Winged Foot Minerals, LLC, Corita Prendergast, Mary Lou Buckman, Grace Hoyt, Connie Sue Gandee, Eugene Prendergast, Frank Prendergast, Melissa Ulik, Lori Gulling, Elizabeth Prendergast, Julya Prendergast, Dawn Miruka, and Paul Prendergast v. SWN Production Company, LLC, et al. (Judge White, concurring)

1
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
WINGED FOOT MINERALS, LLC, CORITA PRENDERGAST,
MARY LOU BUCKMAN, GRACE HOYT, CONNIE SUE GANDEE,
EUGENE PRENDERGAST, FRANK PRENDERGAST,
MELISSA ULIK, LORI GULLING, ELIZABETH PRENDERGAST,
JULYA PRENDERGAST, DAWN MIRUKA, AND PAUL PRENDERGAST,
Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners
v.) No. 25-ICA-100 (Cir. Ct. Marshall Cnty. Case No. CC-25-2022-C-83)
SWN PRODUCTION COMPANY, LLC, EQUINOR USA ONSHORE
PROPERTIES, INC., MARY ELIZABETH ALEXANDER, MARY A. BARKLEY,
KEVIN BLATT, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS TRUSTEE OF THE BLATT FAMILY
IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED APRIL 1, 2011, THOMAS BLATT, PAUL E.
BLATT, LAWRENCE E. BLATT, JR., JOSEPH J. BLATT, WILLIAM J. BLATT,
JR., RICHARD P. BLATT, MICHAEL J. BLATT, STEVEN BLATT, TERESA
CHURCH, LAURA M. DOLAN, PATRICK A. FROHNAPFEL, LISA
FROHNAPFEL, DAVID P. FROHNAPFEL, LYNN FROHNAPFEL, CHRISTINA
M. FROHNAPFEL, MARY ANN GODDARD, JOSEPH A. HOHMAN & MARY L.
HOHMAN, TRUSTEES OF THE HOHMAN REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST
DATED AUGUST 8, 2014, BERTHA KLUG, NANCY KOONTZ, LISA M.
LANTZ, EDNA MCCOMBS, CONSTANCE S. MILLER, MARK H.J. MILLER,
MATTHEW LOUIS NICHOLAS MILLER, MARGARET JULIA AGNES
MILLER, KEVIN MYSLIWIEC, MARY JOSEPHINE NICE, BARBARA
PANCAKE, LINDA RUCKMAN, MARY STINE, ROBERT FRANCIS VILLERS,
KENNETH A. WIEGAND, LEONARD L. WIEGAND, JEAN ANN WIEGAND AS
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ROBERT L. WIEGAND, CHARLES A.
WIEGAND, DAVID PAUL WIEGAND, JOHN G. WIEGAND, MARGARET
WILSON, DAVID L. WILSON, MARY CATHERINE MILLER WRIGHT,
ROBERT F. YEAGER, MICHAEL YOUNG, MINERAL ACQUISITION
COMPANY I, L.P., MAC I(YC) L.P., LYNN E. COOK, MARY K. MCKEETS,
FRANCES J. PUCHARICH, AMY C. MURRAY, SUZANNE THOMPSON, SUE
E. JOHNSON, AND MARSHALL COUNTY SHERIFF, AS CONSERVATOR
FOR BRENDA GARCIA,
Defendants Below, Respondents
FILED
March 3, 2026
released at 3:00 p.m.
ASHLEY N. DEEM, CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK
INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA

2
MEMORANDUM DECISION
In this appeal, Petitioners Winged Foot Minerals, LLC, Corita Prendergast, Mary
Lou Buckman, Grace Hoyt, Connie Sue Gandee, Eugene Prendergast, Frank Prendergast,
Melissa Ulik, Lori Gulling, Elizabeth Prendergast, Julya Prendergast, Dawn Miruka, and
Paul Prendergast, argue that they own 75%, or a 3/4 interest, of the oil and gas underlying
a tract of approximately 227 acres (the “Subject Tract”) in Marshall County, West Virginia.
Petitioners, the successors in interest of James Prendergast, claim that Mr. Prendergast
purchased this interest at a 1991 tax sale and obtained title through the resulting 1993 tax
deed. In the February 24, 2025, order now on appeal, the Circuit Court of Marshall County
found that the 1993 tax deed through which Petitioners claim ownership was void, and that
a group of Respondents own the contested interest. The “SWN Respondents” filed a
response. The “Individual Respondents” also filed a response.1 Petitioners filed a reply.2
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to West Virginia Code § 51-
11-4 (2024). After considering the parties’ arguments, the record on appeal, and the
applicable law, this Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For
these reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate
under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1 The “SWN Respondents” include SWN Production Company, LLC (“SWN”), and
Equinor USA Onshore Properties, Inc. (“Equinor”), who are represented by Timothy M.
Miller, Esq., Robert M. Stonestreet, Esq., and Tiffany M. Arbaugh, Esq.; Mineral
Acquisition Company I, L.P. and MAC I (YC) L.P., who are represented by Andrew G.
Jenkins, Esq.; and Lynn E. Cook, Mary K. McKeets, Frances J. Pucharich, Amy C. Murray,
and Suzanne Thompson, who are represented by Jeffery D. Kaiser, Esq., and Andrew R.
Thalman, Esq.
The Individual Respondents include all named Respondents in this appeal aside
from the SWN Respondents, Sue E. Johnson, and Marshall County Sheriff as Conservator
for Brenda Garcia. These latter two Respondents did not participate in this appeal. The
Individual Respondents are represented by Christian E. Turak, Esq., Daniel J. Guida, Esq.,
and S. David Wilharm, Esq.
Other than SWN and Equinor, who claim to hold leases for the disputed oil and gas,
the Respondents are the individuals who claim—and were determined by the circuit court
to hold—ownership over the disputed oil and gas interest that Petitioners claim.
2 Petitioner Winged Foot Minerals, LLC, is represented by John R. Whipkey, Esq.
The Individual Petitioners are represented by Edmund L. Wagoner, Esq., and Matthew B.
Hansberry, Esq.

3
At the time of his death in 1920, Joseph Nolte, Sr., owned a 363.88-acre tract in
Marshall County (the “Parent Tract”), and all underlying oil and gas. Through bequests in
his last will and testament, Mr. Nolte split the surface into three smaller tracts: a 134.6-acre
tract to his son Joseph Nolte, Jr., a 136.4-acre tract to his daughter Theresa Wiegand, and
a 92.8-acre tract to his granddaughters Mary Nolte and Christina Nolte. Joseph Nolte, Sr.’s
last will and testament also divided the oil and gas underlying the Parent Tract: 1/4 to
Joseph Nolte, Jr., 1/4 to Theresa Wiegand, 1/8 to Mary Nolte, 1/8 to Christina Nolte, and
1/4 to his grandson, Joseph Wiegand, Jr.
Through a 1921 deed, Mary Nolte and Christina Nolte transferred their 92.8-acre
surface tract to Joseph Nolte, Jr., reserving their oil and gas interest. By combining this
92.8-acre tract with his 134.6-acre tract, Joseph Nolte, Jr. owned the surface of the 227.48-
acre Subject Tract at issue in this case. By virtue of his 1/4 interest in the oil and gas
underlying the larger Parent Tract, Joseph Nolte, Jr. owned 1/4 of the oil and gas underlying
the Subject Tract. Similarly, because of their interests in the oil and gas underlying the
Parent Tract, Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr.
owned the other 3/4 of the oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract.
For tax purposes, the 1920 Marshall County land book3 assessed the Subject Tract
to Joseph Nolte, Jr. as “Fee” ownership of 227.48 acres described as “Lynn Camp.” In
1920, Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr., were not
assessed separately for their interests in the oil and gas underlying the entire Parent Tract
or specifically underlying the Subject Tract.
In the 1933 land book, written beneath the assessment on the Subject Tract, the
assessor added an assessment for “Royalty Oil” to “Nolte Joseph.” This assessment
reappeared in each land book until 1937, until it was crossed out with the handwritten note
that “Mr. Nolte tells Paul he has no royalty.”
3 The assessor of each county in West Virginia is required to make and maintain
yearly land books documenting the tax assessments on each parcel of real property in that
county. See W. Va. Code §§ 11-4-1 to 11-4-21. In their discussion of the various yearly
Marshall County land books relevant to this appeal, the parties sometimes refer to land
books by assessment year, and other times refer to them by taxable year. For clarity and
consistency, in this decision the Court will refer to the land books by assessment year.
Beginning in 1961, property was assessed as of July 1 each year. See W. Va. Code § 11-3-
1 (1961); Londo H. Brown, Changes in West Virginia Real Property Tax Law, 66 W. Va.
L. Rev. 271 (1964). For example, “1920 land book” refers to the land book for the
assessment year beginning on January 1, 1920, and “1972 land book” refers to the land
book for the assessment year beginning on July 1, 1972.

4
The assessment of the Subject Tract remained in the land books through 1945. That
year’s land book assessed Joseph Nolte, Jr. on the “Lynn Camp” property for 227.48 acres.4
The property was assessed at a per acre value of $13 and a total land value of $3000. In
1945, Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr. were not
separately assessed on their oil and gas interests underlying the Subject Tract. In 1946,
Joseph Nolte, Jr. was again assessed on the “Lynn Camp” property for 227.48 acres at a
per acre value of $13 and a total land value of $3000. For the first time, the 1946 land book
assessed the “Nolte Joseph Heirs” on an interest described only as “Roy.” The “Roy”
assessment did not include any acreage or a per acre value, and was assessed at a total value
of $50.
Joseph Nolte, Jr. died testate in 1971. Pursuant to Mr. Nolte, Jr.’s last will and
testament, the executor of his estate sold the Subject Tract to R. Robinson Chance, Jr., via
a deed issued on October 10, 1972. In the 1972 land book, the Subject Tract was assessed
to “Nolte Joseph Est.” However, this assessment was crossed out, and a handwritten note
in the margin provides “To R. Robinson Chance Jr. DB432 p361.” The “Roy” property
assessed to the “Nolte Joseph Heirs” was also crossed out, with a handwritten note in the
margin explaining “Sold to State Nov 1973 for 1972 taxes.” In the 1973 land book, the
Subject Tract was assessed to R. Robinson Chance, Jr. as “222.4 A Lynn Camp.”5 The
1973 land book listed the “Roy” assessment under a “Sold to State” section; however, the
assessment was crossed out, with a handwritten note explaining that the property was
“Redeemed from Auditor May 1974 for 1972 taxes Back taxed for 1974.” The 1974 land
book included a handwritten listing of the “Roy” assessment, assessed to R. Robinson
Chance, Jr. Beginning in the 1975 land book, the “Roy” assessment was printed and
assessed to R. Robinson Chance, Jr.
In a December 14, 1982, deed, R. Robinson Chance, Jr. conveyed the Subject Tract
to Daniel B. Watkins and John L. Turcato, without reservation of any mineral rights. The
Subject Tract was assessed in subsequent land books to “Watkins Daniel B Et Al.” No
party asserts that this assessment has ever become delinquent. After this transfer,
subsequent land books continued to assess “Roy” to R. Robinson Chance, Jr. The “Roy”
4 Between 1920 and 1945, the format of the land books changed. In both the 1945
and 1946 assessments for the Subject Tract, “227” is listed under a column designated for
listing the acreage of fee ownership of property, and “48” is listed under the column directly
to the right designated for listing the acreage of surface ownership of property. However,
the parties indicate that this was intended to reference 227.48 acres, not 227 acres of fee
ownership and 48 acres of surface ownership.
5 The SWN Respondents represent that this change in the acreage of the Subject
Tract resulted from a survey of the property completed in 1972. No party disputes that the
property later described as “222.4 A Lynn Camp” is the same tract previously described as
a 227.48-acre property.

5
assessment became delinquent in 1990 and was sold to James Prendergast at a 1991 tax
sale. On April 5, 1993, the Clerk of the County Commission of Marshall County issued a
tax deed to James Prendergast conveying the interest covered by this delinquent
assessment. The deed described the interest as a royalty, included a description of the
Subject Tract, and characterized the interest as “the same oil and gas reserved unto R.
Robinson Chance, Jr., by deed dated December 14, 1982.”
On August 26, 2022, Petitioners, the successors in interest to James Prendergast,
initiated the underlying action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Marshall
County. Petitioners alleged that the “Roy” assessment added to the Marshall County land
book in 1946 was a tax assessment for the 3/4 interest in the oil and gas underlying the
Subject Tract, previously owned by Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and
Joseph Wiegand, Jr. Petitioners claimed that, by purchasing the delinquent “Roy”
assessment and obtaining the 1993 tax deed, Mr. Prendergast became the owner of that 3/4
interest in the oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract.6 Accordingly, Petitioners asked for
a declaratory judgment against the Individual Respondents—the successors in interest to
Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr.—that Petitioners
were the owners of that 3/4 oil and gas interest. Petitioners also raised claims for conversion
and trespass against SWN and Equinor, alleging that those companies had been removing
oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract without leases with Petitioners, the owners.
Petitioners also sought an accounting of all proceeds paid to the Individual Respondents
for the oil and gas. Some of the Respondents filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Respondents (other than SWN and Equinor) were the owners of the 3/4
interest at issue.7
On June 10, 2024, Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on their
declaratory judgment claim. On September 30, 2024, the Individual Respondents and the
SWN Respondents filed separate motions for summary judgment on Petitioners’ claims.
Among other contentions, the Individual Respondents argued that the “Roy” assessment
6 Petitioners did not claim any right to the 1/4 interest in the oil and gas underlying
the Subject Tract initially devised to Joseph Nolte, Jr. Petitioners conceded in their
complaint that the 1/4 interest in the oil and gas owned by Joseph Nolte, Jr. remained
unsevered from the surface of the Subject Tract and was taxed as part of the assessment of
the Subject Tract. Petitioners acknowledged that this 1/4 interest in the oil and gas was
transferred with the surface interest to R. Robinson Chance in the 1972 Deed and to Daniel
B. Watkins and John L. Turcato in the 1982 Deed.
7 It is not entirely clear from the appendix or the briefing which Respondents joined
in this counterclaim. However, there appears to be no dispute that the counterclaim sought
a declaration that the Respondents other than SWN and Equinor, as the successors in
interest of Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr., were
the owners of the contested 3/4 interest in the oil and gas underlying the Subject Tract.

6
was a duplicative assessment. The parties briefed the respective motions, with Petitioners
filing a joint response to the two motions for summary judgment. On February 24, 2025,
the circuit court entered an order denying Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment,
granting the Individual Respondents’ motion for summary judgment, granting the
Respondents’ counterclaim for declaratory relief, and dismissing Petitioners’ complaint.
In this order, the circuit court determined that the “Roy” assessment and the 1993
tax deed were void for two reasons. First, the court found that, to the extent it was intended
as an assessment of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest, the “Roy” assessment was
duplicative. The circuit court noted that the Subject Tract had been taxed as a fee interest,
including the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest, and that when the “Roy” assessment was
created in 1946, the tax assessment on the Subject Tract was not reduced in valuation to
account for the removal and separate taxation of that interest. Accordingly, despite the
creation of the “Roy” assessment in 1946, the Subject Tract continued to be taxed as a fee,
including the contested interest. Because the owner of the surface of the Subject Tract
continued to be taxed on all the underlying oil and gas and that assessment never became
delinquent, taxes were always paid on the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest, and thus the
duplicative “Roy” assessment of that interest and the 1993 tax deed were void. Second, the
circuit court concluded that the assessment was void when sold because it was assessed to
R. Robinson Chance, Jr., who had never owned the contested 3/4 interest and at the time
of the sale did not own any interest in the Subject Tract. It is from this order that Petitioners
now appeal.8
“A circuit court’s entry of a declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo.” Syl. Pt. 1,
City of Martinsburg v. Berkeley Cnty. Counc., 241 W. Va. 385, 825 S.E.2d 332 (2019)
(quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Cox v. Amick, 195 W. Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995)). Our appellate
review of a circuit court’s order granting summary judgment is de novo. See Syl. Pt. 1,
Painter v. Peavy, 192 W. Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994).
Petitioners raise a single, broadly framed assignment of error: that the circuit court
erred in granting summary judgment to Respondents and denying summary judgment to
Petitioners. Petitioners state that both allegedly erroneous rulings stem from the circuit
court’s conclusion that the “Roy” tax assessment at issue was void as a duplicative
assessment. However, in arguing this assignment of error, Petitioners challenge each of the
circuit court’s two grounds for granting judgment to Respondents: that the “Roy”
8 In their Notice of Appeal, Petitioners indicated that the February 24, 2025, order
on appeal was not the final order as to all claims and parties in the case below. However,
it is not entirely clear from the appendix and the briefing what issues remain pending before
the circuit court. However, because the February 24, 2025, order dismissed Petitioners’
complaint, resolved Respondents’ declaratory judgment claim, and was certified as final
under Rule 54(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, we find that it is final for
purposes of this Court’s appellate jurisdiction.

7
assessment was void as duplicative and that it was invalid when sold because it was
assessed to R. Robinson Chance, Jr., who held no interest in the Subject Tract. Because we
find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that the “Roy” assessment was a duplicative,
void assessment, the first issue is dispositive of this appeal, and it is unnecessary to address
the second.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (“SCAWV”) has long recognized
“that property may be assessed but once for taxes and that one full satisfaction of such
taxes is all the State may require.” Orville Young, LLC v. Bonacci, 246 W. Va. 26, 33, 866
S.E.2d 91, 98 (2021). Therefore, “[i]n case of two assessments of the same land, under the
same claim of title, for any year, one payment of taxes, under either assessment, is all the
State can require.” Id. at 28, 866 S.E.2d at 93, Syl. Pt. 2 (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Allen,
65 W. Va. 335, 64 S.E. 140 (1909)). A tax assessment is void where taxes on the same
property are paid under another assessment, and “[a] deed made pursuant to a tax sale under
a void assessment is void.” Id. at 35-36, 866 S.E.2d at 100-01 (quoting Syl. Pt. 4, Blair v.
Freeburn Coal Corp., 163 W. Va. 23, 253 S.E.2d 547 (1979)).
The SCAWV has specifically recognized that a tax assessment is duplicative where
an interest is severed from a larger tract and assessed separately, but the assessment on the
larger tract is not adjusted to acknowledge the diminution. In Allen, the owner of a 9-and-
5/8-acre tract conveyed a smaller parcel from that tract, but “[o]n the land book no
deduction for the portion of the 9⅝ acres conveyed . . . was made from the assessment of
the [larger] tract.” State v. Allen, 65 W. Va. 335, 336, 64 S.E. 140, 140 (1909). Although
the assessment on the smaller parcel became delinquent and was sold, the SCAWV
concluded that the sale of the smaller tract was void because taxes never became delinquent
on the larger tract. Id. at 338-40, 64 S.E. at 141.
Similarly, in Snodgrass v. Jolliff, 59 W. Va. 292, 53 S.E. 151 (1906), the owner of
a tract conveyed it, reserving only a 1/16 oil and gas interest. However, the assessor entered
the tract in the new owner’s name at the same valuation used in the immediately preceding
year, without reduction for removal of the 1/16 interest. Snodgrass, 59 W. Va. at 293-94,
53 S.E. at 151. The grantor then conveyed a 1/32 interest in the oil and gas—half of his
remaining 1/16 interest—and retained the other 1/32 interest. Id. However, the grantor and
the grantees were each assessed for a 1/16 interest. Id. While the assessments for the larger
tract and the grantor’s 1/16 interest remained paid, the 1/16 interest assessed to the grantees
became delinquent and was sold. Id. The SCAWV found this sale and the resulting deed
void, reasoning that taxes on the grantees’ 1/32 interest had already been paid twice: once
by the owner of the larger tract, because the assessed value of that tract was not reduced to
account for the removal of a 1/16 oil and gas interest, and once by the grantor, because the
assessment of a 1/16 interest to the grantor included the 1/32 interest the grantor retained
and the 1/32 interest conveyed to the grantees. Id. at 292, 53 S.E. at 151, Syl. Pt. 1.

8
We find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that, as in Snodgrass and Allen¸ to
the extent the “Roy” assessment was intended to assess the contested 3/4 interest in oil and
gas underlying the Subject Tract, it was duplicative due to the assessor’s failure to reduce
the valuation of the assessment of the surface of the Subject Tract. As an initial matter, the
undisputed facts demonstrate that the “fee” tax assessment added to the land books in 1920
for the 227.48-acre Lynn Camp property in the name of Joseph Nolte, Jr., was an
assessment of the entirety of the surface of the Subject Tract and all the underlying oil and
gas. It is undisputed that, prior to his death, the entirety of the Parent Tract, including the
oil and gas, was assessed to Joseph Nolte, Sr. Moreover, the 1920 land book assessed the
divided surface of the Parent Tract to its respective owners: a 136.4-acre tract to Theresa
Wiegand and the 227.48-acre Subject Tract to Joseph Nolte, Jr. However, the assessor did
not add any assessments for the contested 3/4 interest in the oil and gas in the names of
Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand, Jr. As we have
recognized, the SCAWV’s “caselaw clearly establishes that when a mineral estate has
never been separately assessed, it is assumed to be assessed with the surface, even when
the surface owner and mineral owner are different.” Ne. Nat. Energy, LLC v. LT Realty
Unlimited, LLC, 250 W. Va. 500, 507, 905 S.E.2d 179, 186 (Ct. App. 2024) (collecting
cases). As Petitioners do not identify any evidence in the record contrary to this
presumption, the undisputed facts show that assessment of the Subject Tract added to the
1920 land book assessed taxes on the entire property, including the contested 3/4 oil and
gas interest.
Moreover, the undisputed facts establish that the 1945 assessment to Joseph Nolte,
Jr. for the Subject Tract still included taxes on the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest.
Petitioners do not point to any evidence in the record demonstrating that the contested 3/4
oil and gas interest was removed from this assessment prior to 1945. While Petitioners note
that the valuation of Subject Tract fluctuated between 1920 and 1945, they do not point to
any evidence that these fluctuations reflect a severance of the contested 3/4 oil and gas
interest. Indeed, Petitioners assert that they “cannot state why the various Assessors
changed the relevant values at various times,” and that they could only “guess.” Petitioners
also discuss the “Royalty Oil” assessment added to the land books from 1933 to 1937.
However, as this interest was assessed to Joseph Nolte, Jr.,9 and not any of the owners of
the contested 3/4 interest, we do not find it relevant to this appeal. Indeed, Petitioners
explicitly state that they do not claim the 1/4 interest in the oil and gas originally devised
to Joseph Nolte, Jr. and that at all times this interest continued to be taxed with the surface
in the assessment of the Subject Tract.
Therefore, since the undisputed facts demonstrate that the 1945 assessment of the
Subject Tract also included taxes on the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest, the critical
9 As noted above, this assessment was explicitly assessed to “Nolte Joseph,” just as
the assessment for the Subject Tract during those same years. No party argues that this was
anyone other than Joseph Nolte, Jr.

9
consideration under Allen and Snodgrass is whether the assessor amended the 1946
assessment of the Subject Tract to account for the addition of the “Roy” assessment. As
discussed above, the assessor made no such change. The 1946 land book described the
Subject Tract in the same way as the 1945 land book, and the valuation, both per acre and
in total, was not reduced to account for the severance of any interest. Accordingly, we find
that, pursuant to Snodgrass, the “Roy” assessment was duplicative. As in that case, there
was a surface interest—the Subject Tract—that was assessed on the surface and all
underlying oil and gas. Moreover, just as in that case, when an assessment was added to
tax a severed oil and gas interest, the valuation of the surface interest was not reduced to
account for that severance. Accordingly, the taxes on the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest
were assessed under the assessment of the surface of the Subject Tract, and those taxes
never became delinquent, making the “Roy” assessment duplicative and the sale of that
interest void.
In their reply brief, Petitioners attempt to distinguish Snodgrass, arguing that in
Snodgrass, in addition to the delinquent assessment of a 1/16 oil and gas interest and the
unreduced assessment of the surface tract that remained paid, there was also an assessment
of a 1/16 interest in the oil and gas interest that never became delinquent. Petitioners argue
that “[i]t was therefore apparent, on its face, that the taxes on both were paid, regardless of
the surface assessment.” This misconstrues Snodgrass. In that case, the SCAWV held that
the unreduced surface assessment and the paid assessment for a 1/16 oil and gas interest
each independently rendered the delinquent 1/16 assessment duplicative, explaining “[a]
sale of the interest of [the delinquent owners] in the oil and gas for taxes will not pass good
title, because of the payment of taxes by their co-tenant, Price [who paid the 1/16
assessment] or Higgins [who paid the unreduced surface assessment].” Snodgrass, 59 W.
Va. at 292, 53 S.E. at 151, Syl. Pt. 1. Therefore, while in Snodgrass there were two non-
delinquent assessments covering the allegedly delinquent interest, and this case there is
only one, the SCAWV held that either of the paid interests was sufficient to render the
delinquent assessment duplicative and void. Accordingly, we find Petitioners’ attempt to
distinguish Snodgrass unconvincing.
Finally, Petitioners argue that following Snodgrass and finding the “Roy”
assessment duplicative will upend many past assessments, pointing to other assessments
not at issue in this case and asking the Court hypothetical questions about whether those
assessments would be duplicative under this decision. Petitioners suggest, for instance, that
Snodgrass is incompatible with the severance of “minimum assessments,” because when
an interest assessed at the minimum valuation is divided, each divided portion of that
interest will necessarily also receive a minimum valuation, meaning that the assessor will
have made no reduction in the valuation of the original assessment to acknowledge the
diminution of the interest.
This Court is without authority to answer these hypothetical questions based on facts
not before the Court. See Cummings v. Paine, 249 W. Va. 568, 574 n.7, 899 S.E.2d 646,

10
652 n.7 (Ct. App. 2024) (“This Court, like the SCAWV, is not authorized to resolve such
hypothetical case scenarios[.]”). In their motion for summary judgment, the Individual
Respondents cited to the relevant assessments from 1945 and 1946 and argued that the
“Roy” assessment was duplicative under the holding of Snodgrass. In their response to this
motion, Petitioners asserted generally that the “Roy” assessment was not duplicative, but
they did not point to any evidence demonstrating another possible explanation for the
assessor’s failure to reduce the valuation of the Subject Tract. The SCAWV has held that,
to resist a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must
“(1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked by the moving party, (2) produce additional evidence
showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial, or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why
further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56([d]) of the West Virginia Rules of
Civil Procedure.” Syl. Pt. 3, Williams v. Precision Coil, Inc., 194 W. Va. 52, 459 S.E.2d
329 (1995). Petitioners failed to do this in response to the Individual Respondents’
argument that the “Roy” assessment was duplicative. Therefore, we decline to speculate
on how this case might have differed if Petitioners had produced such evidence at summary
judgment, or how future cases where such evidence is presented should be resolved.
Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s conclusion that, to the extent the
“Roy” assessment was an assessment of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest, it was
duplicative. Because the assessment on the Subject Tract never became delinquent, the
State always received the one tax payment on the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest to which
it was entitled, and the sale of that interest and 1993 tax deed were void. Therefore, we
affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
Although it was not a basis for the circuit court’s decision, the SWN Respondents
also argue that that the “Roy” assessment, by its description, was invalid as an assessment
of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest. We agree and also affirm for this reason.10
An assessment described as a royalty or a deed conveying a royalty reserved to a
particular individual, cannot be construed as transferring a severed mineral estate owned
by others. Prior decisions have supported this conclusion and reinforced the necessity of
respecting the legal distinction between mineral estates, leasehold interests, and royalties.
In Orville Young, LLC, after finding the assessment described as “202 Royalty Wells #629-
630 Nat Gas Co. W. Va.” void for other reasons, the SCAWV also explained that the
“assessment, by its very description, related only to the royalties derived from the subject
oil and gas leasehold interests, not to the actual oil and gas estate.” Orville Young, LLC,
246 W. Va. at 35 n.12, 866 S.E.2d at 100 n.12; see also Venable Royalty, LTD v. EQT Prod.
10 See Syl. Pt. 3, Barnett v. Wolfolk, 149 W. Va. 246, 140 S.E.2d 466 (1965)
(recognizing that an appellate court “may, on appeal, affirm the judgment of the lower
court when it appears that such judgment is correct on any legal ground disclosed by the
record, regardless of the ground, reason or theory assigned by the lower court as the basis
for its judgment”).

11
Co., 250 W. Va. 764, 767-68, 908 S.E.2d 501, 504-05 (Ct. App. 2024) (recognizing and
discussing the difference between an interest in royalties and an interest in an oil and gas
estate). We find this reasoning applicable to the “Roy” assessment, as “Roy” is clearly
shorthand for “royalty.” Because the “Roy” assessment was an assessment on royalties,
Mr. Prendergast did not obtain title to the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest through his
purchase of that delinquent “Roy” assessment and the subsequent 1993 tax deed.
Additional circumstances in the record support our conclusion that the “Roy”
assessment was an assessment on royalties—rather than the contested 3/4 interest in the oil
and gas estate. Notably, when the assessor removed the earlier “Royalty Oil” assessment
from the 1937 land book, the assessor explained in a handwritten note that “Mr. Nolte tells
Paul he has no royalty.” Further, the assessor transferred the “Roy” assessment to R.
Robinson Chance, Jr. in the 1974 land book, and it is undisputed that Mr. Chance never
owned any portion of the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest. Indeed, in explaining that
transfer in the land book, the assessor wrote “See Joseph Nolte Heirs DB 432 p361 per Mr.
Chance,” referring to the 1972 Deed through which Mr. Chance obtained the surface of the
Subject Tract and Joseph Nolte, Jr.’s 1/4 interest in the oil and gas. Additionally, the 1993
tax deed based on the delinquent “Roy” assessment described the interest conveyed as the
“royalty purchased by James Prendergast.”
As Petitioners’ claim to the contested 3/4 oil and gas interest undisputedly depends
on the conclusion that the “Roy” assessment was an assessment of that interest, and we
find that it was not, we also affirm the circuit court on this basis.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the February 24, 2025, order of the Circuit Court
of Marshall County.
Affirmed.
ISSUED: March 3, 2026
CONCURRED IN BY:
Chief Judge Daniel W. Greear
Judge Charles O. Lorensen

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CONCURRING AND WRITING SEPARATELY:
Judge S. Ryan White
WHITE, JUDGE, concurring:
I concur in the Court’s judgment affirming the circuit court. Petitioners acquired no
interest in the disputed three-fourths oil and gas estate. I write separately because this case
should be resolved on narrower, statutory grounds, and I would decline to extend
Snodgrass v. Jolliff, 59 W. Va. 292, 53 S.E. 151 (1906), beyond its facts.
The dispositive defect lies in the assessment and the deed itself. Chapter 11 of the
West Virginia Code governs tax sales, and its requirements are jurisdictional. Real estate
must be entered in the land books in the name of the owner. See W. Va. Code § 11-4-9. A
tax sale conveys only the interest of the person whose property was properly assessed and
became delinquent. If the interest purportedly sold was never assessed in the name of its
true owner, the State lacks authority to sell it.
The record is undisputed that the three-fourths oil and gas interest at issue was
devised in 1920 to Theresa Wiegand, Mary Nolte, Christina Nolte, and Joseph Wiegand,
Jr., and passed to their successors. It was never conveyed to R. Robinson Chance, Jr. The
1972 deed to Mr. Chance transferred the surface and the one-fourth mineral interest owned
by Joseph Nolte, Jr. It did not include the remaining three-fourths mineral estate. By 1982,
Mr. Chance had conveyed away the surface and his undisputed mineral interest.
Nonetheless, the delinquent assessment sold in 1991 was assessed to Mr. Chance
under the shorthand designation “Roy.” At the time of sale, he owned no interest in the
disputed three-fourths mineral estate; a fact undisputed by the parties. The State thus
purported to sell, for Mr. Chance’s delinquency, an interest he never owned, and which
was never assessed in the names of its true owners. The tax sale was void. A tax deed
cannot operate to transfer title from persons whose interests were neither assessed in their
names nor delinquent.
The language of the tax deed establishes the limited scope of what was conveyed.
The April 5, 1993, deed described the interest conveyed as “the same oil and gas reserved
unto R. Robinson Chance, Jr., by deed dated December 14, 1982,” and referred to the
property as the “royalty purchased.” The deed expressly tied the conveyed interest to what
was “reserved unto” Mr. Chance in the 1982 conveyance.
There is no evidence that Mr. Chance reserved the disputed three-fourths mineral
estate in 1982. He could not have reserved what he did not own. A tax deed conveys only
the interest described therein and only such interest as the delinquent taxpayer possessed.

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It cannot enlarge the taxpayer’s estate or divest others of property not assessed in their
names.
For these reasons, I would not extend Snodgrass to reach the result. Snodgrass
addressed a specific circumstance involving overlapping assessments and triple payment
of taxes under related claims of title. It did not authorize courts to invalidate tax deeds
whenever a land book valuation was not visibly adjusted, nor did it displace the threshold
requirement that property be assessed in the name of its owner.
Extending Snodgrass beyond its facts would shift the focus away from the statutory
requirements of a proper tax assessment and toward a retrospective inquiry of county
valuation practices in land books. Mineral severances occurred frequently without precise
adjustments to surface valuations and often counties would employ shorthand descriptions
in land book entries. If the absence of a visible valuation reduction were sufficient to
invalidate a tax deed, the stability of mineral titles could be challenged even where the
threshold statutory requirements of assessment are satisfied.
The statute is clear and straightforward. The delinquent assessment was in the name
of a person who never owned that estate. The tax deed conveyed only a royalty “reserved
unto” that person. The 1993 tax deed conveyed nothing as to the disputed three-fourths oil
and gas interest.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment affirming the circuit court’s order.