Amanda Hanson (Now Jetton) v. Ernie Hanson

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 363
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-22-328

AMANDA HANSON (NOW JETTON) OPINION DELIVERED SEPTEMBER 6, 2023
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 14DR-10-102]

ERNIE HANSON HONORABLE MARY THOMASON,
APPELLEE JUDGE

AFFIRMED

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge

Amanda Jetton, formerly Hanson, appeals from a March 1, 2022 order of the

Columbia County Circuit Court. She argues that the trial court committed reversible error

by (1) placing Ernie Hanson in charge of medical decisions for the parties’ children; (2)

relying on personal information not in evidence; (3) basing the joint-custody decision on an

unfounded belief that the family-in-need-of services (FINS) proceeding was a criminal

proceeding against MC1, the oldest of the parties’ children; and (4) ordering a change to

joint custody of the parties’ three children, MC1, MC2, and MC3. We affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

After seven years of marriage, during which three children were born, Amanda sought

and obtained a divorce from Ernie. The divorce decree, to the extent relevant to this appeal,

provides that Amanda would have custody of the children subject to reasonable and
seasonable visitation with Ernie. Ernie was ordered to pay child support that included a

portion of his bonuses.

Amanda began having concerns that Ernie was not giving the children their

prescribed attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) medication during his visitation,

as well as missing therapy sessions, so she filed a petition on July 22, 2020, asking the trial

court to order him to do so; to award back child support; and to order Ernie to pay a portion

of the cost of the children’s medical insurance and out-of-pocket expenses. Amanda also

requested that visitation be suspended until Ernie agreed to both give the prescribed ADHD

medication and take the children to all therapy sessions and appointments during the times

they would be with him.

Ernie filed a response on August 14 in which he asserted that medical providers had

informed him that the prescribed ADHD medication was unnecessary on weekends and

claimed that the children were in a “zombie-like” lethargic state when taking it. Ernie alleged

that he had not been able to obtain the children’s medical information from Amanda but

that he had resumed giving the ADHD medication as prescribed on his weekends.

Several months later, on February 2, 2021, Ernie filed a motion for the appointment

of an attorney ad litem and for a change of custody. He requested that an attorney ad litem

investigate both homes and the needs and best interest of the children. Amanda responded

on March 1, and on April 6, the trial court appointed Amy Freedman as attorney ad litem.

On December 28, 2021, Ms. Freedman issued her written report that includes the

following:

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BACKGROUND:

This case presents as three children [(MC1 and twins MC2 and MC3)] from a
divorced couple. The mother has remarried and has a younger child with the
stepfather. The father of the children has not remarried but is in a committed
relationship and plans to marry soon.

....

The twins [MC2 and MC3] have consistently stated that they would like to
have equal time with both parents. [MC1], the elder brother, has stated that he wants
to live with his father, Ernie Hanson.

....

CONCERNS:

The parties distrust each other.

The parties are not co-parenting.

A FINS case was filed by the mother against [MC1], due to his “being
habitually disobedient to . . . parents” and “being habitually physically rough
and abusive to younger siblings.” (See EXHIBIT A attached with FINS
records.)

[MC2] has exhibited anxiety and is being treated for it in counseling.

[MC3] is not currently in counseling but may need it, as well.

Family counseling is needed.

Medication for ADHD is a major issue in this case. Dr. Cindy Porter was
deposed and strongly recommends that the children stay on their meds and
not have “drug holidays.” The father, Ernie Hanson, has in the past, not given
the meds when the children were in his care. . . .

....

RECOMMENDATIONS:

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[MC1] shall be in the primary custody of his father, Ernie Hanson, and stay in
the same school district and counseling. This recommendation is based
primarily due to the stated FINS petition allegations (that [MC1] is “being
habitually disobedient to . . . parents” and “being habitually physically rough
and abusive to younger siblings.”)The twins ([MC2 and MC3]) shall remain in
the custody of their mother and have visitation with their father and older
brother, [MC1]. All visitation between the twins and [MC1] should be
supervised by a parent.

All children shall continue to take ADHD meds, including [MC1], without
“drug holidays.” Should [MC1] not take his meds for any reason other than as
directed by a medical doctor, this would be ground[s] to return him to the
custody of his mother.

Counseling for all children, as therapeutically recommended to continue.

Family counseling with both parents and stepparents as therapeutically
recommended.

Ms. Freedman did modify her recommendation based on the testimony at the

hearing, advocating that custody stay the same until everyone became seriously involved in

counseling to learn how to coparent.

The parties, [MC1], and a couple of other persons testified at the final hearing held

on February 17, 2022. Dr. Porter, pediatrician to all three children, testified by deposition.

On February 24, the trial court issued a letter opinion, stating the following:

Change in Circumstances

....

[Amanda’s] filing of a FINS Petition clearly identifies her need for services due to
the inability to deal with one of her children.

Also, the allegations of abuse that were reported to [Ernie] by the children are a
change in circumstances. This would be a change in spite of the fact that Deputy
Leroy Martin testified that when he questioned the daughter, she denied the abuse.

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Deputy Martin stated that [Amanda] and step-father were aware he was going to
question the daughter at the school prior to him doing so. The behavior of the
stepfather towards the children and his scare tactics are a change of circumstances.
[Amanda’s] characterization of her husband as a big “teddy bear” was not borne out
by the testimony.

Custody

It is in the best interest of the minor children that the parties be awarded joint custody
of the three minor children with [Ernie] to make all medical decisions.

....

[Amanda’s] husband is not to discipline the minor children or be left alone with the
children.

The “scare” tactic chosen by [Amanda] of using the juvenile authorities through a
FINS Petition shall immediately stop.

....

Attorney Ad Litem

. . . At the end of the hearing the Attorney Ad Litem changed her recommendation
to leave custody as is subject to a review. The Court does not feel that to leave custody
as it currently is would be in any way in the best interest of the children and only
exposes the children to more stress and uncertainty.

The letter opinion from the trial court specifically stated that Amanda’s testimony

was not credible. It noted the trial court’s observation of MC1 as he cried in the courtroom

and explained that he would never hurt his siblings and referenced Amanda giving him a

“stern” look as he testified. The trial court found that Amanda’s new husband was

disciplining the parties’ children and was in control of them. The trial court further stated

that it did not believe the parties would ever agree on medical decisions and that Ernie was

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to be the one to make them and appears to have a more open mind and would look only to

the children’s best interest.

On March 1, the order establishing joint custody and visitation, which mirrored the

previous letter opinion, was entered followed by a March 28 order modifying Ernie’s child-

support obligation, which included a provision requiring him to pay half of the children’s

monthly medical insurance premiums. Amanda timely filed her notice of appeal from both

orders on March 29, but she has abandoned her appeal of the order modifying support

because her brief did not address it.

II. Standard of Review

In a recent case, Kinder v. Kinder, 2022 Ark. App. 476, at 4, 655 S.W.3d 880, 883–

84, this court reiterated our standard of review in custody cases:

In reviewing domestic-relations cases, appellate courts consider the evidence
de novo. We will not reverse the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly
erroneous. A trial court’s finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed. In reviewing a trial court’s findings, we defer to the trial
court’s superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to
be accorded to their testimony.

(Internal citations omitted.); see also Ryan v. White, 2015 Ark. App. 494, 471 S.W.3d 243. As

was noted in Pace v. Pace, 2020 Ark. 108, at 9, 595 S.W.3d 347, 352, in matters involving

custody, the best interest of the children is the paramount consideration.

III. Discussion

A. Placing Ernie in Charge of Children’s Medical Decisions

On this issue, the trial court ruled in relevant part:

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[Ernie] cannot stop any ADHD medication unless it is recommended by a medical
doctor. If that occurs, he shall only discontinue the medication under the directions
of the doctor.

....

[Ernie] will make the medical decisions because the Court does not believe the parties
will ever agree on medical decisions regarding the children. [Ernie] appears to have a
more open mind and will look only to the children’s best interest.

Amanda argues there is no basis for the trial court’s findings, noting that he testified

more than once that he did not believe the medical science that supports medication helping

children with ADHD.

Ernie had never taken any of the children to the pediatrician until June 25, 2021.

Evidence indicates that on that occasion, he insulted Dr. Porter and called her support of

ADHD medication for the children “hogwash,” at which point Dr. Porter ended the

conversation with Ernie and was so upset that she left her office. Dr. Porter documented the

confrontation in her records, which she read to the trial court.

Amanda submits that since the parties divorced, Ernie has been uncooperative about

giving the children the prescribed ADHD medications, and Dr. Porter specifically did not

support the “no-medication vacations” Ernie engaged in during his visitation with them.

Despite Ernie’s refusal to accept medical science, the trial court appointed him as the parent

responsible for making medical decisions for the parties’ children. Amanda submits that the

trial court abused its discretion in so finding.

We disagree and hold that the record supports the trial court’s finding that Ernie

should be responsible for making the children’s medical decisions. The testimony at the

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hearing indicated that Amanda did not cooperate with him on such decisions, including

failing to provide Ernie with copies of insurance cards so he could obtain treatment if needed

during visitation.

At the hearing, evidence was presented to the trial court that Amanda had made

significant decisions that negatively affected both the welfare of the children and Ernie’s level

of participation in their lives, including their medical care. Amanda acknowledged that she

had not provided Ernie with information regarding the children’s medical needs and

conceded that Ernie was unaware of “most” of the expenses incurred. Although Amanda

testified she wanted Ernie to have open access to the children’s school and medical records,

the trial court found, having considered all the evidence before it, that her testimony was

not credible.

We defer to the trial court on credibility determinations and the weight to be

accorded to witnesses’ testimony, see Williams v. Lofton, 2018 Ark. App. 606, at 17, 569

S.W.3d 872, 881, and in light of our deference, we hold that the record supports the trial

court’s determination regarding the children’s medical decisions. The trial court

thoughtfully addressed the issue and included a specific provision in its order prohibiting

Ernie from failing to give any ADHD medication unless it is recommended by a medical

doctor and then only at the direction of the doctor. When weighed against Amanda’s active

hindrance to Ernie’s ability to actively participate in these and other vital decisions related

to the children’s best interest, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and

affirm this finding.

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B. Trial Court’s Reliance on Advice from an Unnamed
Counselor Regarding Stepparents Disciplining Stepchildren

Amanda next argues that the trial court relied on, and gave great weight to, evidence

that neither side presented, basing part of its findings on evidence not in the record. This

specifically relates to the trial court’s ruling that Amanda’s new husband, Greg, is neither to

discipline the minor children nor to be left alone with them. Amanda submits that there was

no evidence presented that Greg had hurt any of the children and that none of them are

scared of him.

Amanda asserts that the trial court’s decision was based entirely on what the trial

judge’s own counselor had told her at some point in the past when she was a stepparent. She

maintains that a judge must not independently investigate the facts in a case and must

consider only the evidence presented. See Ark. Code Jud. Conduct R. 2.9(C). It is undisputed

that neither party presented the opinion of any expert expressing that stepparents should

not take part in disciplinary matters within the household.

Citing Hicks v. Cook, 103 Ark. App. 207, 288 S.W.3d 244 (2008), Amanda points out

that if a court takes judicial notice of any fact, it must be so notoriously true as not to be

subject to reasonable dispute or must be capable of immediate accurate demonstration. See

also Taylor v. Taylor, 353 Ark. 69, 110 S.W.3d 731 (2003) (reversing a custody award that was

based on perceptions and appearances over proof of likely harm). There is a presumption

that a trial court will consider only competent evidence, but this presumption is overcome

when there is an indication that the trial court gave some consideration to inadmissible

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evidence. See Fields v. Fields, 36 Ark. App. 179, 820 S.W.2d 467 (1991). Amanda urges that

here, the trial court considered just such inadmissible evidence since the counselor whose

opinion the trial court relied on did not testify, making his or her opinion purely hearsay.

Trials are to be decided only on the evidence and the testimony legally admitted

during the course of the trial. Harald v. Corwin, 846 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1998). Yet on this

issue, the trial court announced, “A step-parent—I’ve been a step-parent of a teenager. But I

wouldn’t be disciplining him because counselors told me you don’t, and I didn’t.”

Amanda urges that the trial court cannot shape its rulings by relying on out-of-court

“expert” opinions from an unknown counselor with unknown qualifications. Accordingly,

she maintains that the trial court’s clear error supports the reversal of the entire decision.

We disagree. To the extent, if any, the trial court did factor in the above-described

advice, the record before us supports that it was far from the only information considered

on this issue. Amanda acknowledged at the hearing that Greg did not have a good

relationship with MC1 in the past, but she noted that recently there had been improvement

and credited the ill-reasoned FINS petition. It is significant that evidence before the trial

court indicated that Greg had been directly involved in Amanda’s decision to file the FINS

petition. Likewise, there was evidence presented that Greg made “mean” faces to the children

and that they feared him. Moreover, Deputy Martin testified that Greg was aware of Mr.

Martin’s intention to question one of the children while she was at school after Greg made

a report about an incident that was later determined to be unfounded.

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The totality of this evidence raised questions about Amanda’s new husband’s

disciplinary practices, especially with respect to MC1. The trial court is in the best position

to determine the weight and credibility of evidence before it, and in our de novo review, we

cannot say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that Greg should neither discipline nor

even be alone with the children.

C. Did the Trial Court Base the Change of Custody on a Mistaken Belief That
the FINS Proceeding Was a Criminal Proceeding Against MC1?

On this issue, the trial court ruled:

The “scare” tactic chosen by [Amanda] of using the juvenile authorities
through a FINS Petition shall immediately stop. [Amanda’s] testimony was not
credible. She advised that the counselor, Elana Murphy, recommended the FINS
Petition. However, [Amanda] countered back later to say that Ms. Murphy did not
tell her to do it and only recommended that she pursue the FINS Petition. The step-
father, Greg Jetton, testified that he was hanging out at the Sheriff’s Office and
explained to them that the children were no longer scared of him when he would
bow up at them using his size. According to Mr. Jetton, the Sheriff’s deputies
suggested that [Amanda] pursue a FINS Petition.

The parties’ oldest child, [MC1], is a good student and has no history of
trouble at school.

Amanda testified that she relied on the advice of [MC1’s] counselor and filed a FINS

petition as to MC1. She likewise acknowledged that her husband was told by a sheriff’s

deputy that filing a FINS petition would be a good idea. Amanda also notes that while it is

now true that [MC1] is a good student, he was not prior to the FINS proceeding, which

Amanda submits “got his attention and straightened him up,” both at school and at home.

She argues that the change in [MC1’s] behavior is exactly what a FINS proceeding is aimed

at accomplishing and that she should not be penalized for filing it.

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Amanda submits she was having serious disciplinary problems with MC1, including

poor grades and misbehavior at school. She testified that he had (1) stuffed his younger

siblings into a trash-collection bin and laughed about it and (2) drove a sibling to a

convenience store on a four wheeler and left the child there. Amanda claimed he appeared

to be trying to provoke his stepfather into striking him by being mean and hurtful to the

younger children and doing everything he could to avoid taking his ADHD medicine.

Amanda testified that, on the advice of counselors, she filed a FINS petition to rein

in MC1. She notes that, just as intended, his behavior at home and at school changed for

the better. She claimed, and MC1 acknowledged, that by the time of the final hearing, MC1

was doing well in all respects. But rather than supporting Amanda’s use of the state-

sponsored FINS program, the trial court commented:

This is—it’s really bothersome, Mr. Crane [Amanda’s attorney]. This is a punishment.
She’s using the system - - with serious consequences. She doesn’t have any control
over the consequences, so I want her to answer. . . . To punish a child. Used the legal
system to punish a child. . . . Well, she testified—your client testified it was used as
punishment. . . . That he’s scared? What kind of psychological—I’ll review all my
notes and review the testimony.

Amanda argues that the trial court’s misunderstanding of FINS proceedings as

criminal proceedings led to clearly erroneous findings that punished Amanda for her

successful use of a FINS proceeding to rectify MC1’s behavioral issues. It is well-settled law

that custody awards are not to be made to punish or reward either parent. See Ingle v. Dacus,

2020 Ark. App. 490, 611 S.W.3d 714. Amanda urges that the trial court clearly erred when

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it punished her for seeking the benefits of the state-sponsored FINS program established to

assist families solve such issues.

Our review of the record failed to indicate any finding by the trial court that it

considered the FINS petition criminal in nature; rather, it specifically found Amanda not

credible and reprimanded her for filing the FINS petition during the custody dispute and

because she had “used the legal system to punish a child.” Pursuant to the FINS proceeding,

MC1 could be placed on supervision terms that had to be given to him in writing, and he

could be placed in a detention facility if he violates a court order. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-

27-332(a)(4) & (6) (Repl. 2020), -336(a)(2) (Repl. 2020). MC1 was under weekly supervision

by a probation officer, was subject to the possibility of juvenile detention, and had expressed

fear about being placed in juvenile detention. But nothing in the record supports Amanda’s

allegation that the trial court misunderstood the FINS process or goal, and we see no basis

for reversal.

D. Ordering Joint Custody of the Parties’ Three Children

Amanda initially states that the trial court’s ultimate award of joint custody is directly

counter to what the trial court told the parties at the end of the hearing, announcing from

the bench: “From what I’ve heard and seen today, I don’t ever see any 50/50 . . . .”1 She

also reiterates that the decision is directly contrary to the ad litem’s recommendations, both

before and after the hearing.

1
The trial court’s apparent change of heart is of no moment because the final written
order controls over an oral ruling from the bench. Cordell v. Hylle, 2022 Ark. App. 209, at 8.

13
Amanda submits that the General Assembly initially expressed its concern about

uncooperative parents when it changed the general preference to joint custody in part of Act

1156 of 2013, which provided that if “one parent demonstrates a pattern of willfully creating

conflict to disrupt current joint custody, the court may deem such behavior as a material

change of circumstances and may grant primary custody to the nondisruptive parent.” Ark.

Code Ann. § 9-13-101(b)(1)(A) (before its most recent amendment); see also Hewett v. Hewett,

2018 Ark. App. 235, at 6, 547 S.W.3d 138, 141 (reversal of joint custody based on parties’

inability to cooperate and communicate).

Act 604 of the 2021 regular session of the Arkansas General Assembly, codified at

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101 (Supp. 2023), went into effect prior to entry of the final order

in this case, and states in relevant part:

SECTION 1. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A), concerning the award of custody,
is amended to add an additional subdivision to read as follows:

....

(iv)(b) The presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child may
be rebutted:

(1) If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that joint custody is not in
the best interest of the child;

....

SECTION 2. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (iii), concerning the award
of custody, are amended to read as follows:

(ii) To this effect, the circuit court shall consider awarding joint custody of a child
to the parents in making an order for custody.

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(iii) If, at any time, the circuit court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
one (1) parent demonstrates a pattern of willfully creating conflict in an attempt to
disrupt a current or pending joint custody arrangement and the circuit court is unable
to enter an order that will reduce areas of conflict caused by the disruptive parent,
the circuit court may deem such behavior as a material change of circumstances and
may change a joint custody order to an order of primary custody to the nondisruptive
parent.

Section 9-13-101(b)(1)(A)(ii) does not make joint custody mandatory, it merely

mandates that the trial court consider awarding joint custody. See Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, 2018

Ark. App. 47, 539 S.W.3d 619. Amanda argues that clear and convincing evidence indicates

that the parties cannot cooperate when it comes to deciding the best interest of the children.

More stringent standards are required for modifications than for initial custody

determinations to promote stability and continuity in the lives of the children and to

discourage the repeated litigation of the same issues. See Szwedo v. Cyrus, 2020 Ark. App. 319,

602 S.W.3d 759. Here, neither party requested joint custody, nor did the ad litem.

While there is a statutory preference for joint custody, this preference does not

override the ultimate guiding principle, which is to set custody that comports with the best

interest of the children. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i); Smith v. Hembree, 2022

Ark. App. 121, at 8; Bundy v. Womble, 2018 Ark. App. 462, 558 S.W.3d 429.

Amanda cites Li v. Ding, 2017 Ark. App. 244, 519 S.W.3d 738, for the proposition

that Arkansas law remains that the mutual ability of the parties to cooperate in reaching

shared decisions in matters affecting the children’s welfare is a crucial factor bearing on the

propriety of an award of joint custody. In Li, the trial court found that the parties had

significant disagreement regarding school choice and parenting styles and were “completely

15
failing at communication.” Id. at 8, 519 S.W.3d at 742. This court noted that the parents

had separated six years before the hearing; thus, “the descriptions by the parties and the

court of the parties’ communication” showed that it had been consistently problematic for

years. Id. at 12, 519 S.W.3d at 745. In Hewett, supra, the hearings were held approximately

four years after the parents’ separation, and the children were of school age. Amanda submits

that if those periods of time are sufficient to show a “pattern” of whether parties are able to

coparent, then the seven plus years here does as well.

This court recently noted that when parties have fallen into such discord that they

are unable to cooperate in reaching shared decisions in matters affecting their children, then

a material change in circumstances affecting the child’s best interest has occurred. See Beverly

v. Murphy, 2022 Ark. App. 4, at 5.

Amanda asserts that every witness who testified regarding the ability of the parties to

coparent stated that they could not do so. She references the attorney ad litem’s amended

recommendation that joint custody should be off the table until after serious coparenting

counseling. Even Ernie admitted the parties could not coparent and acknowledged that

coparenting counseling might help things, despite his previous refusal to attend. Amanda

submits that the evidence clearly established the parties have different rules and ideas on

appropriate discipline for the children in their respective homes. She maintains that all of

the evidence before the trial court clearly showed that the parties are incapable of effective

coparenting and states that Ernie’s complete refusal to coparent in any meaningful way

should have resulted in a ruling to keep custody with her, not a change to joint custody.

16
We disagree and find merit in Ernie’s argument that the trial court did not err in

ordering joint custody. See Grimsley v. Drewyor, 2019 Ark. App. 218, at 8 (noting joint custody

favored in Arkansas and that custody should favor “frequent and continuing contact of the

child with both parents”). As the party petitioning for a change in custody, it was Ernie’s

burden to show a material change in circumstances, but in her brief, Amanda does not

challenge the finding that there had been a material change in circumstances since the

divorce—to the contrary, at trial, she acknowledged that her filing of a FINS petition against

MC1 constituted a material change.

It is axiomatic that when there is a material change in circumstances, the trial court

may modify custody, taking into consideration the best interest of the children, see Taylor v.

Taylor, 353 Ark. 69, 77–78, 110 S.W.3d 731, 735–36 (2003), and it is undisputed that

Amanda acknowledged before the trial court that her filing the FINS petition was a material

change in circumstances during cross-examination.

Whether joint custody was in the children’s best interest requires examination of a

variety of factors. See, e.g., Bamburg v. Bamburg, 2014 Ark. App. 269, 435 S.W.3d 6. The

record before us demonstrates that the trial court properly reviewed the evidence in light of

those factors in its determination that a change to joint custody was in the best interest of

the children. A polestar consideration in the determination of both custody or visitation is

that the stability and protection in the lives of children is an issue of paramount importance.

As noted in Bamburg:

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With regard to custody and visitation, the primary consideration is the welfare
and best interest of the children involved; all other considerations are secondary. . .
The factors a trial court may consider in determining what is in the best interest of
the children include the psychological relationship between the parents and children,
the need for stability and continuity in the relationship between parents and children,
the past conduct of the parents toward the children, and the reasonable preference
of the child.

Id. at 8, 435 S.W.3d at 11–12 (citations omitted).

A parent’s violation of court orders is yet another factor that can be considered by the

trial court concerning child custody. Stormes v. Gleghorn, 2022 Ark. App. 416, at 14, 653

S.W.3d 820, 829. Amanda unilaterally decided when, and even whether, visitation would

occur in violation of the decree. Examples included refusing visitation when the children

were out of school for winter break because it was not a “holiday”; cutting off visitation

completely when she learned Ernie had not been giving ADHD medication during weekend

visitation; and refusing visitation because the children had been unmasked in an outdoor

setting on vacation, despite no one being around them. This is significant because a parent’s

past action is a good indicator of future conduct, see Collins v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022

Ark. App. 481, at 6, 655 S.W.3d 892, 896.

Finally, despite all of Amanda’s arguments, the trial court’s review of all the evidence

led it to find her less than credible, as noted in the trial court’s questioning about the FINS

petition and her ultimate admission that it was to teach MC1 a lesson. A trial court weighs

credibility, and if it is wanting, it cannot be overlooked. Digby v. Digby, 263 Ark. 813, 818,

567 S.W.2d 290, 293 (1978).

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On the basis of our de novo review, we hold that the record supports the trial court’s

findings, and no clear error has been shown; accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

BARRETT and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Crane, Phillips & Rainwater, PLLC, by: Steve R. Crain, for appellant.

Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellee.

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