790 Montclair, LLC v. The Station at Crestline Heights, LLC; Valley National Bank; Ard Contracting, Inc.; Birmingham Metro, LLC; Alabama Hoops RE, LLC; Trinity Montclair 800, LLC; Trinity Montclair 820, LLC; and Birmingham Metro Baptist Association

Rel: July 3, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2025

_________________________

SC-2024-0100
_________________________

790 Montclair, LLC

v.

The Station at Crestline Heights, LLC; Valley National Bank;
Ard Contracting, Inc.; Birmingham Metro, LLC; Alabama Hoops
RE, LLC; Trinity Montclair 800, LLC; Trinity Montclair 820,
LLC; and Birmingham Metro Baptist Association

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-22-902511)

SELLERS, Justice.
SC-2024-0100

790 Montclair, LLC, appeals from an order of the Jefferson Circuit

Court ("the trial court") denying its request for a preliminary injunction

against The Station at Crestline Heights, LLC ("the Station"). 790

Montclair sought the injunction based on the Station's construction of an

entrance to its parcel of property that, 790 Montclair claimed, violated a

reciprocal easement.1 We affirm.

I. Facts

The property at issue, formerly a hospital campus, is located in

Jefferson County and was once owned by Baptist Health System, Inc.,

and Baptist Health System Properties, LLC ("the Baptist entities"). In

December 2018, the Baptist entities executed a "Declaration of and

Agreement Granting Reciprocal Easements and Agreement" ("the 2018

easement agreement"), granting easements and rights with respect to,

among other things, access, ingress, and egress over and across parcels

of property within the hospital campus. Relevant here, Section 2(a) of

the 2018 easement agreement provides "[n]on-exclusive easements for

1The other named appellees in this case are the other owners of

property subject to the easement or somehow associated with the owners
thereof: Valley National Bank; Ard Contracting, Inc.; Birmingham
Metro, LLC; Alabama Hoops RE, LLC; Trinity Montclair 800, LLC;
Trinity Montclair 820, LLC; and Birmingham Metro Baptist Association.
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ingress, egress and access across the Access Facilities." The 2018

easement agreement defines "access facilities" as follows:

" 'Access Facilities' means the private drives, pedestrian
bridges and sidewalks located on the Parcels, including but
not limited to Dan Hudson Drive, Medical Park Drive and the
driveway that traverses the BHS Property from Medical Park
Drive to the back parking lot of the BHSP Property, which are
depicted on Exhibit 'C' which is attached hereto and
incorporated herein by reference, as the same are modified
from time to time."
(Emphasis added.)

Section 2 of the 2018 easement agreement also provides, in relevant

part: "Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, [the owners of

the parcels] shall have the right to use the Easement Areas for their own

use for the purposes set forth in this Section 2 and for other purposes that

do not materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of the

Easements." Section 3 of the 2018 easement agreement states that the

access facilities "shall not be altered, relocated or removed, without the

prior written approval of all Owners, which approval may be granted or

withheld by each Owner in its sole and absolute discretion." After the

2018 easement agreement was recorded in the Jefferson County Probate

Office, the Baptist entities sold parcels of property to, among others, 790

Montclair and the Station. In July 2021, the Station began construction

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of a 277-unit apartment complex on its parcel -- a $60 million investment.

According to the Station, the City of Birmingham ("the City") generally

requires apartment complexes with more than 200 units to have at least

2 points of access for fire and emergency vehicles. In this case, one access

point was located at 52nd Street, and the only other possible access point

was Dan Hudson Drive. In November or December 2021, the City

approved the Station's request for a "curb cut" or entrance that would

connect the Station's property to Dan Hudson Drive. On August 24, 2022,

some 7 months after the "curb curt" was completed, 790 Montclair

commenced an action seeking, among other things, preliminary and

permanent injunctive relief.2 In its complaint, 790 Montclair argued that

the Station had violated the 2018 easement agreement by altering the

sidewalk on Dan Hudson Drive without 790 Montclair's prior permission

and that 790 Montclair was entitled to an injunction requiring the

Station to restore the sidewalk back to its original condition. The trial

2790 Montclair also filed a verified request for a temporary
restraining order ("TRO"). Judge Tamara Harris Johnson, in her
capacity as duty judge, issued the TRO, enjoining the Station, Ard
Contracting, and Valley National Bank from accessing Dan Hudson
Drive from the Station's property. The TRO remained in effect until April
2023.
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court conducted multiple evidentiary hearings, heard live testimony, and

considered numerous documents, exhibits, affidavits, and briefs. After

considering all the evidence, the trial court entered an order denying 790

Montclair's request for a preliminary injunction. The trial court

concluded, in relevant part, that the sidewalk on Dan Hudson Drive

where the Station had made its curb cut was not an access facility as

defined in the 2018 easement agreement. This appeal followed. See Rule

4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P.

II. Standard of Review

"A party seeking a preliminary injunction must
demonstrate (1) that the party would suffer irreparable harm
without the injunction, (2) that the party has no adequate
remedy at law, (3) that the party has at least a reasonable
chance of success on the ultimate merits of the case, and (4)
that the hardship that the injunction will impose on the
opposing party will not unreasonably outweigh the benefit
accruing to the party seeking the injunction. Holiday Isle,
LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173, 1176 (Ala. 2008)."

Bethel v. Franklin, 381 So. 3d 1121, 1126 (Ala. 2023).

When reviewing an order granting or denying a preliminary

injunction, this Court reviews the trial court's legal rulings de novo and

its ultimate decision to grant or deny the preliminary injunction for an

abuse of discretion. Bethel. Finally, because the trial court heard live

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testimony in this case, its findings of fact are afforded a presumption of

correctness, and its order based on those findings will not be disturbed

on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous and against the great weight

of the evidence. See State v. Epic Tech, LLC, 378 So. 3d 467, 478 (Ala.

2022) (noting that the ore tenus rule is applicable in preliminary-

injunction proceedings).

III. Discussion

A. The Trial Court's Order

Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., requires a trial court to set forth its

reasons for issuing an injunction. Although the trial court in this case

denied 790 Montclair's request for a preliminary injunction, it,

nonetheless, entered a detailed order setting forth its findings of fact,

conclusions of law, and reasons why 790 Montclair failed to meet its

burden of demonstrating entitlement to injunctive relief. The dispositive

issues in this appeal are whether the trial court exceeded its discretion

in denying 790 Montclair's request for a preliminary injunction and,

specifically, (1) in finding that the sidewalk on Dan Hudson Drive where

the Station had made its curb cut or new entrance was not an access

facility as defined in the 2018 easement agreement and (2) in finding that

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SC-2024-0100

790 Montclair had failed to demonstrate the necessary requirements for

a preliminary injunction.

The 2018 easement agreement defines access facilities as "the

private drives, pedestrian bridges and sidewalks located on the Parcels,

including but not limited to Dan Hudson Drive …, which are depicted on

Exhibit 'C' which is attached [to the 2018 easement agreement] and

incorporated [in the 2018 easement agreement] by reference." 790

Montclair relies primarily on the phrase "located on the Parcels," without

much, if any, consideration of the specific contents or depictions on

Exhibit C. However, the 2018 easement agreement unambiguously

defines access facilities as those facilities "located on the Parcels, …

which are depicted on Exhibit C." It is undisputed that Exhibit C does

not depict sidewalks on the east side of Dan Hudson Drive -- the side

where the Station is located and where the curb cut was made. Exhibit

C, on the other hand, does depict sidewalks on the west side of Dan

Hudson Drive -- the side where 790 Montclair's building is located. Derek

Meadows, the drafter of the survey on which Exhibit C is based, testified

that a sidewalk on the east side of Dan Hudson Drive could have easily

been drawn or depicted on Exhibit C, but was not. Further, 790

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SC-2024-0100

Montclair's attorney, Anne Raymond, participated in the drafting of the

2018 easement agreement and prepared Exhibit C. Raymond testified

that 790 Montclair could have specifically requested language in the 2018

easement agreement precluding curb cuts or new entrances on Dan

Hudson Drive, but did not. Amy S. Allen, the president and chief

executive officer of the Baptist entities, testified in her deposition that

she was the person who signed the 2018 easement agreement and that it

was neither her intent to cut off parcel owners' rights to access their

parcels, nor her intent that 790 Montclair could veto other parcel owners'

rights to access their parcels. Allen stated that there was no dominant

or subservient estate at issue in this case; rather, she said, the 2018

easement agreement gives all parcel owners subject to the easement

nonexclusive access to Dan Hudson Drive and Medical Park Drive. Allen

further indicated that the phrase "access facilities shall not be altered,

relocated or removed" means that no changes should be made to the

access facilities that would block access to another's parcel. Finally, both

Walter Schoel, a licensed civil engineer, and Andrew Phillips, the project

engineer for the Station's project, opined that the curb cut was not an

alteration of Dan Hudson Drive. It is undisputed that the primary

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purpose of the easement is to allow the parties subject to the easement,

as well as their successors in interest, to utilize Dan Hudson Drive and

Medical Park Drive to access their parcels. Thus, Dan Hudson Drive was

expressly reserved as an access easement for the benefit of all the parcel

owners who purchased their parcels from the Baptist entities. The 2018

easement agreement also expressly states that the owners of the parcels

within the former hospital campus have the right to use the easement

areas, including Dan Hudson Drive, for their own use and for other

purposes that do not "materially interfere with the use and enjoyment of

the Easement." The trial court noted that, after four days of testimony

and during the evidentiary hearings, 790 Montclair presented no

evidence to demonstrate how the new entrance from the Station's parcel

to Dan Hudson Drive would interfere with 790 Montclair's use and

enjoyment of the easement. Notably, the evidence was undisputed that

790 Montclair has no direct vehicular access to Dan Hudson Drive and

that it uses Medical Park Drive almost exclusively to access its parcel.

In fact, given the location of 790 Montclair's parcel, opening or closing

access to Dan Hudson Drive would have no appreciable effect of

enhancing or restricting the use and enjoyment of 790 Montclair's parcel.

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SC-2024-0100

Dan Hudson Drive is too remote for 790 Montclair to use for access or

egress from its parcel. The trial court further noted that, if anything, the

Station's curb cut or entrance accessing Dan Hudson Drive was an

improvement to the easement. See Annotation, Right of Owner of

Easement of Way to Make Improvements or Repairs Thereon, 112 A.L.R.

1303, 1303-04 (1938) (stating, in relevant part, that "[i]t is a general rule

that the owner of an easement of way may prepare, maintain, improve,

or repair the way in a manner and to an extent reasonably calculated to

promote the purposes which it was created or acquired, causing neither

an undue burden upon the servient estate, nor an unwarranted

interference with the rights of common owners or the independent rights

of others").

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly

interpreted the 2018 easement agreement to conclude that access

facilities are those facilities depicted on Exhibit C; that Exhibit C does

not depict any sidewalks on the east side of Dan Hudson Drive where the

curb cut was made; and that the curb cut was, therefore, not an alteration

of an access facility, which required the prior written approval of all

owners of parcels subject to the 2018 easement agreement.

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SC-2024-0100

B. Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction

790 Montclair challenges only two of the trial court's findings

regarding the requirements for a preliminary injunction. 790 Montclair

asserts that the trial court erred in finding (1) that 790 Montclair would

not suffer irreparable harm without the injunction because, it concluded,

790 Montclair had an adequate remedy at law and (2) that the hardship

imposed on the Station by blocking access to its parcel from Dan Hudson

Drive far outweighed any benefit to 790 Montclair. The trial court

specifically found that, if 790 Montclair had actually been damaged in

some way by the Station's curb cut or new entrance, then an award of

damages would be available. In Water Works & Sewer Board of

Birmingham v. Inland Lake Investments, LLC, 31 So. 3d 686, 692 (Ala.

2009), this Court stated:

" ' "[I]rreparable injury" is an injury that is not redressable in
a court of law through an award of money damages.' Perley v.
Tapscan, Inc., 646 So. 2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1994). The Court has
likewise stated that '[a] plaintiff that can recover damages has
an adequate remedy at law and is not entitled to an
injunction.' SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles
Co., 931 So. 2d 706, 709 (Ala. 2005). Thus, 'a conclusion that
the injury is irreparable necessarily shows that there is no
adequate remedy at law.' Fleet Wholesale Supply Co. v.
Remington Arms Co., 846 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1988)."

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(Footnote omitted.) See also Martin v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of

Andalusia, 559 So. 2d 1075, 1079 (Ala. 1990) (noting that, when

considering a motion for a preliminary injunction, "the trial court, in its

discretion and given the facts and circumstances of each case, may

consider and weigh the relative hardships that each party may suffer

against the benefits that may flow from the grant of the preliminary

injunction").

790 Montclair relies heavily on West Town Plaza Associates, Ltd. v

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 619 So. 2d 1290 (Ala. 1993), for the proposition

that "an obstruction" of a property right is an injury or harm for which

money damages are inadequate. 790 Montclair argues that the

protection of property rights is paramount and that a party whose

property is subject to an easement cannot be permitted to ignore the clear

terms of the easement and then claim that "hardship" should allow its

violation of those terms. In West Town Plaza, Wal-Mart subleased retail

space from F.W. Woolworth Company. The "Overlease" and "Sublease"

agreements at issue granted Wal-Mart an easement over a parking area

consisting of approximately 30 to 34 parking spaces. Without Wal-Mart's

consent, the lessor's assignee, West Town Plaza, constructed a building

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that deprived Wal-Mart of its right to use the parking spaces. The trial

court granted Wal-Mart injunctive relief, ordering West Town Plaza to

remove the building and to restore the parking spaces. In affirming the

trial court's order, this Court concluded that such "an obstruction of Wal-

Mart's easement is clearly an injury or harm for which money damages

are inadequate." Id. at 1296. Importantly, this Court also noted that,

" '[t]he owner of the servient estate must abstain from acts interfering

with the proper enjoyment of the easement by the owner of the dominant

estate, and a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin the obstruction of

private easements and to require the removal of such obstructions.' " Id.

(quoting Brown v. Alabama Power Co., 275 Ala. 467, 470, 156 So. 2d 153,

155 (1963)). West Town Plaza is distinguishable insofar as it involved a

dominant and servient estate. As previously indicated, Allen, the

president and chief executive officer of the Baptist entities, testified in

her deposition that there was no dominant or servient estate at issue in

this case; rather, she testified, the 2018 easement agreement gives all the

parcel owners subject to the easement nonexclusive access to Dan

Hudson Drive. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding that, to

the extent 790 Montclair had been damaged by the curb cut, it had an

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adequate remedy at law, i.e., an award of money damages. It further did

not err in finding that the hardship imposed on the Station by blocking

access to its parcel from Dan Hudson Drive far outweighed any benefit to

790 Montclair. As previously indicated, the sidewalk on Dan Hudson

Drive where the Station had made its curb cut or new entrance was not

an access facility as defined in the 2018 easement agreement; 790

Montclair presented no evidence to demonstrate how the new entrance

from the Station's parcel to Dan Hudson Drive would interfere with 790

Montclair's use and enjoyment of the easement; and the primary purpose

of the 2018 easement agreement is to allow the parties subject to the

easement, as well as their successors in interest, to utilize Dan Hudson

Drive and Medical Park Drive to access their parcels. Accordingly, the

trial court did not exceed its discretion in finding that 790 Montclair had

failed to demonstrate its entitlement to injunctive relief.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the order of the trial court

denying 790 Montclair's request for a preliminary injunction.

AFFIRMED.

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Stewart, C.J., and Wise, Mendheim, Cook, McCool, and Lewis, JJ.,

concur.

Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.

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