HOWELL v. 918 CONSTRUCTION

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

STEPHANIE HOWELL, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees,

v.

918 CONSTRUCTION, LLC, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 25-0722
FILED 06-26-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2024-030637
The Honorable Mary Collins Cronin, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Collier Litigation Group, Scottsdale
By Timothy M. Collier, William A. Weber
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellees

Wilson-Goodman Law Group, LLC, Gilbert
By Angela M. Wilson-Goodman
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant

Ahwatukee Legal Office, PC, Phoenix
By David L. Abney
Co-Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
HOWELL, et al. v. 918 CONSTRUCTION
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Andrew J. Becke joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1 918 Construction, LLC, appeals the superior court’s denial of
its motion to set aside a default judgment in favor of Stephanie Howell and
Todd Dieckenhoner (the “Howells”), a married couple. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2022, the Howells contracted with a general
contractor, Final Phase Construction (“Final Phase”), to remodel their
Arizona home, and Final Phase retained 918 Construction to complete the
remodel. When the remodel did not progress as expected, in May 2023, the
Howells terminated their contract with Final Phase.

¶3 The next month, the Howells contracted with 918
Construction to complete the unfinished work by October 2023 for $265,143.
When the work was not timely completed, the Howells agreed to extend
the deadline until February 2024. This extension resulted in additional
expenses for the Howells, who had to lease an apartment during the
remodel.

¶4 When Dieckenhoner accepted a job in New Jersey, the
Howells moved there in March 2024, planning to sell their Arizona home
when the remodel was complete. The construction was still not finished by
the end of March, so the Howells offered 918 Construction a $30,000 bonus
if the remodel was done by July 2024.

¶5 By the end of July 2024, the Howells had already paid
$314,000 to 918 Construction, and the remodel was still not complete. 918
Construction then asked for an additional $50,000 to complete the work by
September 2024, or it would not complete the work until November 2024.
When the Howells refused to pay the $50,000, 918 Construction stopped
work and purported to cancel the contract. In December 2024, the Howells
sold their home, with the remodeling still incomplete, for $1,050,000.

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HOWELL, et al. v. 918 CONSTRUCTION
Decision of the Court

¶6 In October 2025, the Howells sued 918 Construction alleging
breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligence claims. The Howells
served Mavrik Groff, the company’s owner and statutory agent, in
December 2024. 918 Construction did not respond to the complaint. Groff
would later claim he thought no response was required because the caption
of the complaint incorrectly spelled the company’s name with an “s” at the
end of “Construction.”

¶7 After 918 Construction failed to respond, the Howells filed an
application for entry of default. When 918 Construction did not respond,
the Howells moved for entry of a default judgment, attaching a sum certain
affidavit.

¶8 The superior court held a default hearing in March 2025 at
which Stefanie Howell testified about the amount of their damages. Groff
appeared, although he could not represent 918 Construction because he
was not a licensed attorney. Groff admitted he was the owner of 918
Construction and was served with the summons and complaint as well as
the default documents. Consistent with the exhibits and testimony
presented, the court entered a default judgment awarding the Howells
$924,481 in damages for the loss of value in their home and for living
expenses incurred during the time of the remodel.

¶9 A month later, 918 Construction moved to set aside the
default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect, misrepresentation,
voidness, and other reasons justifying relief under Rule 60 of the Arizona
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (3), (4), (6). 918
Construction primarily argued that the misspelled name—“918
Constructions, LLC” instead of “918 Construction, LLC” (emphasis
added)—appearing in the caption of the complaint and default documents
rendered the judgment void. The court denied the motion, finding 918
Construction was not prejudiced by the misspelling because the
appropriate party had notice and was properly served.

¶10 918 Construction timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction
under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2).

DISCUSSION

I. Relief from Judgment.

¶11 918 Construction argues that the superior court erred by
denying the motion to set aside the default judgment. We review this ruling
for an abuse of discretion. Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 243 Ariz. 531, 533, ¶ 8 (2018).

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HOWELL, et al. v. 918 CONSTRUCTION
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A. Rule 60(b)(1).

¶12 To set aside a judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), the moving party
must show three things: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect, in failing to answer; (2) prompt action in seeking relief; and (3) a
meritorious defense to the action.” Addison v. Cienega, Ltd., 146 Ariz. 322,
323 (App. 1985) (emphasis added); see also Daou v. Harris, 139 Ariz. 353, 358–
59 (1984). Here, the superior court’s resolution of those issues, only the first
and last of which are contested, is supported by the record.

1. Excusable Neglect.

¶13 918 Construction challenges the superior court’s conclusion
that it did not show its failure to respond to the pleadings was excusable.
Neglect is “excusable” for these purposes if a reasonably prudent person
might have acted in the same manner under the circumstances. See City of
Phoenix v. Geyler, 144 Ariz. 323, 331 (1985). “[M]ere carelessness” or
“unexplained neglect” is not sufficient. Daou, 139 Ariz. at 359; Richas v.
Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 512, 515 (1982).

¶14 918 Construction contends that the additional “s” in the
caption rendered its failure to respond to the complaint and later to the
application for entry of default excusable. First, 918 Construction asserts
that the extraneous “s” in its name in the caption means the complaint
named the wrong entity. Not so. Both the complaint and application were
sent to the correct address and received by Groff, the company’s owner and
statutory agent. And the body of the complaint used the correct spelling of
the company’s name without the “s.” Groff appeared at the damages
hearing and admitted being served. Thus, 918 Construction had actual
notice of the suit against it, so its argument fails. See, e.g., Daou, 139 Ariz. at
360 (finding relief not warranted where defendant “personally knew of the
suit, and apparently merely neglected to act accordingly”); cf. Ariz. R. Civ.
P. 15(c)(2) (a complaint relates back to the original if the defendant knew or
should have known the plaintiff mistakenly failed to name him as a party).

¶15 Second, 918 Construction asserts that its failure to respond
was excusable because, after service of the complaint, Groff relied on an
attorney’s advice that no response was necessary in light of the spelling
error. But Groff did not identify the attorney who provided this advice; nor
did he offer any context for when or where the advice was given. Moreover,
advice not to act would only warrant relief when such advice is “legally
excusable” or arguably reasonable. Daou, 139 Ariz. at 359. Here, no
reasonably prudent attorney would have ignored the filed documents

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HOWELL, et al. v. 918 CONSTRUCTION
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provided to Groff as the statutory agent of 918 Construction. See Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rapton, 140 Ariz. 60, 64 (App. 1984) (finding a reasonable
attorney would make an objection to service or file an answer containing
the defense of improper service if they believed their client was improperly
served but had personal knowledge of the complaint). Accordingly, the
superior court did not err by finding no excusable neglect.

2. Meritorious Defense.

¶16 918 Construction also challenges the superior court’s finding
that it did not provide a meritorious defense. But in the context of Rule
60(b)(1), this argument is moot given our conclusion that 918 Construction
did not establish excusable neglect. See Addison, 146 Ariz. at 323.

B. Rule 60(b)(6).

¶17 To the extent 918 Construction asserts excessive damages as
an independent claim for relief under the catch-all provision of Rule
60(b)(6) (“any other reason justifying relief”), 918 Construction has not
established error. Although the superior court has discretion to set aside a
judgment based on a finding that damages are excessive, see Gonzalez, 243
Ariz. at 534–35, ¶¶ 12–14, here, the record supports the court’s conclusion
that 918 Construction did not meet its burden to prove excessive damages.

¶18 Stefanie Howell testified at the damages hearing and asserted
that comparable homes sold for approximately $850,000 more than their
home during the same month. 918 Construction was on notice that a
damages hearing would be conducted yet did not appear through counsel
or otherwise dispute damages. Given evidence supporting the amount and
no opposition, the court did not abuse its discretion by awarding damages
for loss of value and by subsequently rejecting 918 Construction’s excessive
damages claim. See CSA 13-101 Loop, LLC v. Loop 101, LLC, 233 Ariz. 355,
363, ¶ 26 (App. 2013) (affirming based on “comparable sales of nearby
properties”).

¶19 Finally, 918 Construction argues the court erred by accepting
the Howells’ sum certain affidavit, which stated $920,000 in damages. This
argument was not raised in the superior court and is thus waived. See BMO
Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau, 251 Ariz. 588, 593–94, ¶ 25 (App. 2021). Waiver
notwithstanding, the affidavit was not the basis for the damages award.
Instead, the court conducted a damages hearing, where Groff was present,
and considered evidence before awarding damages. Thus, 918
Construction has not established that the superior court abused its
discretion under Rule 60(b)(6) by denying the excessive damages claim.

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HOWELL, et al. v. 918 CONSTRUCTION
Decision of the Court

II. Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal.

¶20 The Howells request an award of their reasonable attorney’s
fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.1 Because the Howells prevailed on
appeal, and in an exercise of our discretion, we award them reasonable
attorney’s fees upon compliance with ARCAP 21. The Howells are entitled
to an award of taxable costs on appeal, also upon compliance with ARCAP
21.

CONCLUSION

¶21 We affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

1 In their answering brief, the Howells also challenge the superior
court’s denial of their request for attorney’s fees. But the Howells did not
file a cross-appeal, so we lack jurisdiction to consider this request to enlarge
their own rights. See Advantage Pool & Spa Plumbing, Inc. v. Miles, 585 P.3d
827, 832–33, ¶ 24 (App. 2026).

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