Ken Shino v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 94
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CR-24-183

KEN SHINO Opinion Delivered February 19, 2025
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 26CR-22-157]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE RALPH OHM, JUDGE

APPELLEE AFFIRMED

N. MARK KLAPPENBACH, Chief Judge

Appellant, Ken Shino, appeals his conviction of leaving the scene of an accident

involving physical injury. Shino contends (1) that the circuit court abused its discretion by

admitting a document into evidence but excluding the entirety of a witness’s testimony

related to that document, and (2) that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence.

We affirm.

We first address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Shino’s conviction. Shino

was accused of violating Arkansas Code Annotated section 27-53-101(b)(1) (Repl. 2022),

which requires the driver “of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in physical injury”

to stop and remain at or near the scene of the accident. It is undisputed that a pedestrian,

Devan Long, was struck and seriously injured by a vehicle on Central Avenue near the

Arlington Hotel in Hot Springs. Shino argues that the State failed to prove it was his vehicle
instead of another vehicle that struck Long. Shino complains that there were no witnesses

and no video evidence of the moment of impact and that the circumstantial evidence did

not exclude other drivers as the perpetrator. We disagree with Shino.

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we must assess the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports

the verdict. Crider v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 544, 700 S.W.3d 799. We affirm a conviction if

there is substantial evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to support the verdict. Id. This

means evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty,

compel a conclusion one way or the other without resorting to speculation and conjecture.

Id. A jury is entitled to draw upon common sense and experience in reaching its verdict. Id.

The law makes no distinction between circumstantial and direct evidence when

reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence. Warren v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 423, 698 S.W.3d

409. Circumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence to support a conviction if

it excludes every other reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. Id.

Whether circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis consistent with

innocence is a determination for the finder of fact; on review, we must determine whether

the fact-finder had to resort to speculation and conjecture to reach its decision. Id.

Hot Springs police responded to a call shortly after 1:00 a.m. that a person had serious

head and facial injuries and was found lying in Central Avenue. Debris on the street

included what appeared to be pieces from the grill and headlight of a vehicle; the debris was

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north of where Long was lying. The people on the scene did not witness Long being struck

by a vehicle; they stopped after seeing Long in the street.

Videos from area traffic cameras showed the three-minute interval that included the

moment Long was struck. One vehicle went south through the accident area. Then, the

video shows a red Dodge truck (that had been parked at a local bar from approximately 8:15

p.m. until 1:00 a.m.) driven by a male (later identified as Shino) traveling north through the

accident area. Magnolia tree branches obscured the actual impact. The truck stopped at a

red light, and after the light turned green, the truck proceeded away from the accident.

About that time, another vehicle traveled along Central Avenue, swerved, and stopped, and

the driver turned on the SUV’s hazard lights and backed the vehicle up to block traffic from

striking Long again. Long’s body was in the northbound lane. Other motorists stopped to

render aid until an officer and ambulance arrived. An officer stated that none of the people

there had seen the accident.

Long testified that he was walking home, near the local bar where Shino had been,

going north on Central Avenue. He did not remember the actual impact.

Long’s mother was provided still photos of the red truck with a front plate taken from

the traffic videos. She looked around for a matching vehicle. About a month after the

accident, she found a red truck with a front plate with Shino’s name on it at the same local

bar. She called the police. A detective noticed that the driver’s-side headlight was clean and

appeared new compared to the other older headlight; the front grill appeared to have been

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repaired or replaced. A few weeks later, the police photographed Shino’s red truck at his

residence.

A vehicle-insurance document signed by Shino acknowledged that he drove his red

Dodge truck and was involved in an accident on the same date that Long was struck and

injured. The document, related to the civil case that Long filed against Shino, specifically

disclaimed Shino’s liability and denied that Shino caused the accident. The jury was also

presented with several hard drives and a video DVD, still shots from the video, and police

body-camera footage. Several detectives and officers testified in court.

The paralegal, who witnessed and notarized Shino’s signature on the insurance

document, said that Shino’s attorney told Shino to sign it. This drew a hearsay objection

from the State, which was sustained. However, the State did not ask the circuit court to

instruct the jury to disregard the hearsay. The paralegal explained that the attorney had been

ill, was taking a lot of medication, was getting radiation treatment, and was becoming very

forgetful. She said that on the day Shino signed the document, the attorney was acting

consistently with what she had just described.

Shino argues, as he did at trial in his directed-verdict motion, that the “entirely

circumstantial” evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis that other vehicles that

came through before or after Shino might have struck Long. As stated, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the State and consider only evidence that supports the verdict.

Jurors do not and need not view each fact in isolation; rather, they may consider the evidence

as a whole. Cason v. State, 2024 Ark. App. 396.

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The jury had video evidence from between 1:01 and 1:04 a.m. to consider, as well as

the debris left in the street, which was consistent with Shino’s truck. The truck appeared to

have been repaired on the driver’s side. Long was lying in the street very close in time to

when Shino’s truck passed through the location where the video-camera views were blocked

by magnolia branches. Shino had been driving north, and the debris was found north of

Long’s body. One of the two other vehicles in the area came through after Shino, swerved,

and then stopped to protect Long’s body from traffic. The on-scene officer’s body camera

recorded that he was working on “a hit and run” because people on the scene did not see

Long get hit. Every other reasonable hypothesis must be excluded, but not every possible

hypothesis. Warren, supra. We hold that the jury was not left to speculation and conjecture

in reaching its verdict.

Shino’s other argument on appeal attacks the circuit court’s evidentiary rulings

concerning the insurance document. First, Shino contends that the circuit court abused its

discretion by permitting the document into evidence because it violates Arkansas Rule of

Evidence 403. Second, Shino alleges the circuit court abused its discretion by not allowing

the paralegal to testify to the full context surrounding Shino’s signing of the insurance

document, asserting that her testimony was not hearsay and was extremely probative in

weighing the value of the document. We disagree that Shino has demonstrated an abuse of

discretion.

Our appellate courts will not reverse a circuit court’s decision regarding the admission

of evidence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Beard v. State, 2020 Ark. 62, 594 S.W.3d

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29. An abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the

circuit court’s decision but requires that the court acted improvidently, thoughtlessly, or

without due consideration. Id. Moreover, an appellate court will not reverse a circuit court’s

evidentiary ruling absent a showing of prejudice. Id.

At trial, defense counsel objected to the entry of the document on the basis of

attorney-client privilege. The circuit court ruled that it did not fall under that privilege and

overruled the objection. That is not challenged on appeal. Nowhere did Shino’s counsel

cite Ark. R. Evid. 403 or ask the court to weigh probative value versus unfair prejudicial

effect in admitting the document. Objections need not cite specific rules to be sufficient,

but a specific objection and a ruling are necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. See Peer v.

State, 2020 Ark. App. 181, 598 S.W.3d 59. This aspect of Shino’s appellate argument is not

preserved for appellate review, so we will not address it.

The other aspect of Shino’s argument is that the circuit court abused its discretion

when it would not allow the paralegal to fully explain the context surrounding the

document’s signing. Defense counsel wanted to show the attorney’s state of mind when he

advised Shino to sign the document (very ill and forgetful) and to show Shino’s motivation

for signing the document.

At trial, the State objected to allowing any hearsay, and Shino’s attorney responded

that his intent was not to bring out any conversations between the attorney and Shino.

Nonetheless, defense counsel elicited a response from the paralegal that the attorney told

Shino to sign the document and that the attorney had been ill and forgetful around that

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time. Even though the State objected to the paralegal’s hearsay comment, which was

sustained, the jury was never instructed to disregard the paralegal’s hearsay statement. Also,

defense counsel elicited a response from the paralegal that Shino signed “as a result of the

conversation between” Shino and the attorney. Thus, Shino was able to elicit the response

he wanted. Shino, therefore, cannot demonstrate prejudice.

Furthermore, defense counsel told the circuit court that he wanted to proffer the

paralegal’s testimony about the attorney’s mental and physical condition leading up to his

death a year later and his behavior in and out of the office. The circuit court found that this

additional testimony would not be relevant except as to what state of mind the attorney was

in the day Shino came to the office. We agree with the circuit court’s ruling, and Shino was

permitted to have the paralegal describe his medical treatments and forgetfulness regarding

the day Shino came to the office. We can discern no meaningful testimony that was excluded.

Thus, Shino has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the circuit court’s ruling.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Shino’s conviction.

Affirmed.

BARRETT and WOOD, JJ., agree.

Rebekah J. Kennedy, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Walker K. Hawkins, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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