Wood v. Drapkin

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

CHRISTOPHER WOOD, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

JODY DRAPKIN, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 24-0883 FC
FILED 05-11-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2022-090833
The Honorable Keith A. Miller, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Christopher Wood, Phoenix
Petitioner/Appellee Pro Se

Jody Drapkin, Whistler, British Columbia, Canada
Respondent/Appellant Pro Se
WOOD v. DRAPKIN
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Anni Hill Foster delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

F O S T E R, Judge:

¶1 Respondent Jody Drapkin (“Wife”) appeals the superior
court’s final decree of dissolution for her marriage to Christopher Wood
(“Husband”). Wife argues the court improperly sanctioned her, denied her
accommodation requests, failed to consider all evidence, awarded Husband
their community property and that she suffered from misconduct by her
counsel, opposing counsel and the judge. Wife asserts each of these issues
constitute an abuse of discretion. This Court affirms.

FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Married in 2003, Husband and Wife lived with their
daughter 2 in Arizona during the marriage. Husband worked for Sunny
Energy, LLC (“Sunny Energy”) as Director of Business Development. Wife
did not work much during the marriage. The couple held a 25% ownership
interest in Sunny Energy. In February 2022, Husband petitioned the
superior court of Maricopa County for a dissolution of marriage. In May,
Wife moved to British Columbia and has been living there since.

¶3 Throughout the dissolution proceedings, Wife repeatedly
sent harassing messages to Husband, opposing counsel, unrelated third
parties, the court and court staff. Wife’s emails discussed Husband’s
obligation to disclose his hidden financial accounts, her requested
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) accommodations, permanent
spousal maintenance, division of community property and alleged attorney
and judicial misconduct.

1 This Court views the facts in the light most favorable to upholding the

superior court’s ruling. See Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 283, ¶ 14
(App. 2019).
2 Daughter was a minor during these proceedings but has since reached the

age of majority.

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¶4 The emails coupled with Wife’s behavior during litigation led
the court to issue several admonishments and sanctions. The court initially
admonished Wife to stop harassing Husband, numerous third parties and
the court. The court ordered both parties not to send ex parte email
communications to court staff and warned that violation of its order would
result in a fine of $150.00 per violation. Several months later, after Wife’s
attorney withdrew, the court issued a second order directly to Wife
ordering her to immediately stop ex parte communications with court staff
or it would impose the fine. Despite these warnings, and only a few days
after the order, Wife sent twenty separate emails and numerous phone calls
to court staff. As a result, the court fined Wife for the violations. The court
also ordered the parties, again, not to harass one another or associated third
parties. The court notified the parties that violations of this new order
would result in additional sanctions of $1,000.00 per violation. When the
court issued the Decree of Dissolution, it imposed the additional sanctions
on wife, amounting to $120,000.00, due to her unabated harassing behavior
that caused Husband to incur additional attorneys’ fees.

¶5 Wife appeals the court’s final Decree of Dissolution and this
Court has jurisdiction. A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶6 Wife raises several issues on appeal. First, she argues the
superior court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions against her.
Second, she argues the court abused its discretion in denying her requested
ADA accommodations. Third, she argues the court abused its discretion by
accepting and relying on an inaccurate record when determining property
division and spousal maintenance. Fourth, she argues the court materially
misstated the evidence in its decree of dissolution, leading to “a grossly
disproportionate award.” And lastly, she argues she was denied procedural
protections due to attorney misconduct and judicial bias.

I. Wife failed to comply with the Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure.

¶7 As a preliminary matter, because Husband failed to file an
answering brief, this Court assumes he confesses reversible error to any
debatable issues raised by Wife. See Savord v. Morton, 235 Ariz. 256, 259, ¶ 9
(App. 2014). While the term “debatable issue” has not been explicitly
defined, debatable issues exist when: (1) a significant amount of effort and
independent research would be required to refute appellant’s assertion,
Merrill v. Wheeler, 17 Ariz. 348, 350 (1915); (2) appellant has raised “at least

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a grave doubt” about the superior court’s order, Adkins v. Adkins, 39 Ariz.
530, 532 (1932); or (3) the appeal raises novel legal questions, see Childs v.
Frederickson, 21 Ariz. 248, 249 (1920). Conversely, when the record clearly
supports the court’s ruling, a debatable issue does not exist. See, e.g., Air E.,
Inc. v. Wheatley, 14 Ariz. App. 290, 294 (1971). Based on the record, the issues
raised by Wife do not present debatable issues because (1) the record clearly
supports the court’s ruling; (2) this Court does not discern error; and (3)
Wife’s appeal does not raise novel issues. This Court may resolve Wife’s
appeal without Husband’s response.

¶8 Separately, Wife’s brief fails to comply with Arizona Rule of
Civil Appellate Procedure (“Appellate Rule”) 13 because it does not
provide a table of citations or any citation to the record. See ARCAP 13(a)(2),
(7)(A) (opening brief must contain a table of citations and “appropriate
references to the portions of the record on which appellant relies”). If an
appellant’s opening brief presents issues not supported by adequate
explanation or citations to the record or authority, those issues may be
considered abandoned and therefore waived. MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226
Ariz. 584, 591, ¶ 33 (App. 2011); see also Stein v. Stein, 238 Ariz. 548, 549, ¶ 5
n.2 (App. 2015). Self-represented litigants “are held to the same standards
as attorneys.” In re Marriage of Williams, 219 Ariz. 546, 549, ¶ 13 (App. 2008).
But this Court may, in its discretion, consider Wife’s arguments, although
imperfectly presented. See Clemons v. Clark, 101 Ariz. 413, 414 (1966). It does
so below.

II. The court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions.

¶9 Wife argues the court abused its discretion when it imposed
sanctions. This Court reviews the imposition of sanctions for an abuse of
discretion. Hays v. Gama, 205 Ariz. 99, 102, ¶ 17 (2003). A court abuses its
discretion if “the record is devoid of competent evidence to support the
court’s decision.” Woyton v. Ward, 247 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 5 (App. 2019)
(cleaned up).

¶10 Wife concedes that trial courts have the authority to impose
sanctions. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 76.2. To impose sanctions, the court must
have adequate legal grounds. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 76.2(a). Such
grounds include failing: “to obey a scheduling or pre-trial order”; “to
appear at . . . a trial, or other scheduled hearing” or; “to participate in good
faith in a [] hearing, trial, . . . or pre-trial statement. Ariz. R. Fam. Law P.
76.2(a)(1)–(2), (4). Although the Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure
(“Family Rule”) 76.2(b) suggests appropriate sanctions including striking
pleadings, staying proceedings or dismissing an action, See Ariz. R. Fam.

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Law P. 76.2(b)(3)–(5), a court retains discretion to determine which
sanctions to impose. A court may also treat violations as contempt or order
a party to pay the opposing party’s fees or reasonable expenses. Ariz. R.
Fam. Law P. 76.2(c).

¶11 Here, Wife’s conduct provided the court with adequate legal
grounds to impose sanctions. As early as May 2023, the court ordered Wife
not to contact third parties related to Husband’s business. In its finding, the
court considered Husband’s pleading which discussed that, on a daily
basis, she sent several “vile and inappropriate emails and text messages” to
Husband, daughter, opposing counsel, Husband’s business partners,
paternal grandmother, friends of Husband and others. Later that year,
Husband’s counsel reported that Wife continued to send “multiple ...
long, bullying, and rude emails per day to the [c]ourt, Husband,
undersigned counsel, and other third parties, including the state bar.” In
response, the court ordered all ex parte email communications sent to court
staff cease or it would impose a sanction of $150.00 per violation. Wife
continued to email and call court staff, demanding ADA accommodations.

¶12 The court, on its own motion, set in-person oral argument to
address Wife’s ADA accommodation requests. But Wife failed to appear in
person as ordered, instead appearing telephonically without permission
from the court. The court admonished Wife that failure to follow “the
Court’s orders will be considered severely.” But that admonishment did not
stop Wife from calling and emailing the court with more requests.

¶13 Wife’s requests consisted of dozens of calls and emails to the
court. Wife’s conduct led the presiding family department judge to enter a
minute entry on March 21, 2024, making a formal record of Wife’s conduct
and ordering the judge presiding over the case to take no action on Wife’s
calls or emails. On March 25, the court ordered Wife, again, “to immediately
cease ex parte communications with this [c]ourt’s staff or a fine would be
assessed.” But between March 29, and April 4, Wife sent twenty separate
emails and called numerous times.

¶14 Separate from her ADA accommodation requests, Wife
consistently called and emailed opposing counsel about discovery issues.
Husband’s counsel consistently pointed out that Wife’s discovery demands
were for documents easily accessible to her or already disclosed to her or
her counsel. But Husband was deficient in fulfilling his discovery
obligations, and therefore, upon stipulation, the court appointed a special
master to settle discovery disputes between the parties.

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¶15 Wife sent the special master so many emails that he made note
at least fifteen times of Wife’s harassing emails and her failure to comply
with his instructions on how to submit discovery issues. The special
master’s notes report dozens of “bizarre and rambling emails” sent to
himself, Husband, Husband’s counsel, the court, court staff and others.
Many of them contained photos of wholly unrelated discovery requests.

¶16 Wife’s actions resulted in an initial fine of $1,500.00, less than
half of the amount the court could have imposed based on $150.00 per
violation. But Wife’s behavior continued and the court increased the
sanction to $1,000.00 per violation. This did not deter Wife, and she
continued to violate the court’s orders. Her behavior led the court to find
“it [ ] very clear that Wife’s actions caused Husband to incur additional
attorney fees” and imposed a penalty of $120,000.00. Based on this record,
the court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Wife monetarily. Kelly
v. Kelly, 252 Ariz. 371, 376, ¶ 21 (App. 2021) (allowing the superior court to
“impose a progression of monetary sanctions on contemptuous parents”).

¶17 Wife also argues the court abused its discretion by
sanctioning her for not filing a joint pre-trial statement. But Wife
misunderstands the court’s ruling. The court issued an order early in the
proceedings outlining the responsibilities of the parties before trial,
including a joint pre-trial statement. In preparation for the temporary
orders hearing, Wife and Husband filed separate pretrial statements. The
court did not reject these filings.

¶18 Further, in preparation for trial, Husband filed a “Notice of
Issues,” referencing the court’s pre-trial orders and identifying the
contested issues for trial. He also timely filed a separate pre-trial statement.
Wife did not provide a pre-trial statement, nor any of the information
required in a pre-trial statement. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 76.1(g)(1)–(17).
Instead, contrary to the court’s orders, Wife sent an email to the court,
Husband’s counsel and several others. Wife’s email stated that she would
not have an internet connection for the upcoming trial—even though the
court ordered her to be there in-person—and contained ramblings about
the case. Her email failed to contain any information required for Husband
to prepare for trial, such as the evidence Wife intended to present or names
of witnesses that would testify. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 76.2(10), (13).
Accordingly, and considering other sanctions it had already imposed, the
court sanctioned Wife by striking her response. The court did not take this
action lightly and based its decision on Wife’s consistent improper actions,
such as her disobedience of the court’s orders. It did not sanction Wife for
failing to provide a “joint” pre-trial statement.

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III. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wife’s ADA
accommodations.

¶19 Wife argues the court abused its discretion by denying her
repeated requests for ADA accommodations without due process. This
Court reviews the decision to deny ADA accommodations for an abuse of
discretion. See Henderson v. Henderson, 241 Ariz. 580, 589, ¶ 29 (App. 2017).

¶20 Title II of the ADA requires public entities such as courts to
take reasonable measures to accommodate people with disabilities.
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 531–32 (2004). But it does not require “any
and all means to make judicial services accessible.” Id. Instead, the ADA
only requires modifications which are reasonable. Id. at 532; see also Jessica
P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 251 Ariz. 34, 38, ¶ 13 (App. 2021) (“The ADA
imposes an affirmative duty on public entities to make ‘reasonable
modifications.’”).

¶21 A modification is reasonable if it does “not fundamentally
alter the nature of the service provided.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 532. And the
individual seeking the modification must be otherwise eligible for the
service provided by the court. Id. But while a court’s duty to accommodate
is consistent with the due process principle of a meaningful opportunity to
be heard, requested accommodations must be “within the limits of
practicability.” Id. (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).

¶22 Here, the court considered each of Wife’s accommodation
requests. She requested exemption from requirements to file pleadings
through the docket and to travel to Arizona to appear in-person at court.
Wife also asked the court to allow her to appear telephonically, instead of
virtually, at court hearings. With little explanation, the court found these
requests to be “not factually necessary.” Though the court’s findings lack
detail, the superior court is in the best position to determine the credibility
of factual arguments, and this Court will not second guess the superior
court’s factual determinations regarding ADA accommodations absent an
abuse of discretion. See Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Burke, 204 Ariz. 251, 254, ¶
10 (2003) (“We defer to the judge with respect to any factual findings
explicitly or implicitly made, affirming them so long as they are supported
by reasonable evidence.”).

¶23 First, the court’s denial of Wife’s request to exempt her from
filing documents through the court’s docket was proper given that Wife
had previously appropriately filed eight other pro per pleadings.

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¶24 Second, the court’s denial of Wife’s request not to travel to
Arizona for court proceedings was reasonable given the evidence in the
record. Though the record shows that Wife had significant medical issues,
Wife’s psychologist explained that Wife had been traveling out of her home
to his office on a weekly basis for approximately nine months. And Wife’s
financial affidavit indicated she had monthly expenses for driving her car,
eating outside the home, and bus fare or parking fees. Moreover, the record
showed that Wife moved from Arizona to Canada during the pendency of
the divorce proceedings.

¶25 Third, the court properly denied Wife’s request to exempt her
from appearing at court hearings virtually and that it allow her to appear
only telephonically. The record shows she appeared virtually when the
court demanded she do so. Though Wife complained that the video made
her sick and she had limited connectivity, she presented no evidence to
support these claims. Finally, the transcript from the March 12, 2024,
hearing demonstrates that Wife’s telephonic appearance prevented the
court from managing proceedings, including ensuring that Wife could
access exhibits during testimony or that the court could adequately make
determinations of witness credibility. See State ex rel. Montgomery v. Kemp,
239 Ariz. 332, 336, ¶¶ 15–16 (App. 2016) (identifying legitimate reasons for
requiring in-person appearances in court proceedings).

¶26 The superior court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
Wife to appear in-person or denying her other requests.

IV. The court relied on the information presented to it.

¶27 Wife argues the court relied on “incomplete, misleading or
false financial disclosures” to determine property division and spousal
maintenance. This Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable
to the superior court’s order and will affirm” if the court’s judgment is
reasonably supported by the evidence. See Boyle v. Boyle, 231 Ariz. 63, 65,
¶ 8 (App. 2012).

¶28 Because courts prefer to address issues on their merits, their
discretion to impose “severe sanctions such as [ ] striking a pleading or
entering a default judgment,” is more limited than when imposing lesser
sanctions. Estate of Lewis v. Lewis, 229 Ariz. 316, 323–24, ¶ 18 (App. 2012).
Severe sanctions “must be based on a determination of willfulness or bad
faith by the party being sanctioned.” Id. at 324, ¶ 18. Generally,
“[t]he sanction of dismissal is warranted only when the court makes an
express finding that a party, as opposed to his counsel, has obstructed

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discovery, . . . and that the court has considered and rejected
lesser sanctions as a penalty.” Wayne Cook Enters., Inc. v. Fain Props. Ltd.
P’ship, 196 Ariz. 146, 149, ¶ 12 (App. 1999). Here, the record supports the
court’s entry of default.

¶29 As noted in ¶¶ 11-15 and 18, Wife failed to comply with
numerous court orders and rules, including failing to disclose required
information. She continually engaged with the court in ex parte
communications. As a result, the court sanctioned Wife for noncompliance,
and struck her answering brief. In striking Wife’s brief, the court defaulted
her and found “there was no active request for spousal maintenance.” But
before the court defaulted Wife, it asked her whether she thought default
was appropriate. Wife replied: “Oh, it’s fine, sir. Do whatever you feel. It’s
fine.”

¶30 Wife attempts to justify her behavior by claiming that
Husband had additional financial accounts that he failed to disclose. And
while Husband did delay discovery early in the case, Wife failed to produce
even a scintilla of evidence that he failed to disclose or hid financial
accounts. Instead, Wife asked for a four-month continuance on the eve of
trial to attempt to gather such evidence. The court’s denial of spousal
maintenance was a direct result of Wife’s actions and not an abuse of
discretion.

V. The award in the decree of dissolution was appropriate.

¶31 Wife asserts the decree materially misstated evidence, which
resulted in a grossly disproportionate award. When reviewing a court’s
award of community property between spouses, this Court “will not
disturb its allocation absent an abuse of discretion.” Lehn, 246 Ariz. at 283,
¶ 14. This Court “view[s] the evidence in the light most favorable to
affirming the family court’s ruling.” Id.

¶32 Here, the court recognized that the community property
between the spouses should be divided equitably, absent unique facts or
circumstances. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A); In re Marriage of Flower, 223 Ariz. 531,
535, ¶ 14 (App. 2010). After dividing the real property, personal property
and debt, the court found the allocation not equitable and ordered Husband
to make an equalization payment to Wife.

¶33 The record supports the court’s equitable distribution of the
community’s property. In ordering Husband to make the equalization
payment, the court included the community’s 25% ownership in Sunny
Energy in its calculation. Wife has not shown that the court abused its

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discretion in equitably allocating community assets or obligations to
compensate Wife for her share of the community interest in the business.
See Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 457 (1988) (A.R.S. § 25-318 “authorize[s]
the court to make an award of money instead of merely dividing
property”).

¶34 In addition, Wife failed to show the court’s final distribution
of assets was disproportionate. In the decree, the court noted that after the
parties separated, Wife received $357,785.60 from Husband’s sole and
separate earnings. The court considered this amount in Wife’s award of
community assets. Wife’s broad conclusions in her brief fail to show error
in the court’s final distribution of assets.

VI. The court did not deny Wife procedural protections.

¶35 Wife asserts that the court denied her procedural protections
through her collective prior counsel, opposing counsel and the judge. She
provides no citations to the record or legal authority for this argument. By
failing to provide any citations to the record or legal authority, Wife has
waived these arguments. See ARCAP 13(a)(7).

CONCLUSION

¶36 This Court affirms.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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