Kaiser v. Gamarano

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

AMANDA KAISER, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

DOMINIC GAMARANO, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0406 FC
FILED 06-11-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2023-050976, FC2023-091515
The Honorable Colleen E. O’Donnell-Smith, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Sullivan Schick, PLC, Glendale
By Jennifer Olivia Gage
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Dominic Gamarano, Buckeye
Respondent/Appellant Pro Se
KAISER v. GAMARANO
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Michael J. Brown and Judge Veronika Fabian joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Dominic Gamarano (“Father”) appeals the family court’s
order granting final legal decision-making authority on education and
attorney’s fees to Amanda Kaiser (“Mother”). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Father and Mother are the parents of two minor children,
born June 2016 and August 2017. The parties were never married but were
in a relationship until 2020. They split parenting time without involving the
courts until conflict arose in April 2023. Both parties then petitioned the
family court to establish joint legal decision-making, equal parenting time,
and child support.

¶3 Leading up to trial, both parents agreed to joint legal decision-
making authority, but disputed who should have final say on education.
The children were attending Catholic school, but Father wished to find
another, non-religious school because of the cost increases. Father also
claimed one child was being bullied and the other was having behavioral
issues that the school was not equipped to handle. Mother alleged that
Father’s change of heart was attributable to his new wife.

¶4 On the original trial date, Father alleged that the Mother’s
new husband (“Stepfather”) may have molested the parties’ younger child.
Father based his accusation on his belief that the child was sleeping in the
same bed as Stepfather, that the child was wetting himself, and that
Stepfather posted pictures on Facebook touching the child’s butt. The court
stayed the trial and appointed an advisor to investigate.

¶5 The advisor reported that the child did not disclose any abuse
during their forensic interview and that police and the Department of Child
Safety closed their investigations. Father also first heard about Stepfather
and the child sleeping in the same bed over a year before telling the family
court. He confronted Mother at the time, but she has continually denied it.

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Lastly, the advisor concluded that the Facebook picture was an appropriate
family photo.

¶6 With the investigation resolved, the parties proceeded to trial
in February 2025. As relevant here, the family court granted joint legal
decision-making to both parties, but Mother was awarded final decision-
making authority for education. The court also ordered that the children
should remain in their Catholic school for the rest of the school year, but
that Mother must bear the full tuition cost going forward. If Mother was
unwilling to pay the cost, the children would need to change schools. The
court emphasized that Mother must act in good faith on education-based
decisions before making the final decision, and if she fails to act in good
faith then the court will take that into consideration for future decisions
about legal decision-making.

¶7 The family court also awarded Mother a portion of her
attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-415 because Father knowingly
presented a false claim of sexual abuse. The court found that he acted
unreasonably by alleging the sexual abuse on the first day of trial when he
had the concerns for over a year. It concluded that Father did not have a
reasonable basis for the allegation and was attempting to mislead the court
to get legal decision-making authority.

¶8 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction. A.R.S. §§ 12-
120.21(A)(1), -2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶9 Father challenges the family court’s award of final legal
decision-making authority regarding education and sanction of attorney’s
fees.

I. Final Decision-Making Authority

¶10 Father challenges the sufficiency of the family court’s factual
findings for legal decision-making. We review the award of legal decision-
making authority for abuse of discretion. Gish v. Greyson, 253 Ariz. 437, 444
¶ 31 (App. 2022). “An abuse of discretion exists when the record, viewed in
the light most favorable to upholding the trial court’s decision, is devoid of
competent evidence to support the decision.” Little v. Little, 193 Ariz. 518,
520 ¶ 5 (1999) (cleaned up).

¶11 “In a contested legal decision-making . . . case, the court shall
make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and the

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reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.” A.R.S.
§ 25-403(B). The court is required to consider all relevant factors, including
the 11 enumerated factors in § 25-403(A). As relevant here, joint legal
decision making with final decision-making authority “creates shared legal
decision-making with the possibility that one parent will exercise a superior
right if the parents cannot reach a joint agreement in good faith.” Nicaise v.
Sundaram, 245 Ariz. 566, 568–69 ¶ 14 (2019).

¶12 Here, the family court made factual findings on all 11
enumerated factors in its legal decision-making analysis. The record
supports the court’s factual findings and conclusion, and Father does not
identify any particular factor on which the court erred. Thus, we discern
no abuse of discretion.

¶13 Father argues that the family court’s analysis was insufficient
because it did not consider the factors listed in Jordan v. Rea, 221 Ariz. 581,
590 ¶ 23 (App. 2009). The factor test set out in Jordan is merely the § 25-
403(A) best-interests factors as applied to educational placement. Id.
Educational placement decisions by the court was later rejected in Nicaise v.
Sundaram, 244 Ariz. 272, 281 ¶ 29 (App. 2018) (abrogated on other grounds)
because the court lacks statutory authority to make substantive legal
decisions for parents who are unable to agree. Instead, a court should
determine which parent has authority to make education choices under the
best-interests factors—which includes evaluating parents’ proposed
education plans—but not make the decision itself. Nicaise, 244 Ariz. at 281
¶ 29. The court did so here by evaluating the best-interests factors and then
assigning Mother final decision-making authority. Therefore, the court did
not err by not applying the factors in Jordan.

¶14 Father further argues that the family court’s decision violates
his constitutional rights by forcing Catholicism onto his children and
himself. To start, the court granted joint legal decision-making authority to
both parties, only awarding final decision-making on education to Mother.
As Mother concedes, Father is free to raise the children in any religion or
secularly during his parenting time.

¶15 Moreover, the court may not preclude a religious school
simply because it is religious. Jordan, 221 Ariz. at 591 ¶ 25. When fit parents
disagree, the court is tasked with balancing the best-interests factors to
determine which parent should have the final say on issues such as
education and religion. Id. at 590 ¶ 22; A.R.S. § 25-401(3). “There is no
constitutional impediment” to the court’s permitting one parent to enroll

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the child in a religious school over the other parent’s objection when
enrollment is in the child’s best interests. Jordan, 221 Ariz. at 592 ¶ 31.

II. Attorney’s Fees

¶16 Father next challenges the family court’s award of attorney’s
fees to Mother. Because § 25-415 uses the mandatory “shall,” we defer to
the court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but review the court’s
interpretation and application of statutes de novo. Cf. Ariz. Republican Party
v. Richer, 257 Ariz. 237, 242 ¶¶ 9, 10 (2024) (applying a mixed standard of
review to the mandatory unjustified action sanction statute § 12-349).

¶17 Section 25-415(A)(1) requires the family court to sanction a
party for costs and attorney’s fees when that party knowingly presents a
false claim of domestic violence or child abuse. As relevant here, domestic
violence includes sexual assault of a minor by someone who resides in the
same home. A.R.S. §§ 25-415(A)(1), -403.03(A), 13-3601(A), -705.

¶18 Here, the family court sanctioned Father for knowingly
presenting a false claim that Stepfather molested the younger child. The
record supports the court’s finding. The police and court-appointed advisor
found no evidence of inappropriate acts. Mother and Stepfather
continuously denied any co-sleeping since Father made the original
accusation a year before trial. Notably, Father told the court his concerns
the day after asking the children’s therapist how to keep Mother from
getting final decision-making authority. See A.R.S. § 25-403.03 (“[J]oint legal
decision-making shall not be awarded if the court makes a finding of the
existence of significant domestic violence.”).

¶19 Father argues on appeal that he had no malicious intent in
making the sexual abuse allegation, though he would have “handle[d]
things differently.” The family court, however, found that he leveled the
accusation to get final decision-making authority knowing the accusation
was false. We defer to the court’s determination of credibility and weight
given to conflicting evidence. Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz. 277, 284 ¶ 20
(App. 2019). Thus, the court did not err by sanctioning Father under § 25-
415(A)(1).

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CONCLUSION

¶20 We affirm. Mother requests her attorney’s fees on appeal
pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324 which authorizes a fee award after considering
the disparity in financial resources and the reasonableness of the parties’
positions in the litigation. We grant Mother’s request upon compliance with
Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21. We also award Mother her
costs as the successful party on appeal. See A.R.S. § 12-341.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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