County of Mendocino (PERB 2104M)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
MENDOCINO COUNTY PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
V.
COUNTY OF MENDOCINO,
Respondent.
Case No. SF-CE-432-M
PERB Decision No. 2104-M
April 21, 2010
Appearances: Beeson, Tayer & Bodine by Andrew H. Baker, Attorney, for Mendocino County
Public Attorney's Association; Douglas L. Losak, Chief Deputy County Counsel, for County
of
Mendocino.
Before Dowdin Calvillo, Chair; McKeag and Wesley, Members.
DECISION
WESLEY, Member: This case is before the Public Employment Relations Board
(Board) on exceptions filed by the Mendocino County Public Attorney's Association
(MCPAA) to the proposed decision (attached)
of
an administrative law judge (ALJ).
	The
complaint alleged that the County
of
Mendocino (County) violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown
Act (MMBA) 1 when it unilaterally ceased a policy
of
granting a one percent cost-of-living
adjustment (COLA) and simultaneously sought to recoup overpayments
of
the increase issued
to employees by mistake. The ALJ dismissed the complaint finding that the County did not
unlawfully change a policy.
The Board reviewed the proposed decision and the record in light of MCP AA' s
exceptions, the County's response to the exceptions, and the relevant law. Based on this
review, we find the ALJ's proposed decision to be well-reasoned, adequately supported by the
1 MMBA is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq.

record and in accordance with applicable law. Accordingly, the Board adopts the proposed
decision as the decision
of
the Board itself.
DISCUSSION
This case begins with the migration
of
attorney classifications from two existing
bargaining units represented by the Service Employees International Union, Local 707 (SEIU)
and the Mendocino County Management Employees Association (MCMEA), to a newly
created unit represented by MCP AA. The new unit became effective in April 2006.
	MCP AA
and the County began negotiations for an initial memorandum
of
understanding (MOU) three
weeks later.
The MOUs for the old units represented by SEID and MCMEA provided for a
one percent COLA effective September 2006. When the one percent COLA was implemented
in these units, it was mistakenly applied to the employee classifications that had been removed
from the units. In January 2007, after the County realized the mistake, it corrected the error
and ceased further payments
of
the COLA to the employees in the new unit.
The ALJ held, pursuant to the reasoning in Chevron, Shell
Oit2
and related cases, that
the County was not obligated to grant the one percent salary increase attached to the MOUs
of
the units from which the employees had migrated. He also concluded that because the County
was not obligated to grant the increase, and because the application
of
the increase was a
clerical error, the County's prompt correction
of
the error did not amount to an unlawful
unilateral change as contemplated in the MMBA. We concur.
2 Chevron Oil Co. (1970) 182 NLRB 445; Shell Oil Co. (1948) 77 NLRB 1306.
2

ORDER
The complaint and underlying unfair practice charge in Case No. SF-CE-432-M are
hereby DISMISSED.
Chair Dowdin Calvillo and Member McKeag joined in this Decision.
3

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
MENDOCINO COUNTY PUBLIC ATTORNEY'S
ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
V.
COUNTY OF MENDOCINO,
Respondent.
UNFAIR PRACTICE
CASE NO. SF-CE-432-M
PROPOSED DECISION
(10/07/2009)
Appearances: 	Beeson, Tayer & Bodine, by Andrew H. Baker, Attorney, for Mendocino
County Public Attorneys Association; Douglas
L.
Losak, Deputy County Counsel, for
County
of
Mendocino.
Before Donn Ginoza, Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Mendocino County Public Attorneys Association (MCP AA) initiated these
proceedings under the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA or Act)1 on March 14, 2007, by
filing an unfair practice charge against the County
of
Mendocino (County). The Office
of
the
General Counsel
of
the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) issued a
complaint on March 3, 2008, alleging that the County unilaterally ceased a policy
of
granting a
one-percent, cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) and simultaneously sought to recoup
overpayments
of
the portion
of
the increase issued to employees by mistake. This conduct is
1 The Act is codified at Government Code section 3500 et seq. Hereafter all statutory
references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

alleged to violate sections 3503, 3505, 3506 and 3509(b) of the Act and PERB Regulations
32603(a), (b), and (c).2
On March 28, 2008, the County answered the complaint, denying all material
allegations and raising a number of affirmative defenses.
On May 1, 2008, an informal settlement conference was held but the matter was not
resolved.
On April 30, 2009, a formal hearing was held by the undersigned in Oakland.
On July 14, 2009, following the submission of post-hearing briefs, the matter was
submitted for decision.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The County is a public agency within the meaning of section 350l(c). MCPAA is an
employee organization within the meaning of section 350l(a).
In January 2006, MCP AA filed a petition with the County seeking removal of attorney
classifications from two larger represented units. The unit exclusively represented by Service
Employees International Union, Local 707 (SEIU) included deputy district attorneys I and II,
deputy public defenders I and II, and child support attorneys I and II. The unit exclusively
represented by the Mendocino County Management Employees Association (MCMEA)
included deputy district attorneys III and IV, deputy public defenders III and IV, and child
support attorneys III and IV. In or around March 2006, pursuant to a governing board action,
the County established a new unit into which the County attorneys were placed. SEIU and
MCMEA memorialized the unit modifications in separate written documents executed with the
County and MCP AA. Both agreements recited that the County's human resources department
2 PERB Regulations are codified in the California Code of Regulations, title 8, section
3 1001 et seq.
2

had recommended these unit modifications to the governing board, and the governing board
had approved the recommendations. According to the agreements the change in representation
was effective on April 23, 2006.3
SEIU and the County were parties to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) effective
from June 1, 2004 through September 30, 2006. Pursuant to the MOU, Article 7 ("Salary and
Salary Upon Status Change"), section 1 ("Salary Increase"), set forth a schedule of three salary
increases of one percent each. 	These increases were to be granted to all classifications in the
bargaining unit as an addition to the salary range for each classification. They were to take
effect on the first day of the pay period beginning April 24, 2005 (pay warrants issue at the end
of each monthly pay period), January 1, 2006, and September 30, 2006.
MCMEA and the County were parties to a similar arrangement. 	One-percent salary
increases were effective the first full pay period following January 1, 2005, January 1, 2006
and before September 30, 2006 (the expiration of the term of the agreement).4
Typically all of the bargaining units negotiate agreements on the same bargaining cycle.
The County has also maintained uniformity in health insurance premiums for its self-insured
plan without further bargaining with the various units by reserving the flexibility to increase
premiums within a specified range.
A County document issued subsequently references a governing board action on April
11, 2006, and indicates this earlier date for the conception of the new unit. The documents
confirming the creation of the newly formed bargaining unit reference four articles of the
County's local employee relations ordinance which authorized the change. Those provisions
were not entered into the record. A County witness testified that the attorneys were moved
from the existing units by way of a "decertification," though no details or documentation was
offered confirming that characterization of the change in status.
4 No official MOU existed for the MCMEA unit, but there was a document setting forth
terms and conditions for the unit.
3

MCP AA and the County commenced bargaining over an initial MOU approximately
three weeks after the County recognized MCP AA. The MCP AA bargaining team consisted of
three officers of the union, Matthew Finnegan, Brian Newman and Steven Jackson. The
County bargaining team consisted of Fran Buchanan, an independent labor relations
consultant, and Human Resources Director Stephanie Kentala. Kentala separated from the
County in the summer of 2006 and was replaced by Interim Human Resources Director Linda
Clouser.
MCP AA communicated its principal bargaining objectives in one of the early sessions.
Finnegan urged that while negotiations were ongoing, employees in the new unit should have
their terms and conditions maintained at the status quo level. Two critical pieces of the status
quo were maintenance of civil service status for all bargaining unit employees and the salaries
of the employees from their pre-existing units. Finnegan expressed this globally as "nobody
[losing] anything." In addition MCPAA desired maintenance of benefits equal to those
provided management employees for attorney Ills and IVs, as well as extension of those
benefits to attorney Is and IIs-a point of contention described below. As to new wage terms,
MCPAA proposed a 30 percent increase for all steps on the salary schedule, additional
increases by classification and step, a three-percent-at-fifty retirement benefit, and a 4.5
percent increase in deferred compensation County contributions.
The County team explained that it had no authority to counter-propose to the MCP AA
proposals without approval of the governing board, but that it would consult with the board on
a meeting-to-meeting basis. According to Finnegan's unrebutted testimony, the County team
reported back that the board was willing to maintain the "status quo."
Buchanan testified that from the County's perspective the weightier issues were
economic, namely salary increases, and no real negotiations could occur until later in the
4

summer when the County expected to complete a salary survey
of
comparable jurisdictions.5
The County did agree early in the bargaining to extend civil service status to the entire
bargaining unit, a matter
of
priority for MCP
AA
and communicated as such by MCP
AA
in
one
of
the early sessions.
The County's practice in bargaining was to record the ongoing status
of
all proposals
on a three-column chart with a heading for the union's proposal, the "issue/interest" and the
"status." For these negotiations, the proposal column included such items as "civil service
classification," "benefits," "wages," "enhanced retirement," "deferred compensation,"
"leave
time," "training/education fund," and "posted vacancies." Finnegan testified that Buchanan
showed him a document confirming the board's agreement to maintain the status quo.
	In
that
regard, each party produced one
of
Buchanan's status reports: MCPAA produced the
report
dated June 2, 2006, and the County, the one dated May 10, 2006. Both documents contain the
same language regarding identification
of
issues. Under "benefits," Buchanan reported
two
proposals as being under discussion. The first
of
the proposals read, "County to provide
benefit enhancements equal to the management level asap pending negotiations outcome." The
second was "No reduction in current benefits pending negotiations outcome, e.g., longevity
pay." The May 10 document is blank in the "status" column, whereas the June 2 document
states that as
of
May 16, there would be "[ n]o changes in benefits until negotiations
concluded" (as to the first proposal) and "status quo pending negotiations outcome" (as to the
second proposal). 	Buchanan testified the unrecorded agreement to maintain the "status quo"
had the more limited meaning related to carrying over management level benefits for those
coming from the management unit, as opposed to movement toward a uniform set of
5 The County's salary comparability research at the time was across-the-board and not
limited to the attorney classifications.
5

management level benefits across the unit. Essentially, as to the first proposal to extend
management benefits to non-management attorneys, the County was rejecting the proposal, and
as to management benefits for management attorneys, the County was willing to maintain
those. 	Despite a request by MCP AA, no tentative agreement was created to memorialize the
agreement to maintain the status quo, whatever meaning was intended by that phrase.
The parties were unable to reach agreement on terms for a new contract on their own
during the remainder of 2006. Beginning with the September 2006 pay period the County
increased the salary of all employees in MCPP A's bargaining unit by one percent.
At some time in January 2007, the human resources staff discovered that the attorneys
had not been removed from their bargaining unit of origin for payroll purposes at the time the
new unit was created. On January 29, 2007, Clouser issued a notice to employees of
MCPAA's bargaining unit stating the amount of each employee's overpayment for the three
month period and giving the employee several options to elect for repayment. As a result of
the same error, attorney Is and IIs got an additional three-percent increase by virtue of a wage
increase obtained by SEIU in negotiations concluded after expiration of the preceding MOU.
Finnegan objected to the proposed recoupment action on behalf of MCP AA, though not
disputing the three-percent increase to be an error. The County relented in the face of this
demand and took no additional steps to recoup the overpayments. However, it did begin
issuing paychecks without the one-percent increase starting with the next pay period. In a
January 31, 2007, e-mail to MCP AA leadership, County Counsel asserted that payment of the
one-percent increase had been a "mistake."
Also on January 31, 2007, Clouser issued a memorandum to members of the unit
further explaining the County's position. Clouser asserted that the attorneys had been moved
into their new bargaining unit within the payroll office on the date of its creation for some but
6

not all purposes. 	Payroll was one
of
the functions for which the migration did not occur, due
to "coding errors." Hence, when the bargaining units
of
origin received the one-percent
increase, the public attorneys formerly in those units also received the one-percent increase.
In the spring
of
2007, MCP AA affiliated with the International Federation
of
the
Teamsters. 	Teamsters Business Agent Joe Martinelli joined the MCPAA bargaining
team
shortly thereafter. In March 2007, MCPAA engaged in a brief work stoppage in protest
of
the
stalled bargaining and the one-percent issue in particular.
Shortly after the work stoppage, the parties engaged a mediator with a view to resolving
their bargaining impasse. The parties spent several lengthy sessions together. After
brief
face
to-face dealings, the parties caucused separately with the mediator serving as a shuttle
diplomat. 	Going into mediation, the County had agreed to maintenance
of
civil service status
for all members
of
the unit, thereby leaving wages as the paramount unresolved issue.
The groundwork for an agreement came into place after the mediator requested
that
the
County move away from its conceptual framework based on COLAs and market adjustments
for each
of
the major classifications ("Attorney I," "Attorney II," "Attorney III," "Attorney
IV," and " Chief Deputy"). Based on the methodology
of
a single maximum salary achievable
at the end
of
the contract for the top step
of
the range for each classification, the County began
constructing in reverse chronological order, annual COLAs and market adjustments for each
classification in 2007, 2008 and 2009. 	After a few exchanges, the parties arrived at the basis
for agreement to a new MOU. 	The parties agreed to three general annual salary increases
of
three percent beginning upon ratification, together with market adjustments for particular
classifications, effective in July 2007 and July 2008.
Upon reaching a conceptual agreement for settlement of the contract issues, the parties
agreed to present the economic terms to their respective principals and urge ratification
of
the
7

agreement. The County broached the question
of
the status
of
the various pending unfair
practice charges that were before PERB. The County and MCPAA each had pending charges.
Buchanan expressed her belief that the consideration provided through the economic
agreement set the stage for withdrawal
of
all
of
the charges on both sides. MCP AA considered
the request but responded that all but the instant unfair practice charge would be dismissed.
The County prepared a letter for Finnegan's signature, confirming the union's intent to dismiss
all but the one unfair practice charge contingent upon ratification
of
the economic terms
by
both sides. Finnegan declined to sign the document. As to all other issues the parties agreed to
negotiate those matters at a subsequent time in anticipation
of
the need to produce language for
an MOU agreeable to both sides. 	Such an MOU was eventually achieved.
ISSUE
Did the County unilaterally change the salary
of
employees in MCPAA's bargaining
unit by eliminating the one-percent increase it had granted beginning with the September 2006
pay period?
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The complaint alleges that the County violated its duty to meet and confer in good faith
by unilaterally repudiating a policy
of
increasing the salaries
of
bargaining unit members by
one percent, effective with the September 2006 pay period. 	MCP AA contends that until the
parties had completed bargaining over new MOUs for the newly formed bargaining unit, the
status quo included the raise previously negotiated for the units from which its new bargaining
unit members had migrated. The County responds that the one-percent increase policy ceased
to apply to the employees in the newly formed bargaining unit, because they were no longer
covered by the MO Us of the bargaining units from which they migrated.
8

To prevail on a complaint of unilateral change, the exclusive representative must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the employer implemented a change in
policy; (2) the action was taken without giving the exclusive representative notice or an
opportunity to bargain over the change; (3) the action is not merely an isolated incident, but
amounts to a change of policy (i.e., having a generalized effect or continuing impact on terms
and conditions of employment); and (4) the change in policy concerns a matter within the
scope of representation. (Walnut Valley Unified School District (1981) PERB Decision No.
160; Grant Joint Union High School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 196.)
There is no dispute that the County proceeded without providing MCP AA notice and an
opportunity to bargain, that the matter was within the scope of representation, or that it had a
generalized effect or continuing impact on terms and conditions of employment. The issue is
whether the County implemented a change in policy.
MCP AA relies on a line of private sector precedent following Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. (1967) 166 NLRB 27, 29. 6 As explained there:
As a general rule, an employer, in deciding whether to grant
benefits while a representation election is pending, should decide
that question as he would if a union were not in the picture. On
the other hand, if an employer's course of action is prompted by
the Union's presence, then the employer violates the Act whether
he confers benefits or withholds them because of the Union.
(Id. at p. 29, fn. 1; accord Southeastern Michigan Gas Co. (1972) 198 NLRB 1221, 1222-1223;
Liberty Telephone & Communications (1973) 204 NLRB 317, 318; Parma Industries, Inc.
(1988) 292 NLRB 90, 90-91; Lamonts Apparel, Inc. (1995) 317 NLRB 286, 287-288; see also
Armstrong Cork Co. v. NLRB (5th Cir. 1954) 211 F.2d 843, 845-847.) The rule has been
Where the statutes are similar and reliance on private sector precedent is otherwise
appropriate, PERB may rely on authorities under the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169). (Fire Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo (1974) 12 Cal.3d 608, 616-617.)
9

extended to require that an employer refrain from abandoning a prior established compensation
practice even following a certification. (American Telecommunications Corp. (1980) 249
NLRB 1135, 1137;
E.
C.
Waste, Inc. (2006) 348 NLRB 565, 572.)
The County refers to the same line
of
authority, citing NLRB
v.
Dothan Eagle, Inc. (5th
Cir. 1970) 434 F.2d 93, a case also cited by MCPAA. In that case the court examined the
question whether a historic practice
of
providing wage increases to apprentices should have
been followed during negotiations with a new bargaining agent. The County argues that under
the cited case, it was required to maintain the status quo during bargaining. And, under its
interpretation
of
the events here, the County did not alter the status quo by declining to apply
the provisions
of
the MO Us
of
the units from which the attorneys migrated.
I find this line
of
private sector precedent to be distinguishable. The NLRB's primary
concern here appears to be with the employer's obligation during bargaining for a contract
after the union is recognized following an initial organizing campaign. Typically the cases
treat the issue
of
an employer's unilateral discontinuance
of
an expected raise or the selective
granting
of
the raise only to non-represented employees as interference, discrimination,
bypassing, unilateral changes, or a combination of violations. (See, e.g., llliana Transit
Warehouse Corp. (1997) 323 NLRB
111
[section 8(a)(l)7 and 8(a)(3)8 violations as a result
of
withholding annual raise and Christmas bonus to newly represented employees]; Alpha
Cellulose Corp. (1982) 265 NLRB 177 [letter to employees stating legal duty to freeze wages
during bargaining interpreted by employees as a penalty for choosing a bargaining
representative].) But an underlying concern is with protecting employees' right to free choice
7 29 United States Code section 158(a)(l).
8 29 United States Code section l 58(a)(3).
IO

in selection of a bargaining agent, a policy historically policed with vigor by the NLRB. 	(See
Los Angeles Unified School District (1998) PERB Decision No. 1267.)
MCPAA does not contend that the decision was intended as retaliation for creation of
the new unit, or to demonstrate that employees could obtain comparable benefits without any
representation whatsoever. 	(Cf. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra, 166 NLRB 27
[employer's withholding of benefits "and its exploitation of such action, was a tactical
maneuver designed to discriminate against employees and to interfere with the employees'
freedom of choice"].) To the extent that MCP AA relies on such cases as Alpha Cellulose
Corp., supra, 265 NLRB 177, 178, fn. 1, to argue under what circumstances "benefits which
have become conditions of employment by virtue of prior commitment or practice," the cases
are inapposite because the unilateral change theory was parallel to a discrimination or
interference violation. The County's decision is not shown or claimed to have had any
material effect on employee free choice.
Not inconsistent with the same line of authority, the NLRB has found that absent other
proof interference with employee free choice an employer is entitled to vvithhold benefits that
employees would have obtained had they remained unorganized so long as the employer
engages in good faith bargaining. (Chevron Oil Co. (1970) 182 NLRB 445,449, citing Shell
Oil Co. (1948) 77 NLRB 1306; McGraw-Edison Co. (1968) 172 NLRB 1604, 1609-1610.)
When employees exercise choice in representative status they have no right to insist upon
bargaining demands free from economic disadvantages, and an employer's use of economic
pressures solely in support of a bargaining position cannot be held unlawful for that reason
alone. 	(See Shell Oil, Co., supra, 77 NLRB 13 06, 1310 ["Likewise, an employer is under no
obligation under the Act to make such wage increases applicable to union members, in the face
of collective bargaining negotiations on their behalf involving much higher stakes."];
11

American Ship Building
Co.
v.
NLRB (1965) 380 U.S. 300, 308-318 [limit on labor
agency's
ability to protect employee free choice in the context
of
good faith bargaining]; see also
NLRB
v.
Appalachian Electric Power
Co.
(4th Cir. 1944) 140 F.2d 217, 219-220.) In this case,
there
is no
contention-nor
evidence supporting
one-that
the County ever refused to negotiate any
proposal advanced by MCP AA so as to penalize the employees for establishing the new unit.
Evidence to the contrary is found in the County's human resources department's
recommendation for establishment
of
the new unit to its governing board. With solicitation
of
approval
of
all the principals, that action was adopted. As the initial arbiter
of
its own
employee relations ordinance, the County never opposed creation
of
the new unit.
	Though
the
employee relations ordinance was not introduced, and thus it is not clear whether the
employer
had any standing under its own rules to resist the recognition
of
MCP AA prior to the
expiration
of
the two MO Us covering the attorneys, the County immediately commenced
negotiations with MCPAA without limitation as to any subjects.9 This willingness to
reopen
all terms and conditions
of
employment for negotiations five months prior to expiration
of
the
pre-existing MOUs imposed on the County an opportunity cost. Not only were all terms
immediately open to negotiation, retroactivity to the beginning
of
negotiations was a
matter
for
negotiations_
Io
MCPAA has not asserted that the County failed to maintain the status quo as to
the panoply
of
other terms and conditions applicable to unit employees, only this particular
disputed one. Thus, I do not find it effectuates the purposes
of
the Act to find that the County
9 Many MMBA employee relations ordinances are spare in terms
of
procedures for
creation
of
new units from existing ones. However a contract bar rule is generally recognized
by PERB as a legitimate restriction on the exercise of employee free choice.
IO
Notwithstanding MCPAA's failure to achieve retroactivity for its salary increases,
retroactivity potentially would have extended to the date the employees were released from the
prior bargaining units---or at the latest when negotiations commenced.
12

violated the statute by failing to grant a wage increase attached to the MO Us of the units from
which they migrated.
Admittedly, in the context of section 8(a)(5) 11 bargaining allegations, the NLRB has
stated on occasion that following commencement of bargaining and before an agreement or
bargaining impasse has been reached, a violation occurs simply because the employer
implements a change without notice to the exclusive representative-something which did
occur here-that rule does not compel a different result given that the County was never
obliged to grant the one-percent increase in the first instance. (See NLRB v. Katz (1962) 369
U.S. 736; Central Maine Morning Sentinel (1989) 295 NLRB 376,379; Mike O'Connor
Chevrolet-Buick-GMC Co., Inc. (1974) 209 NLRB 701, 703-704.)
Although the complaint alleges that the recoupment action constituted another aspect of
the unilateral change, I find no violation because the County in reasonably short order desisted
from collection of the overpaid compensation. The evidence does not demonstrate a change of
generalized effect or continuing impact (i.e., a conscious creation of a new policy). (See
lvforeno Valley Unified School District (1982) PERB Decision No. 206, pp. 10-11, affd. in part,
revd. in paii, Moreno Valley Unified School Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (1983)
142 Cal.App.3d 191.)
Accordingly, I find that the County did not breach its duty to meet and confer in good
faith.
PROPOSED ORDER
Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in
this case, it is ordered that the complaint and underlying unfair practice charge in Case
11 29 United States Code section 158(a)(5).
13

No. SF-CE-432-M, Mendocino County Public Attorneys Association
v.
County
of
Mendocino,
are hereby DISMISSED.
Pursuant to California Code
of
Regulations, title 8, section 32305, this Proposed
Decision and Order shall become final unless a party files a statement
of
exceptions with
the
Public Employment Relations Board (PERB or Board) itself within 20 days
of
service
of
this
Decision. 	The Board's address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95811-4124
(916) 322-8231
FAX: (916) 327-7960
In accordance with PERB regulations, the statement
of
exceptions should identify
by
page citation or exhibit number the portions
of
the record,
if
any, relied upon for such
exceptions. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32300.)
A document is considered "filed" when actually received during a regular PERB
business day. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32135, subd. (a), 32130; see also Gov. Code,
§ 11020, subd. (a).) A document is also considered "filed" when received by facsimile
transmission before the close
of
business together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet
which meets the requirements
of
California Code
of
Regulations, title 8, section 32135(d),
provided the filing party also places the original, together with the required number
of
copies
and proof
of
service, in the U.S. mail. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 32135, subds. (b), (c), (d); see
also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 32090, 32130.)
14
Donn Ginoza
Administrative Law Judge