San Francisco Unified School District * * * OVERRULED IN PART by Rio Hondo Community College District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2313-E (PERB 2048E)

OVERRULED IN PART by Rio Hondo Community
College District (2013) PERB Decision No. 2313-E
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
UNITED EDUCATORS OF SAN FRANCISCO,
Charging Party,
V.
SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CE-2690-E
PERB Decision No. 2048
June 30, 2009
Appearances: Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld by Stewart Weinberg, Attorney, for United
Educators of San Francisco; Fagen Friedman & Fulfrost by Joshua A. Stevens, Attorney, for
San Francisco Unified School District.
Before Dowdin Calvillo, Acting Chair; Neuwald and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
DOWDIN CALVILLO, Acting Chair: This case is before the Public Employment
Relations Board (PERB or Board) on appeal by United Educators of San Francisco (UESF) of
a Board agent's dismissal of its unfair practice charge. The charge alleged that the San
Francisco Unified School District (District) violated the Educational Employment Relations
Act (EERA) 1 by unilaterally changing the location to which special education aides report for
duty each day. The Board agent dismissed the charge for failure to state a prima facie case of
an unlawful unilateral change by the District.
1 EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540 et seq. Unless otherwise
indicated, all statutory references are to the Government Code.

The Board has reviewed the dismissal and the record in light of UESF's appeal, the
District's response to the appeal and the relevant law." Based on this review, the Board affirms
The Board has reviewed the dismissal and the record in light
of
UESF' s appeal, the
District's response to the appeal and the relevant law. 	Based on this review, the Board affirms
the dismissal
of
the charge for the reasons discussed below.	the dismissal of the charge for the reasons discussed below.
BACKGROUND
UESF's unfair practice charge stated in its entirety:
The Charging Party is the recognized representative of
paraprofessional employees of the San Francisco Unified School
District and specifically Classification S10 Special Education
Paraprofessional. Up until August 21, 2007, paraprofessional
employees employed as Special Education Aides were directed to
begin their duty day at the bus yard by getting on a bus at that
point in order to pick up the individuals to whom they are
assigned as aides. On August 27, 2007, employees in the position
of Classification $10 were instructed that beginning on that date
employees were to report at the location where the first student to
whom they are assigned was to be picked up. This change in
practice was made unilaterally and without notice to the Charging
Party. The change in practice caused a hardship for employees
because it changed the length of their workday and workweek, it
also caused and [sic] inconvenience or in some cases financial
impossibility. For instance, one employee, Trista Duran, had a
first pickup in Chinatown where parking was limited and
prohibitively expensive, and not accessible by bus because of her
home address. Following the Employer's instructions would
have meant a nine-hour day for which Duran would be paid for
The Charging Party is the recognized representative
of
paraprofessional employees
of
the San Francisco Unified School
District and specifically Classification S
10
Special Education
Paraprofessional. Up until August 21, 2007, paraprofessional
employees employed as Special Education Aides were directed to
begin their duty day at the bus yard by getting on a bus at that
point in order to pick up the individuals to whom they are
assigned as aides. On August 27, 2007, employees in the position
of
Classification S
10
were instructed that beginning on that date
employees were to report at the location where the first student to
whom they are assigned was to be picked up. This change in
practice was made unilaterally and without notice to the Charging
Party. The change in practice caused a hardship for employees
because it changed the length
of
their workday and workweek, it
also caused and [sic] inconvenience or in some cases financial
impossibility. For instance, one employee, Trista Duran, had a
first pickup in Chinatown where parking was limited and
prohibitively expensive, and not accessible by bus because
of
her
home address. Following the Employer's instructions would
have meant a nine-hour day for which Duran would be paid for
seven hours.	seven hours.
The Board agent sent UESF a warning letter indicating that these allegations failed to
state a prima facie case. In a subsequent phone conversation with the Board agent, UESF's
counsel stated UESF would not amend the charge to allege additional facts. As a result, the
Board agent dismissed the charge for failure to state a prima facie case of an unlawful
unilateral change by the District.
The Board agent sent UESF a warning letter indicating that these allegations failed to
state a prima facie case. In a subsequent phone conversation with the Board agent, UESF's
counsel stated UESF would not amend the charge to allege additional facts. 	As a result, the
Board agent dismissed the charge for failure to state a prima facie case
of
an unlawful
unilateral change by the District.
2
2
BACKGROUND
UESF's unfair practice charge stated in its entirety:
In its response, the District contends that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of
review for this appeal. In Beverly Hills Unified School District (2008) PERB Decision
No. 1969, the Board reaffirmed that "the Board applies a de novo standard when reviewing a
Board agent's dismissal of an unfair practice charge." Accordingly, we have conducted a
de novo review in this matter.
2
In its response, the District contends that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of
review for this appeal. In Beverly Hills Unified School District (2008) PERB Decision
No. 1969, the Board reaffirmed that "the Board applies a de novo standard when reviewing a
Board agent's dismissal of an unfair practice charge." Accordingly, we have conducted a
de novo review in this matter.

DISCUSSION
1. 	Late Filed Response to Appeal	1 	Late Filed Response to Appeal
PERB Regulation 32635(c) provides that any party may file a statement in opposition
to an appeal of a dismissal within 20 days after the date the appeal is served. PERB Regulation
32130(c) provides a five day extension to file a response to documents served by mail.
PERB Regulation 32635(c)3 provides that any party may file a statement in opposition
to an appeal
of
a dismissal within 20 days after the date the appeal is served. PERB Regulation
32130(c) provides a five day extension to file a response to documents served by mail.
UESF served its appeal by mail on October 1, 2008. Pursuant to the above regulations,
the District had until October 26, 2008, to file a response to the appeal. Having received no
response by that date, the PERB Appeals Assistant notified the parties by letter of October 30,
2008, that the filings were complete and the case had been placed on the Board's docket.
On November 7, 2008, the District filed its response along with a cover letter asking the
Board to excuse the late filing. The letter stated that the District's counsel had been on
paternity leave from October 1 through October 20, 2008. During that time, his office received
the appeal but it was mistakenly filed away without anyone notifying him of its receipt. Upon
receiving the Appeals Assistant's letter on November 3, 2008, counsel found the appeal and
prepared a response, which was served on the Board and UESF four days later.
PERB Regulation 32136 provides that the Board may excuse a late filing for good cause.
The Board has found good cause when the explanation for the late filing was "reasonable and
credible" and the delay did not cause prejudice to any party. (Barstow Unified School District
(1996) PERB Order No. Ad-277.) The Board has historically excused late filings caused by
"honest mistakes" such as mailing or clerical errors. (E.g., Kern Community College District
(2008) PERB Order No. Ad-372 [clerical employee served appeal on respondent but did not
file appeal with PERB]; Trustees of the California State University (1989) PERB Order
31001 et seq.
33
DISCUSSION
UESF served its appeal by mail on October
1,
2008. Pursuant to the above regulations,
the District had until October 26, 2008, to file a response to the appeal. Having received no
response by that date, the PERB Appeals Assistant notified the parties by letter
of
October 30,
2008, that the filings were complete and the case had been placed on the Board's docket.
On November 7, 2008, the District filed its response along with a cover letter asking the
Board to excuse the late filing. 	The letter stated that the District's counsel had been on
paternity leave from October 1 through October 20, 2008. During that time, his office received
the appeal but it was mistakenly filed away without anyone notifying him
of
its receipt. Upon
receiving the Appeals Assistant's letter on November 3, 2008, counsel found the appeal and
prepared a response, which was served on the Board and UESF four days later.
PERB Regulation 32136 provides that the Board may excuse a late filing for good cause.
The Board has found good cause when the explanation for the late filing was "reasonable and
credible" and the delay did not cause prejudice to any party. (Barstow Unified School District
(1996) PERB Order No. Ad-277.) The Board has historically excused late filings caused by
"honest mistakes" such as mailing or clerical errors. (E.g., Kern Community College District
(2008) PERB Order No. Ad-372 [clerical employee served appeal on respondent but did not
file appeal with PERB]; Trustees
of
the California State University (1989) PERB Order
3 PERB regulations are codified at California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
3 1001 et seq.

No. Ad-192-H [mailroom employees incorrectly set postage meter causing exceptions to be
filed late].)
The letter from the District's counsel indicates that the late filing was the result of a
clerical error in counsel's office. Counsel filed the District's response to the appeal four days
after he discovered the error. Based on the facts stated in District counsel's letter and counsel's
conscientious effort to file the District's response soon after the error was discovered, we find the
District has provided a "reasonable and credible" explanation for its late filing. Further, there is
no indication that the late filing prejudiced UESF in any way, particularly as PERB regulations
do not provide for a party to file a reply to another party's response to an appeal of a dismissal.
(University of California, Los Angeles (1992) PERB Decision No. 961-H.) Accordingly, we
find the District has demonstrated good cause for the Board to accept its late filed response to
UESF's appeal.
No. Ad-192-H [mailroom employees incorrectly set postage meter causing exceptions to be
filed late].)
The letter from the District's counsel indicates that the late filing was the result
of
a
clerical error in counsel's office. Counsel filed the District's response to the appeal four days
after he discovered the error. Based on the facts stated in District counsel's letter and counsel's
conscientious effort to file the District's response soon after the error was discovered, we find the
District has provided a "reasonable and credible" explanation for its late filing. Further, there is
no indication that the late filing prejudiced UESF in any way, particularly as PERB regulations
do not provide for a party to file a reply to another party's response to an appeal
of
a dismissal.
(University
of
California, Los Angeles (1992) PERB Decision No. 961-H.) Accordingly, we
find the District has demonstrated good cause for the Board to accept its late filed response to
UESF's appeal.
2. 	Unilateral Change	Unilateral Change
A public school employer's unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment
constitutes a "per se" violation of EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (c)* if: (1) the employer
breached or altered the parties' written agreement or its own established past practice; (2) such
action was taken without giving the other party notice or an opportunity to bargain over the
change; (3) the change was not merely an isolated breach of the contract, but amounts to a
change in policy (i.e., it has a generalized effect or continuing impact upon bargaining unit
members' terms and conditions of employment); and (4) the change in policy concerns a matter
within the scope of representation. (Walnut Valley Unified School District (1981) PERB
Decision No. 160; Grant Joint Union High School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 196.)
EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (c) makes it unlawful for a public school employer
to "[refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative."
2.
A public school employer's unilateral change in terms and conditions
of
employment
constitutes a "per se" violation
of
EERA section 3543.5, subdivision (c)4 if: (1) the employer
breached or altered the parties' written agreement or its own established past practice; (2) such
action was taken without giving the other party notice or an opportunity to bargain over the
change; (3) the change was not merely an isolated breach
of
the contract, but amounts to a
change in policy (i.e., it has a generalized effect or continuing impact upon bargaining unit
members' terms and conditions
of
employment); and ( 4) the change in policy concerns a matter
within the scope ofrepresentation. (Walnut Valley Unified School District (1981) PERB
Decision No. 160; Grant Joint Union High School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 196.)
4
4 EERA section 3 543 .5, subdivision ( c) makes it unlawful for a public school employer
to "[r]efuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with an exclusive representative."

UESF's charge failed to state a prima facie case of an unlawful unilateral change because the
alleged change in special education aides' reporting location does not concern a matter within
the scope of representation and the charge does not sufficiently allege any negotiable effects of
the change on bargaining unit members.
a. 	Negotiability
of
Decision	Negotiability of Decision
In Anaheim Union High School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 177, the Board
articulated the following test for determining when a subject not specifically enumerated in
EERA section 3543.2, subdivision (a) falls within the scope of representation:
In Anaheim Union High School District (1981) PERB Decision No. 177, the Board
articulated the following test for determining when a subject not specifically enumerated in
EERA section 3543.2, subdivision
(a)5
falls within the scope ofrepresentation:
[A] subject is negotiable even though not specifically enumerated
if (1) it is logically and reasonably related to hours, wages or an
enumerated term and condition of employment, (2) the subject is
of such concern to both management and employees that conflict is
likely to occur and the mediatory influence of collective
negotiations is the appropriate means of resolving the conflict, and
(3) the employer's obligation to negotiate would not significantly
abridge his freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives
(including matters of fundamental policy) essential to the
achievement of the District's mission.
5
EERA section 3543.2, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
The scope of representation shall be limited to matters relating to
wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment. "Terms and conditions of employment" mean
health and welfare benefits as defined by Section 53200, leave,
transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions of
employees, class size, procedures to be used for the evaluation of
employees, organizational security pursuant to Section 3546,
procedures for processing grievances pursuant to Sections
3548.5, 3548.6, 3548.7, and 3548.8, the layoff of probationary
certificated school district employees, pursuant to Section
44959.5 of the Education Code, and alternative compensation or
benefits for employees adversely affected by pension limitations
pursuant to Section 22316 of the Education Code, to the extent
deemed reasonable and without violating the intent and purposes
of Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code.
5
UESF's charge failed to state a prima facie case
of
an unlawful unilateral change because the
alleged change in special education aides' reporting location does not concern a matter within
the scope
of
representation and the charge does not sufficiently allege any negotiable effects
of
the change on bargaining unit members.
a.
[A] subject is negotiable even though not specifically enumerated
if
(1) it is logically and reasonably related to hours, wages or an
enumerated term and condition
of
employment, (2) the subject is
of
such concern to both management and employees that conflict is
likely to occur and the mediatory influence
of
collective
negotiations is the appropriate means
of
resolving the conflict, and
(3) the employer's obligation to negotiate would not significantly
abridge his freedom to exercise those managerial prerogatives
(including matters
of
fundamental policy) essential to the
achievement
of
the District's mission.
EERA section 3543.2, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part:
The scope
of
representation shall be limited to matters relating to
wages, hours
of
employment, and other terms and conditions
of
employment. "Terms and conditions
of
employment" mean
health and welfare benefits as defined by Section 53200, leave,
transfer and reassignment policies, safety conditions
of
employees, class size, procedures to be used for the evaluation
ofemployees, organizational security pursuant to Section 3546,
procedures for processing grievances pursuant to Sections
3548.5, 3548.6, 3548.7, and 3548.8, the layoff of probationary
certificated school district employees, pursuant to Section
44959.5 of the Education Code, and alternative compensation or
benefits for employees adversely affected by pension limitations
pursuant to Section 22316 of the Education Code, to the extent
deemed reasonable and without violating the intent and purposes
of Section 415 of the Internal Revenue Code.
5

In Moreno Valley Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 206, the Board
conditions of employment. In such cases, the employer is not obligated to bargain over the
decision itself but must bargain upon proper request over any identifiable effects of the
decision on subjects within the scope of representation. Though PERB first recognized this
distinction between decision and effects bargaining in cases involving layoffs, it has since
expanded the rule to other contexts. (E.g., Trustees of the California State University (2007)
PERB Decision No. 1926-H [computer resource policy]; State of California (Department of
Motor Vehicles) (1999) PERB Decision No. 1347-S [alternate work schedule]; Eureka City
School District (1992) PERB Decision No. 955 [smoking policy].)
applied this test to an employer's unilateral change in employees' reporting location. Certain
employees of the district, such as nurses, psychologists, speech therapists and counselors,
worked at different campuses on different days of the week. Each day these employees would
report to the district headquarters before traveling to their assigned campus. Without prior
notification to the union, the district directed employees to report directly to the campus to
which the employee was assigned on a given day. The Board ruled this did not constitute an
unlawful unilateral change because "the evidence does not support a finding that the change
affected a subject within the scope of representation."
Though its meaning is less than clear, this language could be read to mean that the
district's decision itself, and not just the effects of the decision, would be negotiable if the
decision had an impact on wages, hours, or other terms and conditions of employment. The
Board appears to have adopted this view in later decisions where it held that requiring
employees to check in and/or out at a particular location at a particular time is negotiable if the
requirement has an impact on employees' hours of employment. (State of California
(Department of Youth Authority) (1998) PERB Decision No. 1293-S; Inglewood Unified
School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 624.) Similarly, PERB has held that while the
length of the instructional day is outside the scope of representation, "the subject is negotiable"
when the change to the instructional day affects the length of employees' workday. (Imperial
Unified School District (1990) PERB Decision No. 825; Victor Valley Union High School
District (1986) PERB Decision No. 565.)
Just a few months after its decision in Moreno Valley Unified School District, supra,
the Board held in Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision
No. 223, that an employer's decision on a subject outside the scope of representation does not
6
In Moreno Valley Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 206, the Board
applied this test to an employer's unilateral change in employees' reporting location. Certain
employees
of
the district, such as nurses, psychologists, speech therapists and counselors,
worked at different campuses on different days
of
the week. Each day these employees would
report to the district headquarters before traveling to their assigned campus. Without prior
notification to the union, the district directed employees to report directly to the campus to
which the employee was assigned on a given day. The Board ruled this did not constitute an
unlawful unilateral change because "the evidence does not support a finding that the change
affected a subject within the scope
of
representation."
Though its meaning is less than clear, this language could be read to mean that the
district's decision itself, and not just the effects
of
the decision, would be negotiable
if
the
decision had an impact on wages, hours, or other terms and conditions
of
employment. The
Board appears to have adopted this view in later decisions where it held that requiring
employees to check in and/or out at a particular location at a particular time is negotiable
if
the
requirement has an impact on employees' hours
of
employment. (State
of
California
(Department
of
Youth Authority) (1998) PERB Decision No. 1293-S; Inglewood Unified
School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 624.) Similarly, PERB has held that while the
length
of
the instructional day is outside the scope
of
representation, "the subject is negotiable"
when the change to the instructional day affects the length
of
employees' workday. (Imperial
Unified School District (1990) PERB Decision No. 825; Victor Valley Union High School
District (1986) PERB Decision No. 565.)
To harmonize the line of cases involving reporting location, check in/out requirements
and length of instructional day with the cases that clearly recognize a distinction between
bargaining over a decision and bargaining over the effects of the decision, we interpret the
ambiguous language in the former line of cases as requiring bargaining only over negotiable
effects of the employer's nonnegotiable decision. This interpretation is consistent with the
Board's focus in those cases on whether the charging party established an actual impact on
matters within the scope of representation. Consequently, we read Moreno Valley Unified
School District, supra, as holding that the district's decision to change employees' reporting
location was not negotiable and that the union failed to establish any negotiable effects of the
decision which would have triggered the district's duty to bargain over those effects.
Just a few months after its decision in Moreno Valley Unified School District, supra,
the Board held in Newman-Crows Landing Unified School District (

7
become negotiable merely because it has an impact on wages, hours, or other terms and
conditions
of
employment. In such cases, the employer is not obligated to bargain over the
decision itself but must bargain upon proper request over any identifiable effects
of
the
decision on subjects within the scope
of
representation. Though PERB first recognized this
distinction between decision and effects bargaining in cases involving layoffs, it has since
expanded the rule to other contexts. (E.g., Trustees
of
the California State University (2007)
PERB Decision No. 1926-H [computer resource policy]; State
of
California (Department
of
Motor Vehicles) (1999) PERB Decision No. 1347-S [alternate work schedule]; Eureka City
School District (1992) PERB Decision No. 955 [smoking policy].)
To harmonize the line
of
cases involving reporting location, check in/out requirements
and length
of
instructional day with the cases that clearly recognize a distinction between
bargaining over a decision and bargaining over the effects
of
the decision, we interpret the
ambiguous language in the former line
of
cases as requiring bargaining only over negotiable
effects
of
the employer's nonnegotiable decision. This interpretation is consistent with the
Board's focus in those cases on whether the charging party established an actual impact on
matters within the scope
of
representation. Consequently, we read Moreno Valley Unified
School District, supra, as holding that the district's decision to change employees' reporting
location was not negotiable and that the union failed to establish any negotiable effects
of
the
decision which would have triggered the district's duty to bargain over those effects.
In its appeal, UESF argues that the change in reporting location is "essentially a transfer
or reassignment" and therefore an enumerated subject
of
bargaining under EERA section
3543.2, subdivision (a). A transfer typically involves either a change in job duties or a change
in the location where those duties are performed. The change in reporting location has not
altered either for special education aides; they still perform the same duties for the same
7

students on the same bus as before the change. Nor did the charge allege that UESF and the
District have agreed to any other definition of "transfer" that would govern this matter.
Accordingly, the change in reporting location is not a transfer subject to bargaining pursuant to
EERA section 3543.2, subdivision (a).
b. 	Negotiable Effects of Decision
Having determined that employees' reporting location is not within the scope of
representation, we turn to whether UESF's charge sufficiently alleged any negotiable effects
over which the District was obligated to bargain. (See Beverly Hills Unified School District
(2008) PERB Decision No. 1969 [ no prima facie case of unlawful unilateral change when
charge failed to allege negotiable effects resulting from implementation of nonnegotiable
decision].) When claiming that an employer's nonnegotiable decision has an effect on a subject
within the scope of representation, the charging party bears the burden of alleging facts
establishing an actual impact on employees' terms and conditions of employment. (Salinas
Union High School District (2004) PERB Decision No. 1639.) The impact must be
"reasonably certain to occur and causally related to the nonnegotiable decision." (Fremont
Union High School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 651.) PERB will not find an unlawful
unilateral change when the alleged effect on terms and conditions of employment is "indirect and
speculative." (Lake Elsinore School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 646.)
UESF alleged that the District's decision to change special education aides' reporting
location extended the aides' workday. The length of the workday is within the scope of
representation. (Anaheim City School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 364.) However, the
charge did not allege facts to show that any District special education aide worked a longer
workday as a result of the District's decision. The charge stated that "[following the
Employer's instructions would have meant a nine-hour day for which Duran would be paid for
8
students
on
the same bus as before the change. Nor did the charge allege that UESF and the
District have agreed to any other definition
of
"transfer" that would govern this matter.
Accordingly, the change in reporting location is not a transfer subject to bargaining pursuant to
EERA section 3543.2, subdivision (a).
b.
	Negotiable Effects
of
Decision
Having determined that employees' reporting location is not within the scope
of
representation, we tum to whether UESF's charge sufficiently alleged any negotiable effects
over which the District was obligated to bargain. (See Beverly Hills Unified School District
(2008) PERB Decision No. 1969 [no prima facie case
of
unlawful unilateral change when
charge failed to allege negotiable effects resulting from implementation
of
nonnegotiable
decision].) When claiming that an employer's nonnegotiable decision has an effect on a subject
within the scope
of
representation, the charging party bears the burden
of
alleging facts
establishing an actual impact on employees' terms and conditions
of
employment. (Salinas
Union High School District (2004) PERB Decision No. 1639.) The impact must be
"reasonably certain to occur and causally related to the nonnegotiable decision." (Fremont
Union High School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 651.) PERB will not find an unlawful
unilateral change when the alleged effect on terms and conditions
of
employment is "indirect and
speculative." (Lake Elsinore School District (1987) PERB Decision No. 646.)
UESF alleged that the District's decision to change special education aides' reporting
location extended the aides' workday. The length
of
the workday is within the scope
of
representation. (Anaheim City School District (1983) PERB Decision No. 364.) However, the
charge did not allege facts to show that any District special education aide worked a longer
workday as a result
of
the District's decision. The charge stated that "[f]ollowing the
Employer's instructions would have meant a nine-hour day for which Duran would be paid for
8

seven hours," implying that it would take Duran two hours to commute to and from the new
reporting location. UESF has not provided any authority, nor has the Board found any, for the
proposition that an employee's commute time is considered part of the employee's workday.
Thus, the charge failed to establish that the change in reporting location resulted in an
increased workday for bargaining unit members.
On appeal, UESF asserts that as a result of the District's decision Duran was required to
pay for parking near her new reporting location. PERB has defined "wages" to include
emoluments of value gained in the course of employment, such as employer-provided tools.
(Healdsburg Union High School District and Healdsburg Union School District/San Mateo
City School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 375.) The elimination of such "wages" is
negotiable. (Id.) Thus, if the District had previously provided parking for special education
aides, the elimination of that parking would be negotiable. However, the charge did not allege
that the District previously provided parking for special education aides." Additionally, while
the charge alleged that Duran "had a first pickup in Chinatown where parking was limited and
prohibitively expensive, and not accessible by bus because of her home address," it alleged no
facts showing that Duran ever actually parked in Chinatown. In fact, the charge did not allege
what Duran actually did in response to the change in her reporting location. Consequently, the
charge failed to establish that the change in reporting location had an actual impact on
bargaining unit members' wages.
seven hours," implying that it would take Duran two hours to commute to and from the new
reporting location. UESF has not provided any authority, nor has the Board found any, for the
proposition that an employee's commute time is considered part
of
the employee's workday.
Thus, the charge failed to establish that the change in reporting location resulted in an
increased workday for bargaining unit members.
On appeal, UESF asserts that as a result
of
the District's decision Duran was required to
pay for parking near her new reporting location. PERB has defined "wages" to include
emoluments
of
value gained in the course
of
employment, such as employer-provided tools.
(Healdsburg Union High School District
and
Healdsburg Union School District/San Mateo
City School District (1984) PERB Decision No. 375.) The elimination
of
such "wages" is
negotiable. 	(Id.) Thus,
if
the District had previously provided parking for special education
aides, the elimination
of
that parking would be negotiable. However, the charge did not allege
that the District previously provided parking for special education aides.6 Additionally, while
the charge alleged that Duran "had a first pickup in Chinatown where parking was limited and
prohibitively expensive, and not accessible by bus because
of
her home address," it alleged no
facts showing that Duran ever actually parked in Chinatown. In fact, the charge did not allege
what Duran actually did in response to the change in her reporting location. Consequently, the
charge failed to establish that the change in reporting location had an actual impact on
bargaining unit members' wages.
6 UESF alleges for the first time in its appeal that special education aides were
previously allowed to park at the bus yard. PERB Regulation 32635(b) provides that a party
may not present new allegations on appeal unless good cause is shown. Because UESF has
failed to show it could not have obtained this information through reasonable diligence prior to
the dismissal of its charge, we find no good cause to consider this allegation on appeal.
(Sacramento City Teachers Association (Ferreira) (2002) PERB Decision No. 1503.)
9
UESF alleges for the first time in its appeal that special education aides were
previously allowed to park at the bus yard. PERB Regulation 32635(b) provides that a party
may not present new allegations on appeal unless good cause is shown. Because UESF has
failed to show it could not have obtained this information through reasonable diligence prior to
the dismissal of its charge, we find no good cause to consider this allegation on appeal.
(Sacramento City Teachers Association (Ferreira) (2002) PERB Decision No. 1503.)

In sum, the charge failed to allege facts establishing that the District's change in special
education aides' reporting location concerned a matter within the scope of representation or
had an actual effect on employees' wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment
over which the District was obligated to negotiate. For these reasons, the charge failed to state
a prima facie case of unlawful unilateral change.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-CE-2690-E is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Members Neuwald and Wesley joined in this Decision.
10
In sum, the charge failed to allege facts establishing that the District's change in special
education aides' reporting location concerned a matter within the scope
of
representation or
had an actual effect on employees' wages, hours, or other terms or conditions
of
employment
over which the District was obligated to negotiate. For these reasons, the charge failed to state
a prima facie case
of
unlawful unilateral change.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-CE-2690-E is hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Members Neuwald and Wesley joined in this Decision.
10