Steven Mark Hayden, Jr. v. Newsome Law, LLC, and William B. Cashion (Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court: CV-23-92).

CourtListener 10161233Ala25 oct. 2024

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Rel: October 25, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0412
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Steven Mark Hayden, Jr.

v.

Newsome Law, LLC, and William B. Cashion

Appeal from Elmore Circuit Court
(CV-23-92)

STEWART, Justice.

Steven Mark Hayden, Jr., appeals from a judgment of the Elmore

Circuit Court ("the trial court") dismissing his action against Newsome
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Law, LLC, and William B. Cashion. For the following reasons, we affirm

the judgment in part and reverse the judgment in part and remand the

cause for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

The action underlying this appeal involves Hayden's attempted

redemption of two parcels of property ("the property") located in Elmore

County, which had previously belonged to Hayden's father, Steven Mark

Hayden, Sr. Cashion, in an effort to collect on an approximately $600,000

judgment he had obtained against Hayden's father, sought a writ of

execution on the property. Cashion ultimately purchased the parcels at a

sheriff's sale on September 26, 2022, paying $5,000 for one parcel and

$1,162.59 for the other.

On August 31, 2023, Hayden notified Cashion's counsel, Burt

Newsome, of his intent to redeem the property. Newsome responded with

a quoted redemption price of $663,817.56. Hayden disputed that price

and indicated that he would offer $8,000, which covered the purchase

prices, recording taxes, and interest for the two parcels and $420 to

compensate Cashion for his time. Newsome informed Hayden that

Cashion would not reduce the quoted redemption price, contending that

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Hayden was required to satisfy the entire judgment lien before he was

entitled to redeem the property.

On September 25, 2023, Hayden filed a complaint in the trial court

pursuant to § 6-5-255, Ala. Code 1975, which is one of Alabama's

redemption statutes, see § 6-5-247 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, seeking to

enforce his right to redeem the property.1 Hayden named Cashion and

Newsome's law firm, Newsome Law, as defendants. Cashion and

Newsome Law filed a motion to dismiss Hayden's redemption action,

asserting that, pursuant to § 6-5-248(d), Ala. Code 1975, all judgments

that had attached to the property at the time of the sheriff's sale were

revived against Hayden, as a son of the debtor. Thus, according to

Cashion, the judgment lien constituted a lawful charge that Hayden was

required to pay in full to redeem the property. Following a hearing on

January 30, 2024, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss, stating

that Hayden "is free to redeem the property without the necessity of a

Court Order or other action in the above styled case." Hayden's

postjudgment motion was denied, and Hayden appeals.

1Hayden's complaint for redemption indicates that he had tendered

$1,217.97 and $5,393.27, representing the purchase price and interest for
each parcel.
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Standard of Review

In reviewing a judgment of dismissal on appeal, this Court affords

no presumption of correctness to the trial court's decision. We consider

"whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most strongly

in the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader could prove any set of

circumstances" under which he or she may possibly prevail. Nance v.

Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993).

Analysis

Hayden argues that, because the property was owned by his father,

and was sold to satisfy a judgment, he is entitled to redeem the property

under § 6-5-248(a)(7), which authorizes redemption by "[c]hildren, heirs,

or devisees of any debtor." The amount a redeeming party must pay to

redeem property is generally governed by § 6-5-253, Ala. Code 1975.

Section 6-5-253(a) provides:

"Anyone entitled and desiring to redeem real estate under the
provisions of [the redemption status] must also pay or tender
to the purchaser or his or her transferee the purchase price
paid at the sale, with interest at the rate allowed to be charged
on money judgments as set forth in Section 8-8-10[, Ala. Code
1975,] … and all other lawful charges, also with interest
aforesaid …."

Section 6-5-253(a) identifies as "lawful charges":

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"(1) Permanent improvements as prescribed herein.

"(2) Taxes paid or assessed.

"(3) All insurance premiums paid or owed by the
purchaser.

"(4) Any other valid lien or encumbrance paid by such
purchaser or his or her transferee or if the redeeming party is
a judgment creditor or junior mortgagee or any transferee
thereof, then all recorded judgments, recorded mortgages, and
recorded liens having a higher priority in existence at the time
of sale which are revived under Section 6-5-248(c)[,Ala. Code
1975].

"If the redemption is made from a person who at the
time of redemption owned the debt for which the property was
sold, the redemptioner must also pay any balance due on the
debt, with interest as aforesaid thereon to date.

"(5) …[A] party redeeming must pay all mortgages made
by the purchaser or his or her transferee on the land to the
extent of the purchase price.

"…."

Cashion and Newsome Law argue that, because Hayden is the child

of the debtor, "the prior judgments and liens that existed before the sale

reattach to the property and must be paid off as part of the redemption

process." Cashion and Newsome Law's brief at 11. They rely on § 6-5-

248(d), which provides:

"When any debtor, mortgagor, their transferees, their
respective spouses, children, heirs, or devisees redeem, all
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recorded judgments, recorded mortgages, and recorded liens
in existence at the time of the sale are revived against the real
estate redeemed and against the redeeming party and further
redemption by some party other than the mortgagor or debtor
under [the redemption statutes] is precluded."

(Emphasis added.)

However, although judgments and liens are revived against the

property pursuant to § 6-5-248(d), such judgments and liens are

expressly excluded as lawful charges by § 6-5-253(b) when the redeeming

party is the child of the debtor. Section 6-5-253(b) provides that, "[i]f the

redeeming party is the debtor, mortgagor, their respective spouses,

children, heirs, or devisees then, unless otherwise provided herein, the

judgments, mortgages, and liens revived pursuant to 6-5-248(d)[, Ala.

Code 1975,] are not lawful charges as defined in subsection (a)."

(Emphasis added.) Moreover, Cashion and Newsome Law's citation to

Southeast Enterprises, Inc. v. Byrd, 720 So. 2d 873, 874 (Ala. 1998), is

inapposite because that case concerned redemption by a junior

mortgagee, see § 6-5-253(a)(4), and it did not involve redemption by the

child of a debtor. Here, Hayden is seeking to redeem property previously

owned by his father. Although the redemption will revive the previous

judgments under § 6-5-248(d), those judgments are explicitly exempted

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by § 6-5-253(b) from the "lawful charges" that Hayden is required to

tender to redeem the property.

In dismissing the action, the trial court stated that there was no

"necessity of a Court Order or other action." However, Cashion has

demanded a redemption price that exceeds the amount authorized by the

redemption statutes and has rejected Hayden's tender of an amount

purportedly representing the purchase price and interest for each parcel.

Accordingly, pursuant to § 6-5-256, Ala. Code 1975, the trial court has a

statutory obligation to "settle and adjust all the rights and equities of the

parties." The trial court's judgment dismissing Hayden's redemption

action against Cashion is, therefore, reversed, and the cause is remanded

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Hayden also named Newsome Law as a defendant in his

redemption action. The record, however, indicates that Newsome Law

was not the purchaser of the property against whom a right of redemption

lies, and Hayden's arguments on appeal do not directly address the trial

court's dismissal of his claim as to Newsome Law. Accordingly, the

judgment is affirmed insofar is it dismisses Hayden's redemption action

against Newsome Law.

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AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

Shaw, Acting C.J.,* and Mendheim, J., and Windom, Kellum, and

McCool, Special Justices,* concur.

Sellers, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.

Parker, C.J., and Wise, Bryan, Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., recuse

themselves.

____________________
*Because five members of the Supreme Court, including the Chief
Justice, recused themselves, on October 10, 2024, Acting Chief Justice
Shaw appointed Presiding Judge Mary B. Windom, Judge J. Elizabeth
Kellum, and Judge Chris McCool, of the Alabama Court of Criminal
Appeals, to serve as Special Justices in this appeal.

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SELLERS, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., requires an appellant's brief to

contain a cogent argument supported by citations to the record and to

appropriate authority. In the present case, I do not believe that the brief

of appellant Steven Mark Hayden, Jr., justifies reversing the trial court's

judgment. Hayden provides a series of quotations from statutes and

caselaw without sufficiently expounding on that authority. The

majority's application of the relevant statutory provisions appears to

present the possibility of a continuous loop: redemption, followed by a

sheriff's sale, followed by another redemption and another sheriff's sale,

and so on. I am hesitant to acknowledge such a result without sufficient

briefing. In short, I would affirm the trial court's judgment in its entirety,

deferring to its ability to apply the law to the facts in order to render a

fair and just decision.

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