Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Non-application to Earned Wage Access Products

Publisher currently lists this guidance: Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Non-application to Earned Wage Access Products , 90 FR 60069 (Dec. 23, 2025).

60069 Federal Register/ Vol. 90, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 23, 2025 / Notices
1
85 FR 77987 (Dec. 3, 2020).
2
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Length of Pay
Periods in the Current Employment Statistics
Survey (last modified Aug. 4, 2023), https://
www.bls.gov/ces/publications/length-pay-
period.htm.
3
This includes, for example, additional costs in
both time and money to run payroll more
frequently, cash flow limitations, and inertia. See,
e.g., Marshall Lux & Cherie Chung, Earned Wage
Access: An Innovation in Financial Inclusion?, M–
RCBG Associate Working Paper Series 2023.214,
Harvard University (June 2023), https://dash.
harvard.edu/server/api/core/bitstreams/5cb75832-
883a-4d51-9b0e-d959da124354/content; Mike
Kappel, How Often Should You Run Payroll?
(Weekly, Biweekly, Etc.), Forbes (Apr. 1, 2025),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikekappel/2025/04/
01/how-often-should-you-run-payroll-weekly-
biweekly-etc/. The CFPB has noted that periodic
wage payment may be driven ‘‘by efficiency
concerns with payroll processing and employers’
cash management.’’ 82 FR 54472, 54547 (Nov. 17,
2017).
copy of their workshop certificate before
either of the permits will be issued.
In addition to vessel owners, at least
one operator on board vessels issued a
limited access swordfish or shark permit
that uses longline or gillnet gear is
required to attend a Safe Handling,
Release, and Identification Workshop
and receive a certificate. Vessels that
have been issued a limited access
swordfish or shark permit and that use
longline or gillnet gear may not fish
unless both the vessel owner and
operator have valid workshop
certificates on board at all times. Vessel
operators who have not already
attended a workshop and received a
NMFS certificate, or vessel operators
whose certificate(s) will expire prior to
their next fishing trip, must attend a
workshop to operate a vessel with
swordfish and shark limited access
permits on which longline or gillnet
gear is used.
Workshop Dates, Times, and Locations
1. January 8, 2026, 9 a.m.–1 p.m.,
Residence Inn by Marriott Downtown
Portsmouth, 100 Deer Street,
Portsmouth, NH 03801.
2. February 11, 2026, 9 a.m.–1 p.m.,
Faro Blanco, 1996 Overseas Highway,
Marathon, FL 33050.
3. March 17, 2026, 9 a.m.–1 p.m.,
Holiday Inn Express Houston Medical
Center, 9300 S Main Street, Houston, TX
77025.
Registration
To register for a scheduled Safe
Handling, Release, and Identification
Workshop, please contact Angler
Conservation Education at 386–682–
0158. Pre-registration is highly
recommended, but not required.
Registration Materials
To ensure that workshop certificates
are linked to the correct permits,
participants will need to bring the
following specific items with them to
the workshop:
1. Individual vessel owners must
bring a copy of the appropriate
swordfish and/or shark permit(s), a copy
of the vessel registration or
documentation, and proof of
identification.
2. Representatives of a business-
owned or co-owned vessel must bring
proof that the individual is an agent of
the business (such as articles of
incorporation), a copy of the applicable
swordfish and/or shark permit(s), and
proof of identification.
3. Vessel operators must bring proof
of identification.
Workshop Objectives
The Safe Handling, Release, and
Identification Workshops are designed
to teach the owner and operator of a
vessel that fishes with longline or gillnet
gear the required techniques for the safe
handling and release of entangled and/
or hooked protected species, such as sea
turtles, marine mammals, smalltooth
sawfish, Atlantic sturgeon, and
prohibited sharks. In an effort to
improve reporting, the proper
identification of protected species and
prohibited sharks will also be taught at
these workshops. Additionally,
individuals attending these workshops
will gain a better understanding of the
requirements for participating in these
fisheries. The overall goal of these
workshops is to provide participants
with the skills needed to reduce the
mortality of protected species and
prohibited sharks, which may prevent
additional regulations on these fisheries
in the future.
Online Recertification Workshops
NMFS implemented an online option
for shark dealers and owners and
operators of vessels that fish with
longline and gillnet gear to renew their
certificates in December 2021. To be
eligible for online recertification
workshops, dealers and vessel owners
and operators need to have previously
attended an in-person workshop.
Information about the courses is
available online at https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/atlantic-highly-
migratory-species/atlantic-shark-
identification-workshops and https://
www.fisheries.noaa.gov/atlantic-highly-
migratory-species/safe-handling-release-
and-identification-workshops. To access
the course please visit: https://
hmsworkshop.fisheries.noaa.gov/start.
Authority: 16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.
Dated: December 19, 2025.
Kelly Denit,
Director, Office of Sustainable Fisheries,
National Marine Fisheries Service.
[FR Doc. 2025–23748 Filed 12–22–25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510–22–P
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU
Truth in Lending (Regulation Z); Non-
application to Earned Wage Access
Products
AGENCY: Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.
ACTION: Advisory opinion.
SUMMARY: The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) is issuing this
advisory opinion to resolve regulatory
uncertainty regarding: (1) the
applicability of the definition of credit
under Regulation Z, which implements
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), to
earned wage access (EWA) products that
conform to the description of ‘‘Covered
EWA’’ provided in part I.C.2 of this
advisory opinion; and (2) the
applicability of the definition of finance
charge under Regulation Z to certain
EWA-related charges (expedited
delivery fees, tips) to the extent any
EWA products meet the Regulation Z
definition of credit. The CFPB is also
withdrawing a proposed interpretive
rule.
DATES: This advisory opinion is
effective on December 23, 2025.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Dave Gettler, Paralegal Specialist, Office
of Regulations, at 202–435–7700. If you
require this document in an alternative
electronic format, please contact CFPB_
Accessibility@cfpb.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The CFPB
is issuing this advisory opinion
pursuant to its Advisory Opinions
Policy.
1

I. Advisory Opinion
A. Market Background
According to the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, nearly three-quarters of U.S.
private businesses use biweekly,
semimonthly, or monthly pay periods.
2

Several obstacles continue to prevent
businesses from readily implementing
shorter pay cycles.
3
Starting a little over
a decade ago, earned wage access (EWA)
has emerged as an innovative way for
workers to meet short-term liquidity
needs that arise between paychecks
without turning to potentially more
costly alternatives. EWA seeks to
address the lag between consumers’
hours worked and receipt of their
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60070 Federal Register/ Vol. 90, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 23, 2025 / Notices
4
In some cases, deductions may include fees or
other consumer payments associated with an EWA
transaction.
5
For example, some EP providers instruct the
payroll processor to divert a portion of the
paycheck to the EP provider, with the remainder
going straight to the worker. Others instruct the
payroll processor to pay the entire paycheck to the
EP provider, which then makes the relevant
residual payment to the worker. Whatever the exact
model of payroll process deduction used, EP
providers generally do not take funds from the
worker’s regular transaction account after that
account’s receipt of wages; instead, they make use
of the payroll process to facilitate deduction.
6
This includes, without limitation, prepaid and
payroll card accounts. In some cases, the provider
may partner with a bank to provide its EWA
customers with a payroll card or other transaction
account that the worker then uses to receive both
early wage access and their regular paycheck.
7
For example, at least one D2C provider obtains
consumer authorization to instruct payroll
processors to divert a portion of the paycheck to a
dedicated account opened ‘‘for the benefit’’ of the
consumer, which is used solely for the purpose of
enabling the D2C provider to obtain payment, with
the remainder of the paycheck going straight to the
consumer’s regular transaction account.
8
Lynne Marek, EWA Chases Regulatory Clarity,
Payments Dive (Oct. 27, 2025), https://
www.paymentsdive.com/news/earned-wage-access-
federal-state-legal-regulatory-clarity/803398/.
9
See CFPB, Data Spotlight: Developments in the
Paycheck Advance Market (July 18, 2024), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/research-
reports/data-spotlight-developments-in-the-
paycheck-advance-market/ (hereinafter 2024 Data
Spotlight).
10
See id. (‘‘Combined with employer-partnered
transactions, in 2022, roughly 10 million workers
utilized earned wage product transactions to access
over $31.9 billion.’’). Several providers of D2C
products report significant recent growth. See, e.g.,
Dave, 3Q25 Earnings Presentation (Nov. 4, 2025),
https://investors.dave.com/static-files/4971d257-
0924-4d19-b35e-5d871e5136f8 (showing D2C
origination volume increased 49 percent from 3Q24
to 3Q25); Chime, Welcome to Chime, at 24 (June
2025), https://chime.gcs-web.com/static-files/
ef823261-71ae-4183-bd16-a76f0cf8b6ff (showing
$8.8 billion in D2C EWA transactions in the first
nine months since product launch in 2024).
11
See Market.Us, North America Earned Wage
Access Market Size, Share, Industry Analysis
Report By Model (Nov. 2025), https://market.us/
report/north-america-earned-wage-access-market/.
12
The CFPB is not aware of EP providers that
solicit tips.
13
See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404 (Dec. 10, 2020).
14
15 U.S.C. 1602(f); 12 CFR 1026.2(a)(14).
15
See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404, 79407 (Dec. 10,
2020) (citing 82 FR 54472 at 54547).
16
85 FR 77987, 77987 (Dec. 3, 2020).
17
The definition of ‘‘credit’’ in TILA is virtually
identical to Regulation Z’s definition of the term.
See 15 U.S.C. 1602(f). Accordingly, the 2020 AO
also stated that Covered EWA does not involve the
offering or extension of ‘‘credit’’ under TILA.
18
See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404 at 79405–06.
19
The 2020 AO invited providers of EWA
programs that charge fees to request clarification
from the CFPB about their programs through, for
example, applying for a compliance assistance
sandbox (CAS) approval. See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404
at 79405 (citing the CAS policy published at 84 FR
48246 (Sept. 13, 2019)). In December 2020, the
CFPB granted one such application from Payactiv,
stating that its EWA product—which charged a $1
daily access fee for EWA—was not credit. See
Approval Order (Dec. 30, 2020), https://files.
consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_payactiv_
approval-order_2020-12.pdf. That approval was
rescinded in June 2022.
20
2025 Rescission, 90 FR 3622 (Jan. 15, 2025).
paychecks by facilitating advance access
to earned but as yet unpaid wages.
Two main types of EWA exist in the
market today. Providers of ‘‘employer-
partnered’’ (EP) EWA contract with
employers to offer their workers access
to amounts not exceeding accrued
wages, with the provider generally
utilizing the payroll process to deduct
accessed amounts at the next payroll
event.
4
EP providers have evolved a
variety of methods for making payroll
process deductions.
5
In addition, EP
providers generally claim no rights
against the worker in the event that the
next paycheck is insufficient to support
the deduction. ‘‘Direct-to-consumer’’
(D2C) EWA providers offer access to
amounts that they estimate to be below
accrued wages, with the provider then
generally debiting accessed amounts via
automated withdrawal from the
worker’s regular transaction account
that receives their paycheck.
6
Some D2C
providers claim rights against the
worker in the event that the amount that
they are able to withdraw is insufficient.
Some of the significant differences
between these two types of earned wage
products, however, are starting to erode.
Some D2C providers now obtain payroll
records to determine accrued wages,
rather than estimate accrued wages by
less direct means. Some also make
deductions using the payroll process,
rather than transferring from the
consumer’s regular transaction account
after the consumer is paid.
7
In addition,
some D2C providers limit their ability to
seek recourse.
Both forms of EWA now exist at scale,
reflecting significant consumer demand,
dozens of EWA providers, and upwards
of $3.5 billion investment in the market
from venture capital firms over the past
decade.
8
A 2024 report from the CFPB
estimated that the EP EWA market had
grown from $3.2 billion across 18.6
million transactions in 2018 to $22.8
billion across 214 million transactions
in 2022, with 7.2 million workers
utilizing EP EWA transactions at least
once.
9
That same year, an estimated 3
million workers accessed roughly $9.1
billion in D2C EWA funds; market
analyses indicate that use of D2C
products has also grown significantly
over recent years.
10
Recent estimates
project that the U.S. EWA market is set
to expand by about 300 percent between
2024 and 2034.
11

EP providers obtain revenue from one
or more of several sources: direct
payment from the employer; a share of
interchange revenue from payment
cards used by workers; fees paid by
workers for expedited delivery of EWA
funds; and, less frequently, from
subscription charges for access to EWA,
sometimes packaged with other
employee benefits. D2C providers obtain
revenue from one or more of some of
these same sources as well: interchange
revenue, expedited delivery fees, and
subscription charges. Many D2C
providers also solicit tips from the
workers who use their products.
12

B. Regulatory Background
In November 2020, the CFPB issued
an advisory opinion (the 2020 AO)
13
to
respond to uncertainty about whether
EWA providers offer or extend ‘‘credit’’
within the scope of the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA) and its
implementing Regulation Z.
14
The 2020
AO noted that the CFPB had itself
acknowledged some uncertainty on this
point when it issued the 2017 Payday
Rule.
15
The 2020 AO was issued
pursuant to the CFPB’s Advisory
Opinions Policy, which is ‘‘intended to
facilitate timely guidance by the Bureau
that enables compliance by resolving
outstanding regulatory uncertainty.’’
16

The 2020 AO clarified that a
particular type of EWA—which it
labeled as a ‘‘Covered EWA Program’’—
did not involve the offering or extension
of ‘‘credit’’ as defined by section
1026.2(a)(14) of Regulation Z.
17
As
described further in the 2020 AO, a
Covered EWA Program met all of the
following criteria
18
: it is employer-
partnered; the amount accessed by the
employee does not exceed accrued
wages; accessing EWA is free for the
employee; the provider has no recourse
against the employee if an employer-
facilitated deduction from the next
paycheck is insufficient, and engages in
no debt collection or credit reporting
activity; and the provider does not
assess the credit risk of employees. The
2020 AO noted that Covered EWA
Programs, being functionally equivalent
to early wage payment, do not involve
debt and, by extension, credit under
Regulation Z. The 2020 AO did not state
that other forms of EWA, such as direct-
to-consumer EWA, are credit under
Regulation Z. It did not reach that
question, although it observed that EWA
meeting all the listed criteria except
being free to the consumer might not be
credit under Regulation Z.
19

On January 15, 2025, the CFPB issued
another advisory opinion rescinding the
2020 AO (the 2025 Rescission).
20
The
2025 Rescission contended that the
2020 AO created, rather than reduced,
regulatory uncertainty. It further
claimed that the 2020 AO contained
several legal flaws. Prior to the 2025
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60071 Federal Register/ Vol. 90, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 23, 2025 / Notices
21
See 2024 PIR, 89 FR 61358 (July 31, 2024).
22
In response to the 2024 PIR, the CFPB received
37 comments from industry stakeholders; 15
comments from consumer group stakeholders; 10
comments from Federal, State, and local
government officials; and nearly 150,000 comments
from individual consumers. In part because of the
many comments received on the 2024 PIR, the
CFPB is not seeking comment on this advisory
opinion.
23
The unfinalized and abandoned 2024 PIR is of
no legal effect. However, the CFPB is hereby
formally withdrawing the 2024 PIR for several
reasons, including: the comments received on it; a
number of Executive Orders, including E.O. 14219;
and at least five Federal district court opinions,
directly or indirectly, relying heavily on it. See
cases cited in infra note 81.
24
90 FR 20084 (May 12, 2025).
25
The ‘‘accrued cash value of the wages’’ are
wages that the worker is entitled to receive under
State law in the event of separation from the
employer for work performed for the employer, but
for which the worker has yet to be paid.
26
‘‘Payroll data’’ are generally maintained by a
payroll processor engaged by the employer to
handle payroll; in some cases, however, the
employer may handle payroll in-house and would
be the source for payroll data.
27
Providers should take note of the possibility
that workers could take two or more EWA
transactions, potentially from different providers, in
the same pay period, and that these transactions
could cumulatively exceed the accrued cash value
of the worker’s wages, even as each individual EWA
transaction does not. A transaction that causes the
cumulative amount to exceed the accrued cash
value of the worker’s wages is not a Covered EWA
transaction; earlier EWA transactions may be. To
meet this first criteria, therefore, providers may
need to account for any earlier Covered EWA
transactions in that same pay period.
28
In the event of a technical or administrative
error, Covered EWA encompasses one additional
payroll process deduction at the next payroll event.
Technical or administrative errors include, for
instance, an API malfunction or a mistake in the
employer’s payroll process (e.g., miscalculation of
a worker’s base pay or overtime award). They do
not include situations in which the employer has
withheld a worker’s garnished wages following a
Covered EWA transaction. For example, a Covered
EWA transaction may occur in week one of a
worker’s pay cycle, but the employer learns of and
subjects the worker’s paycheck to a required wage
garnishment in week two of the pay cycle. As a
result of the garnishment, the worker’s paycheck is
less than the amount of the Covered EWA
transaction. That is not administrative or technical
error of the kind identified in part I.C.2.a.(2).
29
Examples of payroll process deduction include,
without limitation: (a) the payroll processor sends
the relevant amount to the EWA provider, and pays
the remaining wages to the worker’s regular
transaction account; (b) the payroll processor sends
the relevant amount to an account held ‘‘for the
benefit’’ of the consumer and used only to make
payments to the EWA provider, and the processor
pays the remaining wages to the worker’s regular
transaction account; and (c) the payroll processor
sends all wages to the EWA provider, with the EWA
provider separately and directly paying the balance
of the wages owed to the worker’s regular
transaction account. Providers seeking clarification
from the CFPB about whether their practices
constitute payroll process deduction may request
clarification from the CFPB by, for instance,
applying for an Approval under the Policy on the
Compliance Assistance Sandbox. See 84 FR 48246.
Although the policy was rescinded in September
2022, the CFPB anticipates reissuing it shortly after
this advisory opinion is published.
30
As noted, a regular transaction account may
include payroll or prepaid card accounts offered to
the consumer by the EWA provider in partnership
with a bank issuer. See supra note 6.
31
A provider may choose to refrain from offering
the worker further EWA services and still meet this
condition.
32
12 CFR 1026.2(a)(14). TILA defines ‘‘credit’’ as
‘‘the right granted by a creditor to a debtor to defer
payment of debt or to incur debt and defer its
payment.’’ 15 U.S.C. 1602(f).
33
See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404 at 79406–07.
34
Debt, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968).
35
See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404 at 79406. Citing a
later Black’s definition of debt, the 2020 AO notes
Continued
Rescission, the CFPB considered
replacing the 2020 AO with a contrary
opinion. Specifically, in June 2024, the
CFPB issued a proposed interpretive
rule (the 2024 PIR) that, if finalized,
would have identified all EWA as
Regulation Z credit.
21
In addition, the
2024 PIR would have identified
expedited delivery fees and, at least in
certain circumstances, tips as finance
charges under Regulation Z. After
soliciting public comment
22
on the
2024 PIR, the CFPB never adopted the
interpretive positions proposed in it,
opting instead for the much narrower
rescission of the 2020 AO.
23
Finally, in
May 2025, the CFPB withdrew both the
2020 AO and the 2025 Rescission.
24

C. Legal Analysis
1. General
Part I.C.2 of this advisory opinion
explains why Covered EWA is not credit
under Regulation Z. Part I.C.3 explains
why, to the extent that any EWA
product is Regulation Z credit,
expedited delivery fees and tips are not,
in the normal course, finance charges
under Regulation Z.
This advisory opinion does not state,
and nothing in it should be understood
to state, that EWA products that are not
Covered EWA are credit under
Regulation Z. In addition, nothing in
this advisory opinion interprets
provisions of law outside of Regulation
Z. The CFPB continues to seek
stakeholder feedback and evaluate
whether it should take further legal
steps with respect to EWA products,
including steps that might encompass
non-Covered EWA and/or other
provisions of law besides Regulation Z.
2. Covered EWA Is Not Credit
a. Covered EWA
For purposes of this advisory opinion,
the term ‘‘Covered EWA’’ means EWA
that includes all of the following
characteristics:
(1) Covered EWA transactions do not
exceed the accrued cash value of the
wages
25
the worker has earned up to the
date and time of the transaction, which
amount is determined based upon
payroll data
26
that evidence this
amount.
27
A Covered EWA provider
does not determine accrued wages based
on other information, such as worker
representations, or on estimates or
predictions of accrued wages.
(2) The provider uses a payroll
process deduction in connection with
the worker’s next payroll event.
28
In a
payroll process deduction, payment
instructions received and acted upon by
the payroll processor (or by the
employer itself if it does not use a
processor) enable the EWA provider to
receive accessed amounts without
debiting the consumer’s regular
transaction account after the consumer
is paid.
29
A transfer to the provider from
any of the consumer’s regular
transaction accounts after the payment
of wages into that account is not a
payroll process deduction.
30

(3) Before providing Covered EWA,
the provider clearly and conspicuously
explains to the worker, and warrants to
the worker as part of the contract
between the parties, that it: (a) has no
legal or contractual claim or remedy,
direct or indirect, against the worker in
the event the payroll process deduction
is insufficient to cover the full amount
of a Covered EWA transaction,
including no right to take payment from
any of the consumer’s regular
transaction accounts;
31
and (b) will not
engage in any debt collection activities
related to Covered EWA, place a
Covered EWA transaction amount as a
debt with or sell it to a third party, or
report to a consumer reporting agency
concerning Covered EWA.
(4) The provider does not directly or
indirectly assess the credit risk of
individual workers, including through
obtaining and reviewing credit reports
or credit scores about the individual
workers.
b. Analysis
Section 1026.2(a)(14) of Regulation Z
defines ‘‘credit’’ as ‘‘the right to defer
payment of debt or to incur debt and
defer its payment.’’
32
Neither
Regulation Z nor TILA define the term
‘‘debt.’’ Covered EWA does not provide
workers with the right to defer payment
of debt or to incur debt and defer its
payment. As a result, Covered EWA is
not credit.
As explained further in the 2020 AO,
this is for several reasons.
33
The primary
reason is that the common meaning of
debt is ‘‘a sum of money due by certain
and express agreement’’ or ‘‘a financial
liability or obligation owed by one
person, the debtor, to another, the
creditor.’’
34
In the context of Covered
EWA, the worker incurs no such
liability or obligation.
35
Covered EWA
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the absence of a ‘‘liability’’ in this context.
However, the 2020 AO did not intend to
differentiate ‘‘liability’’ from ‘‘obligation’’ in this
context. The present AO relies on the 1968 Black’s
definition of debt, which was current when TILA
became law, and which also draws no such
distinction.
36
Covered EWA transactions cannot be more than
this amount, which reduces the risk that EWA
funds do not correspond to funds the worker has
actually earned and is entitled to receive on payday.
37
Payroll process deductions may not be
attempted in any other pay period in the event that
the initial payroll process deduction is insufficient
to cover the full amount of the Covered EWA
transaction. However, in the event of a technical or
administrative error, one additional payroll process
deduction may be attempted at the next payroll
event.
38
In proposing an interpretation of credit that
would cover all EWA, the 2024 PIR noted that ‘‘it
is not uncommon for credit providers to compel
repayment of debt using wage garnishment
automatically deducted from consumer paychecks.’’
2024 PIR, 89 FR 61358, 61361 n.26 (July 31, 2024).
But the fact that some creditors sometimes obtain
repayment of debts via payroll does not
demonstrate that all payroll process deductions
involve the repayment of debt. None of the
examples cited in the 2024 PIR involve deductions
to account for the consumer earlier accessing
money that they were owed by virtue of work that
they had already performed.
39
See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404 at 79406–07.
40
12 CFR 1026, supp. I, comment 2(a)(14)-1.
41
46 FR 20848, 20851 (Apr. 7, 1981) (‘‘The
regulatory definition [of ‘credit’] may be difficult to
apply in particular fact situations, and the Board
therefore offers the following guidance, which will
also be incorporated into the commentary.’’). In a
footnote, the 2024 PIR asserts without support that
because this exclusion was promulgated after notice
and comment, products that are similar but not
specifically covered by it ‘‘should therefore be
presumed to be ‘credit.’’’ See 2024 PIR, 89 FR 61358
at 61361 n.29. The 2024 PIR offers no citation or
basis for this position. In fact, statements by the
Board directly contradict that approach and instead
explain that Regulation Z commentary is intended
to serve as guidance for use in determining
application to particular transactions. See, e.g., 46
FR 28560, 28560 (May 27, 1981) (proposing official
Regulation Z commentary); 46 FR 50288, 50288
(Oct. 9, 1981) (adopting official Regulation Z
commentary).
42
This could happen, for instance, if a worker’s
wages become subject to garnishment or an
employer goes out of business after an EWA
transaction but before the scheduled payday.
43
82 FR 54472 at 54547.
44
See 2020 AO, 85 FR 79404 at 79407. As the
2020 AO noted, courts generally look at the totality
of the circumstances—and weigh multiple factors in
a fact-specific inquiry—to determine if a
transaction’s substance is credit. See id. (citing
cases at note 20).
facilitates workers’ access to wage
amounts that they have already earned,
and to which they are already entitled.
36

Using payroll data, either at the
employer or its payroll processor, the
provider knows the accrued cash value
of the worker’s wages at the point that
the worker requests a Covered EWA
transaction. Using the payroll process,
the provider makes a deduction for the
amount of the Covered EWA transaction
at the next scheduled payroll event,
which corresponds to the pay period in
which the worker accrued the wages on
which the Covered EWA was based.
37

Covered EWA offers workers access to
money that they are owed by virtue of
work that they have already performed.
Rather than the consumer’s repayment
of a debt, the provider’s payroll process
deduction from the payroll event
associated with that work serves to
ensure the consumer is not effectively
compensated twice for the same work.
38

They have had earlier-than-normal
access to wage amounts accrued, so they
are owed less at payday.
Fundamentally, Covered EWA
resembles early wage payment and does
not resemble an extension of credit.
The 2020 AO also drew support from
two prior regulatory statements.
39

Comment 2(a)(14)-1.v to Regulation Z
states that ‘‘[b]orrowing against the
accrued cash value of an insurance
policy or a pension account if there is
no independent obligation to repay’’ is
‘‘not considered credit for purposes of
the regulation.’’
40
When it issued this
Regulation Z commentary, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (the Board) stated that in such
instances, ‘‘credit has not been extended
because the consumer is, in effect, only
using the consumer’s own money.’’
41

As the 2020 AO explains, the accrued
cash value of a worker’s earned but
unpaid wages is similarly the worker’s
own money. Accordingly, in a Covered
EWA transaction, the worker is ‘‘in
effect, only using the [worker’s] own
money’’ and is not incurring debt or
deferring its payment. Similarly,
Covered EWA involves ‘‘no
independent obligation to repay’’
because the provider may only transfer
funds via the allowed payroll process
deduction for the pay period in which
the wages were accrued; it has no claim
direct or indirect against a worker for
nonpayment in the event of a failed or
partial deduction.
42
The 2020 AO also
cited the preamble to the 2017 Payday
Rule in support of its interpretation of
the application of § 1026.2(a)(14) to
Covered EWA Programs. Recognizing
that ‘‘some efforts to give consumers
access to accrued wages may not be
credit at all,’’ that rule took specific
steps to ensure that it had no
application to several types of EWA
products.
43

Finally, the 2020 AO noted that
Covered EWA Programs lack typical
substantive indicia of credit.
44
Covered
EWA providers similarly reserve no
recourse against the worker in the event
a payroll process deduction for the
period in which accessed wage amounts
were accrued is insufficient to cover
those amounts. A Covered EWA
provider also cannot engage in debt
collection, report to consumer reporting
agencies, or sell or place the transaction
as a debt with any third party. Providers
also do not pull credit reports or credit
scores on individual workers or
otherwise assess their credit risk.
The 2020 AO limited its application
to EP EWA, and more specifically to EP
products where the provider transfers
the amount of each EWA transaction
‘‘through an employer-facilitated payroll
deduction from the employee’s next
paycheck.’’ Upon reconsideration,
however, the CFPB now believes that
these specific limitations are not
derived from the text of Regulation Z (or
TILA). Section 1026.2(a)(14) of
Regulation Z defines ‘‘credit’’ as ‘‘the
right to defer payment of debt or to
incur debt and defer its payment’’;
pursuant to this definition, the defining
element of ‘‘credit’’ is a consumer’s
repayment—at some point in the
future—of the amount owed. When an
EWA provider makes arrangements to
ensure that the appropriate amount of
the consumer’s paycheck is directed to
it through a payroll process deduction,
the funds never touch the consumer’s
regular transaction account, and
accordingly the consumer makes no
deferred payment.
Indeed, as noted above, the EWA
market has evolved such that EP
providers now use a variety of methods
for effecting transfers through the
payroll process, which include, but are
no longer limited to, ‘‘employer-
facilitated payroll deductions.’’ For
purposes of interpreting the application
of ‘‘credit’’ to EWA, there is no reason
to preference one such method over
others. Similarly, D2C providers that
transfer EWA amounts through the
payroll process, rather than from a
worker’s regular transaction account
after receipt of wages, are Covered EWA
if they meet the other criteria.
The 2020 AO also limited its
application to EWA products that were
free to the consumer. That limitation,
too, is not required by the text of
Regulation Z (or TILA) and is not
maintained in the present advisory
opinion. Under existing law, consumer
cost is relevant to the question of
whether consumers incur Regulation Z
finance charges in connection with
products that extend credit—but has no
bearing on whether or not a product
amounts to Regulation Z credit in the
first place. As noted, whether a product
constitutes credit depends on whether it
implicates a debt. For the reasons
explained above, Covered EWA does
not. Credit can be free to the consumer
or it can cost the consumer. Non-credit
products, too, can be free or they can
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45
See Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., et al., Letter to
CFPB (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.nclc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2022/10/CFPB-EWA-letter-
coalition-FINAL2.pdf. The same letter also notes
that the question of fees relates to finance charge
issues, rather than to the definition of credit: ‘‘Free
programs might be exempt from TILA for other
reasons (i.e., if the provider is not a ‘creditor’ as
defined by TILA).’’
46
See Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr. & Ctr. for
Responsible Lending, Letter to CFPB (Oct. 12,
2021), https://www.nclc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2022/10/EWA-letter-to-CFPB_Oct-4-2021.pdf.
47
The 2020 AO noted that both wages and free
EWA cost the consumer nothing, but that
observation was not central to its core claim that the
consumer does not incur a liability when using
EWA. The 2020 AO focused on a class of EWA
products that is the most akin to early wage
payment—because wages are free to the consumer.
But that does not mean that other forms of EWA—
including Covered EWA as defined in this advisory
opinion—are not more akin to early wage payment
than to credit extension.
48
A provider is a creditor under Regulation Z if
the product is repayable in more than four
installments or subject to finance charges. 12 CFR
1026.2(a)(17)(i). In the normal course, free EWA
products will not meet either condition and thus
their providers will not be Regulation Z creditors.
Regulation Z also includes definitions of ‘‘creditor’’
that apply specifically to credit card issuers. See 12
CFR 1026(a)(17)(iii), (iv). The CFPB is unaware of
any EWA providers that issue credit cards in
connection with the provision of EWA.
49
Regulation Z provides that undefined terms
‘‘have the meanings given to them by state law or
contract’’ (12 CFR 1026.2(b)(3)), but the regulation
offers no guidance about how to apply this
provision, and there is little applicable case law.
Some cases have interpreted the provision as an
instruction to consult the ‘‘ordinary usage’’ of the
undefined term in question. See, e.g., Fernandes v.
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1086,
1090–91 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (consulting Black’s Law
Dictionary for the meaning of the undefined term
in question); Wilbourn v. Advantage Fin. Partners,
2010 WL 1194950, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 2010). This
advisory opinion, like the 2020 AO, relies on
exactly this kind of ordinary usage of the term
‘‘debt.’’
50
See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 9–2407(a)(1)
(‘‘Earned wage access services provided by a
registrant in accordance with this chapter shall not
be considered to be: (A) A loan or other form of
credit or the registrant a creditor or lender with
respect thereto’’); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 361.749(6)(1)
(‘‘Earned wage access services offered and provided
by a registered provider shall not be considered to
be any of the following: . . . (b) A loan or other
form of credit’’); S.C. Code Ann. § 39–5–860
(‘‘Proceeds provided to a consumer by the [EWA]
provider shall not be considered a consumer loan
for purposes of Section 37–3–104 [defining
consumer loan] or a loan for purposes of Section
37–3–106 [defining loan].’’); Utah Code Ann. § 13–
78–106(1) (‘‘A provider offering or providing earned
wage access services in this state: . . . (b) is not
offering a loan or other form of credit or debt, if the
provider is not a creditor, a debt collector, or a
lender.’’). The 2024 PIR cites State law definitions
of ‘‘debt’’ (many of which happen to appear in State
FDCPA statutes) that it claims support its broad
‘‘any obligation’’ interpretation of ‘‘debt,’’ but it
avoids discussing State law’s treatment of whether
EWA is credit, which predominantly supports the
interpretation offered here and in the 2020 AO.
2024 PIR, 89 FR 61358 at 61360.
51
See Ariz. Op. Att’y Gen., No. I22–005 (Dec. 16,
2022); Mont. Op. Att’y Gen., Vol. 59, Op. 2 (Dec.
22, 2023).
52
See 2025 Rescission, 90 FR 3622, 3623 (Jan. 15,
2025). As part of this criticism, the 2025 Rescission
faulted the 2020 AO for failing to ‘‘explain how its
‘totality of the circumstances’ approach derived
from the definition of ‘credit.’ ’’ Id. But as the 2020
AO explained, courts commonly conduct a fact-
specific inquiry—using the types of factors
articulated in the 2020 AO—to determine whether
a transaction is ‘‘credit.’’ The logic of the 2025
Rescission would prohibit an agency from
interpreting terms using well-established precedent.
cost. The difference between the two is
not cost.
Not only is this point clear from
looking at the text of the statute and
regulation, but it is a point of wide
interpretive consensus, as demonstrated
by stakeholder feedback on the 2020
AO. For example, in an October 12,
2021 letter, some 96 consumer, labor,
civil rights, legal services, faith,
community and financial organizations,
and academics state that the 2020 AO
was flawed in part because ‘‘the
definition of ‘credit’ under TILA is not
related to price.’’
45
A contemporaneous
letter from the National Consumer Law
Center and the Center for Responsible
Lending expands on the point:
‘‘Whether there is a charge for credit has
absolutely no bearing on whether ‘debt’
has been incurred. The cost is only
relevant to whether the lender is a
‘creditor’: one who ‘regularly extends
consumer credit that is subject to a
finance charge or is payable by written
agreement in more than four
installments.’’’
46
Moreover, the 2020
AO did not position cost as critical to
its interpretation. Rather, it simply
limited its interpretive scope to
products that were free.
47

It is important to note that obligations
under Regulation Z and TILA generally
only arise when a provider is a
Regulation Z creditor. Regardless of
whether a product counts as Regulation
Z credit, if its provider is not a
Regulation Z creditor, then as a general
matter, the product is not subject to
regulatory obligations under Regulation
Z or TILA. And cost is relevant to the
question of whether or not a provider is
a creditor, as discussed in part I.C.3
below. In the normal course, providers
of EWA products that are free and thus
carry no finance charges will not be
creditors under Regulation Z, and
accordingly such EWA products will
not be subject to credit regulation under
Regulation Z.
48

While the 2025 Rescission took no
position on whether Regulation Z
applies to any forms of EWA, it
criticized the reasoning of the 2020 AO
in four respects. Upon reconsideration,
the CFPB now believes that none of
these criticisms are persuasive. First, it
faulted the 2020 AO for not drawing on
State law definitions of debt, even as it
did not claim that CFPB interpretations
of Regulation Z debt must rely on State
law.
49
However, the 2020 AO, like this
advisory opinion, relied on the ordinary
meaning of the term ‘‘debt,’’ which is
found in numerous State laws. In
addition, most States to have
specifically considered EWA
legislatively do not regulate EWA as
credit.
50
And two States offering
regulatory guidance on EWA
determined that it does not count as a
loan under State law.
51

Second, the 2025 Rescission targeted
what it characterized as the main
rationale for the 2020 AO’s assertion
that Covered EWA Programs do not
involve the consumer incurring a
liability: the claim that EWA
‘‘functionally operates like’’ an
employer that pays its workers earlier
than the scheduled payday. The 2025
Rescission took issue with this rationale
for insufficiently explaining why
‘‘functional operation’’ supports the
2020 AO’s conclusion. The point
intended by that language is the same
point made above: for all the reasons
stated in the 2020 AO and restated here,
EWA resembles the early payment of
wages and does not resemble the
extension of credit. With Covered EWA,
there is no liability or obligation
sufficient to create a debt because the
provider, by engaging with the
consumer’s employer or its payroll
processor, makes a payroll process
deduction for the pay period in which
the wages have been accrued, and
reserves no recourse against the
consumer if that deduction falls short of
the amount of the EWA transaction—
just as an employer directly advancing
wages to a worker would use the payroll
process to deduct that amount from the
worker’s paycheck and take no further
recourse against the worker. The
deduction operates to ensure that the
consumer is not effectively paid twice
for the same work. The presence of a
third-party intermediary—the EWA
provider—facilitating access to accrued
earnings does not change the nature of
the transaction.
Third, while the 2025 Rescission did
not dispute that Covered EWA lacks
certain significant indicia that are
common in credit transactions (such as
underwriting, debt collection, recourse,
credit reporting, and so on), it asserted
that the 2020 AO failed to consider
EWA features ‘‘commonly found in
credit transactions, including a
consumer’s receipt of funds, consumer
repayment of those funds, and the wage
garnishment tool used to effectuate
repayment.’’
52
The CFPB does not
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53
To the extent the 2025 Rescission contended
that the Payday Rule’s exclusion of certain ‘‘wage
advance products’’ demonstrates that such products
must be Regulation Z credit (because the rule only
applies to such credit), that contention is false. The
Payday Rule made clear that its wage advance
exclusion was limited to ‘‘advances that constitute
credit,’’ indicating that some such advances might
not in fact be credit for the various reasons that it
noted, including that EWA lets consumers ‘‘draw
on the accrued cash value of wages they have
earned but not yet been paid,’’ and does so
‘‘without recourse beyond deduction from the next
paycheck,’’ and without ‘‘collection or debt
reporting activities.’’ 82 FR 54472 at 54547
(emphasis added).
54
The 2024 PIR contends that because the Payday
Rule’s exclusions for ‘‘wage advance products’’ only
operate to the extent that such products are TILA
credit, ‘‘the decision to exclude’’ such products
‘‘has no impact on the credit status of EWA
products under TILA or Regulation Z.’’ What this
misses is that the CFPB was clear that it was
providing these exclusions precisely because it
recognized that such products might not be TILA
credit. Absent a final determination of EWA’s credit
status, the CFPB needed to provide the exclusions
to ensure that the Payday Rule would not apply to
these products.
55
This advisory opinion does not address the
question of whether EWA subscription fees are
finance charges because Regulation Z already
clarifies that this type of ‘‘participation’’ fee is not
a finance charge. See 12 CFR 1026.4(c)(4).
56
See 12 CFR 1026.1(c)(1)(iii).
57
12 CFR 1026.4(a).
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., 12 CFR 1026.18(d).
60
Regulation Z provides that undefined terms
‘‘have the meanings given to them by state law or
contract.’’ 12 CFR 1026.2(b)(3). However, the
regulation itself does not provide any guidance
about how to apply this provision.
61
Impose, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968);
see also Impose, Merriam-Webster, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impose (last
updated Oct. 28, 2025) (‘‘to establish or apply by
authority’’).
62
Incident, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968);
see also Incident, Merriam-Webster, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incident
(last updated Oct. 30, 2025)(‘‘dependent on or
relating to another thing in law’’).
63
Condition, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.
2024); see also Condition, Merriam-Webster,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
condition (last updated Oct. 30, 2025) (‘‘a premise
upon which the fulfillment of an agreement
depends[;] . . . a provision making the effect of a
legal instrument contingent upon an uncertain
event’’).
64
Nor does case law clarify their meaning. A good
example is Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Pfennig,
541 U.S. 232 (2004). In Pfennig, the Supreme Court
overturned the Sixth Circuit’s determination that a
credit card over-limit fee was a finance charge, in
part, on the ground that ‘‘the phrase ‘incident to’
does not make clear whether a substantial (as
opposed to remote) connection is required.’’ Id. at
241. As such, it is not possible ‘‘to conclude that
the term ‘finance charge’ unambiguously includes
over-limit fees.’’ Id. Thus, the opinion provides
little if any assistance in determining whether
expedited delivery fees and tips associated with
EWA are finance charges. The 2024 PIR implausibly
interpreted Pfennig to hold that only a remote
connection is required and then used this
interpretation to buttress the view that expedited
delivery fees and tips are ‘‘incident to’’ the
provision of EWA.
65
61 FR 49237, 49239 (Sept. 19, 1996) (‘‘The
Board has generally taken a case-by-case approach
in determining whether particular fees are ‘finance
charges.’ ’’).
believe those factors are necessary to the
analysis, but considering them further,
it does not believe they would require
a different result. Receipt of funds is
common to many kinds of
transactions—a sale or investment, for
example, not to mention receipt of
wages directly from an employer—and
thus is not a meaningful indicium of
credit. Further, covered EWA products
do not garnish wages, and they do not
involve consumer repayment. As noted
above, the payroll process deduction
that the EWA provider uses at the next
payroll event works to ensure that the
consumer is not effectively paid twice
for the same work—and accordingly is
not consumer repayment for credit
advanced.
Fourth, the 2025 Rescission criticized
the 2020 AO for drawing support from
the 2017 Payday Rule’s exclusion of
certain EWA products. It suggested that
these exclusions have no bearing on the
Regulation Z credit status of EWA
because the Payday Rule was based on
the CFPB’s UDAAP authority, not its
TILA authority, and the exclusions
would only operate to the extent that
EWA was credit under Regulation Z. It
is true that the 2017 Payday Rule did
not conclusively determine that EWA
was not Regulation Z credit. But when
it considered and then finalized the
Payday Rule, the CFPB recognized that
EWA products might well not be credit.
As a result, it took formal regulatory
steps to ensure that the Payday Rule’s
regulation of short-term credit would
not have application to EWA.
53
Upon
reconsideration, the CFPB now believes
that it was appropriate for the 2020 AO
to cite this recognition as additional
support for its conclusion.
54

3. Expedited Delivery Fees and Tips
Associated With EWA Are Not Finance
Charges
As explained in part I.C.2 above,
Covered EWA is not credit. Thus, given
that a finance charge is the cost of
credit, any fees charged in connection
with Covered EWA cannot be finance
charges. To the extent any EWA
products other than Covered EWA are
credit, fees associated with them can be
finance charges. This is not to imply
that any EWA products other than
Covered EWA are credit. As noted, the
CFPB continues to seek stakeholder
feedback and evaluate whether it should
provide additional clarity about whether
(and when) other EWA products, which
are not Covered EWA as described here,
are also not credit under Regulation Z.
The question addressed in part I.C.3.b
is whether expedited delivery fees
associated with EWA are finance
charges. Part I.C.3.c addresses the
question of whether tips associated with
EWA are finance charges.
55
For the
reasons set forth below, the CFPB
concludes that, in the normal course,
fees for expedited delivery of earned
wages and tips for the receipt of earned
wages are not finance charges because
they are not imposed directly or
indirectly by the provider. That said, in
certain factual scenarios discussed
below, each could be a finance charge.
a. General
In general, the obligations of
Regulation Z apply to any credit
provider that regularly offers or extends
consumer credit subject to a finance
charge.
56
The finance charge is ‘‘the cost
of consumer credit as a dollar
amount.’’
57
Unless specifically
excluded by the regulation, this
includes ‘‘any charge payable directly or
indirectly by the consumer and imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as
an incident to or a condition of the
extension of credit.’’
58
Thus, to qualify
as a finance charge, a charge must be
either ‘‘an incident to’’ or ‘‘a condition
of’’ an extension of credit and be
‘‘imposed directly or indirectly’’ by the
creditor. Providers are required to
disclose finance charges in the manner
prescribed by Regulation Z.
59

Neither Regulation Z nor TILA
defines the key terms in the definition
of ‘‘finance charge’’: ‘‘imposed by,’’
‘‘incident to,’’ and ‘‘condition of.’’
60

The 1968 edition of Black’s Law
Dictionary defines ‘‘impose’’ to mean
‘‘to levy or exact as by authority; to lay
as a burden, tax, duty, or charge.’’
61
It
defines ‘‘incident’’ to mean ‘‘anything
which is usually connected with
another, or connected for some
purposes, though not inseparably.’’
62

The meaning of ‘‘condition’’ is ‘‘an
uncertain future act or event whose
occurrence or nonoccurrence
determines the rights or obligations of a
party under a legal instrument and
especially a contract.’’
63
On their own,
however, these highly general
definitions do not provide a clear
answer to the questions at hand, i.e.,
whether expedited delivery fees and
tips are finance charges.
64
Rather, it is
well established that determining
whether a fee qualifies as a finance
charge requires a case-by-case
approach.
65

b. Expedited Delivery Fees
Most EWA providers offer consumers
the option of receiving their earned
wages via regular ACH and/or by instant
transfer to the provider’s debit, prepaid,
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66
Other free options include, for instance,
‘‘visiting a specified retail store to obtain funds;
taking the funds on a designated retailer’s gift card;
or employer-subsidized funding of some or all of
transfers.’’ 2024 Data Spotlight, supra note 9.
67
Id.
68
Id. (summarizing fees charged by a sample of
EP and D2C providers obtained from publicly
available websites).
69
68 FR 16185, 16186 (Apr. 3, 2003).
70
Id. at 16187. The Board’s determination about
the two types of ‘‘expedited’’ fees is codified at 12
CFR 1026, comments 6(a)(2)–2(ix) and (x). The 2024
PIR sought to distinguish the Board’s interpretation
on the ground that neither of those expedited
services ‘‘are as closely and integrally connected to
the extension of credit as faster funds access is to
obtaining an earned wage product.’’ 2024 PIR, 89
FR 61358 at 61362 n.42. But this reasoning is off
point because the Board based its determinations on
whether there were options other than the
expedited option, even if slower.
71
Veale v. Citibank, 85 F.3d 577, 579 (11th Cir.
1996).
72
Id.
73
61 FR 49237, 49240 (Sep. 19, 1996).
74
Id.
75
2024 PIR, 89 FR 61358 at 61362 (citing 61 FR
49237 at 49239).
76
The 2024 PIR also failed to mention that the
Board’s 1996 Rule did not simply determine that
debt cancellation fees are finance charges. It also
determined that debt cancellation fees are not
finance charges where the lender provides certain
disclosures about the debt cancellation agreement.
See 61 FR 49237 at 49240–41. Thus, even if the
Board’s rule were factually on point, it would
provide support only for a more limited
interpretation that expedited delivery fees are
finance charges only if the expedited delivery
feature is not sufficiently disclosed. Moreover, even
if it is assumed that fees for debt cancellation
agreements are factually on point, the Seventh
Circuit has held that fees for such agreements
(specifically GAP agreements) are not finance
charges. See McGee v. Kerr-Hickman, 93 F.3d 380,
383–85 (7th Cir. 1996).
77
See supra note 29 (discussing the Policy on the
Compliance Assistance Sandbox).
or payroll card for free.
66
ACH delivery
typically takes one to three days.
67
Most
also offer one form or another of
expedited delivery to an account of the
consumer’s choice. To effectuate such
delivery, EWA providers incur charges
from expedited delivery services which
they then pass on to consumers.
Consumers that choose this option pay
fees typically ranging from $2.50 to
$5.99.
68
Prima facie, these fees are
charges for expedited delivery rather
than for receiving a certain amount of
earned wages. But are they actually
finance charges?
There is no need for the CFPB to write
on a clean slate when answering this
question. In a 2003 rule, the Board
considered whether two types of
expedited fees in connection with credit
cards accessing home equity lines of
credit are finance charges: a fee for
expediting a consumer’s payment, and a
fee expediting delivery of the physical
card. As regards the former, the Board
determined that ‘‘expedited payment
fees . . . are not finance charges under
TILA and Regulation Z because the
consumer has a reasonable means for
making payment on the account without
paying a fee to the creditor.’’
69
As
regards the latter, the Board likewise
determined that ‘‘a fee for expedited
delivery of a credit card is not
incidental to the extension of credit and
thus is not a finance charge where the
consumer requests the service and the
card is also available by standard mail
service (or another means that is at least
as fast) without a fee.’’
70
Fees that EWA
providers charge for expedited delivery
of EWA fit squarely into this mold,
since consumers can receive exactly the
same service without paying the fee.
Somewhat earlier, the Eleventh
Circuit in Veale v. Citibank addressed
the application of ‘‘finance charge’’ to
an expedited delivery fee very similar to
the expedited delivery fees charged by
EWA providers: a $21 Federal Express
fee for expedited delivery of loan
proceeds. The court noted that ‘‘[i]f the
borrower can choose to avoid the
Federal Express fee by having the
documents sent via regular mail, then
the fee is not imposed as an incident to
the extension of credit.’’
71
And the
court held that ‘‘[s]ince the [borrowers]
could have chosen not to pay the
Federal Express fee and the bank did
not require it, then the fee was not
imposed as an incident to the extension
of credit and need not be included in
the Finance Charge [disclosure].’’
72

The 2024 PIR made essentially no
effort to distinguish Veale. Instead, it
attempted to place the entire weight of
its novel proposed interpretation on a
1996 Board rule about a very different
fact pattern: fees charged for debt
cancellation agreements. Under such an
agreement, ‘‘the creditor agrees to cancel
all or part of any remaining debt in the
event of an occurrence, such as the
death, disability or unemployment of
the borrower.’’
73
The Board reasoned
that fees for such agreements are finance
charges because the agreement ‘‘alters
the fundamental nature of the
borrower’s repayment obligation.’’
74

More specifically, it potentially reduces
the principal amount the consumer
owes the creditor. Such fees bear little,
if any, resemblance to fees for expedited
delivery of earned wages. The earned
wage amount the provider deducts is
unaffected by the consumer’s opting for
expedited delivery; the provider
deducts the same earned wage amount
if the consumer opts instead for free
ACH delivery.
Ignoring this fundamental difference
between debt cancellation fees and
expedited delivery fees, the 2024 PIR
highlighted more general language in
the 1996 rule, namely, ‘‘even though a
lender may not require a particular loan
feature, the feature may become a term
of the credit if it is included.’’
75
Relying
on this formulation, the 2024 PIR
proposed the facially implausible
interpretation that fees for expedited
delivery of earned wages are finance
charges because earned-wages-plus-
expedited-delivery is one credit
product, and earned-wages-without-
expedited-delivery is an entirely
different credit product. That
interpretation conflicts with the long-
standing interpretation of ‘‘finance
charge’’ by the Board itself in its 2003
rule and by the Eleventh Circuit in
Veale, detailed above. In addition, the
2024 PIR’s reading of the Board’s 1996
rule would have created a principle
without any limitation under which any
fee for anything connected to a credit
transaction can be transformed into a
finance charge. All one needs to do is
create a separate credit product for each
‘‘feature.’’
76

The preceding determination that, in
the normal course, expedited delivery
fees associated with EWA are not
finance charges is not intended to mean
that expedited delivery fees can never
be finance charges. The key issue is
whether such fees are ‘‘directly or
indirectly imposed’’ on the consumer.
In the normal course, expedited delivery
fees are the cost of obtaining earned
wages more quickly than via ACH, and
are triggered by the consumer’s opting
for expedited delivery; they are not
‘‘directly or indirectly imposed’’ by the
provider. However, to the extent that an
EWA provider does impose expedited
delivery fees on a consumer’s receipt of
earned wages, those fees could qualify
as finance charges. Determining whether
such imposition is occurring is a matter
that depends on the facts and
circumstances of a provider’s practices.
For example, if an EWA provider makes
it too difficult for consumers to select
the un-expedited delivery of EWA
funds, the resulting expedited delivery
fees may effectively be imposed.
Providers seeking clarification from the
CFPB about whether their practices
concerning expedited delivery fees do
not amount to the imposition of a
finance charge may request clarification
from the CFPB by, for instance, applying
for an Approval under the Policy on the
Compliance Assistance Sandbox.
77

c. Tips
Tipping is a longstanding, familiar
aspect of the retail services economy,
but it has only relatively recently
appeared in the context of consumer
financial services. The practice of
seeking tips, gratuities, and the like is
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60076 Federal Register/ Vol. 90, No. 244 / Tuesday, December 23, 2025 / Notices
78
Tip, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/tip (last updated Oct. 31,
2025); Gratuity, Merriam-Webster, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gratuity (last
updated Oct. 29, 2025). These terms are not defined
in Black’s Law Dictionary.
79
The 2024 PIR likewise indicated that
determining when a tip is imposed depends on the
facts and circumstances. But it also employed
various devices designed to stack the deck in favor
of a determination that tips are finance charges. For
example, it used quotes for each and every mention
of the word tip. It identified numerous
considerations it deemed relevant to making this
determination. Many of these, however, have no
basis in the ordinary meaning of the term ‘‘tip’’ and
the familiar practice of tipping. For example, the
2024 PIR states that the consumer’s ‘‘reasonable
understanding that the provider expects a ‘tip’ ’’ is
evidence that it is imposed. 2024 PIR, 89 FR 61358
at 61363 n.48. Consumers who are served at a
restaurant have a ‘‘reasonable understanding’’ that
the server expects a tip, but that doesn’t mean that
the server imposes the tip. Another ‘‘relevant
consideration’’ identified by the 2024 PIR is
‘‘suggesting ‘‘tip’’ amounts or percentages to the
consumer.’’ This is now a common practice on POS
checkout platforms, but no reasonable consumer
believes this makes any tips selected mandatory.
80
Depending on the facts and circumstances, a
provider’s tipping practices could instead or also be
unlawfully deceptive under 12 U.S.C. 5531, 5536.
81
See supra note 29 (discussing the Policy on the
Compliance Assistance Sandbox). Subsequent to
the issuance of the 2024 PIR, at least five district
court opinions have appeared that concern products
that could be classified as EWA, and that hold that
those products are credit and that expedited
delivery fees and/or tips associated with those
products are finance charges. See Orubo v.
Activehours, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 3d 927, 938 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 30, 2025) (motion to dismiss); Johnson v.
Activehours, Inc., 2025 WL 2299425, at *9 (D. Md.
Aug. 8, 2025) (motion to dismiss); Golubiewski v.
Activehours, Inc., 2025 WL 2484192, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
Aug. 28, 2025) (motion to dismiss); Moss v. Cleo AI
Inc., 2025 WL 2592265, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8,
2025) (motion to dismiss); Vickery v. Empower
Finance Inc., 2025 WL 2841686, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 7, 2025) (motion to compel arbitration). All
rely heavily, directly or indirectly, on the
application of ‘‘credit’’ to EWA and the application
of ‘‘finance charge’’ to EWA-related express
delivery fees and tips in the 2024 PIR, despite the
fact that the 2024 PIR was merely a proposed
interpretive rule. The first of the cases, Orubo v.
Activehours, quotes liberally from the 2024 PIR.
Each of the four subsequent cases then relies
heavily on Orubo. Now that the CFPB has not only
formally withdrawn the 2024 PIR but officially
rejected the interpretations advanced in it, these
opinions have no real bearing on this advisory
opinion.
82
12 U.S.C. 5512(b)(1).
83
5 U.S.C. 801 et seq.
84
44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
relatively common among D2C EWA
providers, which raises the question of
whether tips in this context qualify as
finance charges. In general dictionaries,
a tip is defined as a gratuity, and a
gratuity is defined as ‘‘something given
voluntarily or beyond obligation usually
for some service.’’
78
To the extent that
any EWA products are credit, if a
provider seeks tips in connection with
the provision of EWA, the tip is
arguably ‘‘incident to’’ the extension of
credit. However, it is inherent in the
meaning of ‘‘tip’’ that it is not imposed,
even if providing one is considered
customary. Accordingly, a bona fide tip
provided by the consumer for EWA
services cannot be a finance charge.
To the extent tipping for EWA
services is not voluntary, however, tips
can be ‘‘directly or indirectly imposed’’
by providers and thus qualify as finance
charges. The determination of when a
tip crosses the line from voluntary to
imposed depends on the facts and
circumstances of a provider’s
practices.
79
For example, if the provider
makes it too difficult to avoid tipping,
the resulting consumer payment may be
imposed, at least in part.
80
Providers
seeking clarification from the CFPB
about whether their particular practices
concerning tipping do not rise to the
level of imposing finance charges may
request clarification from the CFPB by,
for instance, applying for an Approval
under its Policy on the Compliance
Assistance Sandbox.
81

II. Regulatory Matters
This advisory opinion is an
interpretive rule issued under the
CFPB’s authority to interpret the Truth
in Lending Act and Regulation Z,
including under section 1022(b)(1) of
the Consumer Financial Protection Act
of 2010, which authorizes guidance as
may be necessary or appropriate to
enable the CFPB to administer and carry
out the purposes and objectives of
Federal consumer financial laws.
82

As guidance, this interpretive rule
does not have the force or effect of law.
It has no legally binding effect,
including on persons or entities outside
the Federal government.
By operation of TILA section 130(f),
no provision of TILA sections 130,
108(b), 108(c), 108(e), or 112 imposing
any liability applies to any act done or
omitted in good faith in conformity with
this interpretive rule, notwithstanding
that after such act or omission has
occurred, the interpretive rule is
amended, rescinded, or determined by
judicial or other authority.
The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has determined that this action
is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’
under E.O. 12866, as amended.
Pursuant to the Congressional Review
Act,
83
the CFPB will submit a report
containing this advisory opinion and
other required information to the United
States Senate, the United States House
of Representatives, and the Comptroller
General of the United States prior to the
interpretive rule taking effect. OIRA has
designated this advisory opinion as not
a ‘‘major rule’’ as defined by 5 U.S.C.
804(2).
The CFPB has determined that this
advisory opinion does not contain any
new or substantively revised
information collection requirements that
would require approval by OMB under
the Paperwork Reduction Act.
84

Russell Vought,
Acting Director, Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau.
[FR Doc. 2025–23735 Filed 12–22–25; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P
CORPORATION FOR NATIONAL AND
COMMUNITY SERVICE
Agency Information Collection
Activities; Comment Request;
AmeriCorps National Civilian
Community Corps (NCCC) Project
Sponsor Survey
AGENCY: Corporation for National and
Community Service.
ACTION: Notice of information collection;
request for comment.
SUMMARY: In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, the
Corporation for National and
Community Service (operating as
AmeriCorps) is proposing to revise an
information collection.
DATES: Written comments must be
submitted to the individual and office
listed in the
ADDRESSESsection by
February 20, 2026.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by the title of the information
collection activity, by any of the
following methods:
(1) Electronically through
www.regulations.gov (preferred
method).
(2) By mail sent to: AmeriCorps, Ken
Goodson, 250 E Street SW, Washington,
DC 20525.
(3) By hand delivery or by courier to
the AmeriCorps mailroom at the mail
address given in paragraph (2) above,
between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m. Eastern Time,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
Comments submitted in response to
this notice may be made available to the
public through regulations.gov. For this
reason, please do not include in your
comments information of a confidential
nature, such as sensitive personal
information or proprietary information.
If you send an email comment, your
email address will be automatically
captured and included as part of the
comment that is placed in the public
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