Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr. v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court: CV-20-900690).

Rel: September 6, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2024

_________________________

SC-2023-0603
_________________________

Sheri Sawyer, as the personal representative of the Estate of
Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr., deceased

v.

Cooper Tire & Rubber Company

Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CV-20-900690)

COOK, Justice.

This is a product-liability action. Sheri Sawyer ("Sawyer"), as the
SC-2023-0603

personal representative of the Estate of Thomas Randall Sawyer, Jr.,

deceased, sued Cooper Tire & Rubber Company in the Mobile Circuit

Court following a single-vehicle accident in Mobile County, in which her

son, Thomas, was killed. The accident occurred after one of the tires on

the vehicle in which Thomas was a passenger experienced a tread

separation. The tire was allegedly manufactured by Cooper Tire and

purchased in Alabama by Barbara Coggin ("Coggin"), an Alabama

resident and the mother of the driver, Joseph Daniel Coggin, who was

also an Alabama resident.

Cooper Tire moved to dismiss Sawyer's action for lack of specific

personal jurisdiction based on its lack of sufficient suit-related contacts

with Alabama. In other words, Cooper Tire argued that Alabama courts

do not have authority to decide Sawyer's claims.

In response to that motion, Sawyer argued that her claims against

Cooper Tire -- a national tire manufacturer with a significant dealer

network in Alabama -- "arise out of or relate to" its contacts with

Alabama, which, she argued, were established through its sale,

distribution, and advertising of the particular tire model at issue in

Alabama.

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SC-2023-0603

While Cooper Tire's motion was pending, the United States

Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth

Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), in which it recognized that,

in a product-liability action, a forum state may exercise specific personal

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant even when there is not a direct

causal relationship between the defendant's contacts with the forum

state and the injury. The Court explained that jurisdiction can exist if

the claim " ' arise[s] out of or relate[s] to' " the defendant's contacts with

the forum state. Ford, 592 U.S. at 362 (citations omitted). The Court

wrote that a claim that "relates to" a defendant's contacts with a forum

state could include circumstances in which the defendant "systematically

served a market in [the forum state] for the very [product] that the

plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them" in that state, even

when the plaintiffs cannot show that the defective product was purchased

there. Id. at 365.

Afterward, the parties filed supplemental briefing addressing Ford,

and the trial court proceeded with holding a hearing on Cooper Tire's

motion to dismiss. Following that hearing, the trial court granted Cooper

Tire's motion. Among other things, the trial court concluded that it could

3
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not exercise personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire because (1) Sawyer

had failed to show that Cooper Tire had sold, distributed, and marketed

the particular tire model at issue in Alabama in the three years before

the underlying accident and (2) Sawyer and her son were not Alabama

residents and, thus, Alabama had "less of an interest" in providing a

forum for her action against an out-of-state defendant. Sawyer appealed.

As explained below, we conclude that the Supreme Court's decision

in Ford is binding in this case. After applying the analytical framework

from Ford to the facts in this case, we hold that Cooper Tire's unrefuted

sale, distribution, and advertising in Alabama of the particular tire model

at issue "relate to" Sawyer's claims against it and, thus, that specific

personal jurisdiction exists in this case. As a result, we further hold that

the trial court's findings concerning the timing of Cooper Tire's contacts

with Alabama before the underlying accident and Sawyer's place of

residency are not dispositive of the jurisdictional question here. We

therefore reverse the trial court's judgment dismissing Sawyer's action

and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Facts and Procedural History

I. The Accident and the Underlying Lawsuit

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On March 31, 2018, Thomas, a Florida resident, was traveling

through Mobile County in a 2004 GMC Envoy driven by Joseph. As

stated previously, the Envoy was owned by Joseph's mother, who had

purchased the vehicle, including its tires, in Alabama.

During the trip, the vehicle's right rear tire -- a CS4 Touring tire,

size P235/65R17 ("the subject tire") -- experienced a tread separation. As

a result, it instantly became "unstable and uncontrollable," and, as

Joseph attempted to steady it, the vehicle struck a ditch and flipped over.

Thomas died in the crash.

On March 24, 2020, Sawyer, a Florida resident and the personal

representative of Thomas's estate, filed suit against Cooper Tire in the

Mobile Circuit Court.1 In her complaint, Sawyer alleged a series of

product-liability, negligence, wrongful-death, and breach-of-warranty

claims against Cooper Tire for which she sought damages.

Sawyer alleged that Cooper Tire was subject to personal

jurisdiction in Alabama because, she said, her claims "relate to Cooper

Tire's contacts with the State of Alabama." Among other things, her

1Sawyer also sued Joseph. However, he was later dismissed from

the action and, thus, is not a party to this appeal.
5
SC-2023-0603

complaint alleged:

"5. Defendant Cooper Tire is a for-profit corporation, which
was engaged in business in the State of Alabama through the
distribution of its products in the stream of commerce, and
whose defective product did injure [Thomas] in the State of
Alabama. Defendant Cooper Tire manufactured, assembled,
marketed, warranted and placed in the stream of commerce
the Cooper CS4 Touring tire P235/65R17 ('Subject Tire')
which caused harm and injury to [Thomas] in the State of
Alabama.

"6. Cooper Tire sells its passenger and light truck tires,
including the Subject Tire Model, to distributors and retailers
throughout the State of Alabama.

"7. According to the Cooper Tire website, Cooper Tire
maintains a tire dealer network comprised of approximately
324 Cooper Tire dealers across 117 cities throughout the State
of Alabama.

"….

"9. Cooper Tire actively collected warranty information and
tire failure data within the State of Alabama from Alabama
consumers. Cooper Tire uses this information when creating
and modifying the design of its tires, including the failed
Subject Tire.

"….

"12. Cooper Tire conducted extensive advertising and
marketing campaigns for its passenger and light truck tires,
including the Subject Tire model, that reached consumers in
the State of Alabama and connected Alabama consumers with
the closest Cooper Tire dealer.

"13. Cooper Tire's advertising also includes Cooper Tire
6
SC-2023-0603

sponsorship for the Southeastern Conference (SEC)
Basketball tournament for the University of Alabama
collegiate basketball program; Cooper Tire sponsorship for
the 'Cooper Tire Performer of the Week' for the University of
Alabama collegiate sports program; Cooper Tire sponsorship
for an Alabama football blog; Cooper Tire sponsorship of the
Bassmaster Elite Series, which is headquartered in the State
of Alabama; and Cooper Tire sponsorship for the Paul
Finebaum sports talk show, which broadcasts in the State of
Alabama. …"

(Emphasis added.) Her complaint also alleged the following:

"111. At all materials times, Cooper Tire has collectively been
engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of
automobile tires and has sold, distributed, and otherwise
place[d] such products into the stream of commerce in the
state of Alabama.

"112. Prior to the date of the incident giving rise to this
litigation, Cooper Tire had manufactured, sold, and
distributed automobile tires into [the stream of] commerce in
the state of Alabama having the following specifications: a
Cooper Tire tubeless radial bearing the name Cooper Tire CS4
Touring P235/65R17."

(Emphasis added.)

II. Cooper Tire's Motion to Dismiss

On August 21, 2020, Cooper Tire moved to dismiss Sawyer's claims

against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because it was undisputed that

Cooper Tire was not subject to general personal jurisdiction in Alabama,

Cooper Tire's motion focused on the arguments for why specific personal

7
SC-2023-0603

jurisdiction did not exist for the claims by Sawyer. 2

In its motion, Cooper Tire admitted that it was "like many

companies whose products are placed into the stream of commerce and

distributed nationally" and that it had purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting business in Alabama. However, relying on

Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114 (Ala. 2016),

in which a plurality of our Court held that specific personal jurisdiction

cannot be exercised when an allegedly defective product is not sold in

Alabama by the out-of-state defendant, Cooper Tire asserted that Sawyer

had neither pleaded nor shown that it had sold the subject tire on

Coggin's vehicle in Alabama. In other words, Cooper Tire argued that

there was not a direct causal connection between its contacts with

2Specifically, it was undisputed by the parties that the trial court

could not exercise general personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire because
Cooper Tire is incorporated in Delaware and has its principal place of
business in Ohio. See Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d
1144, 1149 (Ala. 2022) (recognizing that a defendant is subject to general
personal jurisdiction only in states where it is "essentially at home" and
explaining that, for a corporate defendant, that typically means only the
state in which the defendant is incorporated and the state in which it has
its principal place of business (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011), and Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571
U.S. 117, 139 & n.19 (2014))).

8
SC-2023-0603

Alabama and the claims in this lawsuit. Accordingly, Cooper Tire argued

that Sawyer had failed to meet her burden of establishing that the trial

court could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over it and, thus, that

her claims against it were due to be dismissed.

In support of its motion, Cooper Tire attached the affidavit of Nicole

K. Schwieterman, who was the corporate counsel for the company. In her

affidavit, Schwieterman stated that she was familiar with Cooper Tire's

business operations and admitted that, for the years 2017, 2018, and

2019, "approximately 1% of Cooper Tire's nationwide unit sales were

made in Alabama." Although she admitted that Cooper Tire

manufactured the CS4 Touring tire P235/65R17, she explained that the

CS4 Touring tire was made by Cooper Tire only from 2007-2014 and was

never sold to General Motors -- the manufacturer of the 2004 GMC Envoy

involved in the underlying accident. She also noted that Sawyer's

complaint did not provide the Department of Transportation tire-

identification number of the subject tire so that Cooper Tire could verify

(1) whether it had manufactured that tire or (2) when and where that tire

had been manufactured.

On October 21, 2020, Sawyer filed an opposition to Cooper Tire's

9
SC-2023-0603

motion and served Cooper Tire with a jurisdictional discovery request to

help establish the existence of the contacts between Cooper Tire and

Alabama. 3

However, after filing the above documents, Sawyer notified the trial

court that the exact jurisdictional issue raised by Cooper Tire was

pending before the United States Supreme Court in Ford Motor Co. v.

Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021). Given the

factual and legal similarities between Ford and the present case, Sawyer

asked the trial court to defer ruling on Cooper Tire's motion until after

the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford. 4

3In that request, Sawyer asked Cooper Tire to, among other things:

(1) disclose how many CS4 Touring tires were sold annually in Alabama
between 2017 and 2019 and (2) disclose the total sales of that type of tire
in Alabama. Sawyer also asked Cooper Tire to "[p]roduce all written
agreements concerning advertising funds related to the marketing or
advertisements of Cooper products in Alabama to the extent that such
agreements were in force at any time from 2015 to the present and were
either executed in Alabama or agreed by persons or corporate entities in
Alabama." Finally, Sawyer asked Cooper Tire to admit that, in the last
three years, it had advertised in Alabama and collected adjustment
and/or tire-failure data about tires that had failed or had been returned
in Alabama.

4Among other things, Sawyer attached to her request a copy of the

transcript from the oral argument held by the Supreme Court in the
Ford.

10
SC-2023-0603

On October 23, 2020, the trial court issued an order in which it

agreed to defer ruling on Cooper Tire's motion until after the Supreme

Court issued its decision in Ford. It also agreed to stay further discovery

in the action pending its final ruling on Cooper Tire's motion.

III. The Supreme Court's Decision in Ford

On March 25, 2021, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ford.

In the consolidated suits at issue in Ford, as explained in detail below,

two plaintiffs had been injured in vehicles manufactured by Ford. Ford

moved to dismiss those suits on the basis that the forum states lacked

personal jurisdiction over it because the subject vehicles were not

originally sold in the forum states.

The Supreme Court rejected Ford's assertion, emphasizing that

jurisdiction can exist if injuries either " ' arise out of or relate to' " the

defendant's forum contacts. Id. at 362 (citations omitted). Because Ford

conducted so much business in the forum states and because those

activities "related to" the plaintiffs' claims against it -- including

marketing, selling, and servicing "the very vehicles that the plaintiffs

allege[d] malfunctioned and injured them in those States" -- the Supreme

Court held that it was fair and foreseeable for the courts in the forum

11
SC-2023-0603

states to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford. Id. at 365.

IV. The Parties' Supplemental Briefing in Light of Ford

Following the issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in Ford, on

January 27, 2022, both parties filed supplemental briefs on the impact of

the Ford decision. In support of her supplemental brief, Sawyer attached,

among other things, a copy of a portion of Joseph's deposition, a copy of

the accident report, and a copy of the "Carfax" report showing that the

2004 GMC Envoy's ownership history, maintenance history, and accident

history all occurred in Alabama.

V. The Trial Court's Order Directing the Parties to Conduct Limited
Discovery

After the parties submitted their supplemental briefs, on May 26,

2022, the trial court held a hearing during which it heard arguments

from the parties regarding the impact of the Ford decision as well as the

need for additional jurisdictional discovery. Following that hearing, on

May 27, 2022, the trial court issued an order in which it directed the

parties to conduct limited discovery to establish (1) the state in which the

subject tire was purchased and (2) whether, in 2015, 2016, 2017, and/or

2018, Cooper Tire generally sold the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama.

Neither party raised any objections to the trial court's order.
12
SC-2023-0603

On June 16, 2022, Sawyer's counsel filed a copy of an affidavit from

Coggin, Joseph's mother. Coggin's affidavit stated, among other things,

that she was the owner of the 2004 GMC Envoy involved in the

underlying accident and that she had "purchased the subject tire at issue

in this lawsuit" in Alabama. She further stated that "[a]ny tire [she] ever

purchased for the 2004 GMC Envoy was purchased in the State of

Alabama" and that "[a]ll maintenance for the 2004 GMC Envoy was done

exclusively in the State of Alabama." Although she stated that she "[could

not] be certain as to where and when the subject tire was purchased," she

also stated that she "routinely purchased tires from A1 Tire Store located

in Semmes, Alabama or the Wal-Mart store located in Semmes,

Alabama" and that "[t]hese locations sell Cooper Tires."

Cooper Tire then filed a copy of an affidavit from Craig Marks, the

"Lead Professional for Distribution & Operations Planning" for Cooper

Tire. In his affidavit, Marks explained (1) that Cooper Tire did not sell

the CS4 Touring tire as "original equipment to GM" -- the manufacturer

of Coggin's vehicle -- and (2) that, although Cooper Tire "shipped

approximately 5,000 Cooper CS4 Touring size P235/65R17 tires to other

states from 2015-2018, including California, Texas, New York, and

13
SC-2023-0603

Pennsylvania," it "did not ship any of those tires to Alabama." (Emphasis

added.) Marks further explained that he had "reviewed the shipping

records with ship-to addresses in Alabama and located no records

indicating that Cooper tire shipped any tires of any brand or size to either

the A-1 Tire store in Semmes, Alabama or the Wal-Mart in Semmes,

Alabama from 2015-2018."

In addition to Marks's affidavit, Cooper Tire also submitted a copy

of the GMC Envoy's "Alabama Vehicle Title History," which purported to

show that Coggin had purchased the vehicle in Alabama in 2016.

VI. The Trial Court's Judgment Granting Cooper Tire's Motion to
Dismiss

Following a final hearing on Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss, on

October 18, 2022, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed

Sawyer's claims against Cooper Tire after concluding that it lacked

specific personal jurisdiction over the company.

In support of its decision, the trial court discussed at length the

Supreme Court's recent decision in Ford, supra, as well as this Court's

prior decision in Hinrichs, supra, and the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama's decision in Tyler v. Ford Motor Co.

(Case No. 2:20-CV-584-WKW, Nov. 17, 2021) (M.D. Ala. 2021) (not
14
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reported in Federal Supplement) (judgment vacated), and explained that

its "specific jurisdictional analysis must focus on whether Cooper Tire's

suit-related contacts create a substantial connection with Alabama."

Applying the jurisdictional principles of those cases to the facts of this

case, the trial court found:

"In this case, a non-resident plaintiff alleges her non-resident
decedent suffered an in-state injury caused by an allegedly
defective tire manufactured by Cooper Tire. The specific
Subject Tire was purchased by Barbara Coggin in Alabama,
but there is no evidence Cooper Tire distributed or sold that
tire in Alabama. The evidence is Cooper Tire manufactured
approximately 5,000 of the Cooper CS4 Touring size
[P]235/65R17 tires during 2015-2018. [5] The record reflects
that all of those tires were shipped to states other than
Alabama. The record also reflects that Cooper Tire neither
sold nor shipped to Alabama any Cooper CS4 Touring
[P]235/65R17 tires from 2015-2018. Alabama also has less of
an interest in asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant to provide a forum for an out-of-state plaintiff than
if the plaintiff was an Alabama resident.

"For all these reasons, [Sawyer] has not met her burden
of showing that the connection between [her] claims and
Cooper Tire's activities in Alabama is close enough to support

5In its judgment, the trial court explained that both the "Carfax"

report submitted by Sawyer and the certified "Alabama Vehicle Title
History" submitted by Cooper Tire showed that Coggin had purchased
the 2004 GMC Envoy in Alabama in early 2016 and that the accident
took place in March 2018. Based on that information as well as some of
Sawyer's prior discovery requests, the trial court stated that it considered
2015-2018 to be the "relevant timeframe" for the purposes of evaluating
Cooper Tire's personal-jurisdiction claim.
15
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specific jurisdiction. It therefore is the JUDGMENT of this
Court that Cooper Tire's Motion to Dismiss … should be and
is hereby GRANTED."

(Capitalization in original; emphasis added.)

After the trial court issued its judgment, Sawyer filed a motion to

alter, amend, or vacate the judgment which was later denied. This appeal

followed.

Standard of Review

"A Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion tests the [trial] court's

exercise of personal jurisdiction." Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co.

v. Allen, 143 So. 3d 784, 787 (Ala. 2014). It is well settled that " ' " [a]n

appellate court considers de novo a trial court's judgment on a party's

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction." ' " Id. (quoting Ex

parte Lagrone, 839 So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Elliott v.

Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 2002)).

Discussion

On appeal, Sawyer contends the trial court erred in granting

Cooper Tire's motion to dismiss on the basis that it lacked specific

personal jurisdiction over the company.

I. Alabama's Long-Arm Rule Extends Long-Arm Jurisdiction to
the "Fullest Extent" Under Federal Constitutional Law
16
SC-2023-0603

Our personal-jurisdiction law is coextensive with federal law, and

thus we are bound to apply Ford. Our Court has recently reiterated that

"[a]n Alabama court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant served

out of state … if doing so is consistent with due process and Rule 4.2(b),

Ala. R. Civ. P., which serves the function of Alabama's 'long-arm

statute.' " Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1148

(Ala. 2022). 6 That rule "extends long-arm jurisdiction to the fullest extent

consistent with due process under the United States and Alabama

Constitutions." Id. (emphasis added).

II. Personal-Jurisdiction Allegations in a Complaint Must be Taken
as True Unless Controverted by Affidavit Testimony from the
Defendant

The parties' respective burdens in a case testing personal

jurisdiction are well settled in Alabama:

" ' " 'The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the trial court
has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' " ' Ex parte

6Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in relevant part:

"An appropriate basis exists for service of process outside of
this state upon a person or entity in any action in this state
when the person or entity has such contacts with this state
that the prosecution of the action against the person or entity
in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this
state or the Constitution of the United States ...."

17
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McNeese Title, LLC, 82 So. 3d 670, 674 (Ala. 2011) (quoting
Ex parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103 (Ala. 2010),
quoting in turn J.C. Duke & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v.
West, 991 So. 2d 194, 196 (Ala. 2008), citing in turn Ex parte
Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226 (Ala. 2004)).

" ' " ' "In considering a
Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ.
P., motion to dismiss for
want of personal
jurisdiction, a court must
consider as true the
allegations of the plaintiff's
complaint not controverted
by the defendant's
affidavits, Robinson v.
Giarmarco & Bill, P.C., 74
F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996),
and Cable/Home
Communication Corp. v.
Network Productions, Inc.,
902 F.2d 829 (11th Cir.
1990), and 'where the
plaintiff's complaint and
the defendant's affidavits
conflict, the ... court must
construe all reasonable
inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.' Robinson, 74 F.3d
at 255 (quoting Madara v.
Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514
(11th Cir. 1990))." '

" ' "Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck &
Equip., Inc., 853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala.
2002) (quoting Ex parte McInnis, 820
So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)). However,
if the defendant makes a prima facie
18
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evidentiary showing that the Court has
no personal jurisdiction, 'the plaintiff is
then required to substantiate the
jurisdictional allegations in the
complaint by affidavits or other
competent proof, and he may not
merely reiterate the factual allegations
in the complaint.' Mercantile Capital,
LP v. Federal Transtel, Inc., 193 F.
Supp. 2d 1243, 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2002)
(citing Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF
Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249
(11th Cir. 2000)). See also Hansen v.
Neumueller GmbH, 163 F.R.D. 471,
474-75 (D. Del. 1995) ('When a
defendant files a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), and
supports that motion with affidavits,
plaintiff is required to controvert those
affidavits with his own affidavits or
other competent evidence in order to
survive the motion.') (citing Time
Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic
Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir.
1984))."

" 'Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d
226, 229-30 (Ala. 2004).' "

Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 3d at 787-88 (quoting Ex

parte Excelsior Fin., Inc., 42 So. 3d 96, 103 (Ala. 2010)) (emphasis added).

In sum, the allegations of the complaint govern unless controverted by

affidavits from the defendant.

III. Specific-Personal-Jurisdiction Legal Principles
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Our Court's precedent has been consistent with past Supreme

Court precedent on personal jurisdiction. For instance, we have recently

stated the following with regard to the degree of contacts that must exist

for a trial court to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-

state defendant:

"The touchstone of specific jurisdiction is whether the
defendant has ' "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State." ' Ford Motor Co.
[v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.], 592 U.S. [351] at 352, 141
S. Ct. [1017] at 1024 [(2021)] (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). …
Crucially, specific jurisdiction must be based on ' "the
defendant's contacts with the forum state that are related to
the cause of action" ' in the suit at hand, and, though these
contacts ' "need not be continuous and systematic," ' they must
be substantial enough that the defendant could fairly
anticipate a suit in the forum state. [Elliott v. VanKleef, 830
So. 2d 726] at 730 [(Ala. 2002)] (quoting Ex parte Phase III
Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J.,
concurring in the result)); see also Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.
277, 284, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (stressing that
'the defendant's suit-related conduct must create a
substantial connection with the forum State' (emphasis
added))."

Pruitt, 358 So. 3d at 1149-50 (first emphasis added).

A. Our Court's Decision in Hinrichs v. General Motors of
Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114 (Ala. 2016)

However, in 2016, a plurality of our Court, in Hinrichs, appeared to

narrow the circumstances in which an out-of-state defendant's contacts
20
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with Alabama are deemed to "arise out of or relate to" an action. Cooper

Tire and the trial court relied, at least in part, on Hinrichs. Because

Sawyer asks that we overrule this plurality decision and because it is one

of the most recent cases with some of the most extensive analysis of the

"stream of commerce" test by our Court before Ford, we must discuss it.

In Hinrichs, Daniel Vinson purchased a vehicle in Pennsylvania

that had been manufactured by General Motors of Canada, Ltd. ("GM

Canada"). GM Canada manufactured vehicles for General Motors

Corporation, its parent company, to distribute to all 50 states in the

United States. Hinrichs suffered serious injuries in an automobile

accident in Alabama while he was a passenger in a GMC Sierra pickup

truck driven by Vinson.

Hinrichs thereafter brought a product-liability action against GM

Canada. GM Canada moved to dismiss Hinrichs's complaint based on a

lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted that motion.

On appeal, determining whether Alabama could exercise personal

jurisdiction over GM Canada, this Court considered

"whether a stream-of-commerce analysis consistent with
existing precedent can be applied to uphold specific
jurisdiction over GM Canada under the facts of this case. The
starting point of the stream of commerce in this case is GM
21
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Canada's anticipation of the presence of its vehicles in all 50
states, necessarily including Alabama. But it is undisputed
that the stream of commerce for the [GMC] Sierra [pickup
truck] ended at its sale in Pennsylvania, approximately 1,000
miles from Alabama.

"....

"Although existing Supreme Court precedent on stream
of commerce as a basis for specific jurisdiction is not a model
of clarity, it is clear that a majority of the United States
Supreme Court has yet to hold that foreseeability alone is
sufficient to subject a nonresident defendant to specific
jurisdiction in the forum state. This conclusion is consistent
with a law-review article quoted with approval in Daimler[
AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014),] describing International
Shoe [Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),] as clearly not
saying that 'dispute-blind' jurisdiction is appropriate in cases
involving specific jurisdiction. 571 U.S. at 138, 134 S. Ct. at
761.

"In Walden [v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014),] the United
States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on
specific jurisdiction and the first case in many years to garner
a unanimous Court on the subject, the Supreme Court
emphatically underscored the requirement that the claim
against the defendant have a suit-related nexus with the
forum state before specific jurisdiction can attach. The
Walden Court left no room for any exceptions. 'For a State to
exercise [specific] jurisdiction consistent with due process, the
defendant's suit-related conduct must create a substantial
connection with the forum State.' 571 U.S. at 284, 134 S. Ct.
at 1121 (emphasis added). Vinson, the owner of the vehicle in
which Hinrichs was injured, brought the Sierra to Alabama.
However, Vinson's ' " unilateral activity of [bringing the Sierra
to Alabama, in which GM Canada did not participate,] is not
an appropriate consideration when determining whether a
defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify
22
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an assertion of jurisdiction." ' 571 U.S. at 284, 134 S. Ct. at
1122 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404
(1984))."

Hinrichs, 222 So. 3d at 1138-40 (all but final emphasis added).

In upholding the trial court's conclusion that it did not have specific

personal jurisdiction over GM Canada, a plurality of this Court stated

that "there simply is no 'suit-related conduct' that creates a substantial

connection between GM Canada and Alabama if the vehicle was not sold

in Alabama, even though Hinrichs was injured in Alabama." 222 So. 3d

at 1141 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). In other words,

a plurality of our Court held that it is only when the defective product is

sold in Alabama and that contact results in the plaintiff's injury that

specific personal jurisdiction can be exercised over the out-of-state

defendant.

B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Ford

Five years after our decision in Hinrichs, the Supreme Court

decided Ford. As explained previously, in that case, two plaintiffs were

injured in vehicles manufactured by Ford, and the undisputed facts

showed that the vehicles involved in the accidents -- a 1996 Explorer and

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a 1994 Crown Victoria -- were originally sold outside the forum states.7

Those vehicles were eventually resold as used cars to the current owners

in Minnesota and Montana.

Ford moved to dismiss those suits on the basis that the forum states

lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Although Ford did not dispute that

(1) it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting

activities in both forum states and (2) it did substantial business in both

forum states, including advertising, selling, and servicing the same

models as the vehicles that the suits claimed were defective, it

nevertheless argued that each state court had jurisdiction over it only if

the company's conduct in those states had directly given rise to the

plaintiff's claims. According to Ford, that causal link could be established

only if the company had designed, manufactured, or sold the specific

vehicles involved in the accidents in the forum states. Because the

plaintiffs in each case could not make such a showing, Ford asserted that

their lawsuits against it were due to be dismissed.

The trial courts in each forum state denied Ford's motion. The

7One vehicle was originally sold in Washington and the other in

North Dakota.
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Supreme Court later granted certiorari review to consider whether Ford

was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Minnesota and Montana.8

In its certiorari petition, Ford relied heavily on Bristol-Myers

Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, 582

U.S. 255 (2017). In Bristol-Myers, a large number of purchasers of an

allegedly defective drug sued the drug manufacturer in California state

court. Some of those purchasers were residents of California who had

purchased the drug in California. However, many of the plaintiffs were

residents of other states who had purchased and ingested the drug. The

Supreme Court concluded that the claims of those nonresidents, for

injuries suffered outside California, based upon sales made outside

California, did not "arise out of or relate to" the drug manufacturer's

contacts with California because those claims were for injuries and sales

that took place outside California. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in

Bristol Myers held that there was no specific personal jurisdiction over

the drug manufacturer as to the nonresidents' claims. 582 U.S. at 265-

8The Supreme Court did not address whether Ford could have been

subject to the general personal jurisdiction of those courts because, it
noted, the parties agreed that general personal jurisdiction would attach
only in Delaware or Michigan -- the states in which Ford was organized
and had its principal place of business. 592 U.S. at 359.
25
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66.

Ford reasoned that Bristol-Myers precluded jurisdiction when the

defective product is sold outside the forum State, "even if the defendant

regularly sold 'the same kind of product' in the State." Ford, 592 U.S. at

369 (quoting Ford's reply brief at 2). According to Ford, because the

particular vehicles involved in the accidents were not designed,

manufactured, or first sold in the states where the plaintiffs' injuries

occurred, the necessary "causal link" between it and the forum states

could not be established and, thus, the forum states could not exercise

specific personal jurisdiction over it.

In considering Ford's argument, the Supreme Court first explained

that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the basis

of the personal-jurisdiction doctrine and that it "limits a state court's

power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant." 592 U.S. at 358. The

Court quoted the foundational case of International Shoe Co. v.

Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), to explain how the Due Process Clause

balances (1) fairness to the defendant, (2) reasonableness, and (3) respect

for each state's authority in our federalist system, stating: "[A] tribunal's

authority depends on the defendant's having such 'contacts' with the

26
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forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is 'reasonable, in the

context of our federal system of government,' and 'does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " 592 U.S. at 358

(quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17) (emphasis added).

In applying this test, the Supreme Court then explained that a

defendant must have, at least, purposefully availed itself of the privilege

of doing business in the forum state. According to the Supreme Court,

this is normally determined by looking to see whether the "contacts"

between the defendant and the forum state are of a sufficient nature and

whether they are the result of the "defendant's own choice" and are not

merely " ' random, isolated, or fortuitous.' " 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting

Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)). In other

words, the defendant "must take 'some act by which [it] purposefully

avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum

State.' " 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253

(1958)). See also International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (explaining that a

defendant must "have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state]

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice' " (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.

27
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457, 463 (1940))).

One example of such purposeful availment, the Supreme Court

noted, can be the defendant's cultivating a market, that is " ' exploi[ting]

a market' in the forum State or entering a contractual relationship

centered there." Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 285)

(emphasis added).

Since Ford conceded that it had purposefully availed itself of the

privilege of conducting business in the forum states, the Supreme Court's

analysis focused on the next step of the specific-personal-jurisdiction

analysis -- that is, whether a sufficient affiliation existed between the

forum states, Ford, and the underlying controversies. The Supreme Court

in Ford explained that in Bristol-Myers, although the defendant had sold

the same product (Plavix) in the forum state (California), the claims of

the plaintiffs who resided in other states did not have any connection to

California. In other words, there was simply no "activity or occurrence"

that took place in California connected to those nonresident plaintiffs.

592 U.S. at 369 (quoting Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 265) (explaining that

" ' [w]hat is needed -- and what is missing here -- is a connection between

the forum and the specific claims at issue' " ).

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Ford's argument focused on the language from Bristol-Myers,

quoted above by the Supreme Court, requiring that the suit " ' arise out of

or relate to the defendant's contacts' with the forum." Id. at 359 (quoting

Bristol-Myers, 582 U.S. at 256). In Ford's view, this meant that

jurisdiction could attach only in those states "where Ford sold the car[s]

in question, or else the States where Ford designed and manufactured

the vehicle[s]." Id. at 361. Because none of those things occurred in

Montana or Minnesota, Ford maintained that those states "have no

power over these cases." Id.

The Supreme Court squarely rejected Ford's causation-only

approach and wrote that such an approach "finds no support in this

Court's requirement of a 'connection' between a plaintiff's suit and a

defendant's activities." Id. (quoting Bristol Myers, 582 U.S. at 256).

Further, the Supreme Court noted that "[n]one of [its] precedents has

suggested that only a strict causal relationship between the defendant's

in-state activity and the litigation will do." Id. at 362.

Instead, the Court emphasized that the phrase "arise out of or

relate to" can also be satisfied if there is a sufficient " ' " affiliation between

the forum and the underlying controversy." ' " Id. at 359 (citations

29
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omitted). Specifically, the Supreme Court explained:

"The first half of that standard ['arise out of'] asks about
causation; but the back half, after the 'or[]' ['relate to,']
contemplates that some relationships will support
jurisdiction without a causal showing. That does not mean
anything goes. In the sphere of specific jurisdiction, the
phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits, as it must to
adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum. But again,
we have never framed the specific jurisdiction inquiry as
always requiring proof of causation -- i.e., proof that the
plaintiff's claim came about because of the defendant's in-
state conduct. See also Bristol-Myers, 582 U. S., at 261-62
(quoting Goodyear [Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown],
564 U.S. [915] at 919 [(2011)] (asking whether there is 'an
affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,'
without demanding that the inquiry focus on cause)."

Id. at 362 (emphasis added). In other words, even if there is no direct

causal link between the defendant's conduct in the forum state and the

plaintiff's claims, the Supreme Court explained that jurisdiction may still

exist so long as the claims are sufficiently "relate[d] to" the defendant's

conduct in the forum state.

Although the evidence affirmatively showed that Ford had sold the

subject vehicles in states other than the forum states, it also showed that

Ford had engaged in extensive activities in the forum states related to

those specific model vehicles. Id. at 357. Specifically, the Supreme Court

noted that (1) Ford had sold more than 2,000 of the exact models and

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years of the vehicles involved in the accidents at issue through

dealerships in the forum states; (2) Ford had, "[b]y every means

imaginable," urged residents of the forum states to buy its vehicles,

including through billboard ads, TV and radio commercials, print ads,

and direct mail; and (3) Ford had encouraged the forum states' citizens

to become "lifelong Ford drivers" through its ongoing marketing of

maintenance and repair services. Id. at 365.

The Court wrote that it "has stated that specific jurisdiction

attaches in cases identical to the ones here -- when a company like Ford

serves a market for a product in the forum State and the product

malfunctions there." Id. at 363 (emphasis added). This is so, the Supreme

Court explained, because, "when a corporation has 'continuously and

deliberately exploited [a State's] market, it must reasonably anticipate

being haled into [that State's] court[s]' to defend actions 'based on'

products causing injury there." Id. at 364 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at

781) (emphasis added).

Thus, despite Ford's not having sold the particular vehicles

involved in the accidents in the forum states, the Supreme Court

concluded that Ford had conducted business in those states by, "among

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other things, advertising, selling, and servicing the model of vehicle[s]

the suit[s] claim[] [are] defective," id. at 355 (emphasis added), and that

those contacts were sufficient to create a "strong 'relationship among the

defendant, the forum[s], and the litigation' -- the 'essential foundation' of

specific jurisdiction," id. (citations omitted).

The Court emphasized that "Ford had systematically served a

market" in the forum states "for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs

allege[d] malfunctioned and injured them in those States." Id. at 365

(emphasis added). This was different, the Supreme Court noted, from

Bristol-Myers, in which that Court had found jurisdiction to be improper

because "the forum State, and the defendant's activities there, lacked any

connection to the [nonresident] plaintiffs' claims." Id. at 369.

Because Ford had cultivated the market in the forum states and

because those activities related to the plaintiffs' claims against it, the

Supreme Court held that it was foreseeable for the courts in the forum

states to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford for injuries

caused by those products in those states:

"An automaker regularly marketing a vehicle in a State …
has 'clear notice' that it will be subject to jurisdiction in the
State's courts when the product malfunctions there
(regardless where it is first sold). [World-Wide Volkswagen
32
SC-2023-0603

Corp. v. Woodson,] 444 U.S. [286], at 297 [(1980)]. … Precisely
because that exercise of jurisdiction is so reasonable, it is also
predictable -- and thus allows Ford to 'structure [its] primary
conduct' to lessen or even avoid the costs of state-court
litigation. World-Wide Volkswagen, 44 U.S., at 297."

Id. at 368 (emphasis added).

Sawyer contends that the Supreme Court's reasoning and holding

in Ford renders our plurality decision in Hinrichs "no longer good law"

and that we should instead apply Ford's analytical framework to the

present case. Sawyer's brief at 37. With Ford now being the controlling

law on this issue, we agree with Sawyer that we must apply that

analytical framework to this case. In issuing Ford, the Supreme Court

has now clarified that, even when there is no direct causal link between

a plaintiff's claims and an out-of-state defendant's contacts with the

forum state, specific personal jurisdiction may still attach if the

defendant's contacts with the forum state "relate to" the plaintiff's cause

of action. As it currently stands, our plurality decision in Hinrichs is

inconsistent with Ford and is thus overruled. 9

9Although we overrule Hinrichs, we do not intend to overrule, or

even cast doubt on, the vast bulk of our personal-jurisdiction caselaw.
Our personal-jurisdiction caselaw is generally consistent with Ford. For
instance, as noted previously in this opinion, our Court has recently
accurately summarized the degree of contacts that must exist for a trial
33
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IV. Applying Ford to the Present Case

According to Sawyer, this case presents a straightforward

application of Ford. She argues that Cooper Tire's contacts with Alabama

"relate to" her cause of action because she alleged in her complaint that,

before the accident, Cooper Tire had cultivated a market for the CS4

Touring tire in Alabama and that her claims are related to Cooper Tire's

contacts with the State of Alabama because (1) Cooper Tire sold and

distributed that tire-- the exact type of tire that caused the accident

underlying her claims -- in Alabama through an authorized dealer

network, (2) Cooper Tire extensively advertised and marketed that same

model of tire in Alabama, and (3) the subject tire was purchased in

Alabama, by an Alabama resident, and the accident occurred in Alabama.

Sawyer also contends that the trial court's conclusion that Alabama has

less of an interest in providing a forum for an out-of-state plaintiff's

lawsuit against an out-of-state defendant is inconsistent with Ford, as

well as other well-settled United States Supreme Court precedent,

court to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. See
Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1149-50 (Ala.
2022). See also Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., 294 So. 3d 122, 130 (Ala. 2019).

34
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especially because the accident occurred in Alabama. Because Cooper

Tire failed to offer any affidavit testimony refuting those jurisdictional

allegations, Sawyer contends, the trial court's judgment is due to be

reversed.

In response, Cooper Tire makes two principal arguments to

distinguish Ford from the present case. First, it argues that it did not

sell the CS4 Touring tire, including the subject tire, in Alabama during

the "relevant timeframe" identified by the trial court and that this alone

defeats Sawyer's personal-jurisdiction arguments. Second, it argues

that, unlike the plaintiffs in Ford, Sawyer was not a resident of the forum

state -- Alabama. Thus, Cooper Tire asserts that there is nothing showing

that it had contacts with Alabama that "relate to" Sawyer's action.

A. The Trial Court's Decision to Designate 2015-2018 as the
"Relevant Timeframe" for its Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
in this Case is Unsupported by the Record

Before we apply the framework from Ford to the arguments being

made here, we must first determine if the trial court was correct in

finding that the "relevant timeframe" for analyzing Cooper Tire's

contacts with Alabama was 2015-2018. Sawyer argues that that

limitation is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Ford,

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which emphasized that Ford had sold "thousands" of the subject cars in

the forum states in the two decades leading up to the accidents at issue.

She also argues that this narrow focus "makes particularly little sense"

and runs the risk of creating odd results in cases similar to this one.

Sawyer's brief at 33.

Cooper Tire contends, however, that Sawyer conceded to the

designation of 2015-2018 as the relevant time frame for discovery in this

case. For example, Cooper Tire notes that in one of her interrogatories,

Sawyer asked: " ' [H]ow many Cooper CS4 touring tires sized P235/65R17

were sold annually in Alabama for 2017, 2018 and 2019?' " Cooper Tire's

brief at 39. Cooper Tire appears to contend that Sawyer's argument is, in

essence, waived and that, like the trial court, we too should confine our

personal-jurisdiction analysis to 2015-2018.

First, Cooper Tire does not provide this Court with citations to any

relevant legal authority that hold that the time frame either before or

after a manufacturer stops making a product should have any bearing on

whether the manufacturer had sufficient contacts with a forum state. See

Rule 28(b), Ala. R. App. P. (explaining that "[t]he brief of the appellee …

shall conform to the requirements of subdivisions (a)(1)-(12)," including

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the requirement under subdivision (a)(10) to provide "citations to the

cases … or other authorities … relied on" in support of a legal

proposition).

Likewise, we have been unable to locate any caselaw in this state

or elsewhere that appears to stand for this proposition. In fact, as noted

by Sawyer, the Supreme Court's decision in Ford includes facts that are

just the opposite of such a rule. In that case, the models of the subject

vehicles -- a 1996 Explorer and a 1994 Crown Victoria -- were

manufactured many years before the underlying accidents occurred in

2015. In fact, it appears that Ford had even ceased manufacturing the

Crown Victoria model before the accident occurred. 10 Had the Ford Court

applied a time frame similar to the one advocated by Cooper Tire (and

applied by the trial court), that decision almost certainly would have

come out the other way. In any event, adopting such a rule would be

illogical given that countless products, including car tires, often last

years after they are manufactured and can sit on the shelves of

10The accident involving the Crown Victoria at issue in Ford
occurred in 2015. See Bandemer v. Ford Motor Co., 931 N.W.2d 744, 748
(Minn. 2019). At the time of this decision, the following website indicated
that Ford had ceased manufacturing the Crown Victoria in 2011:
https://www.cars.com/research/ford-crown_victoria/
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distributors for years.

Cooper Tire also does not explain why only this "timeframe" is

"relevant" to the facts of the claims in this case. In any event, the facts

indicate otherwise. It appears undisputed that Coggin purchased the

subject tire in Alabama. It also appears undisputed that Cooper Tire

manufactured the subject tire and sold this same model of tire in

Alabama. Moreover, even if the subject tire had been sold in another

state first -- or even if it had been previously used -- the vehicles in Ford

were also sold first in another state and were previously used cars, but

the Supreme Court still found that personal jurisdiction existed.

Moreover, Cooper Tire's assertion that Sawyer conceded to 2015-

2018 as being the "relevant timeframe" for discovery in this case is not

supported by the record. Although the record reflects that Sawyer did ask

in one of her interrogatories the question identified by Cooper Tire, we

note that only the allegations made in Sawyer's complaint are what are

relevant to our personal-jurisdiction inquiry. The record shows that, in

paragraph 112 of her complaint, Sawyer specifically alleged that "[p]rior

to the date of the incident giving rise to this litigation, Cooper Tire had

manufactured, sold, and distributed automobile tires into [the stream of]

38
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commerce in the State of Alabama having the following specifications: a

Cooper Tire tubeless radial bearing the name Cooper Tire CS4 Touring

P235/65R17." (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the record before us

indicates that the parties agreed that the trial court could designate

2015-2018 as the "relevant timeframe" for evaluating whether Cooper

Tire had sufficient contacts with Alabama for the purpose of determining

specific personal jurisdiction. The trial court's application of such a time

frame is therefore unsupported by the record.

B. Cooper Tire's Contacts with the State of Alabama "Relate
to" Sawyer's Claims in this Action

Without any law or facts indicating that we must treat 2015-2018

as the "relevant timeframe" for jurisdictional purposes, we will examine

the allegations in Sawyer's complaint and Cooper Tire's affidavits to

determine if Sawyer's claims "relate to" Cooper Tire's contacts with the

State of Alabama under the Supreme Court's framework in Ford.

As noted above, Sawyer's complaint broadly alleged that Cooper

Tire had sold and distributed CS4 Touring tires in Alabama before the

underlying accident and that it was the sale and distribution of the

subject tire in Alabama that had caused her son's death. For instance, in

paragraph 112 of her complaint, Sawyer alleged: "Prior to the date of the

39
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incident … Cooper Tire had manufactured, sold, and distributed

automobile tires into [the stream of] commerce in the State of Alabama

having the following specifications: a Cooper Tire tubeless radial bearing

the name Cooper Tire CS4 Touring P235/65R17." In paragraph 5 of her

complaint, Sawyer specifically alleged: "Cooper Tire manufactured,

assembled, marketed, warranted and placed in the stream of commerce

the Cooper CS4 Touring tire P235/65R17 ('Subject Tire') which caused

harm and injury to [Thomas] in the State of Alabama." Likewise, in

paragraph 6 of her complaint, Sawyer alleged: "Cooper Tire sells its

passenger and light truck tires, including the Subject Tire Model, to

distributors and retailers throughout the State of Alabama." Finally, in

paragraph 7 of her complaint, Sawyer alleged: "Cooper Tire maintains a

tire dealer network comprised of approximately 324 Cooper Tire dealers

across 117 cities throughout the State of Alabama."

As explained previously, when considering a motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction, a trial court must consider as true the

allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that are "not controverted by the

defendant's affidavits," and, "where the plaintiff's complaint and the

defendant's affidavits conflict," the trial court "must construe all

40
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reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut.

Cas. Ins. Co., 143 So. 3d at 787-88 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted).

Although Cooper Tire presented affidavit testimony from two of its

employees -- Nicole K. Schwieterman and Craig Marks -- through which

it refuted some of Sawyer's jurisdictional allegations, it has never offered

any affidavit testimony disputing that it at one time sold or distributed

the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama. For example, although Schwieterman

and Marks dispute that Cooper Tire sold and distributed the CS4 Touring

tire in Alabama from 2015-2018, they do not dispute that, as Sawyer

alleges in her complaint, Cooper Tire sold and distributed that model tire

in Alabama before the underlying accident, which would necessarily

include the years before 2015.

Likewise, Cooper Tire never disputed -- even in its response brief in

this appeal -- that it maintains an extensive tire-dealer network

comprising of approximately 324 dealers across 117 cities throughout

Alabama. In fact, in her affidavit, Schwieterman acknowledged that

Cooper Tire's sales in Alabama are to independently owned businesses,

including distributors, dealers, or tire-service facilities. That admission

41
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bolsters Sawyer's allegations that Cooper Tire distributed the CS4

Touring tire in Alabama, as well as Coggin's statement in her affidavit

that she purchased the subject tire in Alabama.

Without such affidavit testimony by Cooper Tire, the trial court was

required to consider the unrefuted allegations in Sawyer's complaint

concerning Cooper Tire's sale and distribution of the CS4 Touring tire in

Alabama as true. Thus, the trial court's finding that there was no

"evidence" that Cooper Tire had sold and distributed the CS4 Touring

tire in Alabama incorrectly placed the burden for producing such

evidence on Sawyer when, under our well-settled standard, that burden

first rested on Cooper Tire.

But Sawyer alleged more than that Cooper Tire sold and

distributed the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama and that it maintained an

extensive authorized dealer network here. She also alleged that Cooper

Tire conducted extensive marketing and advertising of the CS4 Touring

tire in Alabama. In Ford, the Supreme Court concluded that Ford's

extensive marketing and advertising in the forum states of the same kind

of product at issue in the plaintiffs' actions showed that Ford

" ' continuously and deliberately exploited [a State's] market' " to such an

42
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extent that " ' it must reasonably anticipate being haled into [that State's]

court[s]' to defend actions 'based on' products causing injury [there]."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 364 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 781). Relying upon

that holding in Ford, Sawyer contends that Cooper Tire's undisputed

marketing and advertising of the CS4 Touring tire in Alabama supports

a similar finding of specific personal jurisdiction in this case.

In its brief, Cooper Tire does not dispute that it has offered no

affidavit testimony refuting Sawyer's allegations that it marketed and

advertised its products, including the CS4 Touring tire, in Alabama.

Rather, it contends that Sawyer's assertions, if accepted by this Court,

would "fashion a new rule that subjects an out-of-state defendant to

personal jurisdiction based upon nothing other than the fact that the

defendant has advertised in the forum even when that advertising is not

related to the dispute." Cooper Tire's brief at 31. Cooper Tire therefore

contends that we should not hold that Sawyer's advertising allegations

establish that her claims "relate to" Cooper Tire's contacts with Alabama.

Cooper Tire is mistaken that its marketing of the CS4 Touring tire,

along with its past sales of that product, cannot establish specific

personal jurisdiction. In Ford, the Supreme Court wrote:

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"To see why Ford is subject to jurisdiction in these cases
…, consider first the business that the company regularly
conducts in Montana and Minnesota. See generally [Ford
Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct.,] 395 Mont. [478]
at 488, 443 P.3d [407] at 414 [(2019)]; [Bandemer v. Ford
Motor Co.,] 931 N.W.2d [744] at 748 [(Minn. 2019)]; supra, at
1023 - 1024. Small wonder that Ford has here conceded
'purposeful availment' of the two States' markets. See supra,
at 1025 - 1026. By every means imaginable -- among them,
billboards, TV and radio spots, print ads, and direct mail --
Ford urges Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles,
including (at all relevant times) Explorers and Crown
Victorias. Ford cars -- again including those two models -- are
available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the
States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota.
And apart from sales, Ford works hard to foster ongoing
connections to its cars' owners. The company's dealers in
Montana and Minnesota (as elsewhere) regularly maintain
and repair Ford cars, including those whose warranties have
long since expired. And the company distributes replacement
parts both to its own dealers and to independent auto shops
in the two States. Those activities, too, make Ford money. And
by making it easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans
and Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.

"Now turn to how all this Montana- and Minnesota-
based conduct relates to the claims in these cases, brought by
state residents in Montana's and Minnesota's courts. Each
plaintiff's suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of
those States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges
that a defective Ford vehicle -- an Explorer in one, a Crown
Victoria in the other -- caused the crash and resulting harm.
And as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced
those two car models in both States for many years. … In
other words, Ford had systematically served a market in
Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the
plaintiffs allege malfunctioned and injured them in those
States."
44
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592 U.S. at 364-65. Because Ford had systematically served a market in

Montana and Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs alleged

had malfunctioned and injured them in those States, the Supreme Court

held that there was a strong " ' relationship among the defendant, the

forum, and the litigation' " -- the " ' essential foundation' " of specific

jurisdiction. Id. at 365 (citation omitted). The Supreme Court concluded

that this served as a legitimate basis upon which the forum states could

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Ford. Id. at 366-68.

Like in Ford, in her complaint, Sawyer specifically alleged that

Cooper Tire "conducted extensive advertising and marketing campaigns

for its passenger and light truck tires, including the Subject Tire model,

that reached consumers in the State of Alabama and connected Alabama

consumers with the closest Cooper Tire dealer." (Emphasis added.) She

also alleged:

"13. Cooper Tire's advertising also includes Cooper Tire
sponsorship for the Southeastern Conference (SEC)
Basketball tournament for the University of Alabama
collegiate basketball program; Cooper Tire sponsorship for
the 'Cooper Tire Performer of the Week' for the University of
Alabama collegiate sports program; Cooper Tire sponsorship
for an Alabama football blog; Cooper Tire sponsorship of the
Bassmaster Elite Series, which is headquartered in the State
of Alabama; and Cooper Tire sponsorship for the Paul
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Finebaum sports talk show, which broadcasts in the State of
Alabama. …"

As explained previously in this opinion, when considering a motion

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, a trial court must consider as

true the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that are "not controverted

by the defendant's affidavits." Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 143

So. 3d at 787 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Taken

together, under the Supreme Court's decision in Ford, Sawyer's

unrefuted allegations that Cooper Tire (1) sold and distributed the CS4

Touring tire, including the subject tire, in Alabama, (2) maintained an

extensive dealer network in Alabama, and (3) marketed this tire model

in Alabama all support a finding that her claims "relate to" Cooper Tire's

contacts with Alabama. 11

V. The Trial Court's Conclusion that Sawyer's Florida Residency
Prevents the Exercise of Specific Personal Jurisdiction in this Case

11In reaching our conclusion here, we need not reach the outer
limits of the stream-of-commerce test, and nothing in this opinion should
be construed as doing so. As the Supreme Court recognized in Ford, the
conclusion that specific personal jurisdiction exists in cases with these
types of facts "does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific
jurisdiction, the phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits, as it must to
adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum." 592 U.S. at 362.
Although there will be cases in which the facts may require this Court to
address the outer limits of the stream-of-commerce test, this is not such
a case.
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is Mistaken

Cooper Tire alternatively argues, however, that the trial court

correctly concluded that it should not exercise specific personal

jurisdiction over it because, unlike the plaintiffs in Ford who were

residents of the forum states, neither Sawyer nor her son were Alabama

residents. According to Cooper Tire, "Alabama's interest in providing

Florida residents a place to litigate is minimal." Cooper Tire's brief at 28.

In making this argument, Cooper Tire, like the trial court, relies

heavily on a post-Ford product-liability case from an Alabama federal

court -- Tyler v. Ford Motor Co. (Case No. 2:20-CV-584-WKW, Nov. 17,

2021) (M.D. Ala. 2021) (not reported in Federal Supplement) (judgment

vacated). In Tyler, a Florida resident brought claims against Ford for her

injuries, and for the death of her husband, which had been caused by an

accident that had occurred in Alabama while driving a Ford F-250 pickup

truck. Ford moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit against it on the basis

that the district court could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction

over it because (1) the plaintiff was a resident of Florida and (2) the

pickup truck had not been designed, manufactured, or sold to the plaintiff

in Alabama.

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In evaluating Ford's arguments, the district court summarized its

understanding of the holding in Ford by stating "that personal

jurisdiction exists where 'resident-plaintiffs allege that they suffered in-

state injury because of defective products that Ford extensively

promoted, sold, and serviced in [the forum state].' " (Quoting Ford, 592

U.S. at 371) (emphasis added). Applying that reading of Ford to the facts

of the case before it, the district court explained:

"There is no question that Ford has purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of conducting business in Alabama. Ford
purposefully reaches out to Alabama in a number of different
ways -- supplying vehicles to dealerships in Alabama,
advertising in Alabama, maintaining a resale market in
Alabama, shipping replacement parts to Alabama, and so on.
Ford admits that its contacts with Alabama are at least as
extensive as its contacts with the forum states in Ford Motor
[Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351
(2021)]."

Despite Ford "purposefully avail[ing]" itself of "the privilege of

conducting business in Alabama," the district court in Tyler concluded

that Ford's "contacts with Alabama have nothing to do with the

complained-of vehicle, and [the] Plaintiff has not drawn any connection

between Ford's contacts and the events-at-suit." It explained that any

actions by the plaintiff in bringing the vehicle at issue to Alabama were

insufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Ford:
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"It is well-settled that the actions of a plaintiff or third
party cannot alone constitute a basis for personal jurisdiction
over a defendant. See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286
(2014). The minimum contacts analysis must focus on the
defendant's actions in the forum state. Id. Thus, the fact that
the Tylers drove their F-250 into Alabama cannot establish
personal jurisdiction over Ford. The fact that Defendant Lane
side-swiped the Tylers in Alabama also cannot establish
personal jurisdiction over Ford. Indeed, none of the events
with the particular F-250 at issue can be fairly characterized
as contacts that Ford made with Alabama. The only contacts
that Ford made with Alabama -- and thus the only contacts
upon which personal jurisdiction can be based -- are the other
marketing, servicing, repair, and sales contacts that Ford
regularly performs in Alabama."

(Some emphasis in original; some emphasis added.)

In reaching its conclusion, the district court noted that the Supreme

Court has been concerned about expanding specific personal jurisdiction

so far that it would open the door for plaintiffs to sue a corporate

defendant in every state across the country. Specifically, the district

court explained that the Supreme Court in Ford had

"cringed at the idea of plaintiffs being able to sue in all fifty
states for a local controversy. [Ford, 592 U.S.] at [362] n.3.
This kind of unlimited jurisdiction has long been the
bogeyman of the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. See Hanson [v. Denckla], 357 U.S. [235,] 251
[(1958)] ('But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds
the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal
jurisdiction of state courts.'). Yet, if Ford's contacts with
Alabama -- related to this case solely because similar products
are being marketed, sold, and repaired -- are sufficient to
49
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support personal jurisdiction, then there is essentially no
limit on personal jurisdiction against Ford. Ford maintains
such a market in every state, as do nearly all motor vehicle
manufacturers. Personal jurisdiction would become irrelevant
in suits against nationwide companies."

(Emphasis added.)

The district court in Tyler opined that the Supreme Court in Ford

had deemed the plaintiffs' residency to be especially relevant in

determining the relatedness of the defendant's contacts with the

plaintiffs' suits:

"Additionally, the Supreme Court in Ford Motor went to great
lengths to explain how Ford's contacts with the forum states
in those cases were relevant to the resident-plaintiffs' claims.
[592 U.S. at 364-67]. The Court discussed at length the
possibility of causation for resident-plaintiffs. Id. Further, the
Court specifically mentioned the residency of the plaintiffs at
least twenty times in the opinion. Id. If residency were
irrelevant, much of the Court's analysis would be irrelevant.
The Court's holding -- that 'resident-plaintiffs [who] allege
that they suffered in-state injury because of defective
products that Ford extensively promoted, sold, and serviced
in Montana and Minnesota' can invoke the jurisdiction of
their home states, id. at [371] (emphasis added) -- would be
too narrow, as it would be unnecessary to qualify the holding
by mentioning the residency of the plaintiff."

(Some emphasis in original; some emphasis added.) Based on the

foregoing, because the plaintiff in Tyler, a Florida resident, had not

drawn any connection "between Ford's contacts and the events-at-suit,"

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the district court concluded that it could not exercise specific personal

jurisdiction over Ford.

Echoing the district court's analysis in Tyler, Cooper Tire contends

that the Ford Court "plainly held that 'related to' jurisdiction includes an

assessment of the plaintiff's residency." Cooper Tire's brief at 30.

Specifically, Cooper Tire asserts:

"The fact that the accident took place in Alabama is not
enough to allow for the constitutional exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Cooper Tire. The critical factor is the
purposeful suit-related contact the defendant has with the
forum. The plaintiff's residency 'still may be relevant in
assessing the link between the defendant's forum contacts
and the plaintiff's suit ….' [Ford, 592 U.S. at 369].

"In this instance, Cooper Tire did not send into Alabama
any of the approximately 5,000 CS4 Touring size
[P]235/65R17 tires it distributed from 2015 through 2018. …
Thus, Alabama has no interest in exerting personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant with no suit-
related contacts. In other words, Alabama has no interest in
providing a forum for an out-of-state plaintiff."

Cooper Tire's brief at 30 (final emphasis added).

Cooper Tire is misreading Tyler. Such an argument about the

plaintiff's residency conflicts with decades-old precedent from the

Supreme Court that has upheld jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant even when contacts between the plaintiff and the forum state

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are entirely lacking. Those cases have done so because it is the

defendant's contacts with the forum state -- not the plaintiff's contacts --

that are most relevant to determining whether there are sufficient

contacts with the forum state. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 780 (stating that

the "plaintiff's residence in the forum State is not a separate

requirement, and lack of residence [by the plaintiff] will not defeat

jurisdiction established on the basis of [the] defendant's contacts"

(emphasis added)). In fact, Tyler itself states: "The minimum contacts

analysis must focus on the defendant's actions in the forum state."

(Emphasis altered.)

Although the Supreme Court in Ford mentioned the plaintiffs'

residencies, it did so for reasons other than creating a new, independent

requirement for specific personal jurisdiction. This included refuting

Ford's contention that the states of first-sale, design, or manufacture --

all states that had no connection to either the plaintiffs or the injuries --

were the more proper forums. Ford, 592 U.S. at 361, 368.

The Supreme Court also mentioned residency to demonstrate that

the courts in Montana and Minnesota had an interest in providing people

injured within their borders with a convenient forum to enforce their own

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safety regulations. Like those states, Alabama has a strong sovereign

interest in providing a forum to people who are injured on its roads and

in enforcing its own safety regulations within its borders. This is

particularly relevant here, where the owner of the subject tire was an

Alabama resident who had purchased the tire in Alabama.

Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiff's residency has any

relevancy, Tyler is distinguishable from the present case. In that case,

the vehicle at issue had been manufactured in Mexico, sold to an

independent dealer in Tennessee, and purchased by the plaintiff in

Florida. Here, however, as established previously in this opinion, Cooper

Tire has not offered any affidavit evidence refuting that the CS4 Touring

tire -- including the subject tire -- was sold, distributed, and marketed in

Alabama. Even more to the point, unlike Tyler, the purchaser here was

an Alabama resident who had made the purchase in Alabama. It is

therefore reasonable for this Court to conclude that Alabama has a much

stronger interest in this lawsuit as compared to the lawsuit in Tyler.

Under Ford and the facts of this case, the fact that Sawyer and her

son were not Alabama residents is not determinative because Cooper

Tire's contacts with Alabama are sufficient for the exercise of specific

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personal jurisdiction in this case. 12 Thus, for the reasons previously

stated, we hold that the trial court erred in determining that it could not

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire in this case.

Conclusion

For all the reasons explained above, under the Supreme Court's

analytical framework in Ford, the connection between Sawyer's claims

and Cooper Tire's unrefuted sale, distribution, and marketing of the CS4

Touring tire in Alabama is sufficient to support the exercise of specific

personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire in this case. We therefore reverse

the trial court's judgment dismissing Sawyer's claims against Cooper

12Because the facts in this case establish the existence of sufficient

contacts between Cooper Tire and Alabama, we need not decide whether
the district court's emphasis on the plaintiff's residency in Tyler was
mistaken under the facts in that case. Compare Chavez v. Bridgestone
Americas Tire Operations, LLC, 527 P.3d 652 (N.M.Ct.App. 2022)
(holding that the fact that resident motorist's fatal accident occurred out
of state in Texas rather than in New Mexico did not preclude the
determination that tire manufacturer had sufficient minimum contacts
with New Mexico for one of that state's courts to exercise specific personal
jurisdiction over the tire manufacturer); and Martins v. Bridgestone
Americas Tire Operations, LLC, 266 A.3d 753 (R.I. 2022) (holding that
claims brought by resident driver's estate against manufacturers and
designers of allegedly defective tires on truck that driver was operating
out of state, which allegedly caused his death, did not arise out of or relate
to manufacturers' and designers' contacts with Rhode Island and, thus,
that specific personal jurisdiction could not be established).

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Tire and remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 13

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Shaw, Wise, Bryan,∗ Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.

Mitchell, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Parker, C.J.,
joins.

Cook, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

Sellers, J., dissents, with opinion.

13Becausethis issue is dispositive in this case, we pretermit
discussion of the remaining issues raised on appeal. See Johnson v. Ellis,
308 So. 3d 1, 3 n.3 (Ala. 2020) (citing Favorite Market Store v. Waldrop,
924 So. 2d 719, 723 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (stating that this Court would
pretermit discussion of further issues in light of the dispositive nature of
another issue)).

Although Justice Bryan did not attend oral argument in this case,
∗

he has viewed a video recording of that oral argument.
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MITCHELL, Justice (concurring specially).

I concur fully with the majority opinion. I write separately to

encourage parties in future personal-jurisdiction cases to analyze the

original public meaning of Alabama's Due Process Clause, rather than

rely solely on the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

Rule 4.2(b) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure allows Alabama

courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants when

it "is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the

Constitution of the United States" to do so. (Emphasis added.) But past

cases from this Court have deemphasized the role of the State

Constitution in this inquiry.

The majority opinion correctly points out that our Court "has

interpreted the due process guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution

to be coextensive with the due process guaranteed under the United

States Constitution" in the personal-jurisdiction context. Elliott v. Van

Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 730 (Ala. 2002); see also Pruitt v. AAA Interstate

Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1148 (Ala. 2022). As a result, our Court

has relied heavily on federal caselaw in personal-jurisdiction cases. See,

e.g., Pruitt, 358 So. 3d at 1148-49 (relying heavily on federal caselaw);

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Hinrichs v. General Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So. 3d 1114, 1123-41

(Ala. 2016) (plurality opinion) (same); Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 730-32 (same);

Alabama Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431 So. 2d 141, 146 (Ala. 1983)

(same); DeSotacho, Inc. v. Valnit Indus., Inc., 350 So. 2d 447, 449-50 (Ala.

1977) (same).

Our Court, in other words, seems to be engaged in "lockstepping"

-- tethering the interpretation of Alabama's Constitution to the Supreme

Court's interpretation of the federal Constitution. See Jeffrey S. Sutton,

51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American

Constitutional Law 174 (2018). That practice is questionable. As

Georgia Supreme Court Justice Nels Peterson has observed, "it is

difficult to square lockstepping with a focus on original public meaning."

Nels S.D. Peterson, Principles of Georgia Constitutional Interpretation,

75 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 21 (2023). By interpreting the Alabama and federal

due-process guarantees as coextensive, we have signed our State up to

follow the ebbs and flows of a federal court's interpretation of a federal

constitutional provision, regardless of whether that practice reflects the

original public meaning of our State's Constitution. Without more

evidence about the original public meaning of the Alabama Constitution,

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the practice of lockstepping makes little sense.

The problems associated with lockstepping are magnified in

instances in which the text of the State constitutional provision differs

substantially from that of the federal constitutional provision. Here,

Alabama's Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due

Process Clause have little in common except for the phrase "due process

of law." Compare Ala. Const. 2022, art. I, § 13 ("[E]very person, for any

injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a

remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered

without sale, denial, or delay.") with U.S. Const. amend. 14, § 1 ("No State

shall … deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law."). 14 It would be unusual for two provisions that are

worded so differently to have an identical meaning and application in all

cases.

In an appropriate case, I believe this Court should consider what

protections the Alabama Constitution provides independent of the

14For a useful tool to compare state and federal constitutional
provisions, see Am. Juris Link State Const. Tool, which, at the time of
this decision, could be located at: https://stateconstitutiontool.org.

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Fourteenth Amendment. To do so, we need parties to brief and argue the

original public meaning of Section 13 of the Alabama Constitution -- and

any other constitutional provision that may be relevant. See Barnett v.

Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 768-69 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., concurring

specially) (encouraging "parties and amici curiae in future state-

constitutional cases to provide appropriate research and arguments

about the original public meaning" of State constitutional provisions).

Neither party to this appeal has questioned our Court's practice of

lockstepping with federal courts in personal-jurisdiction cases. As a

result, I agree with the majority opinion that, under the United States

Supreme Court's current personal-jurisdiction precedent, Cooper Tire &

Rubber Company has sufficient contacts with Alabama to support

specific personal jurisdiction. See Ex parte McKinney, 87 So. 3d 502, 509

n.7 (Ala. 2011) (noting this Court's "disinclination to overrule existing

caselaw in the absence of either a specific request to do so or an adequate

argument asking that we do"). But with the assistance of proper original-

public-meaning briefing, I would be willing to reconsider our Court's

lockstepping of the Alabama Constitution's and the Fourteenth

Amendment's due-process guarantees in the personal-jurisdiction

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context.

Parker, C.J., concurs.

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COOK, Justice (concurring specially).

In my view, the main opinion presents a relatively straightforward

application of the "relate to" test for specific personal jurisdiction as

discussed in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court,

592 U.S. 351 (2021). Unfortunately, application of that test will not

always be so straightforward in future cases with more complex fact

patterns. Although I am the author of the main opinion, I write

separately to provide some suggestions to the bench and bar in such

future cases. To be clear, this is a test of the United States Supreme Court

and I am bound by it. Further, I speak only for myself in this writing.

Thus, I write as a fellow traveler attempting to explain the map -- rather

than as a mapmaker.

In his concurrence in the judgment in Ford, Justice Neil Gorsuch,

joined by Justice Clarence Thomas, recognized the ambiguity created by

the majority's decision to treat a defendant's contacts with a forum state

that "relate to" the plaintiff's claims as an "independent" basis of specific

personal jurisdiction, writing: "Where this leaves us is far from clear."

592 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added). He noted that, although "the majority

says[] it is enough if an 'affiliation' or 'relationship' or 'connection' exists

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between" a defendant's in-state conduct and a plaintiff's injuries, it is

unclear "what … this assortment of nouns mean[s]" and that, "[l]oosed

from any causation standard, we are left to guess." Id. (emphasis altered).

Although Justice Gorsuch acknowledged that "[t]he majority promises

that its new test 'does not mean anything goes,' " he remained concerned

that this "hardly tells us what does." Id.; see generally Anthony

Petrosino, Rationalizing Relatedness: Understanding Personal

Jurisdiction's Relatedness Prong in the Wake of Bristol-Myers Squibb

and Ford Motor Co., 91 Fordham L. Rev. 1563 (2023).

Perhaps some of this ambiguity created by the "relate to" test is

simply inherent in any personal-jurisdiction test given that a trial court's

authority to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant

must be consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ford, 592 U.S. at 358

(recognizing the key role of the Due Process Clause). The question of

specific personal jurisdiction "depends on the defendant's having such

'contacts' with the forum State that 'the maintenance of the suit' is

'reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government,' and 'does

not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id.

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(quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-17

(1945). In other words, establishing brightline tests for personal

jurisdiction may be extremely difficult given that it must cover such a

wide variety of cases and fact patterns while also taking into account due-

process principles.

Despite this need for flexibility, I sympathize with Justice

Gorsuch's frustration with the "relate to" test. I am certain that judges

across our state and country will feel that same frustration as they

attempt to apply the Supreme Court's new analytical framework for the

"relate to" test in Ford to the dizzying permutation of facts that future

lawsuits will inevitably present. 15 Having reflected upon the Ford

opinion, I believe that there are two metrics that the Supreme Court

implicitly introduced in that case that can help the bench and bar as we

seek to apply Ford's new analytical framework for the "relate to" test. As

explained below, because these metrics are consistent with the values

that drive the Supreme Court's specific-personal-jurisdiction precedent,

15See, e.g., Schrier v. Qatar Islamic Bank, 632 F. Supp. 3d 1335,

1359 n.17 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (discussing Ford and noting that,
"[u]nfortunately, while we now know what the standard isn't (but-for
causation), it's a little unclear what the right standard is").
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I believe that they are the logical tools that can be used when applying

Ford's "relate to" test in cases with more complex fact patterns.

I. The Values Driving Specific Personal Jurisdiction in Ford --
Fairness and Federalism

In Ford, the Supreme Court explained that, to establish specific

personal jurisdiction, a trial court should first ask if (1) the defendant

" ' purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities

within the forum State' " -- for instance, by cultivating a market -- and

(2) "[t]he plaintiff's claims … '… arise out of … the defendant's contacts'

with the forum" or "[t]he plaintiff's claims … "… relate to the defendant's

contacts' with the forum." Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (citation omitted;

emphasis added). Each of those factors bears on whether the defendant

could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the forum state in

connection with the claims brought by the plaintiff. World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

The Supreme Court then noted that "[t]hese rules derive from and

reflect two sets of values -- treating defendants fairly and protecting

'interstate federalism.' " Id. at 360 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen

Corp., 444 U.S. at 293) (emphasis added). In Ford, the Supreme Court

noted that, when evaluating personal jurisdiction in the past, it has
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"appl[ied] the standards set out in International Shoe and its progeny,

with attention to their underlying values of ensuring fairness and

protecting interstate federalism." Id. at 360 n.2 (emphasis added).16

In Ford, both the fairness and the federalism interests were easily

16Likewise, Ford explained that

"[o]ne State's 'sovereign power to try' a suit, we have
recognized, may prevent 'sister States' from exercising their
like authority. [Worldwide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.] at 293. The
law of specific jurisdiction thus seeks to ensure that States
with 'little legitimate interest' in a suit do not encroach on
States more affected by the controversy. Bristol-Myers
[Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cnty.],
582 U.S. [255], at [263] [(2017)]."

592 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added). Some on the Court have gone further
in their emphasis on federalism. For example in J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), a plurality of the Court described
jurisdiction as a matter of state authority (thus respecting federalism).
564 U.S. at 883 (recognizing that "jurisdiction is in the first instance a
question of authority rather than fairness" (emphasis added)). And in
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco
County, 582 U.S. 255 (2017), the Court explained restrictions on
jurisdiction as a result of " 'territorial limitations' " on state power. 582
U.S. at 263 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958)).
Despite the clear statements from the Supreme Court emphasizing
federalism, some commentators have criticized the consideration of
federalism. See generally Robert M. Bloom & Janine A. Hanrahan, Back
to the Future: The Revival of Pennoyer in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine
and the Demise of International Shoe, 56 San Diego L. Rev. 581 (2019)
(criticizing this consideration of authority and federalism and instead
emphasizing fairness).
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satisfied under the "relate to" test. The forum states had a strong and

legitimate interest in adjudicating the disputes because (among other

reasons) (1) the plaintiffs "used the allegedly defective products in the

forum States," (2) the plaintiffs "suffered injuries when those products

malfunctioned in the forum States," and (3) Ford was selling and

advertising the very same model products in the forum states. Id. at 370.

It was not surprising that a state would have the power to exercise

specific personal jurisdiction over a corporation in such circumstances.17

Thus, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Ford was both fair

and protected interstate federalism. As Justice Alito stated very

succinctly in his concurrence in the judgment in Ford:

"Ford has long had a heavy presence in Minnesota and
Montana. It spends billions on national advertising. It has
many franchises in both States. Ford dealers in Minnesota
and Montana sell and service Ford vehicles, and Ford ships
replacement parts to both States. In entertaining these suits,
Minnesota and Montana courts have not reached out and
grabbed suits in which they 'have little legitimate interest.'
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San

17As some commentators have written: "Indeed, what is most
remarkable about Ford is that, seventy-five years after International
Shoe Co. v. Washington and forty years after World-Wide Volkswagen,
Ford could argue with a straight face that specific jurisdiction was
lacking." Maggie Gardner, Pamela K. Bookman, Andrew D. Bradt,
Zachary D. Clopton & D. Theodore Rave, The False Promise of General
Jurisdiction, 73 Ala. L. Rev. 455, 456-57 (2022).
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Francisco Cty., 582 U. S. 255, 263 (2017). Their residents,
while riding in vehicles purchased within their borders, were
killed or injured in accidents on their roads. Can anyone
seriously argue that requiring Ford to litigate these cases in
Minnesota and Montana would be fundamentally unfair?"

Id. at 372 (final emphasis added).

II. The Two Metrics

These two values -- fairness and federalism -- help explain two

metrics that I believe can be distilled from the Ford opinion.

A. "The Most Natural State" Metric

In Ford, the Supreme Court explained that each of the plaintiffs

had brought suit in "the most natural State." 592 U.S. at 370 (emphasis

added). As a result, the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over

Ford by Minnesota and Montana easily satisfied the values of fairness

and interstate federalism. For example, federalism was satisfied because

Minnesota and Montana were not "reach[ing] out and grabb[ing] suits in

which they 'have little legitimate interest.' " Id. at 372 (Alito, J.,

concurring in the judgment). Likewise, fairness was satisfied because

nobody should have been surprised by the exercise of jurisdiction. By

virtue of cultivating a market in those states, Ford should have

"reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court" in those states for such

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claims. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984).

Comparing Ford to Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of

California, San Francisco County, 582 U.S. 255 (2017) -- a case on which

Ford relied in arguing against the exercise of specific personal

jurisdiction -- underscores this point. In Bristol-Myers, the plaintiffs did

not purchase the product in the forum state, did not use the product in

the forum state, and were not even residents of the forum state. In fact,

there was no affiliation between the forum state and the underlying

controversy because no activity relevant to the claims of the nonresidents

took place in that forum and the forum did not have an interest in the

outcome of the plaintiffs' litigation. As a result, California clearly was not

"the most natural State" for the plaintiffs to bring their claims. Allowing

California to exercise specific personal jurisdiction in such a case would

have been contrary to federalism and would have improperly allowed

California to infringe on the authority of the other states that should

have had authority to adjudicate such claims. 18

18It is thus not surprising that some commentators have referred to

the lawsuit in Bristol-Myers as an example of forum shopping. See, e.g.,
Anthony Petrosino, Rationalizing Relatedness: Understanding Personal
Jurisdiction's Relatedness Prong in the Wake of Bristol-Myers Squibb
and Ford Motor Co., 91 Fordham L. Rev. 1563, 1590-91 (2023).
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However, the language in Ford about "the most natural State" does

not mean that there will be only one forum where specific personal

jurisdiction can apply. 19 Thus, it is possible that more than one forum

state could have specific personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state

defendant.

Given that there are so many possible permutations of facts, this

metric may not help resolve every case. 20 Nevertheless, I believe that this

19Nor does such language imply that there always must be at least

one forum state where specific personal jurisdiction exists. In fact,
although unlikely, it might be possible that no state would have specific
personal jurisdiction.

20Some of the many possible permutations that these metrics might

(or might not) reach include: (1) cases against manufacturers of
component parts for other products, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Ct. of California, Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); (2) cases
involving electronic commerce or electronic communication, see Gregory
C. Cook & Andrew Ross D'Entremont, No End in Sight?: Navigating the
"Vast Terrain" of Personal Jurisdiction in Social Media Cases After Ford,
73 Ala. L. Rev. 621 (2022); (3) cases involving intentional torts, especially
those other than defamation, see Ex parte M.E.J., [Ms. SC-2023-0062,
Oct. 13, 2023] ____ So. 3d ____ (Ala. 2023); and (4) cases involving closely
related models of a product, but not the exact same model (for instance,
a sport-utility vehicle and a truck based upon the same vehicle frame),
see Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 506-07 (9th Cir. 2023)
(noting that Ford found specific jurisdiction "because Ford sold the
relevant models to consumers in the forum states" and concluding that
the batteries that LG sold in the forum state (Hawaii) were "as different
as sedans and 18-wheelers" from the batteries at issue in the lawsuit and
therefore finding no personal jurisdiction).
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is a helpful metric in a specific-personal-jurisdiction analysis because, if

the forum state is "the most natural State" (emphasis added), it will be,

in my humble view, very likely that both fairness and interstate

federalism will support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction by

that state. I believe, therefore, that "the most natural State" metric can

be a useful way of overcoming the perceived ambiguity created by the

Supreme Court's new analytical framework for the "relate to" test

provided in Ford.

B. The "Constructive Causation" Metric

In addition to "the most natural State" metric, the Supreme Court

in Ford also appeared to examine whether causation was theoretically

possible even if "but for" causation has not been demonstrated in the

facts:

"Small wonder that Ford has here conceded 'purposeful
availment' of the two States' markets. … By every means
imaginable -- among them, billboards, TV and radio spots,
print ads, and direct mail -- Ford urges Montanans and
Minnesotans to buy its vehicles, including (at all relevant
times) Explorers and Crown Victorias. Ford cars -- again
including those two models -- are available for sale, whether
new or used, throughout the States, at 36 dealerships in
Montana and 84 in Minnesota. And apart from sales, Ford
works hard to foster ongoing connections to its cars' owners.
The company's dealers in Montana and Minnesota (as
elsewhere) regularly maintain and repair Ford cars, including
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those whose warranties have long since expired. And the
company distributes replacement parts both to its own
dealers and to independent auto shops in the two States.
Those activities, too, make Ford money. And by making it
easier to own a Ford, they encourage Montanans and
Minnesotans to become lifelong Ford drivers.

"Now turn to how all this Montana- and Minnesota-
based conduct relates to the claims in these cases, brought by
state residents in Montana's and Minnesota's courts. Each
plaintiff's suit, of course, arises from a car accident in one of
those States. In each complaint, the resident-plaintiff alleges
that a defective Ford vehicle -- an Explorer in one, a Crown
Victoria in the other -- caused the crash and resulting harm.
And as just described, Ford had advertised, sold, and serviced
those two car models in both States for many years. (Contrast
a case, which we do not address, in which Ford marketed the
models in only a different State or region.) In other words,
Ford had systematically served a market in Montana and
Minnesota for the very vehicles that the plaintiffs allege
malfunctioned and injured them in those States. So there is a
strong 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation' -- the 'essential foundation' of specific jurisdiction.
Helicopteros[ Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall], 466 U.S.
[408], at 414 [(1984)] ….

"….

"… For the owners of these cars might never have
bought them, and so these suits might never have arisen,
except for Ford's contacts with their home States. Those
contacts might turn any resident of Montana or Minnesota
into a Ford owner -- even when he buys his car from out of
state. He may make that purchase because he saw ads for the
car in local media. And he may take into account a raft of
Ford's in-state activities designed to make driving a Ford
convenient there: that Ford dealers stand ready to service the
car; that other auto shops have ample supplies of Ford parts;
and that Ford fosters an active resale market for its old
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models."

592 U.S. at 365-67 (emphasis added). In his concurrence in the judgment,

Justice Alito makes the same point:

"To say that the Constitution does not require the kind of
proof of causation that Ford would demand -- what the
majority describes as a 'strict causal relationship,' ante, at 362
-- is not to say that no causal link of any kind is needed. And
here, there is a sufficient link. It is reasonable to infer that
the vehicles in question here would never have been on the
roads in Minnesota and Montana if they were some totally
unknown brand that had never been advertised in those
States, was not sold in those States, would not be familiar to
mechanics in those States, and could not have been easily
repaired with parts available in those States. See ante, at 367
(describing this relationship between Ford's activities and
these suits). The whole point of those activities was to put
more Fords (including those in question here) on Minnesota
and Montana roads. The common-sense relationship between
Ford's activities and these suits, in other words, is causal in a
broad sense of the concept, and personal jurisdiction can rest
on this type of link without strict proof of the type Ford would
require. When 'arise out of' is understood in this way, it is
apparent that 'arise out of' and 'relate to' overlap and are not
really two discrete grounds for jurisdiction."

Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added). Justices Gorsuch and Thomas appear to

make a similar point. See Ford, 592 U.S. at 378.

Why did the Court refer to causation when it was not relying upon

the "arise out of" language in evaluating the nature of Ford's contacts

with Minnesota and Montana? And why did the Supreme Court signal

the use of a theoretical causation standard when it stated that the
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plaintiffs "might never have bought" the subject vehicles absent Ford's

extensive contacts with the forum states? I think here the Supreme Court

is signaling the use of what I will call a "constructive causation" metric

for answering such questions because such a metric provides both

fairness to the out-of-state defendant while also protecting interstate

federalism.

It was fair to subject Ford to specific personal jurisdiction for the

plaintiffs' claims arising from the accidents at issue in that case because

those accidents could have been caused by its contacts with the forum

states. Ford should have anticipated being haled into court over this

specific type of fact pattern. Likewise, each forum state had a legitimate

interest in regulating conduct within its borders that could cause those

accidents; thus the federalism interest was satisfied. Under such facts, a

forum state is not overreaching or grabbing for cases.

Thus, constructive causation is another helpful metric -- a cross-

check -- for the application of the full Ford test. Notably, both the main

opinion and both concurrences in the judgment in Ford discuss some

version of constructive causation having been met. Thus, in my view, if

this constructive-causation standard is met, it is more likely that the

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"relate to" test has been met.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, I believe that "the most natural State"

metric and the "constructive causation" metric can assist the bench and

bar as they navigate how to apply the Supreme Court's new analytical

framework for the "relate to" test for specific personal jurisdiction from

Ford. However, I should not be understood as advocating that these

metrics replace the "relate to" test or that they be viewed as additional

elements of that test. Instead, my thoughts here should be understood

only as encouraging the bench and bar to use these metrics as tools to

confirm the results arising from the application of the full Ford test --

that is, to avoid "guessing" on how to apply the "relate to" test in cases

with more complex fact patterns.

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SELLERS, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent. The critical question on appeal is whether,

for jurisdictional purposes, Cooper Tire & Rubber Company's Alabama-

based conduct relates to Sheri Sawyer's claims. In my view, Cooper Tire's

contacts with Alabama fall short of supporting specific personal

jurisdiction; thus, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause

forbids this Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over Cooper Tire

in this case.

To ensure that an exercise of specific personal jurisdiction accords

with due process, courts apply a three-part analysis, inquiring: (1)

"whether the nonresident defendant 'purposefully availed' himself of the

privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking

the benefit of the forum state's laws"; (2) "whether the plaintiff's claims

'arise out of or relate to' at least one of the defendant's contacts with the

forum"; and (3) "whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports

with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Louis

Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013).

Cooper Tire concedes that it has "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the

privilege of conducting activities within [Alabama]." Hanson v. Denckla,

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357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). And neither party addresses the third prong of

the analysis. Thus, this case requires us to review Cooper Tire's contacts

with Alabama to determine whether Sawyer's claims "aris[e] out of or

relate[] to" one or more of those contacts. Helicopteros Nacionales de

Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).

The complaint and the affidavits filed by the parties reveal the

following regarding Cooper Tire' s contacts with Alabama. Cooper Tire

sells its tires to 324 independently owned dealers across 117 cities.

Between 2007 and 2014, it manufactured the subject tire model, the

"Cooper CS4," and it does not deny that, during that time frame, it sold

the Cooper CS4 to those dealers and "conducted extensive advertising

and marketing campaigns for its passenger and light truck tires,

including the [Cooper CS4]." Additionally, Cooper Tire collects warranty

information and tire-failure data from Alabama consumers, "maintains

an interest in a manufacturing facility in ... Alabama," "lists job postings

for Tire Engineers in the Florence[] ... area," sponsors numerous

University of Alabama-related and State of Alabama-centric sports

programs, and cosponsors a teen driver and tire-safety campaign for

Alabama teenagers.

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Between 2015 and 2018, however, Cooper Tire shipped only 5,000

Cooper CS4 tires matching the subject tire's dimensions. None of those

tires were shipped to Alabama. Indeed, Cooper Tire shipped no tires of

any brand or size to either of the stores where the subject vehicle's owner

purchased tires. And Cooper Tire did not directly sell tires to Alabama

customers between 2015 and 2018.

Those contacts are a far cry from those that supported specific

personal jurisdiction in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial

District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021) -- "the most recent Supreme Court

guidance on personal jurisdiction." Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th

496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023). In that case, Ford had employed "every means

imaginable" to encourage Minnesotans and Montanans to purchase its

vehicles, including, relevantly, the Explorer and Crown Victoria. Ford,

592 U.S. at 365. "And apart from sales, Ford work[ed] hard to foster

ongoing connections to its cars' owners." Id. Ford's dealers consistently

maintained and repaired Ford vehicles whose warranties were long

expired, and Ford even "distribute[d] replacement parts both to its own

dealers and to independent auto shops in [both states]." Id. In sum, Ford

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sought not just one-time vehicle purchasers but "lifelong Ford drivers."

Id.

Indeed, it was Ford's nonsale activities and used-market

exploitation that made the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction

reasonable. Specifically, one of the vehicles in Ford was the Crown

Victoria, a model that, by the time of the accident and resulting litigation,

had long since been discontinued. See note 10, supra. But because Ford

had fostered the sale of its used vehicles through its dealerships and had

put considerable effort into keeping the Crown Victoria on the road, the

Supreme Court found reasonable a Minnesota court's exercising specific

personal jurisdiction over Ford -- even though the specific Crown Victoria

at issue originally had been sold outside the state. See Ford, 592 U.S. at

364-66.

The facts of this case are substantially different. Unable to draw a

causal connection between the purchase of the subject tire and Cooper

Tire's contacts with Alabama, Sawyer proceeds under the "back half" of

the "arise out of or relate to" rule. Id. at 362 ("The first half of th[e]

standard asks about causation; but the back half, after the 'or,'

contemplates that some relationships will support jurisdiction without a

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causal showing."). Thus, Sawyer must specifically show that one or more

of Cooper Tire's contacts with Alabama relates to her claims. The

evidence, however, does not support her. Of Cooper Tire's contacts with

Alabama listed above, the only ones Sawyer can plausibly relate to her

claims are that Cooper Tires: (1) sells its tires in Alabama to hundreds of

dealerships in over a hundred cities; (2) manufactured and sold to dealers

in Alabama the Cooper CS4 between 2007 and 2014; and (3) in that time

frame, extensively advertised and marketed its tires, including the

Cooper CS4. The majority opinion holds that those contacts are enough

to support specific personal jurisdiction; I disagree. Sawyer's problem is

that those contacts predate the sale of the subject tire, by which time

Cooper Tire no longer shipped the Cooper CS4 into Alabama. What is

missing here are two important activities present in Ford: (1) Cooper

Tire's promoting a marketing plan to support additional sales and (2)

Cooper Tire's fostering ongoing connections with its Cooper CS4 tires'

owners by advertising the Cooper CS4 outside of its original sales

between 2007 and 2014. Without any allegations that Cooper Tire

engaged in some conduct that related particularly to the Cooper CS4 at

the time of the subject tire's sale to Barbara Coggin, the owner of the

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vehicle Sawyer's son was traveling in at the time of the accident, there

can be no specific personal jurisdiction in this case. It is not enough that

Cooper Tire sold the Cooper CS4 in Alabama for some period predating

the sale of the subject tire and extensively marketed and advertised the

Cooper CS4 during that period. And it is not enough that Cooper Tire

continues to advertise, market, and sell other tire models in Alabama.

See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco

Cnty., 582 U.S. 255, 264 (2017) ("[S]pecific jurisdiction is lacking

regardless of the extent of a defendant's unconnected activities in the

State."). More is needed. As the Supreme Court stated: "In the sphere of

specific jurisdiction, the phrase 'relate to' incorporates real limits ...."

Ford, 592 U.S. at 362. Those limits are supported by the facts of this case

and precedent.

But, Sawyer has " 'allege[d] facts that would support a colorable

claim of jurisdiction' " such that jurisdictional discovery could be

permitted. Ex parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 876 So. 2d

459, 468 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Schenck v. Walt Disney Co., 742 F. Supp.

838, 840 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)) (emphasis omitted). And, to this end,

Sawyer even requested that the trial court grant her leave "to conduct

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discovery on personal jurisdiction, or alternatively, compel Cooper Tire

to respond to [her] previously-served jurisdictional discovery." In

response and without objection, the trial court granted some limited

discovery to establish where the subject tire was purchased and whether,

between 2015 and 2018, Cooper Tire generally sold the same make,

model, and size tire as the subject tire in Alabama. But now Sawyer

contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion in so limiting the

jurisdictional discovery she requested. I disagree.

"[W]e review for excess of discretion trial courts' decisions on the

availability and scope of jurisdictional discovery." Pruitt v. AAA

Interstate Transp., LLC, 358 So. 3d 1144, 1148 (Ala. 2022). Sawyer

presented the trial court with two options: a general request for

jurisdictional discovery or a request for jurisdictional discovery that

included interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for

admission regarding Cooper Tire's conduct in Alabama between 2017 and

2019. In exercising its discretion, the trial court split the difference

between the two options Sawyer proposed: it expanded and shifted the

time frame of discovery -- from the requested time frame of 2017-2019 to

2015-2018 -- while otherwise limiting the scope of discovery. In essence,

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the trial court granted much of, if not more than, the jurisdictional

discovery Sawyer requested. Thus, Sawyer cannot show, and I cannot

agree, that the trial court exceeded its discretion by limiting the scope of

the jurisdictional discovery in this case.

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