FTC Comment Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Concerning Information Requirements for Available Transfer Capability

Before the
United States of America
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Information Requirements for ) Docket No. RM05-17-000
Available Transfer Capability )
Comment of the
Federal Trade Commission
August 22, 2005

1 70 Fed. Reg. 34,417 (2005) [hereinafter Notice]. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC)
Notice of Inquiry (NOI) in this matter follows a related Notice of Public Rulemaking in Docket No. RM05-
5-000 (70 F ed. Reg. 40696 (2005)), in which FERC proposed to amend its regulations to incorporate by
reference standards promulgated by the N orth A merican Energy S tandards B oard ’s W holesale Electric
Quad rant dealing with Open Access Sam e-Time Information Systems (OA SIS) business practice standards.
2 Comm ent of the Sta ff of the B urea u of E con om ics of the Fed eral Trade Co mm ission(1 ), FER C Nos.
RM 95-8 -000 and R M94-7 -001 (Aug. 7, 1995), available at http://www .ftc.gov/b e/v95 000 8.htm; Letter
from the FTC to Thomas E. Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives
(Jan 1 4, 20 00), ava ilable a t http://www .ftc.gov/b e/v00 000 2.htm [hereinafter Bliley Letter].
3 Substantial economies of scale and transmission siting difficulties generally preclude the organization of
com peting transmission networks, and there are no p racticable alternatives to the grid for d elivering electric
pow er over long distances. FTC Staff Report: Competition and Consumer Protection Perspectives on
Electric Po wer Regulatory Reform ch. 3 (July 2000), available at http://www .ftc.gov/b e/v00 000 9.htm. A
small generator located on a retail customer’s site – often termed “distributed generation” or “DG” – can
Before the
United States of America
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Information Requirements for ) Docket No. RM05-17-000
Available Transfer Capability )
Comment of the
Federal Trade Commission
I. Introduction and Summary
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) appreciates this opportunity to urge the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to standardize the way in which
transmission owners calculate the amount of capacity available for unaffiliated users of
the regulated transmission grid.1 Standardization may help prevent transmission
discrimination in the electric power industry and ensure the reliability and security of the
transmission grid. Over the past nine years, the FTC has urged FERC to address the
problem of transmission discrimination because a firm with incentives and ability to
engage in this type of behavior is likely to do so.2
The transmission grid is the only practicable means for independent generators to
deliver electric power to their wholesale customers.3 Because most observers regard

provide a limited alternative for som e customers. Improvements in DG techno logy may eventually ma ke it
an important substitute for grid transmission services; however, this potential substitute for transmission
service is limited and is often dependent on the availability of natural gas. Comment of the Staff of the
Bureau of Economics and the Office of the General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission, Pub lic
Utilities Comm ission of the State of California R ulema king 02-01 -011 § III (M ar. 25 , 200 3), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030006.pdf.
4 Tim othy J. B rennan, et al., Alternating Currents: Electricity Markets and Public Policy 65 (200 2).
2
distribution and transmission as natural monopolies, “the feasibility of competition
among generators depends . . . on the ability of generators to compete independently
without all being part of the same company that owns the transmission grid.”4 A
transmission operator with control over the electric power grid in an area may have the
incentive and the ability (through transmission discrimination) to insulate its own
generators in the area from the competition presented by independent generators offering
lower wholesale or retail prices for electric power.
Although it is generally understood that vertical integration is often efficiency-
enhancing and consistent with competitive outcomes, the implications of vertical
integration in the electric power industry are mixed. One purpose of regulating the rate
of return that a transmission operator can earn for its transmission services is to constrain
the operator’s ability to extract its monopoly rent through rates charged to generators that
it does not own. Vertical integration in this industry, however, may facilitate evasion of
this rate regulation because the transmission operator has an incentive to disadvantage
independent generators in ways that permit the operator to earn supracompetitive profits
on its unregulated generation business. Indeed, FERC has concluded that, even when
vertically integrated utilities have functionally unbundled their generation assets from
their transmission assets, they have continued to engage in undue discrimination in

5 FERC has de scribed in de tail how transmission discrimina tion disrupts the operation o f wholesale electricity
markets. See Regional Transmission Organizations, Ord er No. 20 00 2 (Dec. 20, 199 9), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto/iss-2000/2000.pdf.
6 The FT C staff has advocated use of a cost/benefit analysis for selecting approaches to discourage
discrim ination and cross-sub sidizatio n. Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal
Trad e Co mm ission, Pub lic Utilities C omm ission of Nevada No. 97-5034 (Sep t. 22, 1998 ), available at
http://www .ftc.gov/b e/v98 002 7.htm.
7 Many of these structural remedies could be most effectively implemented through cooperation between
FERC and the states. Comment of the Federal Trade Commission, FERC Nos. PL04-6-000 and PL04-9-
000 (July 14, 2004 ), available a t http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ferc/v040022.pdf.
3
access to their transmission facilities and thus to impede competitive markets.5 Because
it is difficult to detect and take effective enforcement action against transmission
discrimination, it may be profitable for the regulated transmission operator to engage in
this type of behavior.
Although the FTC supports standardization of the rules for calculating available
transfer capability (ATC) in the short term, the FTC recommends that FERC continue to
examine the costs and benefits of structural reforms to promote competitive wholesale
electric power markets.6 Behavioral rules, such as the rules governing calculation of
ATC, are unlikely to fully address transmission discrimination concerns.
Structural solutions include the establishment of Regional Transmission
Organizations (RTOs) or independent transmission operators (Transcos) to operate the
grid; incentives for economically appropriate transmission upgrades that expand the
scope of the geographic market; the elimination of impediments that make entry less
likely; divestitures of generation assets to reduce the ability and incentive of the
transmission operator to discriminate or cross-subsidize; and steps to encourage price-
responsive demand (such as allowing retail customers to offer consumption reductions as
a form of reserve generation).7 Structural reforms remove the incentives and ability of a
utility with transmission and generation assets in the same geographic market to engage

8 Subtractions from TT C also generally include a transmission reserve margin (TRM ) and often include a
capacity benefit margin (CBM ). Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 34418. “Transmission providers use TRM and
CBM to account for uncertainties or contingencies that are not explicitly modeled in the calculations of
existing transmission obligations.” Id.
9 North Am erican Electric Reliability Co uncil, Long-Term AFC /ATC Task F orce Final Rep ort (revised Apr.
14, 2 005 ), ava ilable a t ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/mc/ltatf/LTATF_Final_Report_Revised.pdf
[hereinafter NER C Report]. The “AF C” in the title of the N orth A merican Electric R eliability Counc il’s
(NER C) report stands for “available flowgate capability,” which is “a measure of the capability remaining
on a flowgate.” NER C Report at 2, app. A. AFC is a measure of capability remaining on a flowgate for
future uses after considering the effect of prior sales. AFC is measured as a flow limit on a flowgate,
whereas ATC is measured as a transaction limit from a source (i.e., from a transmission’s point of o rigin) to
a sink (i.e., to a transmission’s point of termination). Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 34418.
4
in transmission service discrimination – conduct that insulates the discriminating utility’s
generation assets from having to compete with other generating firms that must use the
utility’s transmission services to reach wholesale and retail customers in the market.
The Notice focuses on how to improve the calculation of the amount of ATC.
ATC is the portion of total transfer capability (TTC) that can be used to serve wholesale
customers after the satisfaction of existing transmission obligations, which consist
principally of the transfer capability needed to serve the retail customers of the
transmission operator.8
As discussed in Section III of this comment, improved ATC calculations are
likely to reduce transmission discrimination because ATC is the best available constraint
on transmission discrimination outside of areas with an RTO and may assist efforts by
the North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC) to enhance the reliability and
security of the transmission grid. Section IV discusses NERC’s Long-Term AFC/ATC
Task Force Final Report, which found that ATC calculations differ widely between
geographic areas and that these differences may not be transparent to transmission
customers (i.e., to independent generators and their wholesale customers).9 These
conditions are likely to undermine the effectiveness of FERC’s system for posting

1 0 FTC Staff Report: Com petition and Co nsum er Protection Persp ectives on E lectric Pow er Regulatory
Reform , supra note 3 (compiling previous comments that the FTC staff provided to various state and federal
agencies); FTC Staff Report: Competition and Consumer Protection Perspectives on Electric Power
Regulatory Reform, Focus on Retail Competition (Sep t. 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/elec/electricityreport.pdf.
5
available transfer capability and to mask forms of transmission discrimination by
transmission operators. As discussed in Section V, FERC also should consider the
benefits and costs of developing and implementing standards for measurement of TTC,
which is a key component in the calculation of ATC. TTC may be subject to significant
measurement bias that will in turn result in biased ATC calculations.
* * * * *
The FTC is an independent federal government agency responsible for
maintaining competition and safeguarding the interests of consumers through
enforcement of the antitrust and consumer protection laws and through competition
policy research and advocacy. In the electric power industry, the FTC often analyzes
regulatory or legislative proposals that may affect competition or the efficiency of
resource allocation. The FTC also reviews proposed mergers involving electric power
and natural gas utility companies. In the course of this work, as well as in antitrust and
consumer protection research, investigation, and litigation, the FTC applies established
legal and economic principles and recent developments in economic theory and empirical
analysis to competition issues. As part of its competition advocacy program, the FTC
has released two Staff Reports on electric power industry restructuring issues at the
wholesale and retail levels.10 The FTC and its staff also have filed numerous competition
advocacy comments on electricity restructuring efforts with FERC, the states, and
international competition organizations.

1 1 Market p ower at the transmission level is likely to give a vertically integrated firm the incentive to
exercise that market p ower. Bliley Letter, supra note 2.
1 2 The transmission operator may seek to evade rate regulation by purchasing power for its retail customers
from its unregulated generation affiliates at inflated prices. Comment of the Federal Trade Commission,
supra note 6.
1 3 Prospective entrants faced with transmission discrimination are not likely to enter and bring associated
innovations to the market. Competition from existing independent suppliers also could be discouraged by
transmission risks or co sts impo sed b y the transm ission operator. One variation of this strategy would be to
use transmission discrimination to force an independent generator into liquidation and then to purchase the
bankrupt firm’s generation assets at a price below that which would prevail in the absence of the
discrimination. Because of the prospect of continued transmission discrimination, the assets would have
little value to other independent suppliers but would have value to the transmission operator (which, of
course, would not discriminate against itself). This strategy could impede entry by increasing the
unrecoverable costs if an entrant sub sequently were forced to exit. See Ameren Energy Generating
Comp any and Union E lectric Com pan y, FERC Op. 473 ¶ 63 (200 4); see also Acquisition and Disposition
of Merchant Generation Assets by Public Utilities, FER C N o. PL04 -9-00 (June 10, 2 004 ), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/mergers/opinion-473.pdf (statement of Stephen P. D aniel,
Transmission Depend ent Utility Systems).
6
II. Historical Perspective
A utility that controls the transmission system and owns generation in the same
area may find it profitable to discriminate against competing generators in providing
transmission service.11 Transmission discrimination has two potential advantages for the
transmission operator with generation assets in the same area. First, it may allow the
transmission operator to increase its profits by evading rate regulation that otherwise
would constrain its profits.12 Second, transmission discrimination may reduce or
eliminate competition from firms that help reduce existing or prospective market power.
Absent such discrimination, entry would increase competition and lower the generation
profits of the transmission operator.13
The potential economic harm from this type of discrimination may take three
primary forms: higher prices, less efficient production, and reduced customer choice.
Wholesale prices will increase if transmission discrimination leads customers to purchase
supply from higher-cost generators affiliated with the transmission operators. Price

1 4 FERC issued Order Nos. 888 and 889 on April 24, 1996. Subsequent revisions and refinements to Order
No . 888 can be found at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/ferc-regs/land-docs/order888.asp, and subsequent
revisions and refinements to O rder No. 889 can be found at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/ferc-regs/land-
docs/order88 9.asp.
1 5 Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission(1), supra note 2.
7
increases experienced by wholesale customers generally are passed on to retail
customers. Resources will be used inefficiently if the transmission discrimination
prevents more efficient independent generators from displacing less efficient generators
affiliated with the transmission operator. Customer preferences will go unrealized if the
transmission discrimination precludes customers from turning to generators with
preferred characteristics (e.g., renewable fuel sources) or novel pricing policies (e.g.,
discounts for reduced consumption during peak periods). Transmission discrimination in
part of the nation may harm consumers in other areas to the extent that it reduces the
expected returns from innovative activity and, thus, incentives to innovate, because the
extent and rate of diffusion of the innovation will be reduced.
To address these harms, FERC Order Nos. 888 and 889 set forth FERC’s open
access transmission policy aimed at preventing transmission discrimination by utilities
with transmission and generation assets in the same market. In Order No. 889, FERC
required transmission providers to offer unused transmission capacity to the market by
posting ATC.14
In 1996, the FTC staff supported FERC’s open access transmission policy but
indicated that behavioral rules such as those contained in Order Nos. 888 and 889 were
likely to be insufficient to prevent transmission discrimination.15 The FTC staff comment
explained how behavioral rules do not eradicate the incentives to engage in transmission

1 6 Regional Transmission Organizations, Ord er No. 20 00 (Dec. 20, 199 9), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/ferc-regs/land-docs/RM99-2A.pdf#search='FERC%20Order%202000'.
1 7 A potential concern about any form of vertical separation (unbundling) is the loss of economies of
vertical integration. Many developments within RTOs and ISOs are designed to preserve coordination
between stages of prod uction without creating opp ortunities and incentive s for transmission discrimination.
Because of this po tential, the FTC has co nsistently urged FER C to use a co st/benefit approach to evaluate
the regulatory approach it uses to eliminate transmission discrimination.
1 8 Comm ent of the Sta ff of the B urea u of E con om ics of the Fed eral Trade Co mm ission, FERC No. RM99-2-
000 (Aug. 16, 1999 ), ava ilable a t http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990011.pdf. Although Transcos are referenced
here as an alternative to RTO s, FERC O rder 2000 p rovides for Transcos as a form of RTO . Although a
Transco may qualify as a form of RT O for purp oses o f Order 20 00, the distinction we are dra wing here is
between the existing RTOs (which have been formed as non-profit organizations) and a for-profit Transco.
8
discrimination. In addition, the FTC staff pointed out that it is likely to be difficult,
costly, and time-consuming to detect and document transmission discrimination.
In Order No. 2000, FERC found that vertically integrated utilities have a
continuing opportunity to unduly discriminate with respect to access to their transmission
facilities – and thus to impede the operation of competitive markets – notwithstanding the
functional unbundling of their generation assets from their transmission assets.16 To
address this concern, FERC introduced the concept of the RTO, which involves
operational separation of transmission from generation even though ownership does not
necessarily change. RTOs are structural approaches to the prevention of transmission
discrimination and are more likely to be effective because they remove the transmission
operator’s profit incentive to engage in transmission discrimination.17 An independent,
for-profit transmission company (a “Transco”), which separates ownership of
transmission from ownership of generation in a wholesale electric power market, also
would lack the incentive to engage in transmission discrimination favoring one generator
over another, and its incentives to minimize costs could be superior to those of a non-
profit RTO.18

1 9 Over two-thirds of U.S. economic output is produced in areas in which transmission is operated by an
RT O or an Ind ependent System Operator (ISO ). Restructuring Today 1 (Ma y 13, 2005).
20 A ma p of existing and propo sed R TO s app ears at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-
act/rto/rto-map.asp. The Southeast and Northwest areas of the United States are the primary regions that
lack R TO s.
2 1 See NERC Report, supra note 8, at 1.
9
Although the RTO formation process has gone forward in many areas of the
country,19 RTOs have not been formed everywhere.20 Thus, Open Access Same-Time
Information Systems (OASIS) postings are still a significant component of open-access,
nondiscriminatory service for transmission customers in some areas.
III. Improving ATC Calculations Can Increase the Competitiveness of Wholesale
Electricity Markets
For four reasons, increases in the transparency and uniformity of ATC
calculations may help wholesale markets become more competitive. First, behavioral
rules, while not perfect, are likely to be the best available short-term deterrent to
profitable transmission discrimination in those areas without an RTO. Under these
circumstances, there likely will be incremental benefits from improved ATC calculations
before these benefits are supplanted by the more substantial benefits flowing from an
operating RTO, ISO, or independent Transco.
Second, ATC improvements may assist NERC’s efforts to minimize transmission
disruptions associated with Transmission Line Relief (TLR) orders or even blackouts.21
If ATC is understated, NERC may invoke a TLR order when it is not necessary to do so.
Improving ATC calculations and coordination between areas may reduce this potential
problem.

2 2 The Department of Energy designated NERC as the electricity sector coordinator for critical
infrastructure protection, and NERC organized a Critical Infrastructure Protection Committee. NERC
works with the D epartment of Ho meland Security and C anad a’s counterpart agency. See NERC ’s website,
ava ilable a t http://www.nerc.com/~filez/cip.html (last visited July 27 , 200 5); see also Bre ndan Kirby &
Eric Hirst, Department of Energy, National Transmission Grid Study: Reliability Management and
Oversight (May 2002), ava ilable a t http://www.eh.doe.gov/ntgs/issuepapers/ISSUE_2.PDF.
10
Third, OASIS improvements should help NERC (and the Departments of Energy
and Homeland Security) address grid security issues.22 Transmission security is
enhanced when ATC is transparent and accurate. Responses to security incidents can be
more accurate and timely when improved ATC calculations are available. NERC’s
efforts to establish transmission security priorities also should be enhanced by improved
ATC calculations.
Finally, improving ATC calculations and postings may indirectly facilitate the
formation of RTOs. To the extent that improved ATC calculations will reduce
opportunities for profitable transmission discrimination, these improvements may
coincidentally reduce the advantages that incumbents (i.e., vertically integrated utilities)
may anticipate from delaying the formation of RTOs.
IV. NERC’s Long-Term AFC/ATC Task Force Final Report Found Widely
Diverse ATC Calculations
For wholesale electric power customers and independent suppliers to use ATC
postings to arrange competitive trades, they must have confidence in the accuracy of the
calculations and must be able to compare ATC calculations with different areas for
transmission services that span these areas. For example, if a utility’s postings understate
ATC, some economical transmission services will not be provided that likely would have
occurred if ATC had been stated more accurately. Similarly, if the ATC approach in one
area cannot be converted with accuracy to the approach used in a neighboring area, then

2 3 See NERC Report, supra note 8, at 2.
2 4 Id. at 2-3.
2 5 Id. at 3.
2 6 Id. at app. E.
11
it may be difficult to determine whether, for example, non-firm transmission services will
suffice to accommodate a wholesale transaction across these areas.23
Transmission operators in non-RTO areas reportedly are inconsistent in how they
calculate ATC and in the criteria they use to activate TLR orders. As a result of this
uncertainty about the calculations and this inconsistency in activating TLR orders, some
wholesale transactions between areas may not occur, even though they would be efficient
and likely would occur if ATC information were better. Prices are likely to be higher if
customers are uncertain about being able to access lower-priced electric power from
other areas.
The NERC task force report found between 50 and 60 different methods to
calculate ATC throughout the industry, many of which are not comparable. Methods
differ across and even within NERC regions.24
In addition to finding inconsistencies among firms, the task force determined that
sometimes a firm makes assumptions in performing its ATC calculations that are
inconsistent with the assumptions that its own transmission planning and operations
departments use.25 For example, a transmission operator may use assumptions that result
in reporting little ATC while it uses different assumptions to evaluate the feasibility of
importing electric power generated in other areas to maintain reliability and resource
adequacy.26 The former assumptions would discourage low-cost generators in other areas
from attempting to secure sales to customers in the transmission operator’s franchised

2 7 Id. at 3.
28 Thermal limitations are the most common constraints that limit the capability of a transmission line,
cable, or transformer to carry power. The transmission line resists the flow of electrons through it, causing
the production of heat. The actual temperatures occurring in the transmission line equipment depend on the
current (i.e., the rate of flow of the electrons) as well as on ambient weather conditions such as temperature,
wind sp eed, and wind direction beca use the w eather affects the dissipation of the heat into the air. For ease
of measurement, however, the thermal ratings for transmission lines are usually expressed in terms of
current flows rather than actual temperatures.
Thermal limits are imposed b ecause overheating leads to two possible problems: (1) the
transmission line loses strength because of overheating, which can reduce the expected life of the line; and
(2) the transmission line expands and sags in the center of each span between the supporting towers. If the
temperature is repeatedly too high, an overhead line will permanently stretch and may end up with less
clearance from the ground than is required for safety reasons. Because this overheating is a gradual
12
territory, while the latter would relieve commercial or regulatory pressure for new
transmission investment in the franchised territory. The transmission utility should not
be allowed to claim that there is little ATC for one regulatory purpose while also
claiming that there is abundant ATC for another regulatory purpose.
Further, even when the ATC assumptions are consistent, this consistency may not
be well documented or transparent to other market participants.27 A lack of transparency
can lead independent generators to perceive a greater risk of transmission interruptions
than actually exist and also could insulate the transmission operator’s own generators
from competition from lower-priced generators located in other areas.
V. FERC Also May Wish to Consider Standards for TTC Measurement
If FERC seeks to discourage transmission discrimination by improving ATC
calculations, it may wish to assure that TTC, the starting point for many ATC
calculations, is measured accurately and consistently. Many ATC calculations involve
the subtraction of transmission obligations from TTC. Reportedly, however, some
transmission operators determine TTC on the basis of assumptions about ambient
conditions that are likely to understate actual TTC (and thus understate ATC). The TTC
of a transmission line depends in part on the temperature of the line, which, in turn, is
determined by weather conditions and by power flows over the line.28 When the actual

process, higher current flows can be allowed for limited time periods. A "normal" thermal rating for a line
is the current flow level that it can support indefinitely. “Emergency ratings are levels the line can support
for spe cific periods, for example, several hours.” Departm ent of Energy, Upgrading Transmission
Capacity for Wholesale Electric Power Trade (2002), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/pubs_html/feat_trans_capacity/w_sale.html. See also Steven Stoft, Power
System E con om ics: Design ing M arkets for Electricity ch. 5-2 (2002).
2 9 At the technical conference that FERC held on December 7, 2004, concerning the transmission prong of
the market power screens for market-based rate applicants, John Stout, an experienced transmission planner
and op erator, testified about the po tential underestimation of ATC as a result of transmission operators’ use
of antiquated transmission technolo gy that assumes unfavorable ambient conditions (rather than ac tually
measuring such conditions). See Market-Based Rates for Public Utilities: Hearing on No. RM-04-7-000
Before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 108 -111 (Dec. 7, 2004 ) (testimo ny of Jo hn Sto ut,
Independent Power O perator, Electric P ower Supply Associatio n), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20041215074611-RM04-7-12-07-04.pdf. He drew an analogy
between the use of such assumptio ns in measuring TT C (and consequently ATC ) and withholding by a
generator that fails to produce more p ower when the ambient air temperature is cold (which is typically
possible for most combustion turbines) and the transm ission system faces peak dem and and inadequate
reserves.
3 0
ERCOT, ERCOT at a Glance (June 23, 2 005 ), available at
http://www.ercot.com/NewsRoom/PressReleases/pr20050627.pdf.
13
temperature is below the assumed temperature, for example, TTC calculated on the basis
of the (incorrectly) assumed temperature generally understates the actual TTC.29
ERCOT’s recent experience supports the conclusion that assumed conditions result in
understating TTC and ATC. ERCOT reports that its transmission congestion costs
(largely consisting of a dispatch of higher priced generators to compensate for
transmission congestion) decreased to less than half of the previous level, in large part
because of hourly updates in ATC calculations that are based on the actual conditions on
the transmission lines rather than on assumed conditions. This has allowed ERCOT to
use the transfer capability of its transmission lines more fully and to resort to dispatching
higher priced generators less frequently.3 0
VI. Conclusion
Updating behavioral rules against undue transmission discrimination, such as
improving regulations governing calculation of ATC, are likely to be helpful in the short-
term while FERC continues to implement structural remedies that remove the ability and

14
incentive of transmission owners to engage in discrimination. Transmission reliability
and security concerns also may warrant updates to these regulations. The FTC urges
FERC not to relax its efforts to implement RTOs and Transcos while it is improving
ATC calculations. If FERC determines that there is merit to improving ATC
calculations, it also should consider improvements to TTC calculations, on which ATC
calculations are based.