Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Wiregrass Rehabilitation Center, Inc. v. CHSPSC, LLC and Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital) (Houston Circuit Court: CV-23-900380).

Rel: March 21, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2024-2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0673
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Ex parte Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Wiregrass Rehabilitation Center, Inc.

v.

CHSPSC, LLC, and Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers
Hospital)

(Houston Circuit Court: CV-23-900380)

WISE, Justice.

Triad of Alabama, LLC, d/b/a Flowers Hospital ("Triad"), petitions

this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Houston Circuit Court

to vacate its August 23, 2024, order denying Triad's motion to dismiss,
SC-2024-0673

based on improper venue, the complaint Wiregrass Rehabilitation

Center, Inc. ("WRC"), filed against it and to enter an order dismissing

WRC's complaint against it. We grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

On October 28, 2020, CHSPSC, LLC ("CHS"), a Tennessee limited-

liability corporation with its principal place of business in Franklin,

Tennessee, entered into a "Purchased Services Agreement" ("the

purchasing agreement") and a "Linen Services Agreement" ("the linen-

services agreement") with WRC, an Alabama nonprofit corporation with

its principal place of business in Dothan. The effective date of both

agreements was November 1, 2020.

The purchasing agreement provided, in pertinent part:

"WHEREAS, CHS is contracted to provide professional
management services to affiliates of CHSPSC, LLC, and also
holds an ownership interest in various Affiliates (see
Attachment C, List of Participating CHS Affiliates); and

"WHEREAS, CHS has a need to contract for Linen and
Laundry Services on behalf of its Affiliates; and

"WHEREAS, Service Provider is in the business of
providing Linens and Laundry Services on behalf of its
Affiliates; and

"WHEREAS, CHS and Service Provider previously
entered into an agreement for Linen Services dated April 1,
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2018 which shall be replaced by this Purchasing Agreement
and the Agreement for Linen Services ('Linen Services
Agreement') which is attached and incorporated herein as
Attachment A; and

"WHEREAS, Service Provider desires to offer certain
services to Purchasers;

"NOW, THEREFORE, CHS and Service Provider agree
that Service Provider shall provide the services described
herein to Purchasers in accordance with the terms and
conditions set forth herein."

(Emphasis in original.) The purchasing agreement designated WRC as

the "service provider" and defined "[p]urchaser(s)" "as Affiliates of CHS

that have entered into a Participation Purchasing Agreement and their

Affiliates and are listed in Attachment C." Additionally, the purchasing

agreement provided that "Purchasers obtaining Services from Service

Provider under this Purchasing Agreement shall be considered third

party beneficiaries hereunder." It is undisputed that Triad was an

affiliate of CHS and a third-party beneficiary under the purchasing

agreement.

Section 26.0 of the purchasing agreement included the following

integration clause:

"This Purchasing Agreement, the Linen Services
Agreement, and all attachments hereto (as well as the
agreements and other documents referred to in this
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Purchasing Agreement) constitute the entire agreement
between the Parties with regard to the subject matter hereof.
This Purchasing Agreement supersedes all previous
agreements between or among the Parties with regard to
subject matter. There are no agreements, representations, or
warranties between or among the Parties other than those set
forth in this Purchasing Agreement or the documents and
agreements referred to in this Purchasing Agreement."

(Emphasis added.)

The linen-services agreement was designated as Attachment A to

the purchasing agreement. Attachment B to the purchasing agreement

was a document titled "Additional Provisions" ("the additional-provisions

document"). The introductory paragraph of the additional-provisions

document stated:

"In its performance under this Purchasing Agreement,
Service Provider agrees to the following additional terms,
which are incorporated by reference and are made fully a part
thereof. Any ambiguity or conflict shall be resolved in favor
of these Additional Provisions."

The additional-provisions document also included the following choice-of-

law provision and forum-selection clause:

"10. Choice of Law. The Purchasing Agreement shall
be construed and governed by the laws of the state of
Tennessee, irrespective of its choice-of-law principles. Each
Party irrevocably agrees that any claim brought by it in any
way arising out of this Purchasing Agreement must be
brought solely and exclusively in state courts located in
Davidson County, Tennessee or federal courts located in the
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Middle District of Tennessee and each Party irrevocably
accepts and submits to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
each of the aforesaid courts in personam, generally and
unconditionally with respect to any action, suit, or proceeding
brought by it or against it by the other Party."

Pursuant to the purchasing agreement and the linen-services agreement,

WRC provided linen and laundry services to Flowers Hospital, which is

owned and operated by Triad.

On September 25, 2023, WRC sued CHS in the Houston Circuit

Court. WRC asserted claims of breach of contract and conversion relating

to WRC's provision of linen and laundry services. The complaint

referenced only the linen-services agreement. CHS subsequently filed a

motion to dismiss the complaint, based on improper venue, and relied on

the forum-selection clause in the additional-provisions document.

On November 30, 2022, WRC amended its complaint to add Triad

as a defendant. In the amended complaint, WRC alleged, in pertinent

part:

"7. On or about October 28, 2020, [WRC] and Defendant
CHS entered into a Linen Services Agreement (the
'Agreement') which is attached as Exhibit A.

"8. Under the Agreement, [WRC] would rent hospital
linens to Flowers at agreed pricing.

"….
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"13. Beginning with the date of the execution of the
Agreement on October 28, 2020, [WRC] performed its
obligations under the Agreement and delivered the requested
volume of linens each day to Flowers. As the parties
continued to do business, Flowers began a pattern of failing
to return all of the linens [WRC] was providing under the
Agreement.

"14. Under the Agreement the cost of these non-returned
linens was borne by [WRC] until the Agreement was
terminated.

"15. [WRC] notified Flowers and CHS of this problem,
attempting to minimize the volume of non-returned linens.
Flowers and CHS acknowledged that there was a problem
with Flowers' failure to return the same volume of linens
[WRC] was delivering to it and assured [WRC] it was
attempting to address the cause.

"16. The volume of non-returned linens was so large and
beyond that of [WRC's] other clients that [WRC] worked with
Flowers to resolve the issue, but the volume of non-returned
linens continued to increase to a point that [WRC] could no
longer continue purchasing replacement linens to meet
Flowers' needs.

"17. Despite Flowers' assurances, the problem persisted.
From October 28, 2020, through December 13, 2022, Flowers
failed to return almost 150,000 pounds of linens valued at
$804,668.00. [WRC] had to terminate the Agreement due to
Flowers' conduct. [WRC] notified CHS of this termination by
letter on December 13, 2022, which is attached as Exhibit B.

"18. After this termination of the Agreement the
Defendants requested that [WRC] continue to provide linens
under the Agreement long enough for Defendants to obtain a
replacement linen vendor. [WRC] agreed to continue to
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provide linens under the same terms as set out in the
Agreement and did so.

"19. The Agreement provides that Defendants are
obligated to return all of [WRC's] property provided under the
Agreement and that once the Agreement is terminated, the
Defendants would be obligated to pay [WRC] for any property
not returned. (Exhibit A at ¶ 17).

"20. After the termination of the Agreement and the
period of time the parties agreed to continue doing business
after the Agreement was terminated, [WRC] made demand
that all of its property be returned. On June 23, 2023,
Defendant informed [WRC] that all property belonging to
[WRC] that was in its possession had been returned to [WRC].

"21. At the conclusion of the time wherein [WRC]
provided linen services under the Agreement and after its
termination [WRC] sent invoices to Defendant for the services
provided and for the cost of all the non-returned linen.

"22. Defendant made some payments to [WRC] towards
the amount owed for property not returned to [WRC] but has
refused to pay the remaining balance. As of the filing of this
Complaint, the total owed for property not returned to [WRC]
is $636,133.73 exclusive of interest, attorney fees or costs."

WRC asserted a breach-of-contract claim in which it alleged that the

defendants had willfully breached the linen-services agreement "by

failing to timely pay [WRC] for property not returned to [WRC]." In that

claim, WRC sought a judgment in the amount of $636,133.73 plus

interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. WRC also asserted a conversion claim

in which it alleged: "In not returning [WRC's] property, the Defendants
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have exerted ownership and dominion over [WRC's] property in denial of

[WRC's] rights." With regard to that claim, WRC sought "compensatory,

punitive, consequential and incidental damage[s], interest, and costs."

On January 9, 2024, Triad filed a motion to dismiss, based on

improper venue, and relied on the forum-selection clause in the

additional-provisions document. WRC filed a response to Triad's motion

to dismiss.1 In its response, WRC made the general allegations that, if

the forum-selection clause was enforced, "it would lack the ability to

subpoena certain information and witnesses, not just that witnesses

would be required to travel substantial distances"; that the Tennessee

courts "would not have jurisdiction to hear [WRC's] extra-contractual

claims against Triad for conversion"; and that "the Linen Services

Agreement is distinct from the Purchased Services Agreement and

therefore is not subject to the forum selection clause."

1In its response, WRC stated that it "adopts its response … to
[CHS's] Motion as if set forth fully herein." Additionally, WRC's response
referenced CHS's arguments in its reply to WRC's response. However,
neither party has presented this Court with a copy of WRC's response to
CHS's motion to dismiss or CHS's reply to WRC's response.

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The trial court conducted a hearing on the motions to dismiss.

However, the parties have not provided this Court with a transcript of

that hearing. After the hearing, WRC filed a supplemental response to

the motions to dismiss, and CHS and Triad filed a supplemental

memorandum of law in support of their motions to dismiss.

On August 23, 2024, the trial court entered an order denying

Triad's motion to dismiss. Triad subsequently petitioned this Court for

a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its August 23,

2024, order denying its motion to dismiss and to enter an order granting

its motion to dismiss.

Standard of Review

" ' " 'Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only
where there is (1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; (2)
an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another
adequate remedy; and (4) properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court.' Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497,
499 (Ala. 1995)."

" 'Ex parte CTB, Inc., 782 So. 2d 188, 190 (Ala.
2000). In Ex parte CTB, this Court established
that a petition for a writ of mandamus is the
proper vehicle for obtaining review of an order
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denying enforcement of an "outbound" forum-
selection clause when it is presented in a motion to
dismiss. Indeed, an attempt to seek enforcement
of the outbound forum-selection clause is properly
presented in a motion to dismiss without
prejudice, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ.
P., for contractually improper venue. Additionally,
we note that a party may submit evidentiary
matters to support a motion to dismiss that
attacks venue. Williams v. Skysite
Communications Corp., 781 So. 2d 241 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2000), quoting Crowe v. City of Athens, 733
So. 2d 447, 449 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).'

"Ex parte D.M. White Constr. Co., 806 So. 2d 370, 372 (Ala.
2001). Further, 'a trial court's ruling on the question of
enforcing a forum-selection clause' will be vacated if the court
exceeded its discretion. Id."

Ex parte International Paper Co., 285 So. 3d 753, 756-57 (Ala. 2019).

Discussion

Triad argues that the trial court erroneously denied its motion to

dismiss. In its mandamus petition, Triad argues that this "action

concerns a Linen Services Agreement that is an integrated part, adopted

and incorporated into the [purchasing agreement]"; that the purchasing

agreement includes a forum-selection clause that provides that

Tennessee is the exclusive forum for any claim arising out of the

purchasing agreement; that Triad is a third-party beneficiary of the

purchasing agreement; and that "[t]he enforcement of the forum selection
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clause is neither unfair nor unreasonable." In response, WRC argues

that the language in the integration clause of the purchasing agreement

"unambiguously excludes the forum selection clause." Answer, p. 5. It

also argues that, if the purchasing agreement does not specifically

exclude the forum-selection clause, "there is [an] ambiguity rendering the

forum selection clause unenforceable." Answer, p. 7.

The only real issue in this case is whether the additional-provisions

document, which includes the forum-selection clause, is incorporated into

the purchasing agreement.2 In its answer to the mandamus petition,

WRC asserts:

"The Purchasing Agreement states in Section 26, titled
Integration, that '[t]here are no agreements, representations
or warranties between and among the Parties other than
those set forth in this Purchasing Agreement or the
documents and agreements referred to in this Purchasing
Agreement.' (emphasis added) …. 'A merger clause only
operates to establish that a written agreement is a completely
integrated document, into which all prior and
contemporaneous negotiations are merged.' Crimson
Industries, Inc. v. Kirkland, 736 So. 2d 597, 601 (Ala. 1999)
(emphasis added). The [purchasing agreement] refers to only
three documents: Attachment A - Linen Services Agreement;
Attachment B - Service Provider's Supplies; and Attachment
C - List of Participating CHS Affiliates. …

2In its answer to the mandamus petition, WRC does not argue that

the enforcement of the forum-selection clause would be either unfair or
unreasonable under the circumstances.
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"The forum selection clause relied upon by Triad in its
petition is found in an attachment titled 'Additional
Provisions.' ... The Purchasing Agreement does not contain a
single reference to an attachment or document titled
'Additional Provisions.' The only Attachment B referenced in
the Purchasing Agreement is in paragraph 3.17 which states
'Service Provider's Supplies: Service Provider shall supply
those Service disposables reasonably necessary for Services as
set forth in Attachment B hereto.' … Because there is no
reference in the Purchasing Agreement to a document entitled
'Additional Provisions' and the only Attachment B referred to
in the Purchasing Agreement is the 'Service Provider's
Supplies,' the Additional Provisions are specifically excluded
by the Purchasing Agreement's Integration clause and,
therefore, not a part of the Purchasing Agreement."

Answer, pp. 5-6.

"Under general Alabama rules of contract
interpretation, the intent of the contracting parties is
discerned from the whole of the contract. See Loerch v.
National Bank of Commerce of Birmingham, 624 So. 2d 552,
553 (Ala. 1993). Where there is no indication that the terms
of the contract are used in a special or technical sense, they
will be given their ordinary, plain, and natural meaning. See
Ex parte Dan Tucker Auto Sales, Inc., 718 So. 2d 33, 36 (Ala.
1998). If the court determines that the terms are
unambiguous (susceptible of only one reasonable meaning),
then the court will presume that the parties intended what
they stated and will enforce the contract as written. See id.
at 36; Voyager Life Ins. Co. v. Whitson, 703 So. 2d 944, 948
(Ala. 1997). On the other hand, if the court determines that
the terms are ambiguous (susceptible of more than one
reasonable meaning), then the court must use established
rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity. See
Whitson, 703 So. 2d at 948. Under those established rules of
contract construction, where there is a choice between a valid
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construction and an invalid construction the court has a duty
to accept the construction that will uphold, rather than
destroy, the contract and that will give effect and meaning to
all of its terms. See id. at 948-49; Sullivan, Long & Hagerty
v. Southern Elec. Generating Co., 667 So. 2d 722, 725 (Ala.
1995). Additionally, 'if there exists inconsistency between two
clauses of a contract which cannot be reconciled, the
inconsistency must be resolved in favor of the prior clause,
unless an intention to thereafter qualify is plainly expressed.'
City of Fairhope v. Town of Daphne, 282 Ala. 51, 58, 208 So.
2d 917, 924 (1968); see Whitson, 703 So. 2d at 949. Last, if all
other rules of contract construction fail to resolve the
ambiguity, then, under the rule of contra proferentem, any
ambiguity must be construed against the drafter of the
contract. See Lackey v. Central Bank of the South, 710 So. 2d
419, 422 (Ala. 1998)."

Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741, 746 (Ala. 2000).

As Triad notes in its reply brief to this Court, WRC's argument in

this regard relies solely on the third sentence of the integration clause

while completely ignoring the first sentence of that clause. Section 26.0

of the purchasing agreement provides:

"This Purchasing Agreement, the Linen Services
Agreement, and all attachments hereto (as well as the
agreements and other documents referred to in this
Purchasing Agreement) constitute the entire agreement
between the Parties with regard to the subject matter hereof.
This Purchasing Agreement supersedes all previous
agreements between or among the Parties with regard to
subject matter. There are no agreements, representations, or
warranties between or among the Parties other than those set
forth in this Purchasing Agreement or the documents and
agreement referred to in this Purchasing Agreement."
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(Emphasis added.)

When reading the integration clause as whole, it is clear that any

attachments to the purchasing agreement, such as the additional-

provisions document identified as Attachment B to the purchasing

agreement, were incorporated into the purchasing agreement. Thus, the

integration clause did not specifically exclude the additional-provisions

document.

WRC argues that, even if the integration clause did not specifically

exclude the additional-provisions document that included the forum-

selection clause, "there is [an] ambiguity rendering the forum selection

clause unenforceable." Answer, p. 7.

"The Purchasing Agreement's Integration clause
restricts the agreements and covenants to only 'those set forth
in this Purchasing Agreement or the documents and
agreements referred to in this Purchasing Agreement.'
(emphasis added) …. It is undisputed that the Purchasing
Agreement does not contain a forum selection clause in the
body of the agreement and does not contain any reference to
an 'Attachment B: Additional Provisions' document. … The
only Attachment B referenced therein is in Section 3.17 which
states 'Service Provider's Supplies: Service Provider shall
supply those Service disposables reasonably necessary for
Services as set forth in Attachment B hereto.' ... Thus, there
is conflict within the document as to what Attachment B is
and what purpose it serves. Additionally, by failing to
properly identify the attachment, an argument could be made
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that WRC was not placed on notice that there were additional
provisions, such as a forum selection clause, that could
require WRC to litigate any dispute in a jurisdiction that has
no ties to or involvement in the Purchasing Agreement."

Answer, pp. 7-8.

As we noted previously, the first sentence of the integration clause

specifically provided that all the attachments to the purchasing

agreement were part of the agreement. For the most part, the purchasing

agreement included "CHS Purchased Services Agreement Template -

September 2019" in the bottom left corner of each page and a designation

of "Page __ of 24" in the bottom right corner of each page.3 The signature

page of the purchasing agreement was on page 19 of 24. Page 20 of 24

stated:

"ATTACHMENT A
"LINEN SERVICES AGREEMENT

"See attached Linen Services Agreement"

The additional-provisions document was labeled "ATTACHMENT B"

and was numbered pages 21 of 24 and 22 of 24. Finally, page 23 of 24

stated:

3The first page of the purchasing agreement did not include this

information. Rather, it appeared on the top the following page that was
otherwise blank.
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"ATTACHMENT C

"LIST OF PARTICIPATING CHS AFFILIATES AND PRICES FOR
SERVICES

"Per Addendum B of Attachment A, Linen Services Agreement"

Page 24 of 24 was blank. Section 3.17 of the purchasing agreement

stated: "Service Provider shall supply those Service disposables

reasonably necessary for Services as set forth in an Attachment B

hereto." (Emphasis in original.) However, there is no separately

designated attachment to the purchasing agreement itself that deals

with service disposables or that sets forth services to be provided by

WRC. 4

When viewing the purchasing agreement and its attachments as a

whole, the additional-provisions document was a clearly marked and

paginated attachment to the purchasing agreement. Additionally, the

additional-provisions document specifically stated:

"In its performance under this Purchasing Agreement,
Service Provider agrees to the following additional terms,
which are incorporated by reference and are made fully a part

4The linen-services agreement, which was Attachment A to the
purchasing agreement, was a separately paginated document that
included Addenda A-E. The linen-services agreement and its addenda
set forth detailed information about the services to be provided by WRC
and the pricing for those services.
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thereof. Any ambiguity or conflict shall be resolved in favor
of these Additional Provisions."

Thus, WRC's assertion that the failure to properly identify the

attachment could support an argument "that WRC was not placed on

notice that there were additional provisions, such as a forum selection

clause," is not persuasive. Accordingly, WRC's claim of ambiguity is

without merit.

For these reasons, the trial court exceeded its discretion when it

denied Triad's motion to dismiss.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we grant Triad's mandamus petition and

issue the writ directing the trial court to vacate its August 23, 2024, order

denying Triad's motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing

WRC's claims against Triad.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Bryan, Mitchell, Cook, and McCool, JJ.,

concur.

Sellers, J., concurs in the result.

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