Traveka Stanley, Reginald Burrell, Charlie Gray, and Jermaine Pringle v. Kay Ivey, Governor of Alabama, and John Hamm, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, in their official capacities

Rel: December 19, 2025

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2024-0710
_________________________

Traveka Stanley, Reginald Burrell, Charlie Gray,
and Jermaine Pringle

v.

Kay Ivey, Governor of Alabama, and John Hamm,
Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, in
their official capacities

Appeal from Montgomery Circuit Court
(CV-24-900649)

FRIDY, Judge.

Traveka Stanley, Reginald Burrell, Charlie Gray, and Jermaine

Pringle ("the prisoners"), who are inmates in the custody of the Alabama

Department of Corrections ("ADOC"), appeal from a judgment of the
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Montgomery Circuit Court ("the trial court") dismissing their complaint

against Kay Ivey, in her official capacity as the governor of Alabama

("Governor Ivey"), and John Hamm, in his official capacity as the

commissioner of ADOC ("Commissioner Hamm"). 1 For the reasons stated

herein, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Appellate Jurisdiction

The prisoners originally appealed from the trial court's judgment to

this court. Concluding that we lacked jurisdiction, we transferred the

appeal to our supreme court. In an opinion issued on September 5, 2025,

however, our supreme court held that the appeal was within this court's

appellate jurisdiction and transferred it back to this court. See Stanley v.

Ivey, [Ms. SC-2025-0058, Sept. 5, 2025] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2025).

1Originally, Dexter Avery was also a plaintiff in the prisoners'
action. However, after the trial court entered its final judgment, but
before the prisoners appealed, Avery died in prison.

Originally, Ranquel Smith was also a plaintiff in the prisoners'
action, and he was a party to this appeal, but, on July 9, 2025, the parties
filed a "Joint Motion for Partial Dismissal" because Smith was paroled
from the physical custody of ADOC on July 3, 2025. On July 23, 2025, our
supreme court granted the parties' requested dismissal of Smith from
this case. Because Smith had been the only plaintiff who asserted Count
3 of the prisoners' complaint, which challenged the constitutionality of an
amended version of § 14-9-41, Ala. Code 1975, Smith's dismissal from the
case also dismissed Count 3 in its entirety.
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Background

Because we are reviewing a judgment granting a motion to dismiss,

we must accept the factual allegations in the prisoners' complaint as true

and treat them as the facts pertinent to this appeal. See, e.g., Ex parte

Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 305 (Ala. 2004) (holding that, in reviewing

a ruling on a motion to dismiss, an appellate court must accept the

allegations of the complaint as true). However, we are not required to

accept the prisoners' conclusory allegations regarding the legal effect of

those facts. See Ohio Valley Conf. v. Jones, 385 So. 3d 948, 969 (Ala. 2023)

(" 'Although we are required to accept [the plaintiff's] factual allegations

as true [in reviewing a judgment granting a motion to dismiss], we are

not required to accept her conclusory allegations that [the defendant]

acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad faith. Rather, to

survive [the defendant's] motion to dismiss, [the plaintiff] was required

to plead facts that would support those conclusory allegations.' " (quoting

Ex parte Gilland, 274 So. 3d 976, 985 n.3 (Ala. 2018))).

The prisoners' complaint alleges that each of them is incarcerated

in an ADOC facility, that each of them participates in a voluntary work-

release program authorized by Alabama law that pays the prisoners for

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their labor, and that each of them is required to perform housekeeping

duties at the ADOC facilities where they are incarcerated, such as

cleaning inmate cells and other prison areas, garbage pickup, facility

repair, cafeteria duty, and laundry. The prisoners allege that they receive

no monetary compensation for their labor at their ADOC facilities.

The prisoners' complaint further alleges that ADOC has punished

each of them for refusing to work, being late to work, being fired from a

work-release job, or complaining about unsafe working conditions.

According to the prisoners' complaint, those punishments have included

being assigned extra work duty without pay, losses of telephone and

canteen access, losses of visitation hours, losses of passes to visit family

members, losses of good-time credits, and receiving unfavorable

disciplinary reports that may affect their consideration for parole. Each

of the prisoners alleges that he or she "wants to work for a free-world

employer, but [he or she] does not want to be punished by ADOC for not

working if [he or she] cannot work or declines to do so, including for

reasons such as illness or unsafe working conditions."

The prisoners' complaint alleges that Governor Ivey signed

Executive Order No. 725 ("EO 725"), titled "Promoting Public Safety by

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Establishing Standards and Accountability for Correctional Incentive

Time." Their complaint further alleges that "EO 725 explicitly requires

punishment in the form of loss of good time and inability to accrue good

time for refusing to work and permits other types of punishment, such as

solitary confinement and loss of prison privileges." Moreover, the

complaint alleges that EO 725 instructed the ADOC commissioner to

"implement ... uniform minimum standards for correctional incentive

time sanctions pursuant to ... § 14-9-41(f)(1)[, Ala. Code 1975]."

The prisoners' complaint also alleges that, in response to EO 725,

Commissioner Hamm revised ADOC Administrative Regulation 403

("AR 403"), titled "Procedures for Inmate Rule Violations." The prisoners

allege that "AR 403 sets out a scheme of rule violations, categorized by

severity, and prescribes the possible forms of punishment for each rule

violation." The prisoners allege that the forms of punishment include

forfeiture of good-time credit; a possible bar on earning good-time credit;

loss of privileges and incentives such as canteen, telephone, and

visitation privileges and short-term passes to leave community-based

facilities; and the imposition of "restrictive housing," i.e., solitary

confinement. The prisoners allege that AR 403 also allows ADOC to issue

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behavior citations and disciplinary reports to inmates that commit

violations while engaged in a work-release program, the Alabama

Correctional Industries ("ACI") program, or ADOC-facilities labor that

could have a negative effect on the Alabama Board of Pardons and

Paroles' determinations regarding their parole.

The prisoners' complaint points out that, before the adoption of

Alabama's recompiled Constitution in 2022, the Alabama Constitution of

1901 (Off. Recomp.), Article I, § 32, provided: " That no form of slavery

shall exist in this state; and there shall not be any involuntary servitude,

otherwise than for the punishment of crime, of which the party shall have

been duly convicted." (Emphasis added.) However, the prisoners'

complaint points out that, after the adoption of the recompiled

Constitution in 2022, the same provision states: "That no form of slavery

shall exist in this state; and there shall not be any involuntary servitude."

Art. I, § 32, Ala. Const. 2022. The prisoners allege that the language that

was deleted from Article I, § 32, was removed as a vestige of "racist

language" due to Alabama's history of slavery, black codes, convict

leasing, and chain gangs.

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The prisoners assert that EO 725 and AR 403 violate Article I, § 32,

of the current Alabama Constitution because, the prisoners allege, "they

require and enforce slavery and involuntary servitude." As relief, the

prisoners' complaint seeks a judgment declaring EO 725 and AR 403

unconstitutional and injunctions prohibiting Governor Ivey,

Commissioner Hamm, and their employees, agents, and successors from

enforcing EO 725 and AR 403. Stanley also seeks expungement of "any

disciplinary and behavior citations issued after November 28, 2022,

related to refusing to work or not working from [her] disciplinary and

other ADOC records."

On June 5, 2024, Attorney General Steve Marshall, on behalf of

Governor Ivey and Commissioner Hamm, filed a motion to dismiss the

prisoners' complaint. The attorney general argued that the trial court

lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the prisoners' claims under

Article I, § 14, Ala. Const. 2022; that the prisoners lacked standing to

challenge EO 725 because none of the prisoners possessed good-time

credit at the time they commenced the lawsuit and were ineligible to

accrue such credit; and that the prisoners had failed to state a claim for

which relief could be granted because, according to the attorney general,

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even under the conditions alleged by the prisoners, the work they perform

does not constitute slavery or involuntary servitude under a correct

interpretation of Article I, § 32. On July 22, 2024, the prisoners

responded to the motion to dismiss.

On July 29, 2024, the trial court held a hearing regarding the

motion to dismiss. On August 1, 2024, the trial court entered a judgment

dismissing the prisoners' claims against Governor Ivey and

Commissioner Hamm. In pertinent part, the judgment stated: "[T]he

Court finds that the motion [to dismiss] is due to be GRANTED because

the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity

and lack of standing. [The prisoners'] claims are thus DISMISSED."

(Capitalization in original.) Thereafter, the prisoners timely filed a notice

of appeal to this court.

Standard of Review

As discussed below, we resolve this appeal by considering whether

the prisoners' complaint stated a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ.

P. The standard of review applicable to a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)

is whether, when the allegations of the complaint are viewed most

strongly in favor of the plaintiffs, there is any set of facts the plaintiffs

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could prove that would entitle them to relief. See Ex parte Bitel, 45 So.

3d 1252, 1255 (Ala. 2010). In making this determination, the appellate

court does not consider whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail, but

only whether they may possibly prevail. Id.

Issues

After our supreme court transferred this appeal back to this court,

the prisoners filed a notice stating:

"The only issues presently before this Honorable Court
are whether the Montgomery County Circuit Court properly
dismissed [the prisoners'] complaint on the grounds of
standing and sovereign immunity. Stanley v. Ivey, No. SC-
2025-0058 ... (Ala. Sept. 5, 2025) ('[T]he merits of [the
prisoners'] claims [are] not before the appellate court because
the circuit court had dismissed the prisoners' complaint on the
grounds of standing and sovereign immunity, not on the
ground that the prisoners had failed to state a claim under §
32 of the Alabama Constitution,' and thus 'a constitutional
issue of first impression [is] not before the appellate court.')."

(Emphasis added.)

However, the fragment of a sentence from Stanley that the

prisoners quoted in their notice regarding the issues on appeal was not a

holding of the supreme court; rather, it was the supreme court's

recitation of an argument that the prisoners had made in opposition to

the attorney general's motion to transfer the prisoners' appeal to the

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supreme court. The full sentence from which the prisoners took the

quoted fragment states: "The prisoners also argued that the merits of

their claims were not before the appellate court because the circuit court

had dismissed the prisoners' complaint on the grounds of standing and

sovereign immunity, not on the ground that the prisoners had failed to

state a claim under § 32 of the Alabama Constitution, and so, they said,

a constitutional issue of first impression was not before the appellate

court." Stanley, ___ So. 3d at ___ (emphasis added). In their notice

regarding the issues before this court, the prisoners also ignored the

language in Stanley stating that the attorney general had "argued in the

motion to dismiss that the prisoners' 'allegations fail to state a claim

under § 32 of the Constitution.' " Id. at ___. The prisoners further ignore

"that, aside from exceptions not relevant here, 'this Court will
affirm the trial court on any valid legal ground presented by
the record, regardless of whether that ground was considered,
or even if it was rejected, by the trial court.' Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C.,
881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003)."

Id. at ___. Our supreme court declined to accept a transfer of the appeal

based on any constitutional issues presented by the appeal because, it

said, "the Court of Civil Appeals did not consult with this Court to seek a

transfer of this case under § 12-3-15[, Ala. Code 1975,] based on any

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perceived need to evaluate the prisoners’ constitutional claims in an

expedited manner or for any other valid reason." Id. at ___ (footnote

omitted).

" 'A court has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.' " Miles

v. Helms, 359 So. 3d 266, 270 (Ala. 2022) (citation omitted). However,

having held that this court had appellate jurisdiction over the prisoners'

appeal and having declined to accept this court's transfer of the appeal to

it based on any constitutional issues the appeal presented, our supreme

court had no further jurisdiction and could not determine what issues

this court could consider on appeal. See id. Thus, nothing in Stanley

precludes this court from considering the merits of the prisoners' claims

on appeal, and we will consider that issue pursuant to the legal principle

that, as our supreme court, quoting Liberty National, 881 So. 2d at 1020,

stated in Stanley: "[A]side from exceptions not relevant here, 'this Court

will affirm the trial court on any valid legal ground presented by the

record, regardless of whether that ground was considered, or even if it

was rejected, by the trial court.' " ___ So. 3d at ___.

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Analysis

We hold that the issue whether the prisoners' complaint stated a

claim upon which relief could be granted is dispositive of this appeal and

that our resolution of that issue mandates affirmance of the trial court's

judgment granting the motion to dismiss that Governor Ivey and

Commissioner Hamm filed.

The prisoners' action could survive the motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim upon which relief could be granted only if they alleged

facts establishing that EO 725 and AR 403 violated Article I, § 32. To do

so, they had to allege facts that would support their conclusory

allegations that EO 725 and AR 403 violated Article I, § 32. See Ohio

Valley Conf., 385 So. 3d at 969. Therefore, to survive the motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, they were required to allege facts

supporting the conclusion that EO 725 and AR 403 imposed involuntary

servitude on them.

Governor Ivey and Commissioner Hamm have not cited any

Alabama caselaw defining "involuntary servitude" in the context

presented by this appeal, and we are not aware of any. However, section

one of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

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which was ratified before Article I, § 32, provides: "Neither slavery nor

involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the

party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United

States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." That language is

substantially the same as the language of Article I, § 32, before the

ratification of the recompiled Alabama Constitution in 2022 changed it.

The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Kozminski, 487

U.S. 931, 952 (1988), held that the term "involuntary servitude" in the

Thirteenth Amendment "necessarily means a condition of servitude in

which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat

of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion

through law or the legal process." None of the punishments the prisoners

alleged were imposed by EO 725 and AR 403 for the prisoners' refusal to

work involved physical acts or the threat of physical acts to compel them

to work. There were no allegations that the prisoners would be beaten or

otherwise physically abused if they refused to work or that they would be

threatened with physical harm if they refused to work.

Moreover, the prisoners did not allege that they would be coerced

through law or the legal process if they refused to work.

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" 'The opportunity to earn "good time" is a privilege, not a
right, in Alabama.' Coslett v. State, 697 So. 2d 61, 64 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1997). ' " 'When [a] statute is framed in
discretionary terms there is not a liberty interest created.' " '
Gullet v. State, 613 So. 2d 400, 401 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)
(quoting Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378, 380 (11th Cir.
1991), quoting in turn Thomas v. Sellers, 691 F.2d 487, 489
(11th Cir. 1982))."

Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Booth, [Ms. CR-2023-0426, Nov. 7, 2025] ___

So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2025).

Loss of good-time credit or the loss of the opportunity to earn good-

time credit may, under certain circumstances, trigger a prisoner's due-

process rights because they potentially could affect the term of the

prisoner's confinement pursuant to his or her existing sentence, see

Watkins v. Mitchem, 50 So. 3d 485, 493 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010); however,

they do not equate with a conviction of a crime and the imposition of an

additional sentence. Thus, although a prisoner may be entitled to due

process when his or her good-time credit is eliminated or his or her

opportunity to earn good-time credit is eliminated, their elimination does

not constitute involuntary servitude.

Similarly, placement of a prisoner in solitary confinement may,

under certain circumstances, entitle him or her to due process because it

could constitute an alteration in the conditions of his or her confinement,

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see id.; however, it does not constitute involuntary servitude because it

does not constitute the conviction of a crime and the imposition of an

additional sentence. None of the other punishments the prisoners

alleged, such as being assigned extra work duty without pay, losses of

telephone and canteen access, losses of visitation hours, losses of passes

to visit family members, and receiving unfavorable disciplinary reports

that may affect consideration for parole constitute involuntary servitude

because they do not involve the use of physical coercion, the threat of

physical coercion, or the use of or the threat of coercion through law or

the legal process. See, e.g., In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the

Florida Bar 1-3.1(a) and Rules of Judicial Administration 2.065 (Legal

Aid), 573 So. 2d 800, 805 (Fla. 1990) (holding that Thirteenth

Amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude did not prohibit a

court from appointing a lawyer to represent an indigent person without

his or her consent because, for the prohibition to apply, the person must

be subjected to physical restraint or threat of legal confinement as an

alternative to the service); and Abbot v. Gould, Inc., 443 N.W. 2d 591, 596

(Neb. 1989) ("Plaintiffs' involuntary servitude argument under the

federal Constitution is foreclosed by the holding in U.S. v. Kozminski,

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[487 U.S. 931], 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed. 2d 788 (1988), to the effect that

the conduct proscribed by the 13th amendment is limited to the use or

threat of physical force or legal coercion to extract labor from an

unwilling worker.").

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court's judgment because the prisoners'

complaint failed to allege facts indicating that EO 725 and AR 403

subjected them to involuntary servitude and, therefore, failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Because we affirm the trial

court's judgment on that ground, we omit a discussion of the sovereign-

immunity and standing issues.

AFFIRMED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

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