Consumer Financial Protection Circular 2024-01: Preferencing and Steering Practices by Digital Intermediaries for Consumer Financial Products or Services

Publisher lists this guidance as withdrawn/rescinded: Consumer Financial Protection Circular 2024-01: Preferencing and Steering Practices by Digital Intermediaries for Consumer Financial Products or Services, 89 FR 17706 (Mar. 12, 2024); withdrawn on May 12, 2025 .

17706 Federal Register/ Vol. 89, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 12, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
1
As used in this circular, the term ‘‘digital
comparison-shopping tools’’ includes both tools
that overtly recommend certain products as well as
tools that have the effect of affirmatively
influencing consumers’ likelihood of selecting or
engaging with information about various consumer
financial products and services. The term
encompasses ‘‘Digital Mortgage Comparison-
Shopping Platforms,’’ which are addressed in a
recent advisory opinion regarding the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act. See Digital Mortgage
Comparison-Shopping Platforms and Related
Payments to Operators, 88 FR 9162 (Feb. 13, 2023).
The term also encompasses some ‘‘digital marketing
providers,’’ which are discussed in a recent
interpretive rule regarding the CFPA definition of
‘‘service providers.’’ See Limited Applicability of
Consumer Financial Protection Act’s ‘‘Time or
Space’’ Exception with Respect to Digital Marketing
Providers, 87 FR 50556 (Aug. 17, 2022). The scope
of this circular, however, is different than the scope
of either of those prior documents. This circular
addresses all digital comparison-shopping tools that
provide recommendations for or comparisons
among any consumer financial products or services
and addresses potential violations under the
abusive prong of the CFPA.
(b) If judicial review is not obtained,
the action of the TSOB Review Panel is
final and binding on the parties for the
purpose of resolving the particular
decision under review.
§ 126.31 Administration of proceedings.
(a) A TSOB Review Panel has
authority to govern the conduct of its
proceedings and internal operations by
establishing any additional rules or
procedures that are not inconsistent
with this part.
(b) If TSA withdraws its
Determination of Security Threat at any
time after a notice of appeal has been
filed pursuant to § 126.13(a), the
proceedings before the TSOB Review
Panel are rendered moot and closed.
TSA must file a notice of withdrawal of
the Determination of Security Threat
with the TSOB Docket Clerk within five
calendar days of such withdrawal.
(c) TSOB Review Panel proceedings
will generally be closed to the public. A
TSOB Review Panel may, in its
discretion, open its proceedings to the
public. Classified information, SSI, or
other protected information shall not be
disclosed during administrative
proceedings, in accordance with
§ 126.25(d).
Alejandro Mayorkas,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
[FR Doc. 2024–05131 Filed 3–8–24; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 9110–9B–P
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU
12 CFR Part X
Consumer Financial Protection
Circular 2024–01: Preferencing and
Steering Practices by Digital
Intermediaries for Consumer Financial
Products or Services
AGENCY: Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.
ACTION: Consumer financial protection
circular.
SUMMARY: The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (Bureau or CFPB) has
issued Consumer Financial Protection
Circular 2024–01, titled, ‘‘Preferencing
and steering practices by digital
intermediaries for consumer financial
products or services.’’ In this circular,
the Bureau responds to the question,
‘‘Can operators of digital comparison-
shopping tools or lead generators violate
the Consumer Financial Protection Act
(CFPA) by preferencing products or
services based on financial or other
benefits to the operator?’’
DATES: The Bureau released this circular
on its website on February 29, 2024.
ADDRESSES: Enforcers, and the broader
public, can provide feedback and
comments to Circulars@cfpb.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
George Karithanom, Regulatory
Implementation & Guidance Program
Analyst, Office of Regulations, at 202–
435–7700 or at: https://
www.reginquiries.consumerfinance.gov/
. If you require this document in an
alternative electronic format, please
contact CFPB_Accessibility@cfpb.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Question Presented
Can operators of digital comparison-
shopping tools or lead generators violate
the Consumer Financial Protection Act
(CFPA) by preferencing products or
services based on financial or other
benefits to the operator?
Response
Yes. Operators of digital comparison-
shopping tools can violate the
prohibition on abusive acts or practices
if they distort the shopping experience
by steering consumers to certain
products or services based on
remuneration to the operator. Similarly,
lead generators can violate the
prohibition on abusive practices if they
steer consumers to one participating
financial services provider instead of
another based on compensation
received. Where consumers reasonably
rely on an operator of a digital
comparison-shopping tool or a lead
generator to act in their interests, the
operator or lead generator can take
unreasonable advantage of that reliance
by giving preferential treatment to their
own or other products or services
through steering or enhanced product
placement, for financial or other
benefits.
Background
For many households, the process of
shopping for a financial product or
service now includes interactions with
digital intermediaries. These
intermediaries include websites,
applications, or chatbots that operate as
comparison-shopping tools, which
consumers turn to for help with
researching, comparing, and selecting
consumer financial products or services.
Offering a comparison-shopping tool for
consumers and generating leads for
financial companies can and sometimes
do operate as distinct business models,
and for the purposes of this circular,
comparison-shopping tools and lead
generators are discussed separately.
However, consumers often interact with
them in similar ways and many digital
intermediaries operate as both,
presenting themselves as consumer-
serving comparison-shopping tools
while simultaneously increasing profits
by directing leads based on financial
benefit. Digital intermediaries
commonly receive remuneration or
other benefits, sometimes referred to as
‘‘bounties’’ by market participants.
Digital Comparison-Shopping Tools
Consumers are increasingly using
digital comparison-shopping tools to
find consumer financial products or
services that fit their interests.
1
These
tools facilitate comparison shopping by
presenting information about the costs,
features, or other terms for a set of
comparable financial products or
services, such as credit cards, student
loans, and savings accounts, offered by
different providers. In addition to
presenting options offered by third-
party providers of financial products
and services, some operators of digital
comparison-shopping tools offer their
own financial products and services and
include their own options in the
comparison-shopping tool.
Comparison-shopping information
can be presented in a static or
interactive format. In the latter case,
some operators allow people who use
the tool to sort options based on
different criteria or to otherwise
customize the presentation of
information and options (sometimes
after a default presentation). Also, some
operators collect information from
consumers and then purport to provide
a list of options tailored to the
consumers’ particular circumstances or
preferences. In other cases, operators
just present an ordered list of
recommended providers. Increasingly,
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17707 Federal Register/ Vol. 89, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 12, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
2
Factors that inform whether advertisements are
separate from the content of a comparison-shopping
tool include whether content is completely visually
separate from the presentation of product
recommendations or results, such that paid content
is not embedded or intertwined with a tool’s
presentation of product rankings or
recommendations, and whether paid content is
presented as a recommendation from the
comparison-tool operator. However, the question of
whether advertising content is separate from a
comparison-shopping tool is fact specific and will
often include consideration of other factors.
3
See, e.g., Compl., FTC v. ITMedia Sols. LLC, No.
2:22–cv–00073 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2022) (alleging that
lead generator unlawfully used a ‘‘loan application’’
form to collect consumers’ information by
deceptively presenting itself as connecting
consumers with lenders).
4
See, e.g., Am. Compl., CFPB v. D & D Marketing,
Inc., No. 2:15–cv–09692 (C.D. Cal. June 30, 2016)
(alleging unfair and abusive acts or practices where
lead aggregator ordered sales based primarily on the
price providers would pay for leads).
5
Although this circular focuses on the
reasonable-reliance prong of the abusive
prohibition, conduct discussed in this circular can
also violate other prongs of the abusive prohibition
under 12 U.S.C. 5531(d), 12 U.S.C. 5531 and
5536(a)(1)(B)’s prohibitions against unfair or
deceptive acts or practices, or other Federal, State,
or local laws.
6
12 U.S.C. 5531(d)(2)(C). See generally CFPB,
Policy Statement on Abusive Acts or Practices, at
17–18 (April 3, 2023), https://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_policy-statement-of-
abusiveness_2023-03.pdf (discussing reasonable-
reliance abusive prong).
7
Under the CFPA, a central purpose of the CFPB
is to promote ‘‘fair, transparent, and competitive’’
markets. 12 U.S.C. 5511(a). Moreover, CFPA
legislative history highlights that an important
purpose of the CFPB is to ensure that ‘‘a consumer
can shop and compare products based on quality,
price, and convenience without having to worry
about getting trapped by the fine print into an
abusive deal.’’ S. Rep. No. 111–176, at 11, 229
(2010).
8
See 12 U.S.C. 5481(6) (defining ‘‘covered
person’’); 12 U.S.C. 5481(26) (defining ‘‘service
provider’’).
9
See 12 U.S.C. 5481(5), (15)(A)(i).
digital comparison-shopping tools are
using algorithms that order
recommendations or ranking lists based
on multiple variables, such as consumer
characteristics, product features,
consumer ratings, the likelihood a
consumer would be approved, various
click-through and application
completion or approval rates, and
provider compensation or bids.
Operators of digital comparison-
shopping tools enter various types of
commercial arrangements with
providers of consumer financial
products and services that participate in
a comparison-shopping tool. Some
operators receive revenue in exchange
for the provision of time or space for
advertising that is clearly set apart from
the content of the comparison-shopping
tool, like banner ads or pop-up
advertisements.
2
This kind of
advertising is not at issue in this
circular.
Instead, this circular focuses on
compensation arrangements from
providers for preferential treatment by
an operator of a digital comparison-
shopping tool. Operators are sometimes
paid by product providers on a fee-per-
action basis—for example, by receiving
fees per click, per application, per
conversion, per offer, or per sale. Often,
operators allow firms to bid against each
other for advantageous placement by
paying bounties, which can be targeted
at customers fitting the characteristics a
provider wants to acquire or aimed at
meeting certain volume goals. The
degree to which these bounties affect
product placement depends on the
operator’s business model and the
weight given to provider compensation
over other factors.
Lead Generation
Lead generators in lending markets
sell information about prospective
customers to lenders. Lead generators
sometimes perform this function
without making any contact with the
consumer—selling data on consumers as
a specialty data broker. But these
entities also collect data directly from
consumers by advertising websites that
present themselves as helping
consumers get a loan or connect with
lenders.
3

When consumers submit their
information to a lead generator
indicating an interest in obtaining a
loan, the lead generator sells the
consumer’s information to lenders to
complete a loan transaction. Lead
generators decide which lender obtains
a lead based on a variety of criteria
depending on the firm. They sometimes
deploy algorithms to use many variables
simultaneously to make these
automated decisions, similar to digital
comparison-shopping tools. Sometimes
lead generators collect more information
from consumers to assist lenders in
determining whether to purchase a lead,
and lead generators sometimes perform
underwriting or origination tasks on
behalf of partner lenders. In fact, in
some cases the automated decision on
which a lender obtains a lead can be so
quick that the consumer’s user
experience between navigating to a lead
generator’s website and obtaining a loan
can be continuous.
Similar to compensation agreements
for operators of digital shopping tools,
lead generators are paid by participating
lenders using a variety of pricing
models. Payments can similarly be
charged as a fee-per-action, such as for
each lead, or each completed
application. Lenders sometimes pay for
a number of leads, or a number of leads
meeting certain criteria. And, similarly,
some lead generators send leads to
providers who bid the highest for a
specific type of lead.
4

Analysis and Findings
The CFPA prohibits covered persons
or service providers from engaging in
any unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or
practice.
5
An act or practice in
connection with the provision of a
consumer financial product or service is
abusive if it ‘‘takes unreasonable
advantage’’ of certain circumstances,
including ‘‘the reasonable reliance by
the consumer on a covered person to act
in the interests of the consumer.’’
6

Protecting and facilitating people’s
ability to effectively compare and
choose among options for consumer
financial products or services is among
the core statutory objectives of the
CFPB.
7

Below, this circular first addresses
how an operator of a digital comparison-
shopping tool or a lead generator might
leverage consumer reliance to take
unreasonable advantage of consumers
where the operator or lead generator
preferences particular providers or
products over others in exchange for
financial or other benefits to the
operator, as opposed to making
presentation or lead distribution
decisions using other factors not relating
to the operator or lead generator’s
relative compensation from different
providers. The circular then provides
examples of potentially abusive acts or
practices by digital comparison-
shopping tool operators.
CFPA Section 1031(d)(2)(C) Elements
Reasonable Reliance by the Consumer
on a Covered Person To Act in the
Interests of the Consumer
Digital comparison-shopping tool
operators and lead generators can
qualify as ‘‘covered persons’’ under
CFPA section 1031(d)(2)(C). An operator
or lead generator is a ‘‘covered person’’
if it offers or provides consumer
financial products or services or is an
affiliate of a person that offers or
provides consumer financial products or
services and acts as a service provider
by including those products in the tool
or providing leads.
8
Depending on the
role that a digital comparison-shopping
tool or lead generator plays in a
consumer’s shopping experience, it may
be extending or brokering the credit
products that consumers ultimately
receive.
9
In addition, some digital
comparison-shopping tools and lead
generators may be providing financial
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17708 Federal Register/ Vol. 89, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 12, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
10
See 12 U.S.C. 5481(5), (15)(A)(viii).
11
See generally CFPB, Policy Statement on
Abusive Acts or Practices, at 17–18 (April 3, 2023),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
cfpb_policy-statement-of-abusiveness_2023-03.pdf.
12
Additionally, a comparison-shopping site
operator or lead generator can also attempt to
generate trust and reliance by falsely presenting a
relationship with a trusted institution. See, e.g.,
CFPB, Consumer Financial Protection Circular
2022–02: Deceptive representations involving the
FDIC’s name or logo or deposit insurance (May 17,
2022), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
compliance/circulars/circular-2022-02-deception-
representations-involving-the-fdics-name-or-logo-
or-deposit-insurance/ (CFPB circular addressing
deceptive misuse of the FDIC logo in
representations about deposit insurance); Compl.,
FTC v. Career Education Corporation, No. 1:19–cv–
05739 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2019) (Career Education
Corporation purchased sales from lead generators
that falsely represented they were affiliated with the
U.S. military).
13
See, e.g., Compl., FTC v. ITMedia Sols. LLC.
14
See, e.g., Compl., FTC v. Blue Global, LLC, No.
2:17–cv–2117 (D. Ariz. July 3, 2017) (Blue Global
collected loan applications and promised to match
consumers with loans that had the best interest
rates, finance charges, and repayment periods
when, in fact, they indiscriminately sold leads.).
15
See CFPB, Policy Statement on Abusive Acts or
Practices, at 8 (April 3, 2023), https://files.consumer
finance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_policy-statement-of-
abusiveness_2023-03.pdf (discussing monetary and
advisory services to consumers as
well.
10

Additionally, some operators or lead
generators offer their own version of the
consumer financial product or service
that consumers seek to compare using
the digital comparison-shopping tool or
for which leads are generated—for
example, where an operator of a credit-
card digital comparison-shopping tool
offers its own card on the tool. Other
operators or lead generators offer
consumer financial products or services
of a different type from what consumers
are using a tool to compare or for which
leads are generated—for example, an
operator of a credit-card digital
comparison-shopping tool might use
pop-up advertisements to promote
credit-counseling or credit-repair
services offered by itself or an affiliate.
Reasonable Reliance
Consumers sometimes reasonably rely
on digital comparison-shopping tool
operators or lead generators to act in
their interests. Operators of digital
comparison-shopping tools and lead
generators can engender reasonable
consumer reliance by virtue of playing
the role of helping people select
providers. They can also engender
reasonable consumer reliance by virtue
of their explicit and implicit
representations and communications.
In particular, reasonable consumer
reliance can exist because of a digital
comparison-shopping tool’s function in
a market, such as when a tool operator
assumes the role of acting on behalf of
consumers or helping them to select
products or services based on the
consumer’s interests.
11
The nature of
people’s interactions with the tool
informs an evaluation of the digital
comparison-shopping tool’s function in
the market. For example, consumers
may reasonably rely on a tool that
functions by ‘‘matching’’ people with
consumer financial products or services,
i.e., providing curated recommendations
based partly on information provided by
the consumer.
In addition, if an operator explicitly
or implicitly holds its tool out as
presenting information based on the
interests of the consumer, it may be
reasonable for consumers to rely on the
tool to function accordingly. A tool
operator sometimes explicitly holds
itself out as presenting information
based on the interests of the consumer
by directly stating so, such as by, for
example, claiming its recommendations
are objective.
An operator can also implicitly hold
itself out as presenting information
based on the interests of the consumer
even if it does not explicitly claim to
make objective recommendations. For
example, the operator may emphasize
its ‘‘expertise’’ in helping consumers
evaluate options; describe its tool as
providing ‘‘research-based’’ rankings of
options for consumers; state to
consumers that it will ‘‘help you today’’
to ‘‘achieve your financial goals’’;
purport to match consumers with the
‘‘best’’ or ‘‘right’’ offers; or claim to ‘‘put
consumers first’’ or to provide a ‘‘one
stop shop’’ with all the information
consumers need to make informed
selections among potential providers.
In some contexts, background
conditions, such as an association with
a trusted institution, could factor into
consumers’ reasonable reliance on a
digital comparison-shopping tool (e.g., a
financial aid and student loan advisory
website that is associated with a college
or university).
12
Other factors, such as
evidence that consumers using the tool
tend to not understand that elements of
the tool’s rankings or recommendations
are influenced by financial
considerations, also contribute to
establishing the existence of reasonable
consumer reliance.
Relatedly, consumer-facing lead
generators can engender reasonable
consumer reliance within the meaning
of CFPA section 1031(d)(2)(C) through
their role as intermediating between
consumers and lenders and their
explicit or implicit communications to
consumers. In particular, when lead
generators conceal their real role in the
market and present themselves as a tool
for consumers to connect with trusted
lenders or receive the best available
terms for a consumer financial product
or service, given the consumer’s
individual circumstances, a consumer
would likely be reasonable in relying on
the entity to act in the consumer’s
interests.
13

Interests of the Consumer
Adjusting a digital comparison-
shopping tool’s presentation of
consumer financial products and
services based on fees or other benefits
to tool operators will often not be in the
interests of the consumer. In many cases
where consumers use digital
comparison-shopping tools, consumers
have an interest in navigating a complex
financial market to obtain products that
are best for them. Consumer interests
are not served when they are steered
toward more expensive or less favorable
products because those products are
offered by the tool operator or its
affiliates or because those products
generate more revenue for the tool
operator.
Similarly, consumer interests are not
served when consumers are steered to
more expensive or less favorable
products by lead generators because one
provider is bidding more for the lead
than another.
14

Unreasonable Advantage
A digital comparison-shopping tool
operator or lead generator can take
unreasonable advantage of the
reasonable consumer reliance described
above when they operate a business
model that gives preferential treatment,
such as through steering, to particular
consumer financial products or services
to increase financial or other benefits to
the tool operator. For example, the
operator may be taking unreasonable
advantage of the consumer’s reasonable
reliance if the operator is able to
generate more interest in its own
financial products or services or is able
to increase fees charged to third-party
providers because the tool functions in
a way that engenders the consumer’s
reasonable, but misguided, reliance on
the tool to present information in a
manner consistent with the interests of
the consumer. In addition, benefits that
accrue to the operator or lead generator
include direct financial compensation
or indirect or non-financial benefits,
such as the ability to gather data that
indirectly increases the operator’s or
lead generator’s ability to obtain
financial or other benefits.
15

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17709 Federal Register/ Vol. 89, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 12, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
non-monetary advantages, including ‘‘increased
market share, revenue, cost savings, profits,
reputational benefits, and other operational
benefits’’).
16
A digital comparison-shopping tool operator or
lead generator can face greater risk that the
exclusion of non-paying providers from its service
would constitute an abusive act or practice if a very
low number of providers is included within a
service. Similarly, in the context of digital mortgage
comparison-shopping platforms, the CFPB has
advised that, all other things being equal,
‘‘presenting a greater number of comparison options
rather than fewer’’ generally reduces the risk of a
violation of section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act. 88 FR 9162, 9167 (Feb. 13, 2023).
17
While evidence of harm to consumers can
bolster a determination that an entity is taking
unreasonable advantage of consumers, the text of
CFPA section 1031(d)(2)—in contrast to the
definition of ‘‘unfairness’’ in CFPA section
1031(c)(1)—does not require ‘‘substantial injury’’ to
consumers as a prerequisite for establishing abusive
conduct. Compare 12 U.S.C. 5531(c)(1)(A), with 12
U.S.C. 5531(d)(2).
18
See generally FTC, Bringing Dark Patterns to
Light, at 2 (Sept. 2022) (discussing ‘‘design practices
that trick or manipulate users into making choices
they would not otherwise have made and that may
cause harm’’).
19
Consumers may be less likely to have the
impression that a product is being presented as
being in the consumer’s interest if a tool operator
presents sponsored or other advertising content that
is completely visually separate from the
presentation of product recommendations or results
and the advertisement itself is not presented as a
recommendation.
Enforcers should closely examine the
specific details of bounty or bidding
schemes when making a determination
of abusive conduct. If a digital
comparison-shopping tool operator or
lead generator requires providers to bid
or set bounties for leads, and that
compensation scheme increases overall
revenue while impacting placement on
a comparison-shopping website or
mobile app or impacting who receives
leads, that can suggest that the operator
or lead generator is violating the
prohibition on abusive acts or practices.
The reason is commonsensical: if the
tool operator or lead generator receives
a higher fee from one provider than
another and provides preferential
treatment as a result, this can suggest
that the lead generator or operator is
making decisions based on its own
benefit and not in consumers’ interests.
This concern may be somewhat
mitigated when a comparison-shopping
tool operator or lead generator receives
compensation from providers, but does
not consider such compensation in its
decisions regarding placement or,
similarly, regarding which providers
receive a lead.
16

Unreasonable advantage-taking can
also occur where the operator benefits
by steering consumers toward products
or services—including its own or those
of its affiliates—that are more costly or
otherwise less desirable than what
consumers might otherwise prefer.
17
In
addition, it can occur where an operator
leverages an affiliation or informal
connection with a trusted institution,
such as a college or university, to
increase the operator’s revenue while
making recommendations not based on
factors likely to be consistent with
consumer interests.
Examples of Preferencing or Steering
Arrangements
The following is a non-exhaustive list
of examples that illustrate arrangements
where an operator of a digital
comparison-shopping tool or a lead
generator steers consumers to certain
consumer financial products or services
in exchange for financial or other
benefits to the operator or lead
generator, regardless of the interests of
the consumer. These arrangements can
be abusive if the operator or lead
generator takes unreasonable advantage
of the consumer’s reasonable reliance on
the operator or lead generator to act in
the interests of the consumer.
•A tool operator presents a product
(or set of products) that is preferred
because of financial considerations in a
placement that is more likely to be seen,
reflects a preferential ordering, has more
dynamic design features, requires fewer
clicks to access product information, or
otherwise increases the likelihood that a
consumer will consider or select the
preferred product.
18
This can include
self-preferencing where the digital
comparison-shopping tool promotes the
products or services of the tool operator.
•A tool operator presents certain
options as ‘‘featured’’ because they are
provided by the operator or a third-party
provider that paid for enhanced
placement.
19

•A tool operator directs consumers
to the products that pay higher fees
within a product category—for example,
an operator routinely matches
consumers with a loan provider because
it pays the highest fee per application.
•A tool operator receives different
payment based on whether the digital
comparison-shopping tool meets a
certain threshold volume allocation of
leads generated within a set period of
time, and uses steering practices to
increase the likelihood the operator will
satisfy volume allocation requirements.
For example, in a 14-day period, a
provider pays fees only if at least 1,000
applications are generated, and, on day
13, the operator is more likely to steer
consumers to that provider’s products
until the allocation is met.
•A tool operator or lead generator
uses dynamic bidding or a bounty
system to determine which offers are
presented to consumers with certain
demographic or other characteristics.
•A tool operator expressly or
implicitly presents the total set of
options featured on the tool as relatively
comprehensive or based on criteria such
as price, terms, quality of service, or
security, when in fact the operator
determines which options to include
based on financial or other benefits
obtained by the operator. For example,
a set of lenders jointly establish a
comparison-shopping tool that appears
to present options based on criteria that
further the consumer’s interests but that
actually presents only a subset of
products that are offered or provided by
those lenders. Some sites preference
certain products while also including
other products, but with design features
that ensure that only the preferred
products receive preferred placement,
regardless of whether that is in the
interests of the consumer.
•A tool operator presents a preferred
product as a ‘‘match’’ that is not the
participating product that is most
consistent with the expressed interests
of a consumer. A comparison tool can
prompt users to input information about
their preferences through a survey,
filtering options, or interactions with a
chatbot. By eliciting input on consumer
preferences, the operator creates the
impression that results will be
presented based on an objective
evaluation of those preferences.
However, the operator actually presents
results based on financial or other
benefits to the operator.
•A lead generator guarantees a
certain number and quality of leads to
multiple participating lenders and
divides customers meeting those criteria
up without regard to the fact that
consumers with similar characteristics
are receiving different offers.
About Consumer Financial Protection
Circulars
Consumer Financial Protection
Circulars are issued to all parties with
authority to enforce Federal consumer
financial law. The CFPB is the principal
Federal regulator responsible for
administering Federal consumer
financial law, see 12 U.S.C. 5511,
including the Consumer Financial
Protection Act’s prohibition on unfair,
deceptive, and abusive acts or practices,
12 U.S.C. 5536(a)(1)(B), and 18 other
‘‘enumerated consumer laws,’’ 12 U.S.C.
5481(12). However, these laws are also
enforced by State attorneys general and
State regulators, 12 U.S.C. 5552, and
prudential regulators including the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
the Office of the Comptroller of the
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17710 Federal Register/ Vol. 89, No. 49 / Tuesday, March 12, 2024 / Rules and Regulations
1
12 U.S.C. 3352.
2
Press Release, The White House (August 10,
2023), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/08/10/
president-joseph-r-biden-jr-approves-hawaii-
disaster-declaration-3/.
Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the
National Credit Union Administration.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 5516(d), 5581(c)(2)
(exclusive enforcement authority for
banks and credit unions with $10
billion or less in assets). Some Federal
consumer financial laws are also
enforceable by other Federal agencies,
including the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission, the
Farm Credit Administration, the
Department of Transportation, and the
Department of Agriculture. In addition,
some of these laws provide for private
enforcement.
Consumer Financial Protection
Circulars are intended to promote
consistency in approach across the
various enforcement agencies and
parties, pursuant to the CFPB’s statutory
objective to ensure Federal consumer
financial law is enforced consistently.
12 U.S.C. 5511(b)(4).
Consumer Financial Protection
Circulars are also intended to provide
transparency to partner agencies
regarding the CFPB’s intended approach
when cooperating in enforcement
actions. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 5552(b)
(consultation with CFPB by State
attorneys general and regulators); 12
U.S.C. 5562(a) (joint investigatory work
between CFPB and other agencies).
Consumer Financial Protection
Circulars are general statements of
policy under the Administrative
Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. 553(b). They
provide background information about
applicable law, articulate considerations
relevant to the Bureau’s exercise of its
authorities, and, in the interest of
maintaining consistency, advise other
parties with authority to enforce Federal
consumer financial law. They do not
restrict the Bureau’s exercise of its
authorities, impose any legal
requirements on external parties, or
create or confer any rights on external
parties that could be enforceable in any
administrative or civil proceeding. The
CFPB Director is instructing CFPB staff
as described herein, and the CFPB will
then make final decisions on individual
matters based on an assessment of the
factual record, applicable law, and
factors relevant to prosecutorial
discretion.
Rohit Chopra,
Director, Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau.
[FR Doc. 2024–05141 Filed 3–11–24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–AM–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency
12 CFR Part 34
[Docket ID OCC–2024–0002]
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 225
[Docket No. OP–1829]
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
12 CFR Part 323
RIN 3064–ZA41
NATIONAL CREDIT UNION
ADMINISTRATION
12 CFR Part 722 and 741
Temporary Exceptions to FIRREA
Appraisal Requirements in Maui
County as Affected by Hawaii Wildfires
AGENCY: Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), Treasury; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System (Board); Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC); and
National Credit Union Administration
(NCUA), collectively referred to as the
agencies.
ACTION: Statement and order; temporary
exceptions.
SUMMARY: The Depository Institutions
Disaster Relief Act of 1992 (DIDRA)
authorizes the agencies to make
exceptions to statutory and regulatory
appraisal requirements under Title XI of
the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA) relating to transactions
involving real property located within
an area in a state or territory declared
to be a major disaster by the President.
In this statement and order, the agencies
exercise their authority to grant
temporary exceptions to the FIRREA
appraisal requirements for real estate-
related financial transactions, provided
certain criteria are met, in an area in the
State of Hawaii following the major
disaster declared by President Biden as
a result of wildfires. The expiration date
for the exceptions is August 10, 2026,
which is three years after the date the
President declared the major disaster.
DATES: This order is effective on March
12, 2024 and expires three years after
the date the President declared the
relevant area a major disaster, which is
August 10, 2026.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
OCC: Kevin Lawton, Appraiser, Real
Estate Specialist, Bank Supervision
Policy, at (202) 649–7152; or Mitchell
Plave, Special Counsel, Chief Counsel’s
Office, at (202) 649–6285. If you are
deaf, hard of hearing, or have a speech
disability, please dial 7–1–1 to access
telecommunications relay services.
Board: Devyn Jeffereis, Senior
Financial Institution Policy Analyst II,
Division of Supervision and Regulation
at (202) 452–2729; Matthew Suntag,
Senior Counsel, Legal Division, at (202)
452–3694; or David Imhoff, Senior
Attorney, Legal Division, at (202) 452–
2249; For users of TTY–TRS, please call
711 from any telephone, anywhere in
the United States.
FDIC: Patrick J. Mancoske, Senior
Examination Specialist, Division of Risk
Management and Supervision, at (202)
898–7032, PMancoske@FDIC.gov; Mark
Mellon, Counsel, Legal Division, at
(202) 898–3884, MMellon@FDIC.gov;
Lauren Whitaker, Counsel, Legal
Division at (202) 898–3872, lwhitaker@
fdic.gov; Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, 550 17th Street NW,
Washington, DC 20429.
NCUA: Simon Hermann, Senior
Credit Specialist, Office of Examination
and Insurance, at (703) 518–6360;
Robert Leonard, Compliance Officer,
Office of General Counsel, (703) 518–
1143; Rachel Ackmann, Senior Staff
Attorney, Office of General Counsel, at
(703) 548–2601; National Credit Union
Administration, 1775 Duke Street,
Alexandria, VA 22314.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Statement
Section 2 of DIDRA, which added
section 1123 to Title XI of FIRREA,
1

authorizes the agencies to make
exceptions to statutory and regulatory
appraisal requirements for certain
transactions. These exceptions are
available for transactions involving real
property located in an area in which the
President has determined a major
disaster exists, pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
5170, provided that the exception
would facilitate recovery from the major
disaster and is consistent with safety
and soundness.
On August 10, 2023, the President
declared that a major disaster existed in
the State of Hawaii
2
due to damage
resulting from wildfires beginning on
August 8, 2023. The agencies have
determined that granting relief from the
appraisal requirements set forth in Title
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