In Re Dependency as to L.S.

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.

No. 1 CA-JV 26-0020
FILED 05-11-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD536732
The Honorable David J. Palmer, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Queen Creek
By Steven Czop
Counsel for Appellant Samuel S.

Maricopa County Office of the Public Advocate, Mesa
By Seth Draper
Counsel for Appellant Samantha A.

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Veronica F. Rios
Counsel for Appellee DCS
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

P A T O N, Judge:

¶1 Samantha A. (“Mother”) and Samuel S. (“Father”)
(collectively, “Parents”) appeal the juvenile court’s order adjudicating their
child, L.S. (“Child”), born in October 2024, dependent as to each parent. For
the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On June 11, 2025, police responded to a call from Mother
reporting that Father physically abused Child. When police arrived at
Mother’s home, Mother explained that she saw “scratches on [Child’s] neck
and redness on his ears” and that Father had locked her out of her home.
She also reported that Father “struck her five times in the head” the
previous day.

¶3 Over the next two months, DCS repeatedly attempted to
conduct a wellness check on Child, but was unsuccessful due to Parents’
lack of cooperation. During those two months, DCS also received a phone
call from Mother’s mother (“Grandmother”) and Mother’s neighbor
expressing concerns of domestic abuse by Father against Mother.

¶4 In August 2025, DCS interviewed Mother’s preteen daughter,
B.P., who witnessed the domestic violence incident on June 11. B.P.
explained that Father told Mother to take B.P. somewhere else so he could
“beat [Mother] up.” B.P. also said she heard Father physically assaulting
Mother and saw scratches on Child’s neck. She expressed fear of Father
because he would regularly get angry and strangle Child when Child cried.

¶5 DCS took custody of Child in September 2025. A few days
later, Mother visited the DCS office to ask about Child. DCS staff observed
that Mother wore an ear bud and behaved strangely during the visit. DCS
staff wrote two questions on a piece of paper asking Mother whether Father
was talking to her in her ear bud and whether she felt safe at home. Mother
responded “yes,” but did not indicate which question she was answering.

2
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

¶6 At a subsequent Team Decision Meeting, Mother revealed
that Father hit her earlier that morning for cooperating with DCS, injuring
her lip and bruising her backside. She also expressed a desire for Father to
be arrested and sought resources on how to escape her relationship. But
two days later, she recanted her statements as to the alleged domestic
violence and claimed she felt coerced by DCS to make those allegations
against Father.

¶7 DCS filed a dependency petition as to each parent, alleging
each was “unwilling or unable to provide proper and effective parental care
and control due to” domestic violence and neglect. The juvenile court held
a two-day dependency hearing in December 2025.

¶8 Before the hearing, Father moved to exclude statements made
by B.P. during her interview with DCS as hearsay lacking sufficient
indications of reliability. The juvenile court denied the motion and
admitted the statements.

¶9 During the hearing, Mother and Father both claimed
Grandmother’s, B.P.’s, and Mother’s reports of domestic violence by Father
were unreliable. Mother claimed Grandmother “ha[d] issues with
alcoholism” and was likely under the influence when she made her reports.
Father described B.P. as “passive aggressive,” vengeful, and generally
untrustworthy, while describing their relationship as one that has grown
“further and further apart.” Mother also questioned B.P.’s credibility due
to B.P.’s behavioral issues. As to her own reports, Mother testified that she
lied when she reported the allegations of Father’s domestic violence.

¶10 A DCS child safety specialist testified that Parents refused to
participate in any services DCS recommended, other than visitation. He
also explained the negative behavioral effects that witnessing domestic
violence can have on a child, noting that Child had demonstrated those
behaviors, such as biting and screaming, since being removed from Parents’
custody.

¶11 On January 30, 2026, the court issued an “Under Advisement
Ruling” adjudicating Child dependent as to both Mother and Father. As to
Mother, the juvenile court found that Mother “has been unwilling and/or
unable [to] provide proper and effective parental care and control due to
acts of [d]omestic [v]iolence” in the home. The juvenile court also found
that Mother “senselessly denies the existence of domestic violence in the
home . . . failing to protect the child.” As to Father, the juvenile court found

3
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

that Father failed “to protect [Child] against domestic violence committed
by Father, to which [Child] has tragically been a witness and victim.”

¶12 A few days later, DCS filed a proposed dependency order,
which detailed specific evidence of domestic violence and Parents’ inability
to protect Child from domestic violence. The court adopted the proposed
order. Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Section 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

I. The juvenile court did not err in relying on DCS’s proposed form
of order to issue its dependency order.

¶13 Mother and Father argue the juvenile court erred in relying
on a proposed form of order DCS filed instead of making its own factual
findings. They claim that because there is no mechanism in the juvenile
rules for parties to submit a proposed form of order, the juvenile court was
required to make independent findings. We review the sufficiency of a
juvenile court’s findings of fact regarding dependency de novo as a mixed
question of fact and law. Francine C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 249 Ariz. 289,
296, ¶ 14 (App. 2020).

¶14 When the juvenile court finds that a petitioner has proven the
allegations in a dependency petition by a preponderance of the evidence, it
must provide “specific facts that support a finding of dependency” in the
form of “a signed minute entry or order.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(h); see also
A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1)(a)(ii) (juvenile court must provide “[t]he factual basis
for the dependency”). The juvenile court may rely on proposed orders to
make its factual findings provided “those findings are consistent with the
ones that it reaches independently after properly considering the facts.” See
Elliott v. Elliott, 165 Ariz. 128, 134 (App. 1990). The adopted factual
allegations must be reasonably supported by the evidence and be sufficient
as a matter of law. See Francine C., 249 Ariz. at 299, ¶ 26.

¶15 The juvenile court’s dependency order, which included DCS’s
proposed factual findings, sufficiently provided “specific facts that support
a finding of dependency.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(h)(4); A.R.S. § 8-
844(C)(1)(a)(ii). The juvenile court found Child dependent as to both
Mother and Father because each parent was “unwilling or unable to
provide proper and effective parental care and control due to” both neglect
and domestic violence. A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(i). The order cited specific
supporting evidence, including details of the June 11, 2025, incident, when
Mother called the police to report domestic violence. It also noted B.P.’s

4
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

statements that she heard Father physically assaulting Mother and saw
scratch marks on Child’s neck. It further found that Father continues to
commit domestic violence against Mother and that Mother continues to
deny any domestic violence within the household.

¶16 These findings are both supported by the record and
consistent with the findings the court reached independently in its Under
Advisement Ruling. See Francine C., 249 Ariz. at 299, ¶ 26; Elliott, 165 Ariz.
at 134. In that ruling, the court found that Father committed acts of
domestic violence against Mother and Child, Child was a witness and
victim of those acts, and Mother denied the existence of domestic violence
in the home. These facts are sufficient to support a dependency finding and
are consistent with the adopted findings in the dependency order. See
Francine C., 249 Ariz. at 296, ¶ 14 (the juvenile court need not include every
fact supporting its ruling but must include those essential to the
conclusion).

¶17 Parents also argue that some of the dependency order’s
findings regarding Parents’ substance use are not supported by the record,
so we should disregard all of its findings. Specifically, they point to the
order’s mention of Mother’s history of methamphetamine use, Father’s
history of substance abuse, and Father’s prior conviction for a marijuana
related offense. Although there was evidence that both parents tested
positive for marijuana during the proceedings, parents are correct that these
specific findings are not supported by the record. The juvenile court’s
inclusion of these mistaken facts, however, does not negate its findings that
Child was dependent due to domestic violence and neglect. Because ample
evidence supports the court’s findings of ongoing domestic violence and
failure to adequately care for Child, we find no reversible error. See Shella
H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 51, ¶ 16 (App. 2016) (finding “the
substantiated and unresolved threat” of domestic violence supports a
finding of dependency).

II. The juvenile court did not err in admitting the DCS report
containing B.P.’s statements.

¶18 Father contends the juvenile court erred in admitting B.P.’s
hearsay statements. We review the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings for
an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice. Lohmeier v. Hammer, 214
Ariz. 57, 60, ¶ 6 (App. 2006). We will not find an abuse of discretion unless
the juvenile court’s decision was “manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on
untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.” Quigley v. City of Tucson, 132
Ariz. 35, 37 (App. 1982).

5
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

¶19 In general, “[t]he Arizona Rules of Evidence apply in
contested adjudication hearings in . . . dependency . . . proceedings, except
as otherwise provided by law.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 104(a). Therefore,
hearsay not fitting within any exclusion or exception is inadmissible. Ariz.
R. Evid. 802. But in juvenile court proceedings, the “out-of-court statements
of a minor regarding acts of neglect perpetrated on the minor are admissible
for all purposes in any dependency proceeding if the time, content, and
circumstances provide sufficient indication of its reliability.” A.R.S. § 8-237
(citation modified); see also Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 104(c).

¶20 Father argues this exception does not apply to B.P.’s
statements because B.P. was not the child who experienced acts of neglect
or abuse, and that the time, content, and circumstances of her statements
did not provide sufficient indicia of their reliability. We disagree. Neglect
is “[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . of a child to provide that
child with supervision . . . if that inability or unwillingness causes
substantial risk of harm to child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S. § 8-201(25)(a).
Exposing a child to domestic violence fits within this definition. Cf. Shella
H., 239 Ariz. at 51, ¶¶ 17-18 (affirming a dependency finding because the
mother exposed her child to domestic violence, even though the child was
not a victim of the domestic violence). Because B.P.’s exposure to domestic
violence constitutes neglect, her statements about the domestic violence she
witnessed are statements “regarding acts of . . . neglect perpetrated on
[her].” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 104(c).

¶21 Father also asserts that B.P.’s statements were unreliable
because she made her statements two months after the incident and had a
poor relationship with Father. But we give substantial deference to the
juvenile court’s findings on reliability. See Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety,
255 Ariz. 471, 478, ¶ 30 (2023); Lashonda M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210
Ariz. 77, 82-83, ¶ 19 (App. 2005). Moreover, other evidence corroborates
B.P.’s statements. Mother called police on June 11, 2025, and alleged
domestic violence by Father and described scratch marks on Child’s neck,
consistent with B.P.’s statements. On this record, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that B.P.’s statements were sufficiently
reliable to be admissible under Section 8-237.

¶22 Father also claims that the juvenile court erred by failing to
state its reliability findings on the record. He relies on Francine C., 249 Ariz.
at 289, to support his position. His reliance is misplaced. Francine C. held
that the juvenile court must provide specific findings of fact to support its
dependency order—as required by statute—but it does not extend this

6
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

requirement to specific evidentiary rulings. See Francine C., 249 Ariz. at 298-
99, ¶ 21.

¶23 Father alternatively argues that, even if B.P.’s statements were
admissible, the DCS report containing her statements was inadmissible
hearsay. When admissible hearsay statements are nested within a second
layer of inadmissible hearsay, the statements may not be admitted. See Ariz.
R. Evid. 805 (emphasis added). But the DCS report is not inadmissible
hearsay. In dependency hearings, “the court must review a child safety
worker’s report and may admit the report into evidence if the worker . . .
who prepared or approved the report [is] available for cross-examination.”
Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 104(d)(2). Here, the DCS employee who prepared the
report containing B.P.’s statements testified and was subject to cross-
examination. The report was admissible under Rule 104(d)(2).

¶24 Father nonetheless argues that this was still error because the
DCS employee who interviewed B.P. was not available for cross-
examination. But the rule does not require that the employee who
interviewed the minor be available for cross-examination, only the
employee who authored or approved the report. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct.
104(d)(2). And Rule 104(d)(1) expressly provides that the report “may
include any appendices or reports prepared by a person other than the child
safety worker” who authored the report.

¶25 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting B.P.’s statements. See E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 60,
¶ 20 (App. 2015).

III. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in ordering DCS to
make reasonable efforts to provide services to Mother.

¶26 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in entering its
dependency order because the juvenile court did not order DCS to provide
a specific service or make reasonable efforts to provide services to the
parents. We review a juvenile court’s dependency order for an abuse of
discretion. In re Amber S., 225 Ariz. 364, 367, ¶ 6 (App. 2010).

¶27 Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 339(d)(1)
requires the court, in a signed minute entry or order, to “order DCS to make
reasonable efforts to provide services to the child and child’s parent” if DCS
is a party. The dependency order specifically ordered DCS to “make
reasonable efforts to achieve the case plan.” This suffices as an order for
DCS to “make reasonable efforts” to provide services to Mother. Ariz. R.P.
Juv. Ct. 339(d)(1). And during the disposition hearing, the parties discussed

7
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO L.S.
Decision of the Court

numerous services that DCS offered Mother, including “Family
Connections,” “Nurturing Parenting Time,” visitation, and domestic
violence counseling. The court did not abuse its discretion.

CONCLUSION

¶28 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

8