Jason Hicks v. State of Arkansas

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 35
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CR-23-329

JASON HICKS Opinion Delivered January 17, 2024

APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE HOT SPRING
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
V. [NO. 30CR-22-311]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE STEPHEN L. SHIRRON,
JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

Appellant Jason Hicks was found guilty by a Hot Spring County jury of failure to comply with

sex-offender registration and reporting requirements, a Class C felony, in violation of Arkansas Code

Annotated section 12-12-904. In an order filed on January 27, 2023, Hicks was sentenced to a term

of ten years’ incarceration in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal, Hicks argues that

the circuit court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion because the State failed to prove that

he did not report a change of address. We affirm.

On October 18, 2022, Hicks was charged by information with unlawfully violating the

conditions of his sex-offender registration by failing to appear in person to report a change of address

and by residing within two thousand feet of a school or daycare, against the peace and dignity of the

State of Arkansas.

A jury trial was held on January 26, 2023. Sergeant Jim Sanders, an investigator with the

Union County Sheriff’s Office tasked with handling sex-offender registrations, testified that on May
31, 2019, Hicks electronically signed a sex-offender verification form verifying his address and place

of employment. Sergeant Sanders stated that Hicks also signed an acknowledgment form indicating

that he understood the rules and regulations regarding registration, including the requirement to

report changes of residence, mailing address, temporary domicile, employment, email, and social

network information in person to the local enforcement agency having jurisdiction at the time of the

change. Seargeant Sanders further testified that Hicks signed another verification form on February

26, 2020, and that he had not had any contact with Hicks after that date.

Sergeant Sanders testified that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there were changes made

to the reporting procedures. He stated there was a sex-offender check-in form in the front office for

those people required to report to sign-in and leave a name and phone number; he would then get in

touch and schedule a follow-up appointment. Sergeant Sanders expressed that the changes in

reporting procedures did not prevent reporting and registering as required. Sergeant Sanders

testified that Hicks’s name was never listed on the sign-in sheet; however, once he was provided

information that Hicks was living in the Malvern area, he contacted Detective Jack Seely of the

Malvern Police Department.

Deanna Draper, office manager for Malvern Water Works, testified next. She stated that in

May 2022, during the monthly meter readings, it was discovered that a vacant home located at 927

Edward Street had water usage beginning April 17, although no one had established service at the

address. On May 26, the water to the house was turned off, and the meter was locked. Shortly

thereafter, on June 10, Hicks applied for water service at the 927 Edward Street address and paid the

$150 deposit. A connect order was then issued, and water service was turned on; there has been

ongoing water usage since that time.

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Jack Seely, a detective with the Malvern Police Department, testified that he served as the

sex-offender coordinator for the city of Malvern. He received information indicating that Hicks, an

out-of-compliance Level 3 sex offender, was living in Malvern but had not registered with the

Malvern Police Department. Seely stated that a search revealed a driver’s license listing Hicks’s

address as 927 Edward Street. A probable-cause affidavit was prepared, and officers went to the

address and took Hicks into custody. Detective Seely testified that Hicks verified his sex-offender

registration on September 20 with Jerry Norwood, the Hot Spring County sex-offender coordinator.

According to Detective Seely, prior to the September verification, there was no record of Hicks

registering his current address with the Malvern Police Department.

Hicks moved for a directed verdict following the close of the State’s case. He argued that the

State failed to prove that he failed to report a change of address. He contended that during the

relevant time periods, the sex-offender-registration offices were not functioning full time and that

because the officers were relying on others to relay messages, information could have been lost. The

State countered that the offices had procedures in place to ensure that people could register if they

sought to do so. The circuit court denied the directed-verdict motion. The defense rested without

calling any witnesses and renewed the directed-verdict motion, which was again denied. Hicks was

convicted of failure to comply with sex-offender registration and reporting requirements and

sentenced to ten years in prison. He now appeals.

On appeal, Hicks challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He

specifically argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict because the

evidence was insufficient to establish that he failed to report a change of address as required of sex

offenders.

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We treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. 1

When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. 2 We will affirm a

judgment of conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it.3 Substantial evidence is evidence

of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way

or the other without resorting to speculation or conjecture. 4 We defer to the jury’s determination

on the matter of witness credibility.5 Jurors do not and need not view each fact in isolation; rather,

they may consider the evidence as a whole.6 The jury is entitled to draw any reasonable inference

from circumstantial evidence to the same extent that it can be from direct evidence.7 The jury may

resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence and may choose to believe the

State’s account of the facts rather than the defendant’s. 8 We need only consider testimony that

supports the guilty verdict.9 Circumstantial evidence may provide the basis for a conviction if it is

1 Kelley v. State, 103 Ark. App. 110, 286 S.W.3d 746 (2008).
2 Id.

3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.

7 Id.
8 Dunn v. State, 371 Ark. 140, 264 S.W.3d 504 (2007).
9 Holcomb v. State, 2014 Ark. 141, 432 S.W.3d 600.

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consistent with the defendant’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable explanation of the

crime.10

A sex offender is required to register and to report in person any change of address.11 When

establishing a new residency or temporary domicile at the new address, a sex offender is required to

provide notice to the supervising authority no later than five calendar days before doing so. A sex

offender who fails to register or report as required is guilty of a Class C felony. 12 The failure to

register is a strict-liability offense.13

Here, there is no dispute that Hicks was required to register as a sex offender and comply

with all reporting requirements. The testimony elicited at trial established that Hicks moved from

Union County to Malvern in or around June 2022, at the latest, according to the date he applied for

water service at a Malvern address. The sex-offender statutes require sex offenders to report a change

of address within five days of moving to the new residence. Hicks failed to do so. Notably, on appeal,

Hicks does not argue that he reported as required; instead, he contends that it is possible, with the

changes in reporting procedures, for information to be lost. Accordingly, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the State, we find substantial evidence supports the verdict and affirm the

circuit court’s finding that Hicks failed to comply with sex-offender registration requirements.

Affirmed.

10 Robinson v. State, 2016 Ark. App. 240, 491 S.W.3d 481.
11 See Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-904(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii) (Supp. 2019).

12 Allen v. State, 2020 Ark. App. 84, 596 S.W.3d 518.
13 Id.

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BARRETT and MURPHY, JJ., agree.

Gregory Crain, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.

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