and
say, “white power.” Another officer testified that Mr. Dalton’s specific conduct towards
that secretary occurred on multiple occasions.

Another Westover PD officer’s testimony established that Mr. Dalton, who was his
superior officer, threatened to physically assault him, in addition to making derogatory and
racially-offensive comments to the officer about his Japanese heritage and the race of
others at the department. This officer indicated that Mr. Dalton regularly targeted and
threatened officers he did not like and that his conduct fostered a threatening and hostile
work environment. Mr. Dalton’s practice of targeting other officers was corroborated by
other witnesses. For example, there was testimony that Mr. Dalton openly accused another
officer of being a “Mexican” rapist and pedophile; Mr. Dalton threatened to kill a different
Westover PD officer in front of fellow officers; he continuously harassed a subordinate
officer for praying before meals and told that officer that his biracial nephew would do well
in the military because he was an “athletic monkey”; and that another officer was openly
belittled and subjected to sexually threatening comments from Mr. Dalton on a regular
basis, which included Mr. Dalton threatening to “beat the f**k out of him.”

Likewise, there was testimony of Mr. Dalton hazing another officer during training;
using the “n-word” and making racially insensitive jokes around a black officer; retaliating
against a Westover PD sergeant who turned in complaints that were made against Mr.
Dalton; and telling a female officer that women had no place in law enforcement and
threatened that if she ever reported him for sexual harassment, he would force another

4
officer to make false sexual allegations against her. The Commission’s order also noted the
nature of Mr. Dalton’s Facebook posts.

Thereafter, the Commission concluded that the Facebook posts contained false
allegations, which were intended to harm the reputations of the affected individuals and
damage the public’s trust in the department. The Commission found that the posts violated
City and Westover PD policy, and that the posts alone were just cause for termination.

Collectively, the Commission found that all the evidence established a pattern of
abusive behavior by Mr. Dalton. Specific to this appeal, the Commission determined that
Mr. Dalton’s actions violated the City’s personnel policies regarding insubordination,
creating a hostile work environment, workplace misconduct, and sexual harassment.
Additionally, the Commission found that Mr. Dalton violated Westover PD policies, which
prohibited creating a hostile work environment, engaging in conduct unbecoming of a law
enforcement officer, and failing to comply with established department procedures. It was
also determined that Westover PD policy indicates that all department members may be
terminated for cause.

Thereafter, the Commission noted the requirement of “just cause” under West
Virginia Code § 8-14-20 “means misconduct of a substantial nature directly affecting the
rights and interests of the public, rather than upon trivial or inconsequential matters, or
mere technical violations of statute or official duty without a wrongful intention.” Giannini
v. Firemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n of City of Huntington, 220 W. Va. 59, 63, 640 S.E.2d
122, 126 (2006) (quotations and citations omitted). “[D]ismissal is appropriate where the
alleged misconduct constitutes a substantial violation directly affecting the rights and
interests of the public.” Id. The Commission concluded that Mr. Dalton’s conduct damaged
his credibility with peers, supervisors, and members of the community who were
negatively impacted by his actions; and his repeated violations demonstrate irresponsible
and incompetent conduct, which has resulted in the Westover PD losing faith, trust, and
confidence in Mr. Dalton’s abilities as a police officer. As such, the Commission found
that the totality of Mr. Dalton’s conduct established just cause for his termination.

Mr. Dalton appealed the Commission’s decision to circuit court on December 11,
2023. Before the circuit court, Mr. Dalton argued that the Commission violated his due
process rights by impermissibly basing its ruling upon Mr. Dalton’s violations of policies,
which according to the testimony of Chief Panico, did not exist at the time Mr. Dalton’s
conduct occurred. Next, Mr. Dalton contended that the termination was invalid because
West Virginia Code § 8-14-20 requires the “removing officer” to show just cause for the
termination. Here, Mr. Dalton noted that Mayor Johnson was the removing officer, and
that Mayor Johnson’s testimony established that while he took responsibility for the
decision to terminate Mr. Dalton, he did not believe that Mr. Dalton’s termination was
necessary. Thus, Mr. Dalton contended that no one could meet the requirements of West
Virginia Code § 8-14-20 to sustain the termination of his employment. Lastly, Mr. Dalton

5
argued that even if his termination is valid, the Commission erred by not awarding Mr.
Dalton backpay after finding that the October 13, 2021, statement of charges was
insufficient.4 Mr. Dalton maintained that he is entitled to backpay from the time the original
statement of charges was issued through the filing of the amended statement of charges on
November 16, 2022. In other words, Mr. Dalton claims that because the original statement
of charges was found to be insufficient, the effective date of his termination and removal
from administrative leave can only be November 16, 2022, when the amended statement
was filed.

Following a hearing before the circuit court on July 16, 2024, and the parties’
submission of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the circuit court entered
its order denying Mr. Dalton’s administrative appeal on February 26, 2025. In its order, the
circuit court found that the Commission’s decision was not clearly wrong, arbitrary, or
capricious, and that the Commission’s ruling was plausible in light of the entire record.
Notably, the court found that there was evidence that the City and Westover PD had
policies in effect at the time of Mr. Dalton’s offending conduct; Mayor Johnson made the
decision to terminate Mr. Dalton, took no action in his official capacity to rescind that
decision, and now, as a private citizen, has no power to rescind the termination; and that
Mr. Dalton was not entitled to backpay because the amended statement of charges related
back to the original statement and was requested by Mr. Dalton. Therefore, Mr. Dalton’s
termination was effective on October 13, 2021, when the original statement of charges was
issued to Mr. Dalton. The court’s order affirmed the Commission’s decision and sustained
Mr. Dalton’s termination. This appeal followed.

In this appeal, we are guided by a well-established standard of review. The Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) recently summarized this standard in
Jarrell v. City of Nitro, 244 W. Va. 666, 672, 856 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2021) as follows:

The well-settled standard of review in police civil service commission
appeals requires courts to give deference to the commission’s factual
findings. “A final order of the Civil Service Commission based upon a
finding of fact will not be reversed by this Court upon appeal unless it is
clearly wrong.” Syl. Pt. 1, Giannini v. Firemen’s Civil Serv. Comm’n of
Huntington, 220 W. Va. 59, 640 S.E.2d 122 (2006) [(internal citations and
quotations omitted)]. Similarly, “[a] final order of a police civil service
commission based upon a finding of fact will not be reversed by a circuit
court upon appeal unless it is clearly wrong or is based upon a mistake of
law.” Giannini, [at 59, 640 S.E.2d at 122, syl. pt. 2 (internal quotations and

4
The Commissioner’s final order did not address Mr. Dalton’s motion; however,
Mr. Dalton does not cite error or seek remand for a Commission ruling on that issue in
circuit court. Rather, in both circuit court and in this appeal, Mr. Dalton frames the
Commission’s silence as a de facto denial of the motion.
6
citations omitted)]. To the extent that “the issue on an appeal from the circuit
court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute,
we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 3, Alden v. Harpers Ferry
Police Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 209 W. Va. 83, 543 S.E.2d 364 (2001) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).

The same standards of review apply to correctional officer civil service
commission appeals, which this Court explained in syllabus points one and
two of In re Queen, 196 W. Va. 442, 473 S.E.2d 483 (1996), as follows:

1. An adjudicative decision of the Correctional Officers’ Civil
Service Commission should not be overturned by an
appellate court unless it was clearly erroneous, arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law. Review under this standard is
narrow and the reviewing court looks to the Civil Service
Commission’s action to determine whether the record
reveals that a substantial and rational basis exists for its
decision.

2. An appellate court may reverse a decision of the
Correctional Officers’ Civil Service Commission as clearly
wrong or arbitrary or capricious only if the Commission
used a misapplication of the law, entirely failed to consider
an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation
that ran counter to the evidence before the Commission, or
offered one that was so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
Commission expertise.

Id.

On appeal, Mr. Dalton’s assignments of error are the same as those raised in circuit
court. We will address each argument in turn. First, Mr. Dalton reiterates his contention
that his termination was erroneously predicated on his violation of policies which were not
yet in effect, to the deprivation of his due process rights because he holds property and
liberty interests in his employment. Mr. Dalton contends that while the City offered no
evidence to establish when the policies went into effect, to the contrary, Chief Panico
testified that there were no policies prohibiting Mr. Dalton’s conduct when it occurred, and
that his testimony is unrefuted. Mr. Dalton uses this testimony to assert that because Chief
Panico suspended him for other reasons, it is conclusive evidence that no policies existed
until after Mr. Dalton engaged in the conduct. Therefore, the Commission’s finding of any
policy violation was arbitrary and capricious. Mr. Dalton contends that his argument is

7
supported by the same principles that prohibit the imposition of ex post facto laws and
apply the rule of lenity in criminal cases. He further argues that the circuit court’s order
summarily concludes that the City and Westover PD had policies in effect without
establishing support from the record, or consideration of Mr. Dalton’s uncontroverted
evidence to the contrary.

Stated another way, the nexus of Mr. Dalton’s argument is that he deems Chief
Panico’s testimony sacrosanct on this issue. As a result, he concludes that Chief Panico’s
testimony is definitive evidence that there were no policies for Mr. Dalton to violate. We
find no merit in Mr. Dalton’s argument on this issue.

Mr. Dalton’s argument on this issue spends an inordinate amount of time framing
the issue as one of constitutional due process. However, in doing so, he overlooks the
established case law, which renders a constitutional due process analysis on this issue
unnecessary and a red herring to our resolution of this appeal.

We begin by noting that Mr. Dalton’s contention that the City offered no evidence
to establish the existence of the subject policies conflicts with the record. The
Commission’s order expressly sets forth that Chief Adams testified that the policies were
in effect during Chief Panico’s tenure and used by him to discipline employees, and that
the officers Chief Adams interviewed had knowledge of the policies. Further, Mr. Dalton’s
argument is based purely on the premise that Chief Panico’s testimony is superior to any
other evidence on this issue.

However, this is purely an issue of credibility. See Michael D.C. v. Wanda L.C., 201
W. Va. 381, 388, 497 S.E.2d 531, 538 (1997) (citation omitted) (“A reviewing court cannot
assess witness credibility through a record. The trier of fact is uniquely situated to make
such determinations[,] and this Court is not in a position to, and will not, second guess such
determinations.”); Sims v. Miller, 227 W. Va. 395, 402, 709 S.E.2d 750, 757 (2011) (“the
hearing examiner who observed the witness testimony is in the best position to make
credibility judgments.”); Vogt v. Macy’s, Inc., No. 22-ICA-162, 2023 WL 4027501, at *6
(W. Va. Ct. App. June 15, 2023) (memorandum decision) (declining to disturb credibility
determinations on appeal). Here, the Commission held an evidentiary hearing and was in
the best position to observe witnesses and weigh the evidence in reaching its decision.
Thus, we find no clear error in the Commission’s decision and give deference to its findings
on this issue.

Moreover, even if the record did not establish the existence of governing policy, Mr.
Dalton would still be subject to termination. On more than one occasion, the SCAWV has
indicated that “seriously wrongful conduct can lead to dismissal even if it is not a technical
violation of any statute. . . . The test is not whether the conduct breaks a specific law, but
rather whether it is potentially damaging to the rights and interests of the public.” Mangum
v. Lambert, 183 W. Va. 184, 189, 394 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1990) (quoting W. Va. Dep’t of

8
Corrections v. Lemasters, 173 W. Va. 159, 162, 313 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1984)). See also
Drown v. W. Va. Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 180 W. Va. 143, 145, 375 S.E.2d 775, 777 (1988)
(same); Thurmond v. Steele, 159 W. Va. 630, 635, 225 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1976) (noting that
a civil service employee may be terminated if their “misconduct is of a substantial nature
and can be shown to affect directly the rights and interests of the public by bearing directly
in a substantial manner on the duties which the employee is required to discharge[.]”).

Mr. Dalton’s brief does not attempt to reconcile this principle, let alone directly
challenge the veracity of the Commission’s factual findings with respect to his workplace
conduct as clearly established by officer testimony. In this case, the Commission found,
among other things, that the nature of Mr. Dalton’s conduct was substantially detrimental
to Westover PD’s image, damaged Mr. Dalton’s credibility and trustworthiness with his
colleagues and the public, and exhibited his lack of fitness for his job. The circuit court
determined that these findings were amply supported by the record. Upon review, we
decline to disturb that determination.

Next, Mr. Dalton argues that the Commission did not have the authority to uphold
his termination because Mayor Johnson, the removing officer, did not meet his burden of
proof that there was just cause for the termination. W. Va. Code § 8-14-20. This argument
is predicated on Mr. Johnson’s acknowledgment before the Commission that even though
he recommended Mr. Dalton’s termination, he did not believe his conduct warranted
termination. In Mr. Dalton’s opinion, this establishes that Mayor Johnson had no intention
to terminate Mr. Dalton. We are not persuaded by this contention. While the circuit court
rejected this argument by reasoning that Mayor Johnson did not rescind the termination
during his tenure and lacked standing to do so as a private citizen, we do not need to reach
those same conclusions to find no error in the Commission’s decision.

Here, Mr. Dalton offers no specific authority to support his contention that the
variance between Mayor Johnson’s actions and hearing testimony vindicates Mr. Dalton
of the charges against him. He also does not cite to the record to establish where he raised
this issue before the Commission. See State Dep’t of Health and Human Res. v. Robert
Morris N., 195 W. Va. 759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995) (“[a] skeletal ‘argument,’
really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim[.]” (internal citations
omitted)). Instead, the record shows that Mayor Johnson accepted Chief Adams’
recommendation of termination, endorsed the recommendation, provided Mr. Dalton with
appropriate notice, submitted the recommendation to proceed through the civil service
process, and did not take any official action to withdraw his recommendation. Mr. Dalton
cites no supportive authority for his argument and, thus, we find that his reliance upon pure
conjecture cannot establish error.

Finally, Mr. Dalton argues that even if his termination is valid, the Commission and
circuit court erred by failing to award him backpay pursuant to West Virginia Code § 8-
14-20(a). Parallel to his contention in circuit court, he argues that because the Commission

9
granted his motion for an amended statement of charges, the original charges from which
Mr. Dalton was first terminated and removed from administrative leave were of no force
and effect. Thus, he maintains that the amended charges did not relate back to the original,
and as a result, he was effectively reinstated to administrative leave until he was served the
amended statement of charges in November 2022. We are unpersuaded by this argument.

In relevant terms, West Virginia Code § 8-14-20(a) states that “[n]o member . . .
may be removed, discharged, suspended or reduced in rank or pay except for just cause . .
. and in no event until the member has been furnished with a written statement of the
reasons for the action.” Here, the record establishes that the City provided Mr. Dalton with
notice of his original charges in October of 2021 and provided an amended statement of
charges in November of 2022.5 Thus, our resolution of this issue centers on whether the
amended statement of charges relates back the original charges. We find that it does.

Significant to this case, there is no dispute that the amended statement of charges
simply provided further factual allegations for the original charges and did not allege any
new violations. This point is underscored by Mr. Dalton’s brief, which explains: “The
[s]tatement of [c]harges was subsequently amended to provide more detailed factual
allegations related to these violations, but the violations and categories in the [a]mended
[s]tatement of [c]harges remained the same.” Further, we recognize that Mr. Dalton’s
termination has been upheld at every stage of his civil service proceeding. Moreover, we
note that Mr. Dalton cites no authority to support his position; instead, he attempts to
establish error through supposition and conjecture. Indeed, this is insufficient to establish
error. Therefore, we find that Mr. Dalton is not entitled to relief on this issue.

Accordingly, we find no reversible error and affirm the circuit court’s February 26,
2025, order.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: December 4, 2025

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White

5
The statute further states “in the event the removing officer fails to show just cause
. . . then the member shall be reinstated with full pay . . . for the entire period during which
the member may have been prevented from performing his or her usual employment[.]” Id.
However, given the Commission’s decision, this language is inapplicable.

10