City of Torrance (PERB 2004M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,
COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES,
LOCAL 1117,
Charging Party,
V.
CITY OF TORRANCE,
Respondent.
Case No. LA-CE-232-M
PERB Decision No. 	2004-M
February 18, 2009
Appearances: Rothner, Segall & Greenstone by Bernhard Rohrbacher, Attorney, for American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 1117; Ronald T. Pohl, Assistant
City Attorney, for City of Torrance.
Before Neuwald, Chair; Wesley and Dowdin Calvillo, Members.
DECISION
DOWDIN CALVILLO, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations
Board (PERB or Board) on exceptions filed by the City of Torrance (City) to the proposed
decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ). The unfair practice charge filed by the
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 1117 (Local 1117),
alleged that the City violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA)1 by failing to provide
Local 1117 with notice and an opportunity to request negotiations before implementing a
change to the vehicle usage policy for employees of the City's water operations division. 	The
ALJ found that the City committed the charged violation.
1MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references are to the Government Code.

At the hearing, the ALJ allowed telephonic testimony by former Local
111
7 president
Alan Lee (Lee) over the City's objection. In its exceptions, the City asks the Board to strike
Lee's testimony but does not challenge the ALJ's ruling on the merits
of
the unilateral change
allegation.
The Board has reviewed the entire record in this case, including but not limited to, the
unfair practice charge, the complaint and answer, the hearing transcripts and exhibits, the
ALJ's proposed decision, the City's exceptions and Local 1117's response thereto. 	Based on
this review, the Board affirms the ALJ's denial
of
the City's motion to strike Lee's testimony
for the reasons discussed below.
BACKGROUND
Unilateral Change2
From at least 1982 until March
1,
2005, the City allowed Water Service Technician Ills
to take a City truck home when they were scheduled to work weekend or holiday duty. 	In
early 1998, the City and Local 1117 negotiated and adopted the Water Operations Division
Rules and Regulations (Rules and Regulations). 	Section
21
of
the Rules and Regulations
allowed employees to take City vehicles home "in instances specifically allowed by an
employee's supervisor." However, prior to March
1,
2005, the City never required Water
Service Technician Ills to request a supervisor's permission to take a truck home for weekend
or holiday duty, nor did the City ever prohibit an employee from doing so.
On March
1,
2005, Senior Water Operations Supervisor, Alan Berndt (Berndt), issued a
memorandum that quoted verbatim Section
21
of the Rules and Regulations and added that
failure to follow the rules could result in discipline. 	When Berndt distributed the memorandum
Though the unilateral change issue is not before the Board on appeal, these facts are
presented to provide context for Lee's testimony.
2

to employees, he told them that, per instructions from Deputy Public Works Director, Jack
Van Der Linden, they would no longer be allowed to take a truck home for weekend or holiday
duty. 	The City consistently enforced this prohibition after March
1,
2005.
The PERB Hearing
Lee, the former Local
1117
president, was a member
of
Local 1117' s bargaining team
during negotiations over the Rules and Regulations in 1998. At the hearing, the City presented
testimony that during those negotiations the parties discussed whether Water Service
Technician Ills, and specifically Lee, would be allowed to take a City truck home when they
were scheduled to work weekend or holiday duty. 	City witnesses also testified that Lee had
been prohibited from taking a truck home on several occasions when he was scheduled to work
weekend or holiday duty.
After the City rested its case at the end
of
the first day
of
hearing, counsel for
Local 1117, Bernhard Rohrbacher (Rohrbacher), informed the ALJ that he wished to call Lee
as a rebuttal witness. At this time, Lee was no longer a City employee but was working for the
American Federation
of
State, County and Municipal Employees International in Las Vegas,
Nevada. Because Lee was out
of
state, Rohrbacher proposed to have Lee testify by phone.
The City's counsel, Ronald Pohl (Pohl), objected to telephonic testimony on the grounds that it
was not authorized by regulation and that he had no prior warning that a witness would be
testifying by phone. 	Immediately following the City's objection, the ALJ ruled that Lee's
testimony by phone would be allowed but the City could make a motion to strike the
testimony.
The following morning, the hearing resumed with Lee testifying by telephone. 	Lee
testified that, during the time he was a Water Service Technician III, he was never denied the
ability to take home a City truck on the occasions he worked weekend or holiday duty. 	He also
3

testified that the parties never discussed employees taking a City truck home for weekend or
holiday duty during negotiations over the Rules and Regulations in 1998.
During his examination of Lee, Rohrbacher said that he faxed Lee two exhibits. Lee
testified that he did not receive the documents. Nonetheless, Rohrbacher questioned Lee about
the two documents after reading their contents to Lee. Pohl then questioned Lee about the
documents and about being told not to take a City truck home when he worked weekend or
holiday duty. 	Following Pohl's questioning, Rohrbacher offered to fax the documents to Lee
again. Pohl declined the offer. Pohl then made a formal motion to strike Lee's testimony. The
ALJ asked both sides to address the motion in their post-hearing briefs.
ALJ's Proposed Decision
In his proposed decision, the ALJ denied the City's motion to strike Lee's testimony.
The ALJ rejected the City's argument that PERE is bound by the telephonic testimony
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),3 which prohibits testimony by telephone
if a party objects to it. The ALJ instead found that PERB has granted its ALJs broad authority
to obtain a complete evidentiary record on which to make a decision. The ALJ went on to note
that there was no question as to Lee's identity during his testimony, that the City had the
opportunity to hear Lee's testimony and to cross-examine him, and that no credibility
determinations were based on Lee's demeanor.
DISCUSSION
1. 	Motion to Strike Lee's Testimony
The City's exception to the admission of Lee's testimony is based exclusively on APA
section 11440.30, which states in full:
3The APA is codified at Government Code section 11340 et seq.
4

(a) The presiding officer may conduct all or part of a hearing by
telephone, television, or other electronic means if each participant
in the hearing has an opportunity to participate in and to hear the
entire proceeding while it is taking place and to observe exhibits.
(b) The presiding officer may not conduct all or part of a hearing
by telephone, television, or other electronic means if a party
objects.
The City argues that PERB unfair practice hearings are subject to Chapter 4.5 of the
APA, in which section 11440.30 is found, and therefore the ALJ erred in admitting Lee's
testimony over the City's objection. Local 1117 agrees that PERB unfair practice hearings are
subject to AP A Chapter 4.5, but argues that section 11440.30 is an optional provision.
Because PERB has not adopted section 11440.30, Local 1117 contends, its prohibition on
allowing telephonic testimony over the objection of a party does not apply in unfair practice
hearings.
Before turning to the relevant AP A provisions, it is necessary to examine the statutory
language governing the application of the APA to PERB proceedings. Prior to July 1, 1997,
the AP A provisions governing agency adjudication did not apply to PERB. As part of its 1995
overhaul of the AP A, the Legislature amended section 3541.3 of the Educational Employment
Relations Act (EERA)4 to make the new general adjudication provisions found in AP A
Chapter 4.5 applicable to PERB. 	Section 354 l .3(h) currently provides, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding Section 11425.10, Chapter 4.5 (commencing
with Section 11400) of Part 1 of Division 3 of Title 2 does not
apply to a hearing by the board under this chapter, except a
hearing to determine an unfair practice charge.
Under this section, APA section 11425.10, the Administrative Adjudication Bill of
Rights, applies to all PERB hearings. The remainder of APA Chapter 4.5 applies to PERB
4EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq.
5

unfair practice hearings but not to other types
of
PERB hearings, such as those on
representation matters. Further, MMBA section 3509(a) provides that the "powers and duties
of
the board described in Section 3541.3" apply to proceedings under the MMBA. Thus,
because the hearing in this case involved an alleged unfair practice under the MMBA, it was
governed by the provisions
of
APA Chapter 4.5.
APA Chapter 4.5 contains both mandatory and optional provisions. APA
section 11415.l0(b) provides: 	"This chapter supplements the governing procedure by which
an agency conducts an adjudicative proceeding." The California Law Revision Commission
comment5 to subsection (b) states that some provisions
of
the Chapter are optional, such as the
informal hearing procedure, the emergency decision procedure and the declaratory decision
procedure. According to the comment:
The agency determines whether to use any
of
the optional
provisions. The optional provisions do not replace any other
agency procedures that serve the same purpose.
The comment also states that other provisions
of
Chapter 4.5 are mandatory and gives
the Administrative Adjudication Bill
of
Rights, section 11425 .10, as an example. The
comment then says:
The mandatory provisions govern any adjudicative proceeding to
which this chapter is applicable, and supplement the governing
procedure by which an agency conducts an adjudicative
proceeding, subject to a contrary statute applicable to the
particular agency or proceeding.
5The California Law Revision Commission is an independent state agency charged with
recommending reforms
of
state law to the Legislature. (Gov. Code sec. 8289.) "Because the
official comments of the California Law Revision Commission 'are declarative of the intent
not only of the draftsman of the code but also of the legislators who subsequently enacted it'
[cit.], the comments are persuasive, albeit not conclusive, evidence of that intent."
(Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd.
(2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 12, fn. 9 [50 Cal.Rptr.3d 585] (Alcoholic Beverage Control).)
6

Further, section 11415.20 provides: 	"A state statute or a federal statute or regulation
applicable to a particular agency or decision prevails over a conflicting or inconsistent
provision of this chapter." Thus, a mandatory AP A provision is binding on an agency unless
an exemption is provided by state or federal statute or by federal regulation. An agency cannot
exempt itself from a mandatory AP A provision by its own regulations. Here, neither a state or
federal statute nor a federal regulation exempts PERB from the operation of AP A
section 11440.30. Accordingly, that section is binding on PERB unless the section is optional.
Unfortunately, the Law Revision Commission comment to section 11415 .1 0(b) does
not categorize section 11440.30, or any of the other general procedural provisions contained in
Article 9 of Chapter 4.5, as either mandatory or optional. Nor does the language of section
11440.30 itself indicate into which category it falls. In the face of this statutory silence, it is
necessary to examine the legislative history of the 1995 AP A revisions to determine the
apparent intent of the Legislature regarding section 11440.30. (See Mays v. City of
Los Angeles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 313, 321 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 891] [if statutory language is
ambiguous, the court "may resort to extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be
achieved and the legislative history"].)
"In 1987, the Legislature directed the California Law Revision Commission to study
administrative adjudication and propose reforms to the APA." (Alcoholic Beverage Control, at
pp. 8-9.) The Law Revision Commission originally proposed a system that would apply across
the board to all state agencies. 	(Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act on California's New Administrative Procedure Act (1996) 32 Tulsa L.J. 297,
302.)6 Under this system, the new APA provisions would function as defaults and "agencies
Professor Asimow was the principal adviser to the Law Revision Commission on the
1995 APA revisions. The California Supreme Court has found his prior "work on
7

would be invited to adopt regulations to change or delete the default provisions." (Ibid.) This
approach was strongly criticized by the attorney general and most state agencies. 	(Id. at
p. 303.) "[A]gencies complained that they would have to go through a complex and costly
rulemaking proceeding - for which they lacked the personnel and budget - to get back to
where they were in the first place." (Ibid.)
This criticism led to the more limited approach set forth in the Law Revision
Commission's 1995 recommendation and report. 	(Id. at p. 303.) As adopted by the
Legislature in S.B. 523, the 1995 APA revisions would: (1) set out an administrative
adjudication bill ofrights applicable to all agencies; (2) revise the APA's formal hearing
procedures;7 and (3) provide "a set of flexibility enhancing provisions" applicable to all
agencies. 	(Ibid.) 	Regarding this third group of provisions, the Law Revision Commission
Report stated: "In addition to the mandatory provisions of the administrative adjudication bill of
rights, the proposed law includes a number of optional provisions that will add flexibility to and
help modernize and expedite state agency hearing procedures, whether conducted under the 1945
California APA or under an agency's other hearing procedures. The major optional provisions
are described below." (Recommendation on Administrative Adjudication by State Agencies
(January 1995) 25 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1995) p. 106.) The very first optional
provision discussed is "Telephonic Hearings." (Id. at p. 107.) The description of the content of
that provision matches section 11440.30 (Ibid.) Thus, it appears that the Law Revision
administrative law for the Commission highly persuasive." (Alcoholic Beverage Control, at
p. 9, fn. 5.)
7"Although Section 3541.3 is silent on the question, the formal hearing provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 11500) of Part 1 of
Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code) do not apply to proceedings of the Public
Employment Relations Board under this chapter." (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32A West's
Ann. Gov. Code (1995 ed. & 2008 supp.) foll. sec. 3541.3, supp. p. 204.)
8

Commission intended for section 11440.30 to be optional. There is no indication in the statute
itself or in the legislative history that the Legislature intended differently.
The optional nature
of
section 11440.30 is further supported by the actual practice
of
state agencies regarding the section. 	Several agencies have adopted regulations explicitly stating
that their hearing officers may not conduct all or part
of
a hearing by telephone or other
electronic means
if
a party objects. (E.g., Fair Employment and Housing Commission, Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 2, sec. 7429(c)(3) ["The hearing shall ordinarily be conducted with the parties
present before the Hearing Officer, unless the Hearing Officer, with the approval
of
the parties,
permits the hearing to be conducted by telephone, television, or other electronic means."];
Department
of
Motor Vehicles, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 13, sec. 115.07(b) ["The hearing officer
shall not conduct all or part
of
a hearing by telephone, television, or other electronic means,
if
a
party objects."]; Air Resources Board, Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, sec. 60075.30(e) ["Upon the
motion
of
any party and a showing
of
good cause, or upon the motion
of
the hearing officer, and
in the absence
of
an objection from any party, the hearing officer may exercise discretion to
conduct all or part
of
a hearing by telephone or other electronic means."].) Adoption
of
these
regulations is consistent with the "opt in" scheme contemplated by the Law Revision
Commission and embodied in the 1995 AP A revisions.
On the other hand, some agencies have adopted regulations that exempt their hearings
from the requirements
of
section 11440.30. For example, the regulations governing special
education hearings by the Department
of
Education provide that: "Notwithstanding Government
Code section 11440 .30 of the Administrative Procedure Act, the hearing officer may conduct all
or part
of
a hearing by telephone, television, or other electronic means
if
each participant in the
hearing has an opportunity to participate in and to hear the entire proceeding while it is taking
place and to observe exhibits." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, sec. 3082(g).) Similarly, the Department
9

of
Insurance has adopted a regulation providing that: "The hearing officer may conduct all or
part
of
the proceeding by telephone, television, or other electronic means
if
each participant in
the hearing has an opportunity to participate in and to hear the entire proceeding while it is
taking place and to observe exhibits, which shall have been previously received by all parties and
by the hearing officer." (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, sec. 2509.58(6).) Both
of
these regulations
exempt their adopting agencies from the prohibition in section 11440.30(6) against conducting a
hearing by telephone
if
a party objects.
If
section 11440.30 was mandatory, the Office
of
Administrative Law could not have approved the regulations because they would be in conflict
with existing law. (Gov. Code sec. l 1349(d).)8 This compels the conclusion that section
11440.30 is optional.
Nonetheless, this conclusion does not fully resolve whether section 11440.30 applies to
agencies like PERB that have not adopted regulations regarding use
of
telephonic testimony in
their hearings. As noted, the Law Revision Commission rejected a scheme in which the new
1995 AP A provisions would serve as defaults in favor
of
a system whereby agencies could "opt
in" to the AP A's optional provisions. Under this system,
if
an agency has adopted a regulation
specifically applying section 11440.30 to its proceedings, that section applies to all
of
the
agency's hearings. Conversely,
if
the agency has adopted a regulation exempting its hearings
from section 11440.30, that section does not apply to any
of
the agency's hearings.9 But the
Government Code section 11349(d) requires the Office
of
Administrative Law to
determine
if
a proposed regulation is "in harmony with, and not in conflict with or
contradictory to, existing statutes, court decisions, or other provisions
of
law."
9In 1997, the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (UIAB) successfully sought a
statutory exemption from section 11440.30. (Unemp. Ins. Code sec. 1953.5.) However, this
does not necessarily mean that the UIAB could not have established an exemption by regulation.
It merely shows that, for whatever reason, the UIAB preferred an exemption granted by the
Legislature to one established by the agency's own regulations.
10

APA does not limit an agency to one
of
these two "all or nothing" options. Rather, consistent
with the Legislature's intent that the optional provisions enhance agency flexibility, the
AP
A
also allows an agency to forego adopting a specific regulation on the subject and instead
determine on a case-by-case basis whether to apply section 11440.30 to a particular hearing.
Thus, because the Board has not adopted regulations regarding telephonic testimony in unfair
practice hearings, PERB ALJs are free to apply section 11440.30 on a case-by-case basis.
For the reasons above, we find that AP A section 11440.30 is optional and therefore
PERB is not required to follow it in unfair practice hearings. As a result, the ALJ did not err in
admitting Lee's telephonic testimony over the City's objection. Accordingly, we affirm the
ALJ's
denial
of
the City's motion to strike Lee's testimony.
2. 	Unilateral Change
Local 111 7 urges the Board to uphold the ALJ' s ruling that the City committed
an
unlawful unilateral change on the ground that the City did not properly except to that portion
of
the
ALJ's
proposed decision. PERB Regulation 32300(a)
10
states, in relevant part:
The statement
of
exceptions or brief shall:
( 1) State the specific issues
of
procedure, fact, law or rationale to
which each exception is taken;
(2) Identify the page or part
of
the decision to which each
exception is taken;
(3) Designate by page citation or exhibit number the portions
of
the record,
if
any, relied upon for each exception;
(4) State the grounds for each exception.
10
PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
31001 et seq.
11

"Compliance with [PERB Reg. 32300(a)] is required in order to afford the respondent
and the Board an adequate opportunity to address the issues raised." (Temecula Valley
Unified School District (1990) PERB Decision No. 836.)
The City's exceptions do not address the merits
of
the unilateral change issue. In fact, the
exceptions do not mention the substantive issue in this case at all. Rather, the City asserts that
"the testimony
of
Mr. Lee must be stricken from the record and disregarded when the board
weighs the evidence in this matter." The City then states in its Conclusion: "Upon the exclusion
of
this testimony, the state
of
the evidence leaves the Charging Party substantially short
of
meeting their burden
of
proof."
Even were the Board to rule in the City's favor regarding Lee's testimony, these two
statements would not be sufficient to trigger review
of
the ALJ's ruling on the unilateral change
allegation. Neither statement identifies any "specific issues
of
procedure, fact, law or rationale"
to which the City takes exception, nor does either state any grounds for exception. Because the
City failed to specifically urge an exception to the ALJ's ruling on the unilateral change issue,
any exception on that issue has been waived. 	(PERB Reg. 32300(c).)
11
Accordingly, the
ALJ's decision on the unilateral change issue remains binding upon the parties, but shall have
no precedential effect with respect to other cases. (PERB Regs. 32215 and 32300(c); City
of
Porterville (2007) PERB Decision No. 1905-M; Palos Verdes Peninsula Unified School District
(1979) PERB Decision No. 96.)
ORDER
The administrative law judge's denial of the City of Torrance's (City) motion to strike
the testimony of Alan Lee is hereby AFFIRMED.
11
PERB Regulation 32300(c) provides in full: 	"An exception not specifically urged
shall be waived."
12

Further, upon the findings
of
fact and conclusions
of
law contained in the
administrative law judge's proposed decision, it
is
found that the City violated the Meyers-
Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code sections 3503, 3505 and 3506, and Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) Regulation 32603(a), (b) and (c) (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
8,
sec. 31001 et seq.), by failing to provide the American Federation
of
State, County and
Municipal Employees, Local
111
7 (Local 1117), with notice and an opportunity to request
negotiations before the City changed the vehicle usage policy for employees
of
the City's
water operations division. By this same conduct, the City denied employees the right to be
represented by Local
111
7 and interfered with the right
of
Local 1117 to represent bargaining
unit members.
Pursuant to Government Code sections 3509(a) and 3541.S(c), it is hereby ORDERED
that the City, its governing council, and its representatives shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1.	
Changing the vehicle usage policy for water operations division
employees without providing Local 1117 with notice and an opportunity to request
negotiations over the policy change.
2. 	Denying employees the right to be represented by Local 1117.
3. 	Interfering with the right
of
Local 1117 to represent bargaining unit
members.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1. 	Rescind the absolute prohibition on water operations division employees
taking home a City truck for weekend or holiday duty announced March 1, 2005 and reinstate
13

the policy contained in section
21
of
the 1998 Water Operations Division Rules and
Regulations, unless the parties have subsequently negotiated a new work rule on the subject.
2.	
Reimburse employees for losses they incurred during the period they
were unable to take home a City truck for weekend or holiday duty. 	They shall be reimbursed
at the rate per mile that the City reimburses employees for the use
of
personal vehicles for City
business.
	If
no such rate exists, they shall be reimbursed at the rate the Internal Revenue
Service has established as non-taxable. Additionally, affected employees shall be paid back
pay for the uncompensated time added to their weekend/holiday duty workday and emergency
repairs that resulted from the unilateral change
of
policy. The amount determined shall be
augmented by the interest rate
of
7 percent per year.
3. 	Within ten (10) workdays following the date this Decision is no longer
subject to appeal, post at all work locations where notices to employees are customarily posted,
copies
of
the Notice attached hereto. The Notice must be signed by an authorized agent
of
the
City, indicating the City will comply with the terms
of
this Order. 	Such posting shall be
maintained for a period
of
thirty (30) consecutive workdays. Reasonable steps shall be taken
to ensure that the Notice is not reduced in size, altered, defaced or covered with any other
material.
4. 	Written notification
of
the actions taken to comply with this Order shall
be made to the General Counsel
of
the PERB, or the General Counsel's designee. The City
shall provide reports, in writing, as directed by the General Counsel or his/h~r designee. 	All
reports regarding compliance with this Order shall be concurrently served on Local 1117.
Chair Neuwald and Member Wesley joined in this Decision.
14

APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency
of
the State
of
California
After a hearing in Unfair Practice Case No. LA-CE-232-M, American Federation
of
State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 1117 v. City
of
Torrance, in which all parties
had the right to participate, it has been found that the City
of
Torrance (City) violated the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA), Government Code sections 3503, 3505 and 3506, and
Public Employment Relations Board Regulation 32603(a), (b) and (c), by changing the vehicle
usage policy for water operations division employees without providing the American
Federation
of
State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 1117 (Local 1117) with notice
and an opportunity to request negotiations over the policy change.
As a result
of
this conduct, we have been ordered to post this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1.	
Changing the vehicle usage policy for water operations division
employees without providing Local 1117 with notice and an opportunity to request
negotiations over the policy change.
2. 	Denying employees the right to be represented by Local 1117.
3. 	Interfering with the right
of
Local 1117 to represent bargaining unit
members.
B. 	TAKE THE FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE POLICIES OF THE MMBA:
1.	
Rescind the absolute prohibition on water operations division employees
taking home a City truck for weekend or holiday duty announced March 1, 2005 and reinstate
the policy contained in section
21
of
the 1998 Water Operations Division Rules and
Regulations, unless the parties have subsequently negotiated a new work rule on the subject.
2. 	Reimburse employees for losses they incurred during the period they
were unable to take home a City truck for weekend or holiday duty. They shall be reimbursed
at the rate per mile that the City reimburses employees for the use
of
personal vehicles for City
business.
	If
no such rate exists, they shall be reimbursed at the rate the Internal Revenue
Service has established as non-taxable. Additionally, affected employees shall be paid back
pay for the uncompensated time added to their weekend/holiday duty workday and emergency
repairs that resulted from the unilateral change
of
policy. The amount determined shall be
augmented by the interest rate
of
7 percent per year.
Dated:
---------
CITY OF TORRANCE
By:
Authorized Agent
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR AT LEAST THIRTY
(30) CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST NOT BE
REDUCED IN SIZE, DEF ACED, ALTERED OR COVERED WITH ANY OTHER
MATERIAL.