FTC Staff Comment to Anchorage Assembly Member Debbie Ossiander, Concerning AO NO. 2013-36, Proposing Changes to the Regulatory Framework for the Licensing and Permitting of Taxicabs, Limousines, and Other Vehicles for Hire

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Office of Policy Planning
Bureau of Competition
Bureau of Consumer Protection
Bureau of Economics
April 19, 2013
The Honorable Debbie Ossiander
Assembly Member, Seat A
Municipality of Anchorage
P.O. Box 670772
Chugiak, AK 99567
Re: AO NO. 2013–36
Dear Assembly Member Ossiander:
The staffs of the Federal Trade Commission’s Office of Policy Planning, Bureau
of Competition, Bureau of Consumer Protection, and Bureau of Economics 1 appreciate
this opportunity to respond to your request for our views on AO NO. 2013–36 (“the
proposed ordinance”). According to the Assembly Memorandum for the proposed
ordinance, it is intended as a comprehensive rewrite of AMC Chapters 11.10—11.40
regulating the licensing and permitting of taxicabs, limousines, other vehicles for hire,
chauffeurs, and dispatch services. The proposed ordinance would allow for additional
entry into taxicab services through 2022, after which there would apparently be no limits
on the number of taxicabs that could operate in Anchorage. Because new entry and
competition may generate consumer benefits and are unlikely to harm consumers or
competition, staff strongly supports eliminating restrictions on the number of vehicles
that may provide taxicab service by 2022, or sooner, if practical. Staff also recommends
that rates relating to the business of passenger vehicle transportation services should
generally be set by competitive forces where there are no restrictions on entry.
As we further discuss in the final section of this letter, the Assembly may also
wish to consider additional steps to modernize its regulatory framework, either now or in
the near future, to respond to the development of new smartphone software applications
(“applications”) currently being used in other areas of the country. These applications
appear to provide consumers with new means of arranging for passenger vehicle
transportation services and other new services, as discussed below. Because these
applications may not fit neatly within the traditional regulatory framework, consideration
of additional reforms might be warranted.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20580

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I. 	Interest and Experience of the Federal Trade Commission
The FTC is an independent federal agency that enforces laws prohibiting unfair
methods of competition and unfair and deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce.2 The Commission has wide-ranging responsibilities concerning nearly all
segments of the economy. Pursuant to this responsibility, the Commission seeks to
identify business practices and regulations that impede competition without offering
countervailing benefits to consumers, and advocates for policies that promote
competition and consumer protection.3
Competition and consumer protection enforcement naturally complement and
mutually reinforce each other, to the benefit of consumers. Consumers benefit from
market competition, which pressures producers to be innovative and responsive to
consumer preferences with respect to price, quality, and other product and service
characteristics.4 At the same time, consumer protections promote informed consumer
decision-making by prohibiting firms from engaging in unfair and deceptive acts or
practices, and requiring sellers to make truthful and non-deceptive representations about
their offerings. In general, competition should only be restricted when necessary to
achieve some countervailing procompetitive purpose or other public benefit such as
protecting the public from significant harm.
In carrying out its mission, the Commission has developed considerable expertise
in analyzing issues relating to passenger vehicle transportation services. FTC staff
previously has submitted a number of advocacy filings related to taxicabs with various
local and state authorities, including previous comments regarding taxicab regulation in
Anchorage and the State of Alaska.5 Staff has also recently provided comments
regarding the regulation of new applications for obtaining passenger vehicle
transportation services in Colorado.6 In addition, the FTC has brought enforcement
actions against two cities relating to taxicab regulation.7 Another major contribution in
this area is an FTC staff report on taxi regulation.8 The report’s conclusions are still
generally applicable today.9
II. 	The Passenger Vehicle Transportation Marketplace
Until recently, the passenger vehicle transportation marketplace in the United
States had remained largely unchanged since at least the early 1980s.10 However,
primarily in response to the introduction of smartphones around 2007, both incumbent
passenger vehicle transportation service providers and other entrepreneurs have
introduced new software applications that allow consumers to arrange and pay for such
services in a variety of ways. 11 These software applications, also sometimes called
digital dispatch services, make use of technologies such as mobile smartphone
applications, Internet web pages, email messages, and text messages.
These applications are an innovative form of competition that may enable
consumers to more easily arrange and pay for passenger vehicle transportations services,
compared to traditional methods such as street hails or prearrangement by telephone

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through traditional service dispatchers.12 For example, some applications use the Global
Positioning System (“GPS”) technology incorporated into smartphones to enable
consumers to locate nearby vehicles and track their arrival on an electronic map, thus
facilitating matching between customers and service.13 Some applications also utilize the
GPS and computing capabilities of smartphones to enable new fare calculation methods
based on one or more factors, such as distance, time, per trip fees, demand, additional
services, or gratuities, which the application can then charge to a credit card.14 These
technologies and methods may be more responsive to consumer demand and may
promote a more efficient allocation of resources (e.g., vehicles and drivers) to consumers.
They may also raise novel consumer protection issues, for example, relating to
consumers’ understanding of price information communicated via an application and the
privacy of information collected.
Although some jurisdictions have embraced incremental reforms to expand
competition within the traditional framework, others have responded to these broader
changes in the industry with more expansive reforms. In some cases, the reforms have
sought to facilitate the entry and expansion of new services. In other cases, policies have
been proposed to impede the growth of these new services.15 Below, FTC staff offers its
views on Anchorage’s proposed new ordinance, as well as some recommendations for
possible additional, future steps towards modernization of its regulations.
III. 	The Proposed Ordinance
A. Regulatory Changes that Facilitate Entry May Generate Consumer
Benefits and Are Unlikely to Harm Consumers or Competition
The proposed ordinance responds to perceived current and projected future
shortages of taxicab services. It would add a limited number of new general taxicab
permits, add a process for issuing new limited and special needs taxicab permits, and
phase out the transferability of current taxicab permits.16 It is our understanding that
Anchorage currently has 173 valid taxi permits, of which 158 are transferable.17
Anchorage stopped issuing transferrable permits in 1994; since that time fifteen non-
transferrable permits have been issued, with the last being issued in 2009.18 The most
recent sales of transferable permits were each made for $155,000 in January 2013 and in
August 2012.19
The proposed ordinance would increase the total number of general taxicab
permits by up to ten non-transferable permits a year, subject to certain conditions,
through 2022. 20 In order to address targeted shortfalls in passenger service, it would also
allow for the issuance of non-transferable limited and special needs permits, including for
wheelchair-accessible vehicles and to address a specific public safety need, and require
the issuance of between one and three non-transferable limited public safety permits to
transport patrons home from establishments licensed to serve alcohol.21 The ability to
transfer taxicab permits would expire altogether by the end of 2022, and there would be
no limits on the number of taxicabs after that time.22

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As FTC staff indicated in previous comments regarding proposed ordinance AO
84-251, regulatory changes that facilitate new entry into the provision of passenger
vehicle transportation services may generate consumer benefits and are unlikely to harm
consumers or competition.23 FTC staff, therefore, strongly supports the issuance of more
taxicab permits in Anchorage and the adoption of policies that will lead to free entry and
competition in the taxicab business by 2022, or sooner, if practical. A regulatory
framework for passenger vehicle transportation services should focus primarily on
ensuring qualified drivers, safe and clean vehicles, sufficient liability insurance,
transparency of fare information, and compliance with other applicable laws, and should
otherwise minimize barriers to entry by new entrants.24
Studies have shown that the deregulation of taxicab services, both in the United
States and in other countries, has generated consumer benefits in most instances, and has
not led to significant harm to consumers or competition.25 It appears that in most
instances substantial consumer benefits have followed after restrictions on the supply of
taxicabs have been removed.26 For example, studies suggest that open entry into taxicab
service may lead to price reductions or other discounts for consumers where price
competition is allowed, and generally does not cause price increases.27 New entry also
does not appear to diminish the quantity or quality of taxicab services. Some cities have
reported that service has improved, for example, through reductions in vehicle age,
increases in fleet maintenance, reductions in waiting times for radio dispatched cabs, and
increases in hours of service.28 Certain consumer populations, such as low-income
populations, who generally spend a larger portion of their income on taxicab rides than
other segments of the population, would be expected to benefit most from such
prospective improvements.29
The principal beneficiaries of entry restrictions on taxicab service are incumbent
taxicab operators, who in many instances have a strong incentive to try to restrict entry to
maintain artificially high prices and profits. 30 Studies indicate the value of licenses to
operate taxicabs in various cities to be substantial. 31 Recent sales of transferrable
Anchorage permits for $155,000 appear to be generally consistent with these findings. In
an open entry market, however, the value of such licenses would be greatly diminished.
The fact that such licenses are valued so highly may be evidence that purchasers believe
they can amortize the purchase cost by charging higher prices to consumers, versus what
they would be able to charge if entry were unrestricted.32
There is no obvious reason why the number of passenger transportation vehicles
on the street should be limited in a manner different from private cars, trucks, or other
commercial vehicles.33 Economic theory suggests that it will generally be the case that
the supply of passenger transportation vehicles will expand where there is unmet
consumer demand, thus increasing the availability of transportation services to consumers
who want them. 34
Assuming the Assembly proceeds with its planned transition towards fully open
entry into taxicab services, the Assembly may wish to consider collecting certain data

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(e.g., regarding rates, vehicle arrival times and consumer wait times, service to various
areas, consumer complaints, and safety), in order to evaluate the effects of these changes.
B. Rates Should Generally be Set by Competitive Forces Where There is
Open Entry
The proposed ordinance also amends certain provisions relating to the regulation
of rates in the passenger vehicle transportation service business. It would define
limousine service and executive sedan service separately, apply the current minimum
hourly charges for limousine service to an amended definition of limousine service, and
implement new minimum half-hourly and hourly charges to a stand-alone definition of
executive sedan service.35 The proposed ordinance would continue to provide for the
regulation of maximum taxicab rates, dispatch service rates, maximum lease rates
between taxicab permit holders and lease operators, and allowable fuel surcharge
amounts and durations for taxicabs.36 It would further provide for maximum rate
regulation for all other regulated vehicles, and allow for the adoption of rate exceptions to
promote competition to fulfill service needs.37
Where there is open entry into passenger vehicle transportation services, as is the
case for limousines and sedans in Anchorage, consumers are generally best served when
prices are set by competitive forces, and disclosed in a truthful and non-deceptive
manner. 38 As staff has noted in previous comments to The Alaska State Legislature in
regards to taxi fares, price regulation relating to the business of passenger vehicle
transportation services supplants competitive forces that will otherwise operate to lower
prices and improve service.39 In particular, minimum charges for passenger vehicle
transportation services, such as those for limousine and sedan service, raise at least some
prices, and may eliminate the ability of discounters to offer consumers lower prices.
In certain limited circumstances, such as at airport or railroad taxi lines, where it
might be difficult for travelers to determine the cost of service in advance of actually
needing to obtain it, maximum price regulation may be an efficient means to protect them
from paying higher prices due to a lack of local knowledge. Requiring the posting of
rates on vehicles may also be an efficient means to protect consumers in such situations,
and in other circumstances, such as street hails, where it might also be difficult for
consumers to determine service costs in advance.40 But these particular situations do not
provide a rationale for the general regulation of prices where there is open entry.
Where entry is restricted, however, as is currently the case for taxicabs in
Anchorage, price regulation may serve to limit the ability of incumbents to charge higher
prices than they would otherwise be able to do in an open entry framework.41 But,
assuming the transition towards open entry by 2022 proceeds, staff recommends that the
Assembly consider the extent to which there will then remain a rationale for general price
regulations relating to the taxi business, or whether other alternatives might be sufficient
to facilitate price competition and transparency.42

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IV. 	A Regulatory Framework Should be Responsive to New Methods of
Competition, While Maintaining Appropriate, Reasonably Tailored
Consumer Protections
As already noted above, today’s passenger vehicle transportation industry is in a
state of transition. Facilitated by technological advances in smartphones, software
applications, and GPS systems, new forms of services are emerging. While these new
services appear to be responsive to consumer demand, they may not fit neatly within
longstanding traditional regulatory frameworks. To the degree regulatory reforms are
being considered, therefore, the Assembly might want to look beyond merely adjusting
competition within the boundaries of longstanding systems of regulation. The Assembly
may wish to consider reforms that anticipate and will facilitate the future development of
new technologies and new services, while maintaining or creating appropriate consumer
protections. By perpetuating a framework that may now be dated, even while seeking to
promote competition within its terms, regulators can unnecessarily and inadvertently
impair the emergence of additional competitive and innovative forms of services.
Staff therefore recommends that a regulatory framework for passenger vehicle
transportation services should allow for flexibility and adaptation in response to new and
innovative methods of competition, while still maintaining appropriate, reasonably
tailored consumer protections. Consumers benefit from competition among passenger
vehicle transportation services, both traditional and new. Generally, a forward-looking
regulatory framework should promote innovation and experimentation, because these
forms of competition can benefit consumers, and should avoid creating impediments to
new methods of competition, unless necessary to achieve some countervailing
procompetitive purpose or other public benefit such as protecting the public from
significant harm. 43 Thus, the Assembly, now or in the near future, may wish to consider
expressly updating the regulatory framework to provide for such technologies.44
Alternatively, it may wish to consider providing for the testing of applications under a
pilot program or on an interim basis.45
Regulation of new computer and smartphone applications should focus primarily
on ensuring the safety of customers and drivers, deterring deceptive pricing practices, and
addressing other consumer protection issues, especially privacy and the prevention of
identity theft.46 A regulatory framework should not restrict the introduction or use of
new types of applications, or novel features they provide, absent some evidence of public
harm. In the event that the Assembly finds evidence of harm from new methods of
competition, a restriction on competition should be narrowly crafted to minimize its
anticompetitive impact.
Conclusion
FTC staff appreciates this opportunity to provide views in regards to this proposed
ordinance and would be happy to address any questions you may have regarding
competition and consumer protection policy in the passenger vehicle transportation
marketplace.

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Respectfully submitted,
Andrew I. Gavil, Director
Office of Policy Planning
Richard A. Feinstein, Director
Bureau of Competition
Charles A. Harwood, Acting Director
Bureau of Consumer Protection
Howard Shelanski, Director
Bureau of Economics

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1 This staff letter expresses the views of the Federal Trade Commission’s Office of Policy
Planning, Bureau of Competition, Bureau of Consumer Protection, and Bureau of Economics.
The letter does not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Trade Commission or of any
individual Commissioner. The Commission, however, has voted to authorize staff to submit
these comments.
2 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
3 Specific statutory authority for the FTC’s competition advocacy program is found
in Sections 6(a) and (f) of the FTC Act, under which Congress authorized the FTC “[t]o gather
and compile information concerning, and to investigate from time to time the organization,
business, conduct, practices, and management of any person, partnership, or corporation engaged
in or whose business affects commerce,” and “[t]o make public from time to time such portions
of the information obtained by it hereunder as are in the public interest . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 46(a),
(f).
4 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the benefits of competition go beyond lower
prices: “The assumption that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free
market recognizes that all elements of a bargain - quality, service, safety, and durability - and not
just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative
offers.” Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); accord, FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423 (1990).
5 E.g., FTC Staff Comments to Anchorage Assemblyman John Wood Concerning
Proposed Ordinance AO 84-251 (Feb. 11, 1985); FTC Staff Comments to Alaska State
Representative Johne Binkley Concerning House Bill 376 (Feb. 18, 1986).
6 FTC Staff Comments Before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission In The Matter of
The Proposed Rules Regulating Transportation By Motor Vehicle, 4 Code of Colorado
Regulations 723-6 (Mar. 6, 2013), available at
http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130703coloradopublicutilities.pdf.
7 The FTC sued the cities of New Orleans and Minneapolis in 1984, charging both
cities with unfair competition by combining with taxicab operators to impose regulations that
limited the number of taxicab licenses, increased fares, and eliminated competition in violation of
the federal antitrust laws. The complaint against Minneapolis was withdrawn after the city
revised its ordinance to permit more competition. The complaint against New Orleans also was
withdrawn after the state authorized the conduct in question by a new law. See generally FTC,
1985 A NNUAL REPORT 5 (1985), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/annualreports/ar1985.pdf.
8 M ARK W. FRANKENA & P AUL A. P AUTLER, AN E CONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
T AXICAB REGULATION (1984) (FTC Bureau of Economics Staff Report), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/econrpt/233832.pdf (“Staff Report”).
9 See OECD, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee
Working Party No. 2 on Competition and Regulation, Taxi Services Regulation and Competition
199-210 (Sept. 11, 2008) (Submission of the United States), available at
http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/41472612.pdf.

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10 Id. at 200 (“As of 2007, the general description of the taxicab industry and taxicab
regulation in the United States remains much as it was when Frankena and Pautler described it in
1984. That is, nothing dramatic has happened to alter the U.S. industry in the interim.”).
11 See generally Lauren Goode, Worth It? An App to Get a Cab, WALL S TREET J. (June
17, 2011), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/06/17/worth-it-an-app-to-get-a-cab/.
12 See generally id.
13 See generally id.
14 See generally Brian X. Chen, Uber, an App That Summons a Car, Plans a Cheaper
Service Using Hybrids, N.Y. T IMES , July 1, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com
(discussing charging by time, distance, consumer demand, and gratuities); Michael B. Farrell,
Taxi app Hailo to expand service, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 2013, available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com (discussing booking fees, service fees, and gratuities).
15 See supra note 6.
16 AO NO. 2013-36 (2013) at Ch. 11.20.016–11-20.050 (“Proposed Ordinance”).
17 	Email of Debbie Ossiander to Christopher Grengs Concerning Anchorage Taxi
Information (Feb. 28, 2013).
18 	Id.
19 	Email of Debbie Ossiander to David Conn Concerning Taxi Permit Sales in Anchorage
(Mar. 27, 2013).
20 Proposed Ordinance, supra note 16, at Ch. 11.20.030.
21 	Id. at Ch. 11.20.035-11.20.036.
22 	Id. at Ch. 11.20.030 F.; Ch. 11.20.040.
23 FTC Staff Comments to Anchorage Assemblyman John Wood, supra note 5, at 5.
24 	See generally Staff Report, supra note 8, at 1-2.
25 See generally id. at 112-56; OECD, supra note 9, at 8-9, 202-05.
26 	See generally OECD, supra note 9, at 17.
27 See generally Staff Report, supra note 8, at 115-16, 156; OECD, supra note 9, at 202-05.
Price declines of as much as 20% were reported in the 1990s in major New Zealand cities due to
the deregulation of entry. OECD at 204 n.20. Indianapolis, Indiana deregulated taxicabs in 1994
and allowed jitney (transportation services for individuals along a semi-fixed route) and minivan
operation. According to the city, new entrants cut fares by 7-10%. Others have questioned the
overall, long-term effect of the Indianapolis deregulation, however. Id. at 202-03. Seattle,
Washington opened entry and allowed fares to be set by individual taxicab firms in 1979. One

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study found that immediately after regulation, the fare for an average trip increased by 35%.
Using a longer time frame, another study found that by 1984 these changes may have led to a 5%
net reduction in fares, as radio-dispatch fares fell and taxicab stand fares rose. A third study
found no net change in fares. Staff Report at 125-31; OECD at 202 (both summarizing the
experience of Seattle after deregulation). Other studies have questioned whether regulated fares
were, in fact, held artificially low prior to deregulation, as compared to general rates of price
inflation. Craig Leisy, Taxicab Deregulation and Reregulation in Seattle: Lessons Learned 5
(2001).
28 Staff Report, supra note 8, at 116-20, 156. See also generally Office of Fair
Trading, The Regulation of Licensed Taxi and PHV Services in the UK (2003), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared oft/reports/comp policy/oft676.pdf. The report finds, among other
things, that quantity controls on taxicab service result in: fewer taxis per capita; longer wait times
for service; and the use of less suitable alternative transportation by consumers. Therefore, the
report recommends that such quantity controls be removed. Id. at 2-6, 23-44.
29 See generally Staff Report, supra note 8, at 102-03.
30 Id. at 68, 74-79, 105-11. Typically, the operator of a taxicab service, as an overall
business, is distinct from an individual taxicab driver (“cabbie”) who physically transports
passengers via automobile.
31 Id. at 106-07 (collecting taxicab license values in various cities); OECD,
supra note 9, at 208-10 (appendix collecting taxicab license values in various cities); Government
of the District of Columbia, Office of the Chief Financial Officer, Office of Revenue Analysis,
Taxicab Medallions – A Review of Experiences in Other Cities 2-3 (May 31, 2011) (appendix
collecting taxicab license values in various cities), available at
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo taxicab briefing n
ote.pdf.
32 Certain authors, however, have argued that these substantial license values serve
as a deterrent mechanism that ensures good behavior by cab drivers who fear the loss of the
license in the event of inappropriate behavior. Staff Report, supra note 8, at 71-72; OECD, supra
note 9, at 201.
33 Special issues have sometimes arisen following regulatory reform, as in the case of first-
in first-out taxicab lines at airport, rail station, or downtown taxicab stand areas. Such queues
may complicate consumer efforts to find the lowest fares. For example, it appears in some cases
that first-in first-out taxicab queues have inhibited price competition, that drivers sometimes
bickered over their places in line as queues of waiting cabs lengthened, and drivers also
sometimes refused service to passengers wanting only a short trip. Staff Report, supra note 8, at
1, 50-51, 123-24, 156; OECD, supra note 9, at 204-05. But these particular problems do not
provide an argument that new entry will harm consumers or competition, generally. Instead,
consumers appear to be better off when regulators pursue alternatives for such locations that are
less restrictive than wholesale bans on new entry, such as: redesigning taxicab stands, increasing
fare transparency and fare competition, imposing lower fare ceilings, increasing taxicab line user
fees, or entering into contracts with operators.
34 	Although an expansion in the number of passenger transportation vehicles could
potentially lead to traffic congestion effects under certain conditions, permitting an increase in the

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number of passenger transportation vehicles can also potentially reduce congestion in areas that
currently have high traffic densities to the extent that consumers decrease their reliance on private
automobiles.
35 Proposed Ordinance, supra note 16, at Ch. 11.10.010; 11.20.260. Limousine service
from a specific point of departure to a specific destination of no more than one hour is subject to a
minimum one-hour charge at a minimum rate of $60.00 per hour; all other limousine trips are
subject to a minimum ninety-minute charge at a minimum rate of $45.00 per hour. Id. at Ch.
11.20.260 B. Executive sedan service from a specific point of departure to a specific destination
of no more than a half-hour is subject to a minimum half-hour charge at a minimum rate of
$25.00 per half-hour; all other executive sedan trips are subject to a minimum hourly charge of
$40.00 per hour. Id. at Ch. 11.20.260 C.
36 Id. at Ch. 11.10.050. In particular, see Ch. 11.10.50 A. 1.-2., 5.-6.
37 Id. at Ch. 11.110.50 A. 1., 7.
38 	From the perspective of consumer protection, information relating to the provision of
passenger transportation vehicle services communicated to consumers should be evaluated on a
totality of the circumstances approach. See generally FTC Policy Statement on Deception,
Appended to Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm.
39 FTC Staff Comments to Alaska State Representative Johne Binkley, supra note 5, at 5-6.
40 See Proposed Ordinance, supra note 16, at Ch. 11.10.050 C.
41 	See generally OECD, supra note 9, at 20.
42 	See generally id. at 20-21.
43 See generally supra note 6.
44 For example, under the Washington, D.C. Public Vehicle-for-Hire Innovation
Amendment Act of 2012 (D.C. Council B19-0892) (adopted Jan. 18, 2013) (amending D.C.
Official Code § 50-329.02), "For the purposes of this section, the term ‘digital dispatch service’
means a business that provides a service that connects a passenger to a public vehicle-for-hire
through advanced reservation, including by computer, mobile phone application, text, email, or
web-based reservations, or by other means as the [District of Columbia Taxicab] Commission
may define by rule."
45 See generally Press Release, California Public Utilities Commission, CPUC Enters Into
Operating Agreement With Uber (Jan. 31, 2013), available at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/F013B3B9-ED4E-4554-9C34-
E468C9DAED88/0/CPUCEntersIntoOperatingAgreementwithUber.pdf (describing an interim
agreement allowing Uber Technologies, Inc. to operate pursuant to certain safety requirements,
while a California Public Utilities Commission rulemaking on innovations in passenger vehicle
transportation services is underway). The details of this agreement are contained in Term Sheet
for Settlement Between the Safety and Enforcement Division of the California Public Utilities

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Commission and Uber Technologies, Inc. Re Case PSG-3018, Citation F-5195 (Jan. 2013)
(available via the California Public Utilities Commission).
46 For example, under the Washington, D.C. Public Vehicle-for-Hire Innovation
Amendment Act of 2012, supra note 44, (amending D.C. Official Code § 50-329.02), “A digital
dispatch service shall be exempt from regulation by the [District of Columbia Taxicab]
Commission, other than rules and regulations that are necessary for the safety of customers and
drivers or consumer protection.”