Monroe County Board of Education v. Barbarietta Turner-Pugh

Rel: June 5, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
_________________________

CL-2025-0707
_________________________

Monroe County Board of Education

v.

Barbarietta Turner-Pugh

Appeal from the Decision of the Students First Act Hearing
Officer
(2025 100)

FRIDY, Judge.

The Monroe County Board of Education ("the Board") appeals from

the decision of a hearing officer appointed pursuant to the Students First

Act ("the SFA"), § 16-24C-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, reversing the Board's

decision to terminate the employment of its tenured employee, Dr.
CL-2025-0707

Barbarietta Turner-Pugh ("Pugh"). For the reasons set forth herein, we

reverse.

Background

On December 19, 2024, Monroe County school superintendent

Gregory L. Shehan ("the superintendent") issued a written notification to

Pugh that he was recommending the termination of her employment as

director of student services based on allegations of failure to perform her

duties in a satisfactory manner, incompetency, insubordination, and

other good and just cause. The notice advised Pugh that she had a right

to request a termination hearing and that, upon timely written notice

from her, the Board would provide her with written notice of the date of

the hearing.

On December 20, 2024, Pugh submitted a timely written request

for a termination hearing. On December 26, 2024, pursuant to the SFA,

she submitted a written notice of contest demanding all procedural

protections afforded by law, stating that her attorneys would be notifying

the superintendent of their appearances, and requesting that any further

correspondence be directed to her attorneys. Pugh did not identify any

attorneys by name in her written notice.

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When Pugh requested the hearing before the Board, she was

already involved in an employment-discrimination action ("the federal

case") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

Alabama against the Monroe County School System, the Board, and the

Board's members in their official capacities. Pugh was represented in the

federal case by Christine Hernandez and other attorneys in her law firm.

The attorneys who represented the superintendent in this case, Mark

Boardman and Katherine Watkins, also served as counsel for the Board

and its members in the federal case.

In a letter dated January 3, 2025, the superintendent notified Pugh

that the Board had set the termination hearing for February 6, 2025. The

letter advised Pugh of her rights under the SFA; established prehearing

procedural deadlines that required submission of witness lists, exhibits,

and subpoena requests by January 27, 2025; and provided that the

superintendent's anticipated witness list and exhibits would be produced

by the same deadline. The letter asked Pugh to provide an e-mail address

for her or her attorney for service of materials.

On January 6, 2025, attorney Leston C. Stallworth, Jr., sent

written correspondence to the superintendent, copying the

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superintendent's counsel, Boardman, advising that he represented Pugh

in connection with the proposed employment-termination matter. The

letter expressly instructed that "[a]ll correspondence regarding [that]

matter should be directed to [him]." On the same date, Hernandez

transmitted correspondence to the Board's counsel, Watkins, regarding

scheduling depositions in the federal case and identifying multiple

potential deposition dates, including February 7, 2025 ("the deposition-

scheduling letter").

Although Pugh did not file a written motion to continue the

termination hearing, Boardman, as attorney for the superintendent, and

Stallworth, as attorney for Pugh, engaged in telephone discussions

concerning the scheduling of the termination hearing and reached an

agreement to continue the hearing by one day, to February 7, 2025, and

the Board agreed to the change. On January 15, 2025, the superintendent

sent a letter and an e-mail to Stallworth confirming that Stallworth had

requested a change of the February 6, 2025, termination-hearing date,

"citing a potential conflict with [his] co-counsel." The superintendent

further stated that Stallworth's unnamed co-counsel (presumably

Hernandez) had sent correspondence to Boardman and Watkins stating

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that February 7, 2025, was available on her calendar and that, based on

those communications, Stallworth and Boardman had agreed to move the

termination hearing from February 6 to February 7, 2025. The

correspondence confirmed that the termination hearing would proceed on

February 7, 2025, and adjusted the prehearing disclosure deadline from

January 27 to January 28, 2025. The superintendent also noted that

Stallworth was the only attorney from whom he had received written

notice of representation and that, consistent with Stallworth's

instruction that all communications be directed to him, he had sent the

correspondence only to Stallworth.

It appears that sometime between January 20 and January 27,

2025, Stallworth sent an e-mail to the superintendent that is not

contained in the record; however, the record does include the

superintendent's January 27, 2025, response to that e-mail explaining

that a snow emergency and school closures since January 20, 2025, had

delayed the superintendent's reply. In the response, the superintendent

explained to Stallworth that the Board could not reschedule the

termination hearing to March 2025 and that Stallworth had indicated

that February 7, 2025, accommodated his calendar. The superintendent

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enclosed the deposition-scheduling letter from Hernandez to Board

attorney Watkins that proposed February 7, 2025, as a potential date for

depositions in the federal case, and the superintendent stated that the

Board had already moved the termination hearing from February 6 to

February 7, 2025, at both Stallworth's and Hernandez's request.

On January 30, 2025, Boardman e-mailed both Hernandez and

Stallworth stating that he had received Stallworth's January 6, 2025,

letter of representation and Hernandez's deposition-scheduling letter of

the same date referencing her availability on February 7, 2025, for

depositions in the federal case. Boardman stated that the termination

hearing had originally been set for February 6, 2025, and that, after

discussions with Stallworth, he had agreed to move it to February 7,

2025, because of a conflict Hernandez had with the February 6, 2025,

date. He further stated that the Board was required to hold the

termination hearing in February and that he and Stallworth had also

considered February 20, 2025, but that date had not been agreeable.

Boardman explained that, because Hernandez had indicated February 7

was available in her deposition-scheduling letter and because he and

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Stallworth had agreed to move the hearing to that date, the termination

hearing would remain scheduled for February 7, 2025.

On February 3, 2025, Boardman sent an e-mail to Hernandez

responding to an inquiry she had apparently made regarding the date of

the termination hearing.1 In the e-mail, Boardman wrote that he did not

set, and could not unilaterally set, the termination-hearing date under

the SFA and that the hearing date had been set by the Board itself. He

explained that the termination hearing had already been moved with the

agreement of Pugh's "sole attorney," Stallworth, who had notified him in

writing that he represented Pugh in the termination proceeding and that

he had sent Hernandez that letter of representation "earlier." Boardman

further stated that Stallworth had instructed that all correspondence be

directed to him and that he had complied with that instruction by sending

1The information about the communications between the parties is

derived from copies of the letters appearing in the record on appeal as
attachments to briefs that they filed with the hearing officer who
presided over Pugh's appeal from the decision of the Board to uphold the
superintendent's recommendation to terminate her employment.
Although the record on appeal does not contain a copy of the
communication from Hernandez that Boardman referenced in his
February 3, 2025, e-mail to Hernandez, an attorney of Pugh's in a
different matter attempted to provide a copy of that letter to this court as
an attachment to an amicus brief she sought to file with this court. This
court denied that attorney's request to file her amicus brief.
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Stallworth a letter confirming that the termination-hearing date had

been moved to February 7, 2025. He further stated that Pugh could not

"create" a scheduling conflict by changing attorneys and that, because

the Board had originally reserved February 6 and 7, 2025, for the

termination hearing, the matter remained set for February 7, 2025.

On February 7, 2025, the Board convened the termination hearing

to consider Pugh's contest. The record reflects that Boardman prosecuted

the superintendent's recommendation for termination, while the Board

retained separate counsel to advise it on related legal issues and to

prepare any written order the Board issued after the hearing. According

to the record, one Board member, identified as Pugh's mother, recused

herself from the termination proceeding. Pugh did not appear at the

termination hearing, and no attorney appeared on her behalf.

At the outset of the termination hearing, Boardman advocated that

the hearing proceed without Pugh. He told the Board that Pugh had been

represented by at least four attorneys in connection with the termination

of her employment and that he had had contact with three of them. He

explained that Stallworth was the attorney who initially contacted him

in this matter and that the Alabama Education Association had retained

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Stallworth to represent Pugh. Boardman explained that, as far as he

knew, Stallworth was available for the February 7, 2025, termination

hearing. Boardman further explained that the Board had originally set

the termination hearing for February 6, 2025, had held February 7 in

reserve in the event an additional day was needed, and had moved the

hearing to February 7 after discussions with Stallworth and in light of

communications referencing the parties' availability on that date. He

said that, when Pugh's counsel had requested a change of the

termination-hearing date, he had consistently advised that he lacked the

authority to move the termination hearing because it was set by the

Board. Boardman argued that no formal request to continue the

termination hearing had been filed and requested that the hearing

proceed because proper notice had been provided.

The Board's advisory counsel advised that the SFA requires the

termination hearing to be set within thirty to sixty days of the employee's

request for a hearing and probably prohibited any continuance that

would extend the proceeding beyond that statutorily prescribed period. 2

2Actually, the SFA provides that "the hearing shall be set by the

employer not less than 30 and not more than 60 calendar days from the
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CL-2025-0707

He further explained that the SFA required the Board to conduct a

termination hearing once requested, but did not require the employee to

be present, to be represented, or to present evidence in order for the

hearing to proceed. He advised that all the required participants were

present and that the absence of Pugh or her counsel did not relieve the

Board of its statutory obligation to proceed with the termination hearing

and to render a decision.

The Board proceeded with the termination hearing in Pugh's

absence and received testimony and documentary evidence. At the

conclusion of the termination hearing, the Board voted to adopt the

superintendent's recommendation to terminate Pugh's employment. On

February 7, 2025, the Board issued a written notice to Pugh of its decision

and informed her of her right to appeal within fifteen days, pursuant to

the SFA. Pugh timely appealed, asserting that her attorney had

contacted the Board in advance and had requested a new hearing date

because of a scheduling conflict, that she did not receive notice of the

rescheduled termination-hearing date, and that she appeared at the

date written notice of the time, date, and place of the hearing is issued to
the employee ...." § 16-24C-6(b), Ala. Code 1975.
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Board office on February 6, 2025, in reliance on the original notice, only

to be told that no hearing would occur that day and that no new hearing

date had been provided. She further contended that she had been denied

the opportunity to present evidence, examine witnesses, or otherwise

defend against the allegations underlying her termination.

On August 13, 2025, the date set for the hearing on Pugh's appeal,

the Board filed two briefs with the hearing officer assigned to consider

Pugh's appeal. One addressed the issue of Pugh's alleged lack of notice of

the February 7, 2025, termination hearing. The Board asserted in that

brief that Pugh had received clear and repeated notice of the February 7

date and that communications had been properly directed to Stallworth,

consistent with his instruction that all correspondence be routed to him.

It further asserted that the hearing date had been rescheduled from

February 6 to February 7, 2025, at Stallworth's request, that the

superintendent had confirmed the rescheduled hearing date in writing

on January 15, 2025, and that the parties had consistently referenced

February 7 as the operative date in subsequent communications. The

Board contended that Pugh's failure to appear was voluntary and did not

constitute a due-process violation because she had notice and an

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opportunity to be heard and that the decision not to participate in the

hearing reflected a strategic choice that did not invalidate the outcome of

the hearing.

At the August 13, 2025, hearing on Pugh's appeal, Hernandez

appeared on behalf of Pugh and argued that her initial communication

regarding Pugh's representation was with Stallworth on January 6, 2025,

and that they intended to work together on the matter. She argued that

"no [hearing] date [was] set that was provided to [her]" and that,

although Boardman represented to the Board that she, Hernandez, was

representing Pugh and had agreed to the February 7, 2025, hearing date,

she had not in fact agreed to that date. Hernandez further argued that

the notice Pugh had received from the Board identified a February 6,

2025, hearing date and that Pugh had not received any subsequent

written notice of the rescheduled February 7 hearing date. She told the

hearing officer that Pugh had appeared at the Board's office on February

6, but no hearing had been held that day, and that Pugh had not been

aware of the February 7 hearing date. As a result, Hernandez concluded,

Pugh had been denied her right to due process, including the opportunity

to present documentation.

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Boardman acknowledged that the correspondence from the

superintendent on January 15 and 27, 2025, was directed to Stallworth

and stated that he had no notice that Hernandez was handling the SFA

matter. He pointed out to the hearing officer that the record reflected two

sets of instructions -- one from Pugh and one from Stallworth -- that he

was to direct all correspondence to Stallworth and that there was no

letter from Stallworth withdrawing from representation or otherwise

indicating he was no longer involved. Boardman noted that he had

received a letter from Stallworth expressly stating that he represented

Pugh but that he had not received any similar notice from Hernandez,

although he acknowledged that he had "informal notice" of her

involvement.

After addressing the notice issue, the parties proceeded to argue the

merits before the hearing officer, disputing whether the exhibits and

testimony presented to the Board rendered its decision arbitrary and

capricious.

After the review hearing, Pugh filed a response brief asserting that

the February 7, 2025, termination decision arbitrarily and capriciously

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denied her procedural-due-process rights and reiterated the arguments

she had made before the hearing officer.

On August 22, 2025, the hearing officer issued a decision reversing

the Board's decision to terminate Pugh's employment. In her decision,

the hearing officer found that Pugh had been denied her right to

procedural due process in connection with the scheduling and conduct of

the February 7, 2025, termination hearing. She credited the assertions

that neither Hernandez nor Pugh had been informed of the rescheduled

termination-hearing date, that Hernandez had advised the Board's

counsel of a scheduling conflict due to a criminal jury trial and had

requested that the hearing be rescheduled within the statutory

timeframe, and that she had received no response to that request. As a

result, the hearing officer concluded, the Board heard only from the

superintendent's witnesses, which in effect rendered the Board's decision

arbitrary and capricious.

In support of that conclusion, the hearing officer offered extensive

findings, including her belief that Boardman's contention that

Hernandez's correspondence regarding deposition dates in the federal

case showing her availability for depositions on February 7, 2025, proved

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that Hernandez had been available for the termination hearing on that

date was "totally disingenuous." She also found unpersuasive

Boardman's argument that Stallworth's prior notice of representation

and direction that future correspondence be sent to him justified not

communicating with Hernandez about rescheduling. She noted that

Boardman knew Hernandez had been retained by Pugh, had

communicated with her regarding the termination hearing and the

appeal on several occasions, and knew she had requested that the

hearing be rescheduled.

Although the hearing officer made "no comment or judgment

concerning the merits of the termination case brought against [Pugh],"

she found that Pugh had followed the "rules and procedures in requesting

a hearing before [the Board] to appeal [the superintendent's decision] to

terminate her employment." She also found that Pugh had been entitled

to a hearing and had demonstrated every intention of appearing by

reporting on the original hearing date, only to be told that no hearing

would occur that day and not told that the hearing had been reset for the

following day. She further found that Hernandez had remained in contact

with Boardman, had informed him that she was unavailable on February

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6 and 7, 2025, and had requested that the hearing be rescheduled within

the time permitted by the SFA. She found that Boardman never

responded to that request and proceeded with the hearing on February 7

in the absence of both Pugh and Hernandez.

The hearing officer concluded that those circumstances resulted in

a "blatant denial" of Pugh's due-process rights and led to a Board decision

that was "arbitrary and capricious." The hearing officer therefore

reversed the Board's decision to terminate Pugh's employment and

ordered that she be reinstated to her employment in accordance with the

SFA. The Board timely appealed the hearing officer's reversal of its

decision to terminate Pugh's employment to this court, pursuant to § 16-

24C-6(f), Ala. Code 1975, of the SFA.

Analysis

The Board argues that the hearing officer improperly reversed its

termination decision, not because the termination itself was unsupported

by the evidence or was arbitrary on the merits, but solely on the

conclusion that Pugh's procedural-due-process rights were violated. The

Board contends that it complied with all procedural requirements under

the SFA and provided Pugh with both notice and a meaningful

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opportunity to be heard. It maintains that Pugh and her attorneys made

the voluntary decision not to appear at the February 7, 2025, termination

hearing and that their failure to attend cannot later be used to invalidate

the proceedings.

The Board further argues that the hearing officer's factual findings

were incorrect, particularly the conclusion that Pugh lacked notice of the

February 7, 2025, termination hearing when the record reflects repeated

communications confirming that date to Stallworth, Pugh's designated

counsel. It also contends that disputes regarding which attorney was

actively handling the matter are immaterial because Stallworth was the

only attorney who formally appeared, expressly directed that all

correspondence be sent to him, and never withdrew as counsel. According

to the Board, notice to Stallworth was legally sufficient and any internal

confusion among counsel does not transform statutory compliance into a

due-process violation.

The hearing officer concluded that the Board's decision to proceed

with the February 7, 2025, termination hearing was arbitrary and

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capricious based on an alleged denial of procedural due process. 3 The

reversal rested solely on the conclusion that Pugh was denied adequate

notice of the February 7, 2025, termination hearing and, as a result, was

deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

The SFA was enacted to ensure "fundamental fairness and due

process" while also reducing unnecessary procedural obstacles and delay

in personnel adjudications. Ala. Code 1975, § 16-24C-2(1) and (5). Under

the SFA, an employee must receive written notice of his or her proposed

employment termination, including the reasons for the termination and

notice of the right to request a hearing; if a hearing is requested, the

employer must set the hearing no fewer than thirty and no more than

sixty calendar days after written notice of the hearing date is issued; and,

after the hearing, the employee must receive written notice of the final

decision and notice of the right to appeal. § 16-24C-6(b)-(d). The SFA also

provides that the employee may be represented by counsel and that "[t]he

3We note that the hearing officer applied the wrong standard in

determining that Pugh's due-process rights had been denied. The
arbitrary-and-capricious standard under the SFA applies to the
employer's ultimate personnel decision, not to procedural matters
relating to the termination process. Calhoun Cmty. Coll. v. Hudson, 200
So. 3d 1175, 1178-79 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015).
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employee or his or her representative" shall be afforded the opportunity

to present testimony, evidence, argument, and cross-examination. § 16-

24C-6(c).

Pugh has not shown that the Board failed to comply with the

statutory requirements of the SFA. It is undisputed that the

superintendent issued written notice recommending termination of

Pugh's employment and advising her of her right to request a hearing. It

is further undisputed that Pugh timely requested a hearing and that the

Board issued written notice setting the hearing for February 6, 2025,

advising her of her procedural rights under the SFA, including the right

to counsel, and establishing prehearing deadlines. It is also undisputed

that Pugh later received written notice of the termination decision and

her right to appeal. The issue we must decide is whether notice of the

continued February 7, 2025, hearing date was constitutionally sufficient

given that notice was provided to Stallworth.

Pugh did not contend below, and does not contend here, that the

Board violated § 16-24C-6(k), which pertains to how notice is to be

provided under the SFA. Section 16-24C-6(k) provides that, "[u]nless

otherwise provided, notice for all purposes under [the SFA]" must be

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given by certified mail, private mail carrier, or physical delivery to the

employee or the employee's last known address. As previously noted,

when Pugh notified the Board that she was contesting her proposed

termination, she indicated that her attorneys would be noticing their

appearance and that all further correspondence should be directed to

them. By a letter dated January 3, 2025, and apparently sent by certified

mail, the Board provided notice to Pugh of the original hearing date of

February 6, 2025. Thereafter, Stallworth gave notice of his appearance

for Pugh and directed that all further communication regarding the

termination matter be directed to him. Thus, when the Board provided

correspondence on January 15, 2025, that the hearing had been

rescheduled from February 6 to February 7, 2025, at Stallworth's

request, it did so in the manner instructed by both Stallworth and Pugh

-- by sending notice to Stallworth. Pugh did not argue below, and does

not argue here, that the manner of providing that correspondence

violated § 16-24C-6(k), but, even if she had, and even if we were to

conclude that that subsection applied to that correspondence, by

directing that communications be directed to her counsel and thereafter

having Stallworth appear on her behalf and direct that all

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correspondence be directed to him, Pugh waived any claim that the Board

was obligated under § 16-24C-6(k) to direct that correspondence to her.

Cf. Alabama State Tenure Comm'n v. Goldsby, 627 So. 2d 434, 436 (Ala.

Civ. App. 1993) (under the former Alabama Teacher Tenure Act, § 16-24-

1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, teacher waived any claim of defective notice).

Due process requires " 'notice reasonably calculated, under all the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action

and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.' " Taylor v.

Huntsville City Bd. of Educ., 143 So. 3d 219, 228 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)

(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314

(1950)). " 'The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the

required information,' " id. (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314), and " '[t]he

means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the

absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it,' " id. (quoting Mullane,

339 U.S. at 315) (emphasis omitted). Due process does not require that a

party actually receive the notice but only that the method employed was

reasonably calculated to provide it. McDonald v. Keahey, 301 So. 3d 823,

838 n.18 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019). Accordingly, the question is whether the

Board's method of notice to Stallworth was reasonably calculated, under

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the circumstances, to apprise Pugh of the hearing and afford her an

opportunity to respond. We conclude that it was.

The SFA expressly permits representation by counsel and

contemplates that an employee may proceed through a representative.

See § 16-24C-6(c). While the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure are not

binding in this context, see Rule 81(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Berryman v. Civil

Serv. Bd. of Muscle Shoals, 571 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990),

they provide guidance reflecting the general framework Alabama courts

use in evaluating whether notice to counsel satisfies due-process

requirements for represented parties. Rule 5(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides

that "[w]henever … service is required or permitted to be made upon a

party represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the

attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court."

Consistent with that framework, the Alabama Supreme Court has

held that " '[k]nowledge of the attorney will be imputed to the client if the

knowledge comes to the attorney while engaged in a service for the client

after the attorney-client relationship has commenced.' " Ex parte Utilities

Bd. of Roanoke, 348 So. 3d 1098, 1103 (Ala. 2021) (quoting Sanders v.

Flournoy, 640 So. 2d 933, 939 (Ala. 1994)). Indeed, it has specifically held

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that "notice of a hearing that is provided to an attorney constitutes notice

to the attorney's client." Id. (citing Shirley v. McDonald, 220 Ala. 50, 53,

124 So. 104, 106 (1929) (holding that counsel's knowledge of a trial date

"must be imputed" to the client as a matter of law)). Likewise, our

appellate courts have recognized that service on a party's "attorney of

record,"4 rather than directly on the party, satisfies due-process

requirements absent an explicit order authorizing an alternate method.

Stribling Equip., Inc. v. Crager, 891 So. 2d 299, 304 (Ala. 2004) (finding

no due-process violation when notice was served on counsel rather than

directly on the party because service complied with the Alabama Rules of

Civil Procedure); see also Calhoun v. Calhoun, 46 Ala. App. 381, 386, 243

So. 2d 37, 42 (Civ. App. 1970). Furthermore, notice to one attorney is

sufficient to give notice to both attorneys when the record reflects their

"co-counsel" status. Thomas v. Kellett, 489 So. 2d 554, 555 (Ala. 1986).

Here, Pugh informed the Board that her attorneys would be

notifying it of their appearances and requested that future

4An "attorney of record" is an attorney who has filed an appearance

or pleading in the action and is therefore presumed to have authority to
bind the client, including by accepting service on the client's behalf.
Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 658, 189 So. 2d 336, 342 (1966).
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correspondence be directed to her counsel. Thereafter, Stallworth sent

written correspondence advising that he represented Pugh in connection

with the proposed termination matter and expressly instructed that "[a]ll

correspondence regarding [that] matter should be directed to [him]." No

other attorney filed a formal notice of appearance or directed that

communications be handled differently, and Stallworth never filed a

notice of withdrawal. Therefore, the Board could have reasonably

believed that Stallworth was Pugh's attorney of record for purposes of the

termination matter and that notice provided to Stallworth of the hearing

was imputed to Pugh. See Ex parte Utilities Bd., 348 So. 3d at 1103;

Maner v. Maner, 279 Ala. 652, 658, 189 So. 2d 336, 342 (1966). Cf. Ex

parte Hill, 225 So. 3d 56, 65 (Ala. 2016) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co. v. Humphres, 293 Ala. 413, 418, 304 So. 2d 573, 577 (1974)) (" '[A]

party may not avail himself of error, if any, into which he has led the

court.' "). Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the Board's notice to

Stallworth, as Pugh's attorney of record, was inconsistent with due

process or that it was not reasonably calculated to apprise Pugh of the

hearing and afford her an opportunity to respond.

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The record also does not support the conclusion that Pugh and her

attorneys were unaware that the hearing would proceed on February 7,

2025. The superintendent sent a letter on January 15, 2025, to Stallworth

indicating that the hearing before the Board would be held on February

7. Boardman sent his exhibit list, witness list, and subpoena information

to both Hernandez and Stallworth, and, on February 3, 2025, in response

to Hernandez, specifically confirmed that the termination hearing would

proceed on February 7. The record reflects that Pugh did not file a motion

to continue the hearing. When neither Pugh nor her attorneys appeared

at the termination hearing, the Board had no duty to continue the matter

or to separately contact them again. Cf. D. & J. Min. & Mining, Inc. v.

Wilson, 456 So. 2d 1099, 1100-01 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (noting that a

party, "usually through an attorney," is responsible for keeping track of

his or her case and that "the court owes no duty to notify a party of the

setting of a case or to continue a case because of the absence of a party or

other engagements of his attorney").

Likewise, Hernandez's assertion that she was unavailable on

February 6 and 7, 2025, does not establish a due-process violation. Under

§ 16-24C-6(b), the hearing is set "by the employer," i.e., the Board, and

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may be rescheduled only "by agreement or for good cause shown." The

Board originally set the hearing for February 6 and continued it to

February 7, a date already contemplated during scheduling, based on an

agreement with Stallworth. The statute did not require Hernandez's

consent to set the hearing date. It is clear that there was no agreement

to further modify the date, because Boardman advised Hernandez that

the hearing would remain scheduled for February 7 and that he could not

unilaterally change it. The record reflects no communications with

Hernandez after February 3. Further, nothing in the record establishes

that Stallworth -- the attorney the Board reasonably understood to be

representing Pugh -- was unavailable or that any of Pugh's attorneys

filed a motion with the Board seeking a continuance of the hearing for

good cause. Although there is some indication that Pugh terminated

Stallworth's services at some point during the termination proceedings,

the record does not indicate when that occurred, and nothing in the

record indicates that the Board was ever informed that Stallworth no

longer represented Pugh.

Due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond, not

guaranteed attendance or actual participation. " ' "[T]he essential

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requirements of due process … are notice and an opportunity to

respond." ' " Huntsville City Bd. of Educ. v. Jacobs, 194 So. 3d 929, 942

(Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (quoting Frizzell v. Autauga Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 972

F. Supp. 564, 565 (M.D. Ala. 1997), quoting in turn Cleveland Bd. of Educ.

v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985)). In the school-employment

context, "[t]he essential elements of due process are not that the teacher

must personally appear, nor that teacher's counsel must examine or

cross-examine witnesses, but that the teacher be afforded opportunity to

do these things." Alabama State Tenure Comm'n v. Board of Sch.

Comm'rs of Mobile Cnty., 332 So. 2d 724, 730 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976).

That is exactly what occurred here. As discussed above, Pugh had

notice of the hearing date through Stallworth, the sole attorney who

notified the Board of his appearance and who remained Pugh's counsel of

record. Pugh had the opportunity to appear, present evidence, cross-

examine witnesses, and contest the recommendation. The Board held the

hearing in compliance with the SFA, and, as the Board's advisory counsel

correctly noted, nothing in the SFA conditions the validity of that hearing

on the employee's attendance. Pugh's failure to appear -- and her

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attorneys' failure to appear -- does not transform adequate notice into a

due-process violation.

Ultimately, the hearing officer's conclusion rested not on any failure

by the Board to provide notice, but on dissatisfaction with how Pugh's

attorneys managed the representation and communicated with each

other and with Pugh. Due process does not require the Board to resolve

internal communication failures among counsel or to investigate private

attorney-client disputes before proceeding with a statutorily required

hearing. The Board acted consistently with Pugh's own instructions, with

Stallworth's written directive, and with the procedural requirements of

the SFA. Because the Board provided Pugh with constitutionally

sufficient notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, the hearing

officer erred in reversing the termination decision on procedural-due-

process grounds. The Board's decision is therefore due to be reinstated.

Conclusion

Having concluded that the hearing officer erred in reversing the

Board's decision to terminate Pugh's employment on the ground that the

Board violated Pugh's procedural-due-process rights, we reverse the

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hearing officer's order and remand the case to the hearing office to enter

an order affirming the Board's decision.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Moore, P.J., and Edwards, Hanson, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

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