Trudy S. Cain v. Town of Worthington

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
FILED
February 27, 2026
TRUDY S. CAIN,
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
Defendant Below, Petitioner INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

v.) No. 25-ICA-230 (Cir. Ct. Marion Cnty. Case No. CC-24-2021-C-141)

TOWN OF WORTHINGTON,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Trudy S. Cain appeals the Circuit Court of Marion County’s May 6, 2025,
amended order denying Ms. Cain’s renewed motion for summary judgment and declaring
that Respondent Town of Worthington (the “Town”) owns a small parcel of property used
by the Town to honor area military veterans. The Town filed a response.1 Ms. Cain filed a
reply.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On June 16, 1943, the Trustees of the Worthington Methodist Church and the
Trustee of the Estate of Caroline V. Wood, deceased, executed a lease agreement with the
Town leasing a 28’ by 20’ parcel of property owned partly by the church and partly by the
estate, to the Town for the purpose of maintaining an honor roll board commemorating the
names of area residents who served in World War II (the “Honor Roll Parcel”).

By 1988, William L. Brooks acquired the church and estate properties, including
the Honor Roll Parcel, and combined the adjoining tracts into one large tract. Mr. Brooks
died testate in 1991, and his will devised the combined tracts to his three children, Gary
Lee Brooks, Barbara Jean (Kimbrew) Vanderheiden, and Cindy Sue Harbert. Through deed
dated August 18, 1994, the children of William Brooks and their respective spouses
conveyed the property previously owned by William Brooks to Bryan Beavan and Karen
Beavan (the “Beavans”). Following this conveyance, a correction deed dated November
22, 1994, executed by the heirs of William Brooks, adjusted the description of the property

1
Ms. Cain is represented by Kenneth R. Miller, Esq. The Town of Worthington is
represented by Jeffrey D. Van Volkenburg, Esq.
1
conveyed to the Beavans to exclude the Honor Roll Parcel. The Beavans conveyed the
property to Ms. Cain by way of a general warranty deed dated March 20, 2000. The 2000
deed accepted by Ms. Cain contained the same property description as contained in the
1994 correction deed and did not include the Honor Roll Parcel.

On September 22, 2021, the Town filed this action seeking a judicial declaration
that it owned the Honor Roll Parcel and to quiet title. On April 8, 2022, the circuit court
ordered a survey of the Honor Roll Parcel, which was completed on July 12, 2022.
Subsequently, Ms. Cain filed a motion for summary judgment. In its January 25, 2023,
order, the circuit court denied Ms. Cain’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the
Town had standing to bring the action and that the Town had a valid lease for the Honor
Roll Parcel. Additionally, the circuit court determined that the 1994 correction deed was
valid, and that the property conveyed to her by the Beavans in 2000 did not include the
Honor Roll Parcel.

Ms. Cain then filed a motion to quiet title and for appointment of commissioners.
On February 15, 2023, the civil action was transferred from Division II (Judge Janes) of
the Circuit Court of Marion County to Division I (Judge Wilson). Following the transfer,
Ms. Cain’s motion to quiet title and appoint commissioners was denied. She filed a revised
motion for appointment of a special commissioner and a motion for declaratory judgment,
quieting title and appointment of special commissioner, which the circuit court heard on
November 20, 2023. On December 15, 2023, the circuit court entered an order denying the
collective relief sought by Ms. Cain.

On December 9, 2024, Ms. Cain filed a renewed motion for summary judgment
containing many of the same arguments presented in her previous motion for summary
judgment and in her other motions for relief. On May 6, 2025, the circuit court entered its
amended order denying Ms. Cain’s renewed motion for summary judgment and granting
summary judgment in favor of the Town. In that order, the circuit court incorporated the
findings and conclusions contained in the 2023 order denying summary judgment and
ultimately determined that “all right, title, and interest to the Honor Roll Parcel is owned
by the Town.”2 Ms. Cain’s appeal of that May 6, 2025, order followed.

Our review of orders granting declaratory judgment and for entry of summary
judgment, like the order on appeal in this case, is de novo. See Syl. Pt. 3, Cox v. Amick,
195 W. Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995) (“A circuit court’s entry of a declaratory judgment
is reviewed de novo.”); Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994)

2
While the circuit court’s May 6, 2025, order did not grant a motion for summary
judgment filed by the Town or explicitly state that the court was granting summary
judgment to the Town, in making this quoted declaration the circuit court functionally
granted summary relief to the Town on its complaint.
2
(“A circuit court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”). With this standard
in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments on appeal.

Ms. Cain raises five assignments of error, but the issue we find to be dispositive of
this appeal is Ms. Cain’s assertion that she has an ownership interest in the Honor Roll
Parcel. Based on our review, the record on appeal conclusively demonstrates that the
property description in the 1994 correction deed to the Beavans and in the 2000 deed to
Ms. Cain does not include the Honor Roll Parcel. Thus, we find no error in the circuit
court’s conclusion that the Honor Roll Parcel was never conveyed to Ms. Cain. Without a
legal interest in the Honor Roll Parcel, we conclude that Ms. Cain lacks standing to raise
any of her other substantive assignments of error from the circuit court’s May 6, 2025,
order.3

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has held,

Standing is comprised of three elements: First, the party attempting to
establish standing must have suffered an “injury-in-fact”—an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must
be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct forming the basis
of the lawsuit. Third, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed
through a favorable decision of the court.

Syl. Pt. 5, Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W. Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002).
While standing is typically discussed in the context of a party’s right to raise a claim at the
trial court level, it also applies to a party’s right to raise an issue on appeal. See W. Va. AAA
Statewide Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 186 W. Va. 287, 288, 412 S.E.2d 481,
482 (1991) (finding that the petitioner lacked standing to raise several of its assignments
of error on appeal because it “lack[ed] a legally protectable and tangible interest at stake
pertaining to those matters and is therefore not the proper party to raise those
assignments”).

3
Those substantive assignments of error are as follows: (1) the circuit court erred
in concluding that the subject parcel is owned by the Town; (2) the 1943 lease agreement
terminated by its own terms and thus, the circuit court erred by ignoring the clear intent of
the parties to the lease agreement; (3) the circuit court erred in determining that the 1994
correction deed was valid; (4) the circuit court erred in determining that the 1994 correction
deed conveyed title of the honor roll parcel to the Town. Ms. Cain also contends the circuit
court erred in finding that Ms. Cain’s renewed motion for summary judgment was
procedurally incorrect; however, the circuit court explicitly declined to rely on this
procedural basis in denying Ms. Cain’s renewed motion, so any error in this finding was
harmless.

3
As Ms. Cain did not own the Honor Roll Parcel or have any other legal interest in
that property, she has no legally protected interest which could have been injured by the
circuit court’s rulings. See Butler v. Price, 212 W. Va. 450, 454, 574 S.E.2d 782, 786
(2002) (finding that a party with no legal interest in a parcel had no standing to appeal the
circuit court’s ruling related to an alleged right-of-way on that property). Moreover,
because Ms. Cain lacked an interest in the Honor Roll Property, she has no injury that could
be redressed through a favorable decision of this Court. To the extent Ms. Cain’s arguments
that the Town’s lease on the Honor Roll Parcel terminated or that the Town has no
ownership interest in the Parcel have any merit, she is not the proper party to raise those
arguments. See Guido v. Guido, 202 W. Va. 198, 202-03, 503 S.E.2d 511, 515-16 (1998)
(finding that a party had no standing to appeal rulings that only affected the interests of
non-parties). Accordingly, Ms. Cain lacks standing to raise her additional substantive
assignments of error related to the circuit court’s rulings on the possession and ownership
of the Honor Roll Parcel.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Ms. Cain has no interest in the Honor
Roll Parcel and that she lacks standing to raise her other assignments of error. Accordingly,
the circuit court’s May 6, 2025, order is affirmed.4

Affirmed.

ISSUED: February 27, 2026

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge S. Ryan White

4
Our decision to affirm is based on Ms. Cain’s lack of a legally protected interest
in the Honor Roll Parcel and should not be construed as a decision on the substance of the
circuit court’s conclusion that the Town is the lawful owner of the Honor Roll Parcel.
4