FTC Staff Comment Before the FDA Concerning Labeling of Meat Products

V890001
BEFORE 	THE
FOOD SAFETY AND 	INSPECTION SERVICE,
UNITED 	STATES 	DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Washington, 	D.C.
COMMISSION AUTHORIZED
Labeling of 	Meat 	Food 	Products,
Under 	Certain Circumstances,
That 	Contain Mechanically
Separated 	(Species)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
-----------------)
9 	CFR 	Part 	317
[Docket 	No. 	86-049P]
COMMENTS 	OF THE 	STAFF OF 	THE 	BUREAU OF 	ECONOMICS
OF THE 	FEDERAL TRADE 	COMMISSION*
Washington, 	D.C. 	20580
November 	8, 	1988
* 	These 	comments 	are 	the 	views 	of 	the 	staff 	of 	the 	Bureau
of 	Economics 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission. 	They 	are 	not
necessarily 	the 	views 	of 	the 	Commission 	or 	of 	any 	individual
Commissioner. 	Please 	contact Michael 	R. 	Metzger, 	Economist,
Division 	of 	Economic 	Policy Analysis, 	at 	(202) 	326-3367 	if 	you
have 	any 	questions 	about 	these 	comments.

I. 	Introduction and Summary
On September 	9, 	1988, 	the 	Food 	Safety and 	Inspection Service
["FSIS"] 	of 	the 	Department 	of 	Agriculture 	invited comments 	on 	its
Notice 	of 	Proposed 	Rulemaking 	["NPRM"] 	that 	would 	amend 	the
Federal 	meat 	inspection 	regulations 	by 	excepting, 	under 	certain
specified 	instances, 	Mechanically 	Separated 	(Species) 	["MS (S) II ]
from 	the 	requirement 	that 	the 	list 	of 	ingredients 	on 	the 	labels
of 	meat 	food 	products 	show 	the 	common 	or 	usual 	names 	of 	all
ingredients. 1
The 	staff 	of 	the 	Bureau 	of 	Economics 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade
Commission 	["the 	FTC 	staff"] 	submits 	the 	following 	analysis 	in
response 	to 	the 	NPRM. 	Al though 	we 	support 	the 	FSIS 	in 	its
ongoing 	reconsideration 	of 	its 	MS(S) 	disclosure 	requirement, 	we
can 	take 	no 	position 	on 	the 	merits 	of 	the 	proposed 	regulatory
change 	without 	the 	development 	of 	further 	evidence. 	The 	purpose
of 	our 	comment 	is 	instead 	to 	suggest 	an 	analytical 	framework 	for
determining 	whether 	consumers 	are 	likely 	to 	benefit 	from 	changes
in 	the 	current 	rule. 	To 	employ 	this 	analytical 	framework, 	the
FSIS 	should 	examine 	specific 	market 	and 	consumer 	survey
information 	in 	order 	to 	identify 	the 	effects 	of 	the 	current
disclosure 	requirement 	and 	the 	proposed 	regulatory 	change. 2 	In
1 	See 	53 	Fed. 	Reg. 	35089 	(Sept. 	9, 	1988).
2 	In 	addition, 	despite 	its 	past 	determination 	that 	MS(S) 	is
generally 	nutritional 	and 	nonhazardous, 	the 	FSIS 	may 	wish 	to
investigate 	any 	new 	arguments 	or 	evidence 	that 	may 	have 	been
advanced to support allegations 	that MS(S) 	may be in some way unsafe.
2

1986, 	approximately 	$9.2 	billion 	of 	meat 	food 	products 	that 	are
affected 	by 	this 	regulation 	were 	sold. 3 	Consequently, 	the
potential 	impact 	of 	this 	proceeding 	on 	consumers 	may 	be
substantial.
The 	regulations 	governing 	the 	disclosure 	of 	MS (S) 	in 	meat
products 	have 	evolved 	over 	the 	last 	decade 	to 	lessen 	the
regulatory 	burdens 	facing 	meat 	processors 	that 	attempt 	to 	market
meat 	food 	products 	containing 	MS(S). 	Not 	only 	have 	the
disclosure 	requirements 	been 	reduced, 	but 	the 	nomenclature 	of 	the
ingredient 	itself 	has 	been 	changed 	from 	"mechanically 	de-boned
meat" 	to 	"mechanically 	processed 	(species) 	product" 	to 	the
current 	term 	"mechanically 	separated 	(species)". 	Since 	1982, 	the
FSIS 	regulations 	have 	required 	only 	that 	the 	term 	appear 	in 	the
ingredient 	list. 4
In 	1986, 	four 	meat 	processors S 	petitioned 	the 	FSIS 	for
permission 	to 	delete 	the 	term 	"mechanically 	separated 	(species)"
from 	the 	ingredient 	list 	whenever 	MS(S) 	constitutes 	no 	more 	than
10% 	of 	the 	meat 	(and 	poultry) 	portion 	of 	the 	meat 	food 	product.
3 	This 	represents 	consumer 	expenditures 	on 	frankfurters,
sausages, 	sausage 	products 	and 	cold 	cuts. 	Supermarket 	Business
Magazine 	(September 	1987).
4 	In 	addition, 	the 	calcium 	content 	of 	the 	meat 	food 	product
must 	be 	declared 	whenever 	MS (5) 	contributes 	20 	mg 	or 	more 	of
calcium 	to 	a 	serving 	of 	the 	product, 	unless 	(1) 	the 	contribution
is 	not 	different 	from 	that 	which 	would 	be 	declared 	if 	the 	product
contained 	only 	hand 	de-boned 	ingredients, 	or 	(2) 	the 	calcium
content 	of 	a 	serving 	of 	the 	product 	containing 	only 	hand 	de-boned
ingredients 	would 	be 	20% 	or 	more 	of 	the 	u.S. 	RDA.
5 	Bob 	Evans 	Farms, 	Inc., 	adorn 	Sausage 	Company, 	Sara 	Lee
Corporation, 	and 	Owens 	Country 	Sausage.
3

Instead, 	the 	meat 	processors 	proposed 	disclosing 	in 	the
ingredient 	list 	only 	the 	species 	from 	which 	the 	MS(S) 	is
derived. 6 	Two 	arguments 	were 	offered 	to 	support 	the 	proposed
regulatory 	change: 	( 1) 	that 	consumer 	perceptions 	of 	the 	term
"mechanically 	separated 	(species)" 	have 	made 	it 	unprofitable 	to
use 	this 	ingredient 	in 	meat 	food 	products, 7 	and 	(2) 	that 	meat
food 	products 	are 	subjected 	to 	an 	unjustifiably 	stricter 	standard
than 	the 	one 	applied 	to 	poultry 	food 	products 	(which 	do 	not 	have
an 	ingredient 	disclosure 	requirement 	for 	"mechanically 	separated
poultry" 	["MSP"]). 	In 	reviewing 	the 	public 	comments 	filed 	in
response 	to 	this 	petition, 	the 	FSIS 	concluded 	that 	there 	is 	both
merit 	in 	the 	petitioners' 	arguments 	and 	public 	support 	for
granting 	the 	petition. 	Accordingly, 	the 	FSIS 	is 	now 	proposing 	to
adopt 	the 	regulatory change 	suggested by 	the 	petitioners.
In 	Section 	II 	we 	explain 	the 	FTC 	staff's 	interest 	in 	this
matter 	and 	experience 	in 	related 	matters. 	Then, 	in 	Sections 	III
and 	IV, 	we 	discuss 	the 	two 	arguments 	that 	have 	been 	advanced 	in
support 	of 	the 	proposed 	regulatory 	change. 	Our 	conclusions 	are
summarized 	in 	Section V.
6 	In 	addition, 	the 	petitioners 	proposed 	that 	the 	calcium
content 	of 	the 	meat 	food 	product 	be 	declared 	on 	the 	label,
irrespective 	of 	the 	amount.
7 	In 	the 	Notice 	of 	Proposed 	Rulemaking, 	two 	assertions 	of
the 	petitioners 	were 	cited, 	namely: 	(1) 	"the 	unwarranted
negative 	connotations 	of 	the 	term 	MS (S) 	which 	is 	required 	on
labels 	of 	finished 	products 	containing 	this 	ingredient
cause 	consumers 	to 	refrain 	from 	purchasing 	such 	products"; 	and
(2) 	"that 	the 	labeling 	requirements 	imposed 	on 	products
containing 	MS(S) 	have 	effectively 	thwarted 	its 	use". 	See 	53 	Fed.
Reg. 	at 	35091-2.
4

II. 	FTC Staff 	Interest
The 	FTC 	staff's 	interest 	in 	food 	standards 	and 	labeling
stems 	from 	the 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission's 	general 	statutory
obligations 	to 	promote 	competition 	and 	to 	prevent 	false 	and
deceptive 	advertising. 	Under 	sections 	5 	and 	12 	of 	the 	Federal
Trade 	Commission 	Act,8 	which 	prohibit 	false, 	deceptive 	or 	unfair
practices 	in or 	affecting commerce, 	the 	FTC 	has 	jurisdiction over
the 	advertising 	of 	food, 	and 	has 	concurrent 	jurisdiction with 	FDA
and 	USDA 	over 	the 	labeling 	of 	food. 	The 	FTC 	also 	has 	statutory
authority 	to 	enforce 	a 	number 	of 	laws 	that 	mandate 	disclosure,9
has 	itself 	promulgated 	disclosure 	rules,10 	and 	enforces 	several
laws 	relating 	to 	standard-setting. 11 	In 	implementing 	its
responsibilities, 	the 	FTC 	staff 	has 	developed 	considerable
expertise 	in 	understanding 	the 	roles 	of 	advertising 	and 	labeling
in 	providing 	consumers 	with 	reliable 	product 	information 	and 	in
the 	roles 	that 	might 	be 	played 	by 	disclosure 	standards 	in
situations 	where 	the 	market 	may 	fail 	to 	provide 	adequate
8 	15 	U.S.C. 	41 	et. 	seg.
9 	~, 	the 	Federal 	Cigarette 	Labeling 	and Advertising 	Act,
the 	Truth 	in 	Lending 	Act, 	and 	the 	Energy 	Policy 	and 	Conversation
Act 	(appliance 	labeling).
10 	~, 	Octane 	Rating, 	R-value 	Rule, 	and 	Care 	Labeling.
11 	~, 	the 	Wool 	Products 	Labeling 	Act 	and 	the 	Magnuson-
Moss 	Warranty 	- 	FTC 	Improvement 	Act.
5

information 	without 	regulation. 12 	In 	1987, 	the 	FTC 	staff
submitted 	comments 	when 	the 	FSIS 	was 	considering 	amending 	its
standard 	of 	identity 	for 	frankfurters 	and 	similar 	cooked
sausages. 13
III. 	Potential Consumer Harm Due to 	Imperfect 	Information
Proponents 	of 	the 	current 	disclosure 	requirement 	argue 	that,
to 	the 	extent 	that 	MS(S) 	is, 	or 	is 	perceived 	to 	be, 	an 	inferior
ingredient, 	consumers 	would 	be 	harmed 	if 	they 	unknowingly
purchased a 	product 	containing MS(S). 	Proponents 	of 	the 	proposed
regulatory 	change 	argue 	that 	the 	current 	disclosure 	rule
effectively 	misinforms 	consumers 	as 	to 	the 	nature 	of 	MS(S), 	and
that 	the 	resulting 	negative 	public 	perception 	makes 	it 	difficult
or 	impossible 	for 	firms 	to 	use 	MS(S) 	as 	an 	ingredient. 	However,
since 	some 	form 	of 	required 	disclosure 	has 	been 	in 	place 	since
12 	FTC 	staff's 	research 	in 	this 	area 	includes: 	W. 	Jacobs
et 	al., 	"Improving 	Consumer 	Access 	to 	Legal 	Services: 	The 	Case
for 	Removing 	Restrictions 	on 	Truthful 	Advertising" 	(1984); 	R.
Bond 	et 	al., 	"Effects 	of 	Restrictions 	on 	Advertising 	and
Commercial 	Practice 	in 	the 	Professions: 	the 	case 	of 	Optometry"
(1980); 	Bureau 	of 	Consumer 	Protection, 	FTC, 	"Drug 	Product
Selection" 	(1979); 	A. 	Masson 	and 	R. 	Steiner, 	"Generic
Substitution 	and 	Prescription 	Drug 	Prices: 	Economic 	Effects 	of
State 	Drug 	Substitution 	Laws" 	(1985); 	M. 	Frankena 	et 	al.,
"Alcohol 	Advertising, 	Consumption, 	and Abuse" 	(1985); 	M. 	Lynch 	et
al., 	"Experimental 	Studies 	of 	Markets 	with 	Buyers 	Ignorant 	of
Quality 	Before 	Purchase: 	When 	Do 	'Lemons' 	Drive 	Out 	High 	Quality
Products?" 	(1986).
13 	Comments 	of 	the 	Bureaus 	of 	Economics, 	Consumer
Protection, 	and 	Competition 	of 	the 	Federal 	Trade 	Commission,
Standard 	for 	Frankfurters 	and 	Similar 	Cooked 	Sausages, 	Food
Safety 	and 	Inspection 	Service, 	u. S. 	Department 	of 	Agriculture,
Docket 	No. 	85-009F, 	June 	22, 	1987, 	[Final 	Rule, 	9 CFR 	Part 	319].
6

the 	development 	of 	the MS(S) 	process, 	there 	is 	no 	experience 	from
which 	to 	determine 	whether 	an 	unregulated 	market 	would 	fail 	to
provide 	information 	sufficient 	to 	prevent 	the 	inadvertent
consumption 	of 	MS(S).14 	At 	issue 	in 	this 	proceeding 	is 	whether
the 	potential 	harm 	to 	consumers 	from 	a 	lack 	of 	information 	about
the 	inclusion 	of 	MS(S) 	in 	meat 	food 	products 	outweighs 	the
potential 	harm 	resulting 	from 	any 	misperceptions 	conveyed 	by 	the
disclosure.
We 	cannot 	discern 	from 	the 	currently 	available 	information
which 	of 	the 	alternatives--the 	existing 	disclosure 	requirement,
the 	proposed 	changes 	to 	it, 	or 	even 	the 	absence 	of 	regulation--
would 	best 	serve 	consumers. 	The 	record 	developed 	in 	this
proceeding does 	suggest 	that, 	despite 	the 	FSIS 	determination 	that
MS(S) 	is 	"as 	safe 	and 	wholesome 	as 	the 	species 	from 	which 	it 	is
derived,"15 	products 	containing 	MS(S) 	have 	not 	been 	successfully
marketed 	(or, 	they 	have 	been 	marketed 	only 	on 	a 	limited
14 	For 	example, 	suppose 	consumers 	are 	aware 	of 	what 	MS(S)
is, 	but 	are 	unable 	to 	detect 	its 	presence 	in 	meat 	food 	products.
If 	there 	is 	no 	required 	disclosure 	of 	MS(S), 	meat 	processors
would 	have 	an 	incentive 	to 	include 	MS (S) 	in 	their 	product 	in
order 	to 	reduce 	costs. 	However, 	if 	sufficient 	consumers 	have 	a
subjective 	aversion 	to 	the 	ingredient, 	then 	suppliers 	would 	also
have 	an 	incentive 	to 	produce 	and 	market 	a 	more 	expensive 	product
clearly 	labeled, 	for 	example, 	"Contains 	No 	MS (S)" 	or 	"Contains
Only 	Hand-Carved Meat". 	Presumably, 	enforcement 	of 	existing 	laws
against 	deceptive 	advertising 	and 	labeling 	would 	prevent 	meat
processors 	from 	including 	MS(S) 	in 	these 	higher 	priced 	products.
In 	this 	way, 	the 	market 	would 	provide 	both 	a 	lower-priced, 	MS(S)-
containing 	product 	and 	a 	higher-priced 	product.
15 	53 	Fed. 	Reg. 	at 	35092. 	Despite 	the 	determination 	of
FSIS 	on 	this 	issue, 	others 	have 	continued 	to 	express 	concerns 	as
to 	the 	safety 	of 	the 	product.
7

scale).16 	However, 	this 	fact 	can 	be 	used 	to 	support 	either 	the
current 	disclosure 	requirement 	or 	the 	proposed 	change.
Advocates 	of 	the 	current 	requirement 	could 	argue 	that 	the
failure 	of 	producers 	to 	market 	products 	containing 	MS(S)
accurately 	reflects 	consumer 	preferences, 	that 	is, 	that 	the
number 	of 	consumers 	willing 	to 	purchase 	a 	MS(S)-containing
product 	has 	been 	insufficient 	to 	assure 	its 	production.
However, 	this 	argument 	presumes 	that 	consumers 	are 	fully 	informed
as 	to 	the 	nature 	of 	MS (S) 	and 	prefer 	not 	to 	consume 	products
containing 	MS (S), 	placing 	a 	relatively 	low 	value 	on 	any 	cost
savings 	and 	the 	added 	calcium 	and 	mineral 	content 	of 	such
products.
Conversely, 	advocates 	of 	the 	regulatory change 	could 	explain
the 	absence 	of 	MS(S)-containing 	products 	from 	the 	market 	by
arguing 	that 	consumers 	are 	not 	well 	informed 	as 	to 	the 	nature 	of
MS(S), 	and 	that 	the 	required 	disclosure 	of 	MS(S) 	conveys
misperceptions, 	perhaps 	by 	raising 	questions 	as 	to 	whether 	MS(S)
is 	nutritional, 	or 	even 	hazardous. 17
We 	understand 	from 	conversations 	with 	FSIS 	staff 	that 	there
16 	In 	the 	Notice 	of 	Proposed 	Rulemaking, 	the 	petitioners
were 	cited 	as 	claiming 	"that 	to 	their 	knowledge 	no 	meat 	processor
was 	presently 	producing 	MS(S) 	... 	despite 	the 	fact 	that 	it 	was
safe 	and 	wholesome." 	See 	53 	Fed. 	Reg. 	at 	35091-2.
17 	Meat 	processors 	could 	of 	course 	collectively embark 	on 	a
program 	to 	educate 	consumers 	as 	to 	the 	merits 	of 	MS(S). 	While
the 	credibility 	of 	the 	meat 	processors 	may 	be 	questioned 	due 	to
their 	vested 	interest 	in 	MS (S), 	the 	FSIS 	has 	gone 	on 	record
citing 	the 	nonhazardous 	and 	nutritional 	attributes 	of 	MS(S). 	We
are 	aware 	of 	nothing 	that 	would 	prevent 	meat 	processors 	from
conveying 	this 	fact 	in 	consumer 	education 	messages 	or 	even 	on
meat 	food 	product 	labels.
8

is 	little 	evidence 	in 	the 	record 	to 	date 	about 	either 	the 	actual
consumer 	perceptions 	of 	current 	MS(S) 	disclosures, 	or 	the
strength 	of 	consumer 	preferences 	for 	products 	containing 	or 	not
containing 	MS(S). 	Thus, 	the 	FSIS 	may 	wish 	to 	consider 	obtaining
additional 	information 	that 	would 	help 	provide 	answers 	to 	the
following 	questions:
1) 	To what 	extent 	are 	consumers 	aware 	of:
a) 	the 	contents 	of 	meat 	food 	products?
b) 	the 	meaning 	of 	"mechanically 	separated meat"?
c) 	the 	nutritional 	and 	safety 	aspects 	of 	meat
food 	products 	with 	and without 	MS(S)?
2) 	What 	connotations 	do 	consumers 	attach 	to 	the
disclosure 	of 	MS(S)on 	a 	meat 	food 	product
ingredient 	list, 	and 	how 	would 	those 	connotations
affect 	their 	purchase 	decisions?
3) 	What 	proportion 	of 	consumers, 	if 	fully 	informed 	as
to 	the 	true 	nature 	of 	MS(S), 	would 	be 	less
inclined 	to 	purchase 	a 	meat 	food 	product
containing 	MS(S)? 	[In 	this 	regard, 	the 	FSIS 	may
wish 	to 	examine 	any 	new 	arguments 	or 	evidence 	that
may 	have 	been 	advanced 	to 	support 	allegations 	that
MS(S) 	may be 	in 	some 	way 	unsafe 	or 	not 	wholesome.]
4) 	What 	is 	the 	expected 	cost 	savings 	for 	a 	meat 	food
product 	that 	contains 	10% 	MS(S)? 	[For 	comparison,
it 	would 	be 	useful, 	but 	admittedly more 	difficult,
to 	obtain 	(as 	part 	of 	#3 	above) 	an 	estimate 	of 	the
approximate 	price 	differential 	that 	would 	make
informed 	consumers 	indifferent 	to 	products 	with
and without 	MS(S).]
5) 	What 	would 	the 	likely 	mix 	of 	products 	be 	if 	the
current 	disclosure 	rule 	were 	not 	in 	effect? 	[For
example, 	it 	would 	be 	useful 	to 	know 	what 	range 	of
products 	are 	supplied 	in 	those 	countries 	(if 	any)
that 	do 	not 	have 	comparable 	disclosure
requirements. 	Alternatively, 	since 	there 	is
apparently 	no 	disclosure 	rule 	for 	mechanically
separated 	poultry 	in 	poultry 	food 	products, 	it 	may
9

be 	of 	value 	to 	determine 	whether 	products 	are
supplied 	both with 	and 	without 	mechanically
separated poultry.18]
To 	the 	extent 	information 	concerning 	these 	questions 	is 	not
contained 	in 	the 	comments 	filed 	in 	this 	proceeding, 	the 	FSIS 	may
wish 	to 	consider 	obtaining 	this 	information 	through 	the 	use 	of
copy 	tests, 	consumer 	surveys, 	and 	examination 	of 	the
corresponding 	international 	product 	markets. 	If 	the 	information
indicates 	that 	an 	unregulated 	market 	cannot 	reasonably 	be
expected 	to 	provide 	MS (S) 	ingredient 	information, 	some 	form 	of
MS(S) 	disclosure 	regulation 	may 	be 	justified. 	The 	same
information 	will 	also 	provide 	the 	basis 	for 	a 	meaningful
examination 	of 	the 	consumer 	effects 	of 	the 	proposed 	regulatory
change, 	if 	it 	were 	to 	be 	adopted. 	On 	the 	other 	hand, 	if 	FSIS
believes 	it 	has 	sufficient 	evidence 	to 	conclude 	that 	MS(S)
ingredient 	information 	would 	be 	provided 	by 	an 	unregulated
market, 	then 	FSIS 	should 	consider 	rescinding 	the 	current
disclosure 	regulation 	entirely.19
18 	For 	the 	poultry 	product 	experience 	to 	be 	relevant, 	it
would 	be 	necessary 	to 	first 	determine 	whether 	the 	nutritional 	and
health 	characteristics 	of 	mechanically 	separated 	meat 	and
mechanically 	separated 	poultry 	are 	comparable, 	and 	if 	so,
ascertain 	that 	well 	informed 	consumers 	would 	view 	the 	two
ingredients 	similarly on 	subjective 	grounds.
19 	In 	our view, 	evidence 	of 	market 	failure 	should 	generally
be 	a 	precondition 	for 	regulation.
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IV. 	Nonuniform 	Regulatory 	Treatment 	of 	Heat 	and 	Poultry 	Food
Products
A 	second 	justification 	for 	relaxing 	the 	disclosure
requirement 	for 	MS(S) 	is 	the 	alleged 	preferential 	regulatory
treatment 	accorded 	Mechanically 	Separated 	Poultry 	["MSP"] .
Currently, 	no 	disclosure 	of 	MSP 	is 	requirpd when 	it 	is 	used 	as 	an
ingredient 	in 	either 	poultry 	food 	products 	or 	meat 	food
products. 20 	The 	FSIS 	staff 	has 	indicated 	to 	us 	that 	this
difference 	in 	treatment 	results 	at 	least 	in 	part 	from 	the
different 	legislative 	acts 	establishing 	the 	regulation 	of 	meat
and 	poultry 	products. 	This 	difference 	may, 	however, 	be 	justified
if 	MS(S) 	is 	relatively 	less 	wholesome 	than 	MSP, 	or 	if 	consumer
attitudes 	toward MS(S) 	and MSP 	are 	in 	fact 	different.
If 	meat 	food 	products 	are 	reasonable 	substitutes 	for 	poultry
food 	products,21 	then 	regulations 	that 	impose 	unjustifiably 	high
costs 	on 	producers 	of 	one 	food 	product 	necessarily 	harm 	consumers
by 	raising 	the 	cost 	of 	producing 	one 	product 	relative 	to 	the
other. 	If 	no 	valid 	justification 	exists 	for 	the 	current
differential 	regulation, 	consumers 	could 	be 	expected 	to 	benefit
(e.g., 	through 	lower 	prices) 	from 	a 	more 	uniform 	regulatory
treatment 	of 	the 	two 	meat 	processing 	industries.
This 	prescription 	does 	not, 	however, 	necessarily 	translate
into 	support 	for 	the 	proposed 	rule. 	Rather, 	it 	leads 	to 	the
20 	The maximum calcium content of MSP 	is, 	however, 	regulated.
21 	For 	example, 	consumers 	may 	switch 	between 	bologna 	and
turkey 	bologna 	depending 	upon 	their 	relative 	prices.
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conclusion 	that, 	if 	all 	relevant 	aspects 	of 	MS(S) 	and 	MSP 	are
roughly 	comparable, 	then one 	or 	both of 	the 	regulatory 	schemes 	is
inappropriate. 22 	Depending 	upon 	the 	evidence 	collected 	in 	the
course 	of 	this 	proceeding, 	the 	FSIS 	may 	wish 	to 	consider 	a
unified 	regulatory 	approach 	to 	meat 	and poultry 	food 	products.
V. 	Conclusion
The 	FTC 	staff 	supports 	the 	FSIS 	in 	its 	reconsideration 	of
its 	MS(S) 	disclosure 	requirements. 	Our 	comment 	also 	identifies
information 	that 	the 	FSIS 	may 	wish 	to 	consider 	prior 	to 	resolving
the 	issues 	raised 	by 	the 	Notice 	of 	Proposed 	Rulemaking.
Specifically, 	we 	recommend 	the 	consideration 	of 	market 	and
consumer 	survey 	information 	to 	analyse 	the 	rationales 	underlying
the 	proposed 	regulatory 	change 	and 	the 	disclosure 	requirements
that 	are 	in place 	today.
22 	For 	example, 	while 	it 	is 	conceivable 	that 	there 	is 	no
compelling 	need 	for 	requiring 	disclosure 	of 	either 	MS(S) 	or 	MSP,
it 	is 	also 	possible 	that 	a 	potential 	market 	failure 	can 	be 	found
to 	justify 	imposing 	the 	current 	MS(S) 	regulatory 	scheme 	on 	MSP.
Yet 	another 	alternative 	is 	that 	the 	disclosure 	rules 	for 	MS (S)
may 	deserve 	to 	be 	relaxed 	while 	new 	rules 	for 	MSP 	may 	need 	to 	be
promulgated.
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