State v. Hart

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

STEFANO ROBERT HART, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 25-0243
FILED 06-04-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2024-126721-001
The Honorable Max H. Covil, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Joshua C. Smith
Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
By Mikel Steinfeld
Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. HART
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew J. Becke delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.

B E C K E, Judge:

¶1 Defendant Stefano Robert Hart appeals his convictions and
sentences for aggravated assault, assault, and criminal damage. For the
following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On June 3, 2024, Phoenix police responded to a 911 call from
a woman stating her apartment front door had been kicked in. Dispatch
heard “what sounded like a physical struggle or screaming” and the
woman yelling “stop” and “he’s going to hurt me.” Upon arrival, police
observed the front door was closed, but the doorjamb was “completely
splintered” and the locking mechanism had been broken off. From outside
the door, police heard a woman screaming and pleading for help from
upstairs. Police announced their presence and ordered everybody to vacate
the apartment, but the screaming continued and no one exited the premises.

¶3 Police entered the apartment, and in the upstairs master
bathroom, saw Hart grabbing Lauren (a pseudonym) with one hand and
pouring bleach on her with the other. Police ordered Hart to stop, he
complied, and they took him into custody. Lauren was “hyperventilating,
crying” with red eyes and a flushed face. Police also observed bruising on
Lauren’s forehead. Lauren later played a video recording from her front
doorbell camera for police, showing Hart demanding a cellphone and
forcing his way through the door. Police also saw a laptop broken in half, a
hole in the wall in the master bedroom, and a broken closet door handle in
the master bathroom.

¶4 Three hours later, Lauren underwent a Sexual Assault Nurse
Examiner examination at an advocacy center. During the examination,
Lauren vomited and told the forensic nurse she was “very dizzy” and did
not feel well. The forensic nurse ended the exam, called 911, and
paramedics arrived. Based on Lauren’s vitals and her narrative of the

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attack, paramedics transported her to an emergency room for treatment by
a doctor.

¶5 Hart was indicted for one count of aggravated assault, a class
four felony; one count of assault, a class one misdemeanor; and one count
of criminal damage, a class one misdemeanor. The aggravated assault was
charged under A.R.S. § 13-1204(B), which requires proof both that Hart was
in a domestic relationship with the victim and that he “intentionally or
knowingly impede[d] the normal breathing or circulation of blood . . . by
applying pressure to the throat or neck or by obstructing the nose and
mouth . . . .“ See A.R.S. §§ 13-1204(B), -3601(A).

¶6 The State filed a pretrial motion seeking to admit “any and all
non-testimonial statements made by [Lauren] for medical diagnosis or
treatment following the . . . assault.” See Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4) (“A statement
that . . . is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or
treatment; and . . . describes medical history; past or present symptoms or
sensations; their inception; or their general cause” is not excluded by the
rule against hearsay.). Hart did not respond or otherwise object and the
superior court granted the motion. Although subpoenaed to attend trial,
Lauren did not do so, and her testimony was not provided to the jury.

¶7 On the third day of trial, the ER doctor, the paramedic, and
the forensic nurse testified. At the start of his testimony, the ER doctor
explained he relies on information obtained from others, which can include
nurses, medical technicians, and other doctors. He also explained that he
relies on information provided by the patients themselves. The State then
asked what Lauren told him during her visit and Hart objected on hearsay
grounds. The Court overruled the objection, citing its earlier ruling on the
State’s pretrial motion.

¶8 The ER doctor then testified that Lauren stated she had
experienced domestic violence, was placed in a choke hold and lifted two
feet in the air, causing her vision to go black, and that she had a seizure
during the attack. The ER doctor further testified Lauren reported neck pain
and a severe headache. When questioned about the type of strangulation
Lauren reported, the ER doctor clarified that his own report did not identify
how Lauren was strangled but that the ER nurse’s report stated: “Patient
states [she] was choked with forearm of her ex-partner and lifted 2 feet off
the ground and then had a seizure.”

¶9 During direct examination of the paramedic, the State tried to
elicit testimony about what Lauren said when the paramedic asked her

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what happened. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds and the
superior court again overruled the objection. The paramedic then testified
that Lauren reported “she was choked with an arm around her neck” and
simultaneously “struck multiple times with a closed fist.”

¶10 Without objection, the forensic nurse testified that Lauren
reported she was “hit multiple times” and choked in a headlock from
behind which “lifted her up,” that she experienced a stress-induced seizure
while “wrestling to the ground,” and that she had bleach poured all over
her. The forensic nurse added that Lauren reported pain in her neck and
throat, and that after the strangulation, her voice was “raspy,” and it was
painful to speak. The forensic nurse also testified about her personal
observations including petechiae (ruptured blood vessels) in Lauren’s eye,
a sign and symptom consistent with strangulation, and abrasions and
contusions on Lauren’s arm, neck, chest, and temple.

¶11 On the fourth day of trial, before defense counsel began his
cross-examination of the forensic nurse, the State moved to reopen direct
examination to ask the forensic nurse if Lauren reported the identity of her
assailant during her examination. The State argued the information was
covered by the pretrial motion previously granted without objection for
hearsay statements allowed under Rule 803(4).

¶12 The superior court declined to reopen direct examination but
clarified that, depending on what was asked during cross-examination, the
State would be permitted to ask on redirect if, based on the report, the
forensic nurse “had any inclination as to what the relationship was between
[Lauren]” and the assailant. Defense counsel did not elicit testimony
concerning the forensic nurse’s knowledge of Lauren’s relationship with
her assailant during cross-examination. The court asked defense counsel if
he intended to cross-examine the forensic nurse on the checked box
indicating a relationship with the assailant, and defense counsel stated he
did not intend to do so and that he did not object to the State eliciting that
testimony. The State then asked the forensic nurse on redirect examination
if Lauren reported what kind of relationship she had with the person who
attacked her. The forensic nurse answered that Lauren reported it was a
“dating relationship.”

¶13 The State also played two phone call recordings between Hart
and Lauren to establish their domestic relationship and to explain Lauren’s
absence. In the first phone call, Lauren tells Hart, “I’m never going to leave
you” and Hart asks Lauren, “Do you know that I love you?” and shortly
after, states that he loves her. On the second phone call, the jury heard Hart

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explain a situation where a man committed domestic violence against a girl,
who later went missing and “they didn’t hear nothing from her.” Hart
explains the man may have sat down with her and tried to get her to write
an affidavit to say that she was under emotional distress and lied about the
assault because the man cheated. Hart then asks Lauren, “Do you get what
I’m saying? Do you get where I’m going?” Hart then tells Lauren not to go
to court.1

¶14 At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Hart moved for a
judgment of acquittal under Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 20. Hart
argued the State failed to present evidence showing “choking” and “who
caused the criminal damage.” Hart also argued Lauren’s absence and “the
medical reports being allowed by the hearsay exception”2 required a
judgment of acquittal. The superior court found there was enough evidence
to submit the case to the jury and denied his motion.

¶15 The jury found Hart guilty as charged and found aggravators
for each count. For count one, the superior court sentenced Hart to the
minimum term of eight years in prison with 351 days of presentence
incarceration credit. For counts 2 and 3, the court sentenced Hart to “time
served.” Hart timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Article
6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-
4031, and -4033(A)(1).

1 The State makes no argument on appeal that Lauren’s hearsay statements

were separately admissible under Ariz. R. Evid. 804(b)(6), which creates a
hearsay exception for “statement[s] offered against a party that wrongfully
caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s
unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.” In light of that
omission and our resolution of this appeal, we do not address that issue.

2 Hart made no Confrontation Clause objection to this testimony, U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 24, and raises no such argument on
appeal.

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DISCUSSION

I. Hart Argues the Admission of Hearsay Testimony on the
Assailant’s Identity was Error.

¶16 Hart argues the superior court erred in admitting two hearsay
statements that identified Lauren’s assailant. Hart takes issue with (1) the
ER doctor’s testimony based on an ER nurse’s report that Lauren stated she
“was choked with [the] forearm of her ex-partner and lifted [two] feet off
the ground” and (2) the forensic nurse’s testimony that Lauren reported to
her she was in a “dating relationship” with the assailant. Hart properly
objected at trial, and so we review the admission of the two statements for
harmless error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶¶ 18–19 (2005).
“Harmless error review places the burden on the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the verdict or
sentence.” Id. at ¶ 18.

¶17 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement that “a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Ariz. R. Evid. 801(c).
Hearsay is not admissible unless otherwise allowed by an exception. Ariz.
R. Evid. 802. One exception is a statement made for and reasonably
pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment and that “describes medical
history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; or their
general cause.” Ariz. R. Evid. 803(4).

¶18 Hart argues statements identifying the alleged assailant are
neither reasonably pertinent to medical diagnoses or treatment nor
“describe medical history, symptoms or sensations, their inception, or
general cause.” Hart cites to State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404 (1983) in support
of his argument.

¶19 In Jeffers, our supreme court spelled out a two-part test to
decide whether a statement fit in Rule 803(4)’s exception.3 135 Ariz. at 420–
21. Courts look at “(1) whether the declarant’s motive is consistent with
receiving medical care; and (2) whether it is reasonable for the physician to
rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.” Id. The supreme court
held a victim’s statement to an ER nurse about who drugged her failed to

3 Jeffers interpreted an older version of Arizona Rule of Evidence 803. Rule

803 was reworded in 2012 to conform to the federal restyling of the
rules. See Ariz. R. Evid. 803 cmt. to 2012 amendment. However, the
restyling was “stylistic only,” and there was “no intent in the restyling to
change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” Id.

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satisfy either prong of the test. Id. at 421. The Court relied on United States
v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980), which noted that statements
concerning what happened are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment, while
those concerning who assaulted someone are “seldom, if ever, . . .
sufficiently related.” Id. at 84.

II. The State Argues the Robinson Exception Should Include
Domestic Violence.

¶20 Although conceding Rule 803(4) generally does not include
statements of identity, the State argues Arizona case law created an
exception to this rule in State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191 (1987), and that the
exception should apply here.

¶21 In Robinson, our supreme court held an assailant’s identity is
relevant in child sexual abuse cases because “the abuser’s identity is critical
to effective diagnosis and treatment.” 153 Ariz. at 200 (emphasis in
original). “The exact nature and extent of the psychological problems which
ensue from child [sexual] abuse often depend on the identity of the abuser.”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 437
(8th Cir. 1985)). For example, the psychological consequences of sexual
abuse by a father may differ and require different treatment than abuse by
a stranger. Id. And such treatment may require the child to avoid contact
with the abuser to prevent further harm and “facilitate recovery from past
abuse.” Id.

¶22 The State argues this same logic applies to domestic violence
offenses involving adults and cites to a recent memorandum decision as
persuasive authority. State v. Fairchild, 2 CA-CR 2022-0164, 2024 WL
3579461, at *3, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. July 29, 2024) (mem. decision) (“And as in
child sex abuse cases, medical providers treating domestic violence victims
must identify the abuser to counsel the patient in the practical steps
necessary to prevent further injuries and allow the current injuries to heal.”)

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III. Any Error in Admitting Testimony Concerning the Assailant’s
Identity Was Harmless.

¶23 We need not decide if the Robinson child abuse exception
applies in domestic violence cases because any alleged error was harmless.
Hart argues the State relied on the hearsay evidence to establish the
identity4 of Lauren’s assailant and the domestic relationship required for
the aggravated assault conviction. Hart does not argue the hearsay
evidence affected the underlying findings that Lauren was strangled and
assaulted or that Lauren’s property was damaged.

¶24 But there is no real question as to who assaulted Lauren. The
State presented video evidence from Lauren’s doorbell camera showing
Hart breaking down her front door the day of the assault. Just before police
witnessed the assault, they heard Lauren screaming and crying for help.
Captured on body camera footage and confirmed by officer testimony,
police walked in on Hart actively assaulting Lauren, holding her and
pouring bleach on her. Notably, Lauren’s description of her assault to the
forensic nurse included her assailant pouring bleach all over her, choking her,
and hitting her multiple times. Police observed a broken laptop, damage to
the master bedroom wall, the front door and a closet immediately following
the assault.

¶25 There was also no question as to the nature of Lauren’s
relationship with Hart. The State played Hart and Lauren’s recorded jail
phone calls with each other for the jury. During those calls, they declared
their love for each other and Lauren promised Hart that she would never
leave him. In a second phone call, the jury heard Hart telling Lauren not to
come to court. Hart also told Lauren he knew a man who committed
domestic violence against a woman, but the man had this woman write an
affidavit stating she lied about the assault because she was devasted by the
man’s cheating. Hart then implied Lauren should do the same.

¶26 Despite the State mentioning the hearsay statements in its
closing argument, given the brevity of the ER doctor’s and forensic nurse’s
testimony contrasted with the overwhelming admissible evidence showing
Hart did the acts, no reasonable juror could conclude the assault was
committed by anyone other than Hart or that Lauren was not in a domestic
relationship with Hart. See State v. Brown, ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶ 52, 577 P.3d

4 Neither the ER doctor nor the forensic nurse used Hart’s name nor pointed

him out in court.

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14, 25 (2025) (“In essence, the state must demonstrate that even with the
error, no reasonable jury could have found that the state failed to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567, ¶ 18.
The properly admitted evidence “presents a body of proof, firmly
convincing on the essential facts” showing the jury would have convicted
even without the error. State v. Copeland, 253 Ariz. 104, 116, ¶ 27 (App. 2022)
(cleaned up). To the extent that the court erred in admitting the ER doctor’s
and forensic nurse’s statements identifying Hart as the assailant, any such
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION

¶27 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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