Jaylen Lamarvin Farmer v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 331
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-18-570

Opinion Delivered June 5, 2019

JAYLEN LAMARVIN FARMER APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
APPELLANT [NO. 18CR-17-518]

V. HONORABLE JOHN N. FOGLEMAN,
JUDGE

STATE OF ARKANSAS AFFIRMED

APPELLEE

LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge

Jaylen Lamarvin Farmer appeals the sentencing order entered by the Crittenden County

Circuit Court convicting him of one count of attempted capital murder, with an enhancement

for employing a firearm; sixteen counts of second-degree unlawful discharge of a firearm from

a vehicle, with each count being enhanced for employing a firearm; and one count of fleeing,

with an enhancement for employing a firearm. Farmer was sentenced to a total of ninety-six

years’ imprisonment for these convictions. On appeal, Farmer raises three points: (1) the

circuit court erred in denying his motion for mistrial; (2) the circuit court erred in denying his

motion for new trial; and (3) there was insufficient evidence corroborating the accomplice

testimony to support his convictions. We affirm.

At trial, the evidence established that around 9:30 p.m. on May 19, 2017, patrol officer

Cody Gross of the West Memphis Police Department observed a gold Oldsmobile Alero with
three occupants turn into a convenience store. Officer Gross witnessed two of the occupants

of the Alero, Farmer and Vondre McClure, standing outside the vehicle at the gas station.

When the Alero left the convenience store, the officer followed it. As the vehicle approached

speeds of fifty-five to sixty-five miles an hour, Officer Gross turned on his blue lights to

initiate a traffic stop. The Alero made an abrupt right turn without applying the brakes, after

which someone in the backseat of the Alero pointed an assault rifle out of the window and

began firing multiple shots at the officer. One of the bullets struck the passenger-side

windshield of Officer Gross’s patrol vehicle. Officer Gross stopped his vehicle, and the Alero

drove away. Law enforcement officers later found the Alero in a ditch at a dead end still

running with the front doors open.

Officer Gross testified that he was familiar with Farmer’s vehicle and had assumed,

immediately after the incident, that Farmer was driving it when the shots were fired from the

backseat. Gross further testified that he could have been mistaken and that he was unable to

identify the person who was driving. After reviewing surveillance video from the convenience

store, Officer Gross stated that Farmer was wearing a green shirt and a watch and that McClure

was wearing a red hooded sweatshirt.1

Farmer, McClure, and JK, a minor, were arrested following the incident. Farmer gave

an interview to police wherein he stated that the Alero is his vehicle and that he had been

driving the vehicle. He said that he was going to pull over for the officer when JK unexpectedly

1There is no evidence on this record of what JK, the third occupant, was wearing on

the night of the incident.
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started firing a weapon from the backseat. Farmer denied that either he or McClure shot at

the officer. Farmer stated that once he stopped the vehicle, he ran from his car on foot.

McClure testified at trial that JK had been driving the Alero when Farmer, who was in

the backseat, fired the assault rifle at Officer Gross. McClure stated that when the officer tried

to stop the Alero, Farmer told JK to “go, go.” McClure further testified that when JK reached

a dead end, all three occupants jumped out of the car and ran away. McClure stated that he

met up with Farmer later that night and that Farmer told McClure that JK was going to take

the blame as the shooter and for McClure not to “snitch.” According to McClure, when he

disagreed with Farmer’s plan, McClure felt threatened by Farmer. McClure turned himself in

to the authorities the next day.

McClure also testified that he had given three interviews to police. In his first two

interviews, he said that he had lied and told officers that Farmer was the driver and that JK

was in the backseat firing the assault rifle because that is what Farmer told him to say, and he

was afraid of Farmer. McClure said that he received seven or eight letters from Farmer while

they were both in jail indicating that JK was going to take the blame as the shooter, stating

that there was no evidence against Farmer or McClure, and instructing McClure not to

“snitch.” McClure testified that he requested a third police interview, and on February 2, 2018,

he told the police the truth that JK had been driving the Alero and that Farmer was the person

who had shot the assault rifle from the backseat.

Harvey Taylor, a sergeant with the West Memphis Police Department, testified that he

was skeptical about McClure’s third interview, so he conducted a follow-up investigation.

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Taylor said that he read the letters that Farmer had sent to McClure 2 and listened to a phone

call Farmer made from jail to McClure.3 Sergeant Taylor stated that the letters and the phone

call were consistent with McClure’s story that JK was taking the blame as the shooter for

Farmer. Sergeant Taylor testified that he watched gas-station surveillance video that showed

Farmer wearing a shiny watch and McClure wearing a red hoodie. The sergeant also watched

Officer Gross’s dashcam video that showed the shooter had bare arms and a shiny object on

his wrist.4 Sergeant Taylor testified that after his follow-up investigation, he believed Farmer

was in the backseat firing the assault rifle at Officer Gross.

The State also presented evidence that sixteen shell casings from an AK-47 assault rifle

were collected at the scene. The parties stipulated that no DNA, fingerprints, or other scientific

evidence was found on the shell casings. Seven DNA samples were taken from the Alero. The

state crime laboratory tested the samples, and the results were inconclusive.

As set forth above, the jury convicted Farmer. This appeal followed.

Farmer’s third argument on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his convictions. Due to double-jeopardy concerns, we are required to review arguments

2Eight letters from Farmer to McClure were introduced into evidence. In those letters,

Farmer informed McClure that JK “took his charges,” and if McClure and Farmer would wait
nine months, their charges would be dropped because there was no evidence against them. In
several letters, Farmer told McClure that he (Farmer) was not going to “snitch” and that
McClure should not “snitch.” In one letter, Farmer wrote that he had heard McClure was
going to “take da stand,” and Farmer encouraged McClure not to testify.

3In that phone call, Farmer said that JK went to juvenile court and “took the time.”

Farmer said that if they just waited, they would be out of jail in nine months.

4Sergeant Taylor further learned that the Alero’s driver’s-side automatic window was

closed and did not work; therefore, the driver could not have been the shooter.
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regarding the sufficiency of the evidence first. Morgan v. State, 2009 Ark. 257, at 6, 308 S.W.3d

147, 152. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict.

Id., 308 S.W.3d at 152. We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Id.,

308 S.W.3d at 152. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that

it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting

to speculation or conjecture. Id., 308 S.W.3d at 152. Circumstantial evidence may provide a

basis to support a conviction, but it must be consistent with the defendant’s guilt and

inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. Id. at 6–7, 308 S.W.3d at 152. Whether the

evidence excludes every other hypothesis is left to the jury to decide. Id. at 7, 308 S.W.3d at

152. The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not the court. Id., 308 S.W.3d at

152.

Farmer was convicted of attempted capital murder, sixteen counts of second-degree

unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing. A person commits capital murder

if, with the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of any law enforcement

officer, the person causes the death of any person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(3) (Supp.

2017). A person also commits capital murder if the person purposely discharges a firearm from

a vehicle at a person or at a vehicle he or she knows or has good reason to believe to be

occupied by a person and thereby causes the death of another person under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(10).

A person commits criminal attempt to commit capital murder if he or she purposely engages

in conduct that “[c]onstitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate

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in the commission of an offense.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-3-201(a)(2) (Repl. 2013). A person

commits unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in the second degree if he or she

recklessly discharges a firearm from a vehicle in a manner that creates a substantial risk of

physical injury to another person or property damage to a home, residence, or other occupiable

structure. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-74-107(b)(1) (Supp. 2017).

If a person knows that his or her immediate arrest or detention is being attempted by

a duly authorized law enforcement officer, it is the lawful duty of the person to refrain from

fleeing, either on foot or by means of any vehicle or conveyance. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-

125(a) (Repl. 2016). Fleeing by means of any vehicle or conveyance is considered a Class D

felony if, under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, a

person purposely operates the vehicle or conveyance in such a manner that creates a

substantial danger of death or serious physical injury to another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-

54-125(d)(2). Finally, a person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an

offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, the

person solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit the offense; or

aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing the offense.

Ark. Code Ann. § 5-2-403(a)(1), (2) (Repl. 2013).

Farmer argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict

because his convictions were based solely on the testimony of codefendant and accomplice

McClure. Farmer argues that (1) McClure’s testimony is the only evidence that directly

implicates him in the offenses for which he was convicted; (2) McClure was an accomplice,

and his testimony required corroboration; (3) the State failed to introduce corroborating

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evidence; and (4) if McClure’s testimony is removed, there is no substantial evidence against

him to support the convictions.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-89-111(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2017) provides that a

conviction may not be had in any case of felony upon the testimony of an accomplice unless

corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the

offense. With respect to corroborating testimony, this court has held that

[c]orroborating evidence is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was
committed and the circumstances thereof. The corroboration must be sufficient,
standing alone, to establish the commission of the offense and to connect the
defendant with it. Corroborating evidence need not, however, be so substantial in and
of itself to sustain a conviction. The test is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice
were completely eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes
the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Martin v. State, 346
Ark. 198, 57 S.W.3d 136 (2001).

Vaughan v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 439, at 6, 555 S.W.3d 922, 926 (citing Riley v. State, 2009 Ark.

App. 613, at 4, 343 S.W.3d 327, 331).

The State argues that evidence to corroborate McClure’s testimony is not required

because Farmer failed to demonstrate that McClure was an accomplice. We agree. First,

McClure testified that he was merely present in the Alero, and his testimony is unrefuted.

Second, the circuit court did not find McClure to be an accomplice at law. Finally, an

instruction was given to the jury to allow it to determine whether Farmer was an accomplice,5

but we have no knowledge of whether the jury did, in fact, make such a determination. See

Gilcrease v. State, 2009 Ark. 298, at 5, 318 S.W.3d 70, 76; Bush v. State, 374 Ark. 506, 509–10,

5The circuit court instructed the jury pursuant to AMI Crim.2d 403 that if the jury

found McClure was an accomplice, his testimony must be corroborated by other evidence
tending to connect Farmer with the commission of the offenses.
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288 S.W.3d 658, 661 (2008). It is the appellant’s burden to prove that a witness is an

accomplice whose testimony must be corroborated. Gilcrease, 2009 Ark. 298, at 5, 318 S.W.3d

at 76; Bush, 374 Ark. at 510, 288 S.W.3d at 661. We hold that Farmer has failed to meet his

burden that McClure’s testimony required corroboration. Accordingly, we further hold that

McClure’s testimony is substantial evidence supporting Farmer’s convictions.

Even were we to assume that McClure was an accomplice, we would conclude that

there is independent evidence that tends to connect Farmer with the crimes of attempted

capital murder, unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing. Officer Gross

testified that when he attempted to conduct a traffic stop of the Alero, the driver drove away

at an accelerated rate of speed while someone in the backseat fired an assault rifle multiple

times at him. One of the bullets struck Gross’s windshield. Sixteen shell casings were found

at the scene. It was undisputed that Farmer owned the Alero. The officer also testified that he

had seen Farmer and McClure at a convenience store standing near the Alero just before the

shooting. Officer Gross saw Farmer wearing a green shirt and a watch and saw McClure

wearing a red hoodie. Sergeant Taylor testified that surveillance and dashcam videos revealed

that there was a watch on the shooter’s bare arm. The jury could have found that Farmer’s

letters and phone call to McClure were attempts to prevent him from telling the truth about

Farmer’s being the shooter. Sergeant Taylor testified that Farmer’s letters and call to McClure

were consistent with McClure’s testimony that Farmer was the shooter. Finally, the jury could

have found that Farmer’s actions in firing the assault rifle at Officer Gross and telling JK to

“go, go” aided and encouraged JK—the driver of the Alero—in fleeing from the officer.

Therefore, assuming evidence corroborating McClure’s testimony was required, we hold that

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there is evidence in this case that tends to connect Farmer with the commission of attempted

capital murder, sixteen counts of unlawful discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and fleeing.

Farmer’s next point on appeal is that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for

mistrial. A mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that will be resorted to only when there

has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing with the trial or

when fundamental fairness of the trial has been manifestly affected. McClinton v. State, 2015

Ark. 245, at 2, 464 S.W.3d 913, 914. Declaring a mistrial is proper only when the error is

beyond repair and cannot be corrected by any curative relief. Id. at 2–3, 464 S.W.3d at 914.

The judge presiding at trial is in a better position than anyone else to evaluate the impact of

any alleged errors. Id. at 3, 464 S.W.3d at 914. Therefore, the circuit court has wide discretion

in granting or denying a motion for mistrial, and the decision of the circuit court will not be

reversed except for abuse of that discretion or manifest prejudice to the complaining party.

Id., 464 S.W.3d at 914–15.

At trial, the State introduced into evidence sixteen shell casings recovered at the scene

of the crime. The State sought to introduce two live rounds similar to the type found at the

scene. Farmer objected, and the circuit court sustained the objection. After the parties had

rested and the court had instructed the jury, the following colloquy occurred at the bench:

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, let me tell you, I’d like to play it fair and
I’m going to play it fair, but why is [the prosecutor] sitting
up there with them live bullets on his desk that we have
dealt with? Now I’m asking for a –

COURT: Those need to be gone.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: I am asking for a mistrial right now. I’m asking for a
mistrial.

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COURT: Your request for a mistrial will be denied. I don’t think the
mere presence of those is sufficiently prejudicial to go as
far as a mistrial, so I’m denying the motion for mistrial.
But get rid of them.

Farmer argues on appeal that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his

motion for mistrial. He contends that the State improperly attempted to influence the jury

with an open display of live rounds that had previously been ruled inadmissible. He argues

that the circuit court must have believed that the live rounds were prejudicial because it

instructed the State to “get rid of them.” Farmer also argues that the circuit court abused its

discretion in refusing to issue a curative instruction to the jury.

There is no evidence in this case that the State’s motive was to influence the jury with

the live rounds on its table or that the jury even saw the live rounds. In denying the motion

for mistrial, the circuit court found that Farmer did not suffer prejudice as a result of the live

rounds being on the State’s table. The circuit court is in a better position to determine whether

a remark prejudiced the jury. Neal v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 384, at 9, 499 S.W.3d 254, 260.

Accordingly, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Farmer’s motion

for mistrial.

Moreover, Farmer did not request an admonition to the jury. His failure to do so, when

such an admonition could have cured any prejudice from the allegedly improper statement, or

in this case conduct or display, precludes relief on appeal. Howard v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 573,

at 18, 386 S.W.3d 106, 117 (citing Weaver v. State, 324 Ark. 290, 300, 920 S.W.2d 491, 496

(1996) (“When there is doubt as to whether the circuit court abused its discretion, a failure to

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request an admonition will negate a mistrial motion.”). We hold that the circuit court did not

abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

Farmer next argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for new trial.

Under this point, Farmer raises four subpoints. The first is that he is entitled to a new trial

because the circuit court violated his right to an impartial jury. He contends that only sixty-

two of the 308 individuals summoned for jury duty appeared for his trial and that, of those

sixty-two individuals, less than 15 percent were African American. Farmer is African

American, and he argues his jury was unrepresentative of the racial makeup of Crittenden

County, which is over 60 percent African American.

We cannot reach the merits of the jury-panel subpoint. The sentencing order was

entered on March 16, 2018. Thereafter, Farmer filed a motion for new trial, and he amended

this pleading four times. One of the arguments—made for the first time in the posttrial

motions—was the jury issue. On April 13, the circuit court entered an order denying the

motion. Later that same day, Farmer filed a notice of appeal of the March 16 sentencing order.

Four days later, on April 17, Farmer filed an amended notice of appeal of the March 16

sentencing order.6 Neither the original nor amended notice of appeal mentions the April 13

order denying the motion for new trial.

A notice of appeal must identify the order appealed, and orders not mentioned in a

notice of appeal are not properly before the appellate court. Ramsey v. State, 2010 Ark. App.

601, at 1–2 (citing McDonald v. State, 356 Ark. 106, 146 S.W.3d 883 (2004); Rawe v. Rawe, 100

6The amended notice of appeal is identical to the original notice except for the word

“amended” in the title of the pleading.
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Ark. App. 90, 264 S.W.3d 549 (2007); Daniel v. State, 64 Ark. App. 98, 983 S.W.2d 146 (1998)).

Because the notices of appeal do not reference the order denying Farmer’s motion for a new

trial—the only occasion on which Farmer raised the jury-panel issue—the notices are not

sufficient to effect an appeal from the denial of the motion. Id. at 2; see also Miller v. State, 2018

Ark. App. 614, at 13–14, 567 S.W.3d 68, 77.

Likewise, we cannot reach the merits of Farmer’s second subpoint within his argument

that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for new trial. In this second subpoint, Farmer

argues that the circuit court erred in convicting him of more than one count of unlawful

discharge of a firearm because it was conduct constituting one continuous event. However,

the first and only time Farmer raised this issue was in posttrial motions. As set forth above,

Farmer’s original and amended notices of appeal do not reference the order denying his

motion for a new trial; therefore, the notices are not sufficient to effect an appeal from the

order denying the motion. Ramsey, 2010 Ark. App. 601, at 1–2.

Farmer’s third subpoint under his argument that the circuit court erred in denying his

motion for new trial is that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a

continuance. We are able to address this subpoint because it was not raised for the first time

in posttrial motions; it was raised and ruled on prior to trial. Id. Nevertheless, we cannot reach

the merits of Farmer’s motion-for-continuance argument for a different reason.

Farmer filed a motion for continuance on March 12, 2018, two days before trial. The

circuit court held a hearing on Farmer’s motion that same day and denied the motion. In

Farmer’s first attempt in appealing this case, we ordered rebriefing due to an insufficient

abstract under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(a)(5). Farmer v. State, 2019 Ark. App. 93, 569

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S.W.3d 376. We expressly directed Farmer to supplement the abstract with the contents of the

motion-for-continuance hearing.7 However, Farmer’s supplemental abstract does not include

an abstract of the parties’ arguments or the court’s ruling from the motion-for-continuance

hearing. As we stated in Farmer, 2019 Ark. App. 93, at 2, 569 S.W.3d at 377, this information

is essential for the appellate court to decide Farmer’s argument on appeal that the circuit court

abused its discretion in denying the motion. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(5) (2018). We cannot

review the issue without it. Despite the opportunity to supplement the abstract with the

required information, it has not been provided.

Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-2(b)(3) provides that this court may automatically

affirm a judgment or conviction when the appellant has had the opportunity to cure his or her

deficient brief and fails. Patrick v. State, 359 Ark. 504, 505, 199 S.W.3d 74, 75 (2004) (affirming

a conviction under Rule 4-2(b)(3) for noncompliance with Rule 4-2(a)(5) & (8), stating counsel

had his one additional chance to comply and still failed to do so). Due to Farmer’s failure to

cure the deficiency despite the opportunity to do so, we do not reach the merits of Farmer’s

arguments related to the circuit court’s denial of his motion for continuance.

Farmer’s fourth and final subpoint under his argument that the circuit court erred in

denying his motion for new trial is that the circuit court erred in finding that the State had

complied with its discovery obligations. While the notices of appeal are not sufficient to effect

an appeal of this issue from the denial of the posttrial motion, we are able to address this

particular subpoint because it was not raised for the first time in posttrial motions—it was

7InFarmer, supra, we discussed three other briefing deficiencies, and Farmer’s
supplemental abstract and addendum have corrected those deficiencies.
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raised and ruled on prior to trial in a motion to exclude evidence. Ramsey, 2010 Ark. App. 601,

at 2.

On March 9, 2018, the circuit court held a hearing on Farmer’s motion to exclude

evidence. Counsel for Farmer argued that he did not learn of McClure’s February 2 statement

that implicated Farmer until February 26; that he had just received CDs of the recorded jail

calls, and there were too many for him to listen to before trial; and that he received a

supplemental crime-lab report from the State on March 8. Counsel argued that his client was

prejudiced by the State’s delay in tendering this discovery and asked that the evidence be

excluded.

In response, the State argued that it had turned over its entire file to Farmer’s counsel

on January 15, 2018, which included police reports, crime-lab reports, and a CD of phone calls

made by Farmer while in jail. The State argued that it advised defense counsel of McClure’s

third statement and a new jail call by Farmer on February 26, and on March 1, the State mailed

defense counsel copies of the third statement and a CD of three new phone calls made by

Farmer. Regarding the supplemental crime-lab report, the State explained that on Sunday, it

had learned that two swabs from the Alero that had been sent to the crime lab were

inadvertently sent back to the police department untested. The samples were rushed to the lab

on Tuesday, the results were provided to the State on Thursday, and the State provided the

results to the defense that same day. The State further argued that all the crime-lab results,

including those in the supplemental report, were inconclusive. The circuit court denied

Farmer’s motion to exclude the evidence.

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On appeal, Farmer argues that the State’s delay in providing discovery violated

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 17.1. Rule 17.1 requires the prosecuting attorney to

provide to the defense counsel, upon request, certain information and material which is, or

may come into, the possession, control, or knowledge of the prosecuting attorney. Ark. R.

Crim. P. 17.1(a) (2018). It is well settled that the purpose of the discovery rules is to require

the State to disclose its evidence to the defendant in time for the defendant to make beneficial

use of the information. N.D. v. State, 2011 Ark. 282, at 10, 383 S.W.3d 396, 401. The standard

of review for imposing sanctions for discovery violations is whether there has been an abuse

of discretion. Id. at 10, 383 S.W.3d at 401. Our supreme court has said that “the key in

determining if a reversible discovery violation exists is whether the appellant was prejudiced

by the prosecutor’s failure to disclose.” Id. at 10–11, 383 S.W.3d at 401. The burden is on the

appellant to prove that the discovery violations were sufficient to undermine the confidence

in the outcome of the trial. Id. at 11, 383 S.W.3d at 401.

We cannot reach the merits of Farmer’s arguments regarding two of the three

categories of evidence to which he objects. McClure’s third statement was not introduced at

trial, and the CD of three phone calls is not in the addendum or the supplemental addendum.

Without this evidence, we cannot determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in

denying Farmer’s motion to exclude it. In Farmer, 2019 Ark. App. 93, at 4, 569 S.W.3d at 378,

we specifically stated that counsel was encouraged to review Rule 4-2 to ensure that the

supplemental abstract and addendum comply with the rule and that no additional deficiencies

are present. Counsel has failed in this regard.

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On the merits of the third piece of evidence to which Farmer objects—the

supplemental crime-lab report—we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in

denying his motion to exclude this evidence. The record shows that the State explained why

the supplemental crime-lab testing was delayed and necessary, and the supplemental crime-lab

report was provided to Farmer within two days of the State’s receipt. Moreover, Farmer

cannot establish that he was prejudiced by the ruling regarding this evidence. All the DNA

testing was inconclusive—it excluded Farmer, McClure, and JK. Farmer contends that he was

denied time to conduct his own testing to establish that McClure was the shooter based on a

blood stain found in the backseat; however, the record reveals that on January 15, Farmer had

possession of the crime-lab report that confirmed that the DNA of Farmer, McClure, and JK

did not match that stain. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion

in denying Farmer’s motion to exclude the supplemental crime-lab report.

Affirmed.

KLAPPENBACH and WHITEAKER, JJ., agree.

Roy C. Lewellen, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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