Brandon L. v. Stephanie L.

1
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
BRANDON L.,
Respondent Below, Petitioner
v.) No. 25-ICA-41 (Fam. Ct. Harrison Cnty. Case No. FC-17-2024-D-250)
STEPHANIE L.,
Petitioner Below, Respondent
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Petitioner Brandon L.1 (“Father”) appeals the Family Court of Harrison County’s
December 26, 2024, divorce order, incorporating the parties’ settlement agreement and
agreed parenting plan and ordering him to pay spousal support and attorney’s fees.
Respondent Stephanie L. (“Mother”) responded in support of the family court’s decision.2
Father filed a reply.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the family court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Father and Mother were married on March 15, 2002, and separated on June 26,
2024. They share one child, born in 2010. Mother filed for divorce on July 25, 2024,
alleging that Father had engaged in unsafe and unendurable behavior during the marriage.3
Father is an engineer, and Mother is a nurse who worked part-time and served as the child’s
primary caretaker. Mother, who was represented by counsel below, also filed a proposed
1 To protect the confidentiality of the juvenile involved in this case, we refer to the
parties’ last name by the first initial. See, e.g., W. Va. R. App. P. 40(e); State v. Edward
Charles L., 183 W. Va. 641, 645 n.1, 398 S.E.2d 123, 127 n.1 (1990).
2 Father is represented by Connor L. Thomas, Esq., and Shannon R. Thomas, Esq.,
Thomas Legal Group, PLLC. Mother is self-represented.
3 West Virginia Code § 48-5-203 states that divorce may be ordered for cruel and
inhuman treatment, which includes, in part, “[c]onduct or treatment which destroys or tends
to destroy the mental or physical well-being, happiness and welfare of the other and render
continued cohabitation unsafe or unendurable.”
FILED
August 29, 2025
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

2
parenting plan, wherein she alleged that Father was abusive to the child and engaged in
domestic violence in the child’s presence. For parenting time, Mother requested that
visitation take place at the child’s discretion and asked that Mother be granted sole
decision-making authority. Father, who was unrepresented below, did not file an answer or
otherwise respond to Mother’s pleadings.
The parties appeared for a telephonic hearing on September 24, 2024. Father hired
an attorney on September 25, 2024, who filed discovery requests on his behalf, but later
withdrew as counsel.
On November 15, 2024, the parties signed an agreed parenting plan, wherein they
agreed that “all parenting time between the parties’ child and [Father] shall be at the
discretion of the parties’ child.” The parties also agreed to share decision-making authority.
On December 10, 2024, the night before the final hearing was scheduled, Mother’s
attorney contacted Father to discuss the case. On that same date, Mothers’ attorney also
drafted a settlement agreement and sent it to Father through DocuSign for him to review,
sign, and return to her, which included attachments reflecting the division of property for
equitable distribution. On December 11, 2024, the parties signed the settlement agreement,
which included the following provisions:
• The parties shall split the mortgage payment pending the sale of the
marital home.
• The parties shall equally divide the proceeds from the sale of the marital
home.
• Child support and spousal support will have an effective date of
December 1, 2024.
• Father shall pay Mother $12,383 to equalize the marital estate; said
payment shall be made from Father’s share of the sale proceeds from the
marital home.
• “The parties hereto certify that each of them has read and understand the
terms and provisions of this agreement; that, if he desired to do so,
Brandon [L.] has had an opportunity to consult with counsel before
executing the same; that Stephanie [L.] has had an opportunity to consult
with her counsel; that each of them enters into the agreement voluntarily
of his/her own free will without fraud, duress, undue influence or
coercion; and that each of them believes the terms and provisions herein
are fair, equitable, and just under the circumstances existing at the time
of the execution of hereof. There are not representations, promises, or
warranties other than those expressed and set forth herein.”
The settlement agreement covered everything except child support, attorney’s fees, and
spousal support.

3
The final divorce hearing was held on December 11, 2024, and the final order was
entered on December 26, 2024. The final order incorporated and adopted the parties’
parenting and property agreements. Husband’s monthly income was determined to be
$14,375, and Wife’s monthly income was determined to be $7,400. Father’s child support
obligation was set at $1,129.08 per month.
As for spousal support, the family court analyzed all the spousal support factors
listed in West Virginia Code § 48-6-301 (2018).4 The family court found that the parties
were married for almost twenty-three years, Father’s income was almost double that of
Mother’s income, the sale of the marital home would provide each party with
approximately $100,000, Mother was forty-three years old and Father was forty-five,
Mother was a nurse and Father was an engineer, Mother worked sporadically and cared for
the child, the parties had more income during the marriage than their needs required, and
Mother’s expenses exceeded her monthly income. Father provided no evidence of his
monthly expenses, but the family court heard evidence that he has a significant other who
could assist with his household expenses. The family court further determined that Father
was at fault for the divorce due to committing domestic violence. Based on those facts, the
family court ordered Father to pay $2,000 per month in permanent, modifiable spousal
support.
Regarding attorney’s fees, the court conducted a Banker analysis,5 finding that
Mother prevailed in the contested spousal support issue, Mother’s $3,757.50 in attorney’s
fees were reasonable, Father’s inaction in the case was unreasonable, and Father had
significantly more disposable income. Based on those facts, the family court ordered Father
to pay Mother $3,000 in monthly installments of $600.00 to help cover her attorney’s fees.
4 West Virginia Code § 48-6-301 provides a list of twenty non-exclusive factors to
be considered in awarding spousal support.
5 See Syl. Pt. 4, Banker v. Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996), which
provides guidance on how to calculate attorney’s fee awards, and states as follows:
In divorce actions, an award of attorney’s fees rests initially within the sound
discretion of the family law master and should not be disturbed on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. In determining whether to award attorney’s
fees, the family law master should consider a wide array of factors including
the party’s ability to pay his or her own fee, the beneficial results obtained
by the attorney, the parties’ respective financial conditions, the effect of the
attorney’s fees on each party’s standard of living, the degree of fault of either
party making the divorce action necessary, and the reasonableness of the
attorney’s fee request.

4
Regarding Father’s participation in the proceedings, the family court found that he
“did not submit any financial information to the court as ordered and as required by the
West Virginia Code, [. . .] provided no evidence about the amount of his monthly expenses,
[. . .] [and he] was unreasonable during the action as he filed no disclosure and did not ever
respond to discovery requests.”
It is from the December 26, 2024, order that Father now appeals.
For these matters, we apply the following standard of review:
When a final order of a family court is appealed to the Intermediate Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, the Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review the
findings of fact made by the family court for clear error, and the family
court’s application of law to the facts for an abuse of discretion. The
Intermediate Court of Appeals shall review questions of law de novo.
Syl. Pt. 2, Christopher P. v. Amanda C., 250 W. Va. 53, 902 S.E.2d 185 (2024); accord W.
Va. Code § 51-2A-14(c) (2005) (specifying standards for appellate court review of family
court orders).
On appeal, Father raises four assignments of error, two of which will be consolidated
because they are similar. See generally Tudor’s Biscuit World of Am. v. Critchley, 229 W.
Va. 396, 402, 729 S.E.2d 231, 237 (2012) (stating that “the assignments of error will be
consolidated and discussed accordingly”).
First, Father asserts that the family court erred when it adopted the property
settlement agreement and parenting plan because he was not given a reasonable
opportunity or accommodation to review it with his counsel. Father’s argument lacks merit.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has long held that “[o]nce a
competent party makes a settlement and acts affirmatively to enter into such settlement, his
second thoughts at a later time as to the wisdom of the settlement [do] not constitute good
cause for setting it aside.” Moreland v. Suttmiller, 183 W. Va. 621, 625, 397 S.E.2d 910,
914 (1990). The SCAWV has also held, “[t]hese agreements, when properly executed, are
legal and binding and this Court will not set aside such agreements on allegations of duress
and undue influence absent clear and convincing proof of such claims.” Warner v. Warner,
183 W. Va. 90, 95, 394 S.E.2d 74, 79 (1990). Moreover, the settlement agreement
specifically states that both parties had an opportunity to consult counsel, and that the
agreement was not entered into due to fraud, duress, or coercion. Here, Father has not
shown that he experienced duress or undue influence nor has he shown any reason why
this Court should not accept his acknowledgement that he had the opportunity to consult
with counsel prior to signing the settlement agreement. Therefore, we find no error the
family court’s decision to adopt and incorporate the parties’ property settlement agreement
and parenting plan into the final divorce order.

5
In Father’s second and third assignments of error, he contends that the family court
erred in calculating child support because it improperly failed to attribute full-time pay to
Mother and used inconsistent incomes for determining support amounts. He also argues
that the family court failed to consider Mother’s voluntary and unreasonable
underemployment, as well as his monthly needs. We disagree. The record reflects that
Mother worked thirty-six hours per week as a registered nurse, and even though she is
classified as an optional part-time employee, she earns more than full-time pay.
Furthermore, Father originally failed to provide financial documentation, failed to respond
to Mother’s discovery requests, and failed to provide evidence about his monthly
expenses.6 West Virginia Code § 48-7-206(1) (2001) states, “[u]pon the failure by either
party timely to file a complete disclosure statement [. . .] the court may accept the statement
of the other party as accurate.” Additionally, West Virginia Code § 48-13-804(a)(1) (2008)
states, “[w]hen applying the child support guidelines, the court may accept financial
information from the other party as accurate.” The SCAWV has consistently held that “a
party who does not cooperate in a proceeding cannot complain about the result.” See
generally Young v. Young, 194 W. Va. 405, 460 S.E.2d 651 (1995). Here, Father failed to
cooperate below and now seeks a different result in his child support and spousal support
obligations. However, we find no merit in his arguments and affirm the family court’s
ruling on these issues, in accordance with Young.
Last, in his fourth assignment of error, Father argues that the family court erred in
its award of attorney’s fees because it failed to properly analyze the factors outlined in
Banker v. Banker, 196 W. Va. 535, 474 S.E.2d 465 (1996). We disagree with Father. Upon
our review of the family court’s order, we cannot conclude that the family court erred in its
application of Banker, and thus, we find no abuse of discretion by the family court.
Accordingly, we affirm the family court’s December 26, 2024, divorce order.
Affirmed.
ISSUED: August 29, 2025
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Judge Charles O. Lorensen
Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge S. Ryan White
6 We also note that Father was questioned by the court and opposing counsel about
his income and paystub and provided detailed testimony about both.