L. Drennan Parks v. James Steven Hendersona and Marilee Henderson, as Co-Trustees of the Henderson Revocable Trust

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 45
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CV-24-443

L. DRENNAN PARKS Opinion Delivered January 21, 2026
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
V. COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. 72CV-21-2610]
JAMES STEVEN HENDERSON AND
MARILEE HENDERSON, AS CO- HONORABLE JOHN C. THREET,
TRUSTEES OF THE HENDERSON JUDGE
REVOCABLE TRUST
APPELLEES AFFIRMED IN PART;
REVERSED AND REMANDED
IN PART

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

This appeal arises from a property dispute between appellant Lloyd Drennan Parks

and appellees James Steven Henderson and Marilee Henderson, as co-trustees of the

Henderson Revocable Trust. The parties own adjacent property in Washington County,

and Parks unsuccessfully sued the Hendersons on his claim for establishing the width of an

easement over the Hendersons’ property and his quiet-title claim for ownership of a portion

of the Hendersons’ property based on boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession.

The trial court entered partial summary judgment in favor of the Hendersons on Parks’

easement claim based on the trial court’s finding that the claim was barred by res judicata.

At the subsequent bench trial on the quiet-title cause of action, following Parks’ case-in-chief,

the trial court granted the Hendersons’ motions to dismiss Parks’ remaining claims of

boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession.
Parks now appeals from the partial summary-judgment order and the order dismissing

his remaining claims. On appeal, Parks argues that the trial court erroneously concluded

that his easement claim was barred by res judicata. Parks also argues that the trial court erred

in dismissing his claims for boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession because he

presented a prima facie case at trial on both of those claims. Because we agree that Parks’

claim for establishing the width of the easement was barred by res judicata, we affirm the

partial summary-judgment order. However, we agree with Parks’ remaining arguments, and

we reverse the dismissal of his boundary-by-acquiescence and adverse-possession claims and

remand for further proceedings on those claims.

I. Facts and Procedural History

In 1983, Parks purchased an L-shaped tract of property (similar to the shape of

Louisiana) from Bill Carpenter. At the time of the conveyance, Carpenter also owned the

property to the north and east of the right angle of the L-shaped property. In 1995,

Carpenter’s son (to whom Carpenter had conveyed the property north and east of Parks’

property) conveyed that property to the Hendersons.1

When Parks purchased his property from Bill Carpenter in 1983, he received an

easement over what later became the Henderson property. The 1983 warranty deed from

Carpenter to Parks conveyed “a right-of-way grant and easement over and across the existing

roadway” followed by a description of the easement’s location. This easement begins on the

1
In 2019, the Hendersons conveyed their property to James Steven Henderson and
Marilee Henderson, as co-trustees of the Henderson Revocable Trust.

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north/south boundary line of the parties’ property and generally runs in a northerly

direction over the Henderson property to access a county road.

In 1998, a dispute arose between Parks and Henderson concerning Parks’ use of this

easement. In December 1998, Parks filed a complaint for injunctive relief against Steve

Henderson alleging that Henderson had interfered with his use of the easement by closing

and locking the gate where the county road meets the easement and also by feeding cattle,

thereby causing the cattle to congregate on the easement right-of-way. In his complaint, Parks

asked for injunctive relief prohibiting Henderson from unreasonably interfering with Parks’

use of the easement. In January 1999, Henderson filed a counterclaim against Parks alleging

that the inclusion of the language in the 1983 warranty deed from Carpenter to Parks that

conveyed the easement was obtained through fraud or mistake without Carpenter’s

knowledge or consent, and therefore, the easement should be set aside. This prior dispute

over the easement resulted in the parties agreeing to a consent judgment entered in April

1999. The consent judgment ordered Steve Henderson to not unreasonably close or lock

the gate to the easement; ordered Henderson to not feed cattle near the easement; and

provided that Parks may improve the road on the easement and right-of-way as he sees fit,

including putting down gravel or other surfacing materials. Unfortunately, as it turns out,

the consent judgment did not otherwise define the easement, particularly the width.

The portion of the Hendersons’ property that Parks now claims through boundary by

acquiescence and adverse possession (hereinafter referred to as “the disputed property”) is

generally the strip of land between the surveyed north/south boundary line of the parties’

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property and an old meandering fence that lies to the north of that boundary and extends

about 1700 feet eastward from the parties east/west boundary to the county road. The

distance between the surveyed north/south boundary line and the fence varies as the fence

meanders eastward and, at its maximum, measures about fifty feet in width. It is undisputed

that this fence was in existence before Parks purchased his property in 1983 from Bill

Carpenter and that part of the fence was removed by the Hendersons in 2016.

On November 19, 2021, Parks initiated this litigation when he filed a petition to

quiet title to the disputed property and to establish the scope of the easement. In this

petition, Parks alleged ownership of the disputed property between the parties’ north/south

boundary line and the old fence to the north based on his claim that the fence line was a

boundary by acquiescence.2 Parks alleged that when he bought his property from Bill

Carpenter in 1983, both he and Carpenter understood the fence to be the boundary line

between the two properties. Further, Parks alleged that after the Hendersons bought their

property in 1995, Parks and the Hendersons had the understanding and agreement that the

fence constituted the boundary line. Parks alleged that since purchasing his property in

1983, he has maintained, asserted ownership over, and otherwise acted in all respects as

owner of the disputed property up to the boundary line established by the fence. Parks

alleged further that Carpenter, and later the Hendersons, had acted as respective owners of

the property north of the fence and that the parties had acquiesced in the fence being the

2
Parks later filed an amended petition claiming this strip of property by adverse
possession.

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boundary line. Parks stated that in 2000, the Hendersons had a survey done showing that

the fence was not the “true” boundary line, but the Hendersons nevertheless did not attempt

to claim any interest in the disputed property for over a decade after the survey was

completed. Parks stated that it was not until 2016 that the Hendersons unilaterally decided

to tear down a portion of the fence, apparently based on the 2000 survey. In his petition,

Parks also alleged that the Hendersons had been hindering his use of his easement by

attempting to limit his use to the two dirt paths created by vehicles driven over the easement.

Parks claimed his easement is required to be thirty feet wide and requested a declaration

from the trial court to this effect.

On March 24, 2022, the Hendersons filed a motion for partial summary judgment as

to Parks’ easement claim only. In their motion, the Hendersons argued that Parks’ claims

regarding the scope (the width) of the easement are barred by res judicata based on the prior

litigation between the parties pertaining to the easement that resulted in a consent judgment

in April 1999. The Hendersons stated that neither the 1983 deed conveying the easement

to Parks nor the 1999 consent judgment defined the width of the easement as thirty feet but

rather confirm it as being only “over and across the existing roadway.” The Hendersons

argued that because the width of the easement could have been litigated by Parks in the

parties’ prior lawsuit involving the easement, res judicata barred that claim in the present

lawsuit. On April 14, 2022, Parks responded to the Hendersons’ motion for partial summary

judgment, stating that there was no dispute as to the width of the easement in the prior

litigation and that the only issue in dispute was whether an easement existed at all. As such,

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Parks argued that res judicata did not apply and that the Hendersons’ motion should be

denied.

On September 7, 2022, the trial court entered an order granting the Hendersons’

motion for partial summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. The trial court made these

findings:

1. Plaintiff, L. Drennan Parks, previously instituted litigation against
defendant, Steve Henderson, concerning the same easement identified in Count III
of the first amended complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the width of said
easement be held as a matter of law to be 30 feet. That litigation ended in a consent
judgment between the parties which confirmed the existence of the easement and
plaintiff’s right to maintain it.

2. The deed granting the referenced easement defined the easement as being
“over and across” an existing roadway. Due to the fact that this easement was
previously the subject matter of litigation between plaintiff and defendant, this court
finds that the issue of the width of said easement was necessarily within the issues of
the prior litigation and could have been litigated at that time.

3. Accordingly, it is the order of this court that plaintiff is now barred from
further litigating ancillary issues concerning the easement - including, but not limited
to its width - based upon a showing by defendant that all required elements of res
judicata concerning this issue are met.

On February 14, 2024, Parks’ remaining claims of ownership of the disputed property

based on boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession went to a bench trial. Parks was

the only witness to testify in his case-in-chief.

Parks testified that for two years before he bought his property in 1983, he had hunted

on the disputed property with Bill Carpenter at Carpenter’s invitation and that the old

meandering fence that travels east/west (which Parks now claims as the boundary) was there.

Parks stated that, when he bought the property from Carpenter in 1983, Carpenter showed

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him the location of the property line between their properties, and it was the fence.

According to Parks, both he and Carpenter understood the property line to be the fence and

treated it as such, and Parks continually used and exercised ownership of the disputed

property. Parks stated that he built a gate into the fence that had a lock to control access to

the property south of the fence and to “keep people out.” Parks stated that during the twelve

years before Carpenter’s son sold his adjacent property to the Hendersons, Carpenter never

exercised ownership of any of the disputed property, nor did he ever take issue with Parks

exercising ownership of the disputed property.

Parks described some of his activities on the disputed property. He stated that he

spent “every spare moment” that he had cleaning it up and maintaining it. He stated that

he kept a tractor there and bulldozed it. There is a “yard area” containing the remnants of

a cabin that lies south of the fence on the western portion of the strip of land at issue, which

Parks leveled, cleared, and cleaned. Parks stated that he mowed and bush hogged the area.

Parks stated that he or his lady friend would plant flowers every year near the old cabin and

the gate and that he had built up the gate with tall posts and boulders. Parks stated further

that he had frequently hunted deer on the disputed property and that during deer season he

would be there for days at a time. Parks also maintained and improved the fence by adding

boards.

Parks stated that, after the Hendersons bought the adjacent property in 1995, he

continued to utilize and maintain the disputed property, and the Hendersons did not take

issue with his use of the property or claim ownership of it. Parks stated that he never saw

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the Hendersons on the disputed property and that they never utilized that property. Parks

stated that after the Hendersons had a survey done in 2000, he continued to exercise control

of the disputed property with no claim of ownership from the Hendersons. Parks stated that

the fence remained intact until 2016, when Steve Henderson tore part of the fence down.

Parks stated that he demanded that Henderson replace the fencing that he had torn down,

and although Henderson said he would, he never did. Parks stated that he has continuously

asserted ownership of the disputed property since he bought his property and that, after part

of the fence was torn down, he filed suit against the Hendersons to establish his ownership.

Parks also testified and presented documentation that he has continuously paid the taxes on

property contiguous to the strip of land at issue.

On cross-examination, Parks acknowledged that the fence at issue served as a cattle

fence. Parks clarified, however, that the fence was both a cattle fence and a border fence.

At the close of Parks’ case-in-chief, the Hendersons filed a motion to dismiss Parks’

claims of boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession under Arkansas Rule of Civil

Procedure 50(a), arguing that there was insufficient evidence to sustain either claim. The

trial court announced from the bench that, even viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to Parks, it was going to grant the motion to dismiss on both claims.

On February 21, 2024, the trial court entered an order of dismissal with prejudice as

to Parks’ claims of boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. The trial court found

that Parks failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the elements required to prove

boundary by acquiescence—namely, the existence of mutual recognition and agreement that

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the fence is the true boundary rather than that contained within the parties’ legal

descriptions. The trial court found further that Parks failed to present sufficient evidence

demonstrating that his alleged use of the disputed property meets the legal requirements to

prove adverse possession.

Parks timely appealed.

II. Arguments on Appeal

In this appeal, Parks challenges both the partial summary-judgment order that denied

his claim to establish the scope of the easement and the order dismissing his remaining

claims of boundary by acquiescence and adverse possession. We discuss these orders

separately.

A. Partial Summary Judgment on Parks’ Scope-of-the-Easement Claim

Parks alleged in his petition below that his easement across the Hendersons’ property

was required to be thirty feet wide and requested a declaration from the trial court to this

effect. The trial court entered partial summary judgment against Parks with respect to this

claim on the basis of res judicata, finding that this issue could have been litigated in the prior

litigation between the parties in 1998–99 pertaining to the easement. Parks argues that the

trial court erred in finding that res judicata barred this claim because the width of the

easement was not in dispute in the prior litigation and there was thus no reason or

opportunity for him to assert that claim at that time.

Our summary-judgment standard is well settled. Summary judgment may be granted

only when there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the moving party

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is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Greenlee v. J.B. Hunt Transp. Servs., 2009 Ark. 506,

342 S.W.3d 274. The burden of sustaining a motion for summary judgment is always the

responsibility of the moving party. McGrew v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., 371 Ark.

567, 268 S.W.3d 890 (2007). Once the moving party has established a prima facie

entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and

demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Greenlee, supra. On appellate review,

this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate by deciding whether the

evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material

fact unanswered. Greenlee, supra. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the

moving party. Id.

Res judicata bars relitigation of a subsequent suit when (1) the first suit resulted in a

final judgment on the merits; (2) the first suit was based on proper jurisdiction; (3) the first

suit was fully contested in good faith; (4) both suits involve the same claim or cause of action; and

(5) both suits involve the same parties or their privies. Sterkel v. Sisler, 2025 Ark. App. 212,

710 S.W.3d 478 (emphasis added). Res judicata bars not only the relitigation of claims that

were actually litigated in the first suit but also those that could have been litigated. Id. Where

a case is based on the same events as the subject matter of a previous lawsuit, res judicata will

apply even if the subsequent lawsuit raises new legal issues and seeks additional remedies.

Swofford v. Stafford, 295 Ark. 433, 748 S.W.2d 660 (1988). The purpose of the doctrine is to

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prevent parties’ relitigating issues on which they have already been given a fair trial.

McCormac v. McCormac, 304 Ark. 89, 799 S.W.2d 806 (1990).

Parks asserts that the only element of res judicata at issue is the fourth element above—

whether both suits involve the same claim or cause of action. Parks argues that this element

was not met here because in the prior litigation, the controversy was whether an easement

existed but not the width of the easement if one did exist. Parks argues that it was not until

recently when the Hendersons tore down fencing on either side of the easement that an issue

as to the width of the easement was created and that the issue was not ripe in the prior

litigation.

In support of his argument, Parks relies on Perkins v. Henry, 2012 Ark. App. 707, 425

S.W.3d 802. In that case, Perkins bought property from Henry in 2005 for the purpose of

constructing a house in a residential subdivision, which was adjacent to a runway. An

attachment to the warranty deed included several land-use restrictions, and a separate

paragraph provided that all property owners would have use of the runway upon payment of

an annual $250 maintenance fee. In 2008, Henry filed for and was granted an injunction

requiring Perkins to remove trees and a metal building on his property because these

allegedly violated the land-use restrictions. On appeal, this court reversed the injunction,

holding that the land-use restrictions were unenforceable due to the lack of a general plan of

development.3 Later, Perkins filed a new action to enforce his use of the runway, and Henry

3
See Perkins v. Henry, 2010 Ark. App. 126.

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argued that the claim was barred by res judicata because the land-use restrictions attached to

the deed had been declared invalid and unenforceable in the prior litigation. The trial court

found that Perkins’ claim for use of the runway was barred by res judicata, but this court

reversed. We stated in Perkins that there was no controversy in the prior litigation over the

use of the runway and that this was an entirely different claim from that sought in the original

action. We held in Perkins that because there was no controversy concerning the use of the

runway at the time of the first action, there was no reason for either party to have raised or

litigated that issue at that time, and thus, res judicata did not apply.

Parks argues that, similar to Perkins, the parties never disputed the width of the

easement until recently, and there was no controversy concerning that issue in the prior

litigation. As such, Parks argues that res judicata does not apply and that the partial

summary-judgment order should be reversed.

We do not agree with Parks’ argument, and we find Perkins distinguishable. In Perkins,

the prior litigation involved only enforcement of land-use restrictions, which was an entirely

different claim than the use of the runway presented in the subsequent litigation. In the

present case, in contrast to Perkins, the prior litigation pertained to a controversy involving

the same easement over which Parks now brings a subsequent cause of action. Notably, the

1983 deed that conveyed the easement to Parks did not assign any particular width to the

easement other than it being “over and across the existing roadway.” When Parks filed the

complaint against the Hendersons in the prior litigation, he alleged that the Hendersons

were interfering with his easement by closing and locking a gate and by feeding cattle on the

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right-of-way. The prior litigation resulted in a consent judgment in April 1999 that

confirmed Parks’ right to use the easement free from the Hendersons’ interference, and it

also permitted Parks to improve the surface of the road on which the easement lies. Any

attempt to enlarge the existing easement beyond that of the language granting it was within

the same subject matter contemplated in the previous lawsuit and could have been litigated

there. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that

Parks’ present claim to a thirty-foot-wide easement is barred by res judicata.

B. Dismissal of Parks’ Claims for Boundary by Acquiescence and Adverse Possession

After a bench trial on the remaining issues, the trial court granted the Hendersons’

motion to dismiss Parks’ remaining claims of boundary by acquiescence and adverse

possession of the disputed property at the close of Parks’ case-in-chief. Parks argues that he

presented a prima facie case on both of these claims and that dismissal on both claims was

therefore improper. For the following reasons, we agree that the trial court erred in

dismissing these claims.

In a nonjury trial, a party may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the

conclusion of the opponent’s evidence by moving to dismiss. Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(a). When

a party moves for dismissal in a nonjury trial, it is the duty of the trial court to consider

whether the claimant’s evidence, given its strongest probative force, presents a prime facie

case. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 2012 Ark. App. 695. The trial court must use the same legal

standard in evaluating a motion to dismiss as it would in evaluating a motion for directed

verdict. Sammons v. SEECO, Inc., 2012 Ark. App. 650, 425 S.W.3d 38. The trial court must

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decide whether, if it were a jury trial, the evidence would be sufficient to present to the jury.

Id. In evaluating whether the evidence is substantial enough to make a question for the fact-

finder, however, the trial court may not assess the witnesses’ credibility. Id. When reviewing

the grant of a motion to dismiss, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, giving the proof presented its highest probative value and taking into

account all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom, and we will affirm if there is no

substantial evidence to support a jury verdict. Crenshaw, supra. If, however, the evidence is

such that fair-minded persons might reach different conclusions, a fact question exists and

the dismissal will be reversed. Id.

1. Boundary by Acquiescence

A boundary by acquiescence may arise when adjoining property owners tacitly accept

a fence or other monument as the visible evidence of a property boundary and apparently

consent to it. White v. Randolph, 2025 Ark. App. 336. A boundary by acquiescence is inferred

from the conduct of the landowners over many years that implies the existence of an

agreement about the location of the boundary line; in such circumstances, the adjoining

landowners and their grantees are precluded from claiming that the boundary so recognized

and acquiesced to is not the true one, although it may not be. Fritchie v. Hearne, 2025 Ark.

App. 276. The period of acquiescence need not last for a specific length of time, but it must

be for “many years” or a “long period of time” sufficient to sustain the inference that there

has been an agreement concerning the location of the boundary line. Jennings v. Burford, 60

Ark. App. 27, 31, 958 S.W.2d 12, 14 (1997). A boundary by acquiescence is usually

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represented by a fence, a turnrow, a lane, a ditch, or some other monument tacitly accepted

as visible evidence of a dividing line. Fritchie, supra. However, neither the mere existence of

a fence nor one party’s subjective belief or opinion that a fence is a boundary line will sustain

a finding of acquiescence. White, supra. There must be mutual recognition or mutual

agreement of a fence (or other monument) as the dividing line before there can be any

boundary by acquiescence. Id. In determining whether a fence between two tracts has

become a boundary by acquiescence, the basic question is one of intention: namely, whether

the adjoining landowners both meant to recognize the fence as a boundary. Id. Express

recognition or agreement between the parties is not necessary, and silent acquiescence is

sufficient when mutual recognition of the boundary line can be inferred from the conduct

of the parties over a period of years. Waggoner v. Alford, 2021 Ark. App. 120, 619 S.W.3d

59.

Parks argues that he presented a prima facie case that the meandering fence bordering

the disputed property had become a boundary by acquiescence. We agree. Parks testified

that this fence was present when he bought his property from Bill Carpenter in 1983, and

that when he bought the property, Carpenter represented to Parks that the fence was the

boundary line separating the properties.4 Parks testified that, for the next twelve years, both

he and Carpenter recognized the fence as the boundary, with Parks utilizing the disputed

4
Although the Hendersons argue that any conversations between Parks and
Carpenter were hearsay and should not be considered as evidence of the boundary, we note
that Parks’ testimony in this regard was admitted at trial and was therefore part of the
evidence to be considered by the trial court in testing the Hendersons’ motion to dismiss.

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property and Carpenter never putting Parks on notice of any claim of ownership. Parks

testified that he built a gate in the fence and locked the gate to keep others off the disputed

property. Parks also stated that he repaired and maintained the fence.

According to Parks, after the Hendersons bought Carpenter’s property in 1995, he

continued to utilize the disputed property without objection. Parks stated that even after

the Hendersons had a survey performed in 2000, they made no claim to the disputed

property for many years thereafter, and they did not assert any ownership interest to the

disputed property until 2016 when Steve Henderson tore down part of the fence.

In deciding whether Parks made a prima case, the trial court was required to view the

evidence in the light most favorable to Parks and give the evidence its highest probative value,

and the trial court was not permitted to assess Parks’ credibility. See Crenshaw, supra;

Sammons, supra. Viewing the evidence in this light, we hold that Parks’ testimony was

sufficient to create a question for the fact-finder as to whether the fence line had become a

boundary by acquiescence. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s dismissal of this claim.

2. Adverse Possession

To prove the common-law elements of adverse possession, a claimant must show that

he has possessed the contested property continuously for seven years and that the possession

has been actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and exclusive, and it must be

accompanied with an intent to hold against the true owner. Stevens v. Hillenburg, 2024 Ark.

App. 295, 689 S.W.3d 695. Arkansas Code Annotated section 18-11-106 (Repl. 2015) adds

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the requirement of proving color of title and payment of taxes on either the property in

dispute or contiguous property.5

This court recently held that the hostility element should be determined by behaviors

and not primarily by inquiring into a claimant’s subjective intent. Collier v. Gilmore, 2018

Ark. App. 549, 562 S.W.3d 895. In Collier, the claimant believed he owned the contested

tract of land for forty years, and during that time, he possessed and farmed the contested

property; however, the claimant was mistaken on where the relevant deed placed the true

boundary line. We favored the claimant’s conduct over his intent when determining hostile

use and held that “the possession was ‘hostile’ because it was to an extent greater than the

deed anticipated; and his conduct was not subordinate to [the true owner’s property]

interests or done with [the true owner’s] permission.” Id. at 9, 562 S.W.3d at 900. This

rationale is in accord with the “oft-repeated statement that adverse possession is a possession

commenced in wrong but maintained in right,” as such statement “does not mean that the

possessor must commence his possession with an intentional wrong, for the doctrine of

adverse possession is intended to protect one who honestly enters into possession of land in

the belief that the land is his own.” Barclay v. Tussey, 259 Ark. 238, 241, 532 S.W.2d 193,

195 (1976).

We have held that planting grass, trees, and shrubs and maintaining them for a period

of seven years is sufficient to put the world on notice that the party asserting adverse

5
It is not disputed that Parks has color of title and has paid taxes on property
contiguous to the disputed property.

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possession is claiming the property as his own. Walker v. Hubbard, 31 Ark. App. 43, 787

S.W.2d 251 (1990). Also, when both parties maintain and mow their property up to the

fence line, when said fence serves to keep livestock on their respective properties, this has

been sufficient to establish adverse possession. Boyette v. Vogelpohl, 92 Ark. App. 436, 214

S.W.3d 874 (2005).

Parks argues that he presented a prima facie case of adverse possession with respect

to the disputed property, and we agree. According to Parks’ testimony, from the time he

purchased his property in 1983, he continuously engaged in conduct consistent with

ownership of the disputed property. Parks testified that he bulldozed, bush hogged, and

mowed on the disputed property. Parks stated further that he built and maintained a locked

gate on the fence that borders the disputed property. Parks stated that planted flowers every

year and hunted on the property. And Parks stated that, up until 2016, neither Carpenter

nor the Hendersons interfered with his use of the disputed property, occupied the property,

or utilized the property.

Here again, in deciding whether Parks made a prima case, the trial court was required

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Parks and give the evidence its highest

probative value, and the trial court was not permitted to assess Parks’ credibility. See

Crenshaw, supra; Sammons, supra. Viewing the evidence in this light, we hold that Parks’

testimony was sufficient to create a question for the fact-finder as to whether he had acquired

the disputed property by adverse possession. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s

dismissal of this claim.

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III. Conclusion

In conclusion, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that Parks’ claim for

establishing the width of the easement was barred by res judicata, and we therefore affirm

the partial summary-judgment order on that issue. However, we agree with Parks’ remaining

arguments, and we reverse the dismissal of his boundary-by-acquiescence and adverse-

possession claims and remand for further proceedings on those claims.

Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

WOOD and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Andrew J. Myers, for appellant.

Davis, Butt, Taylor & Clark, PLC, by: Jacob T. Newcomb, for appellees.

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