Memarzadeh v. Gutierrez CA1/3 filed 7/20/26

Filed 7/20/26 Memarzadeh v. Gutierrez CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MAHER MEMARZADEH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FRANCISCO ARTURO GUTIERREZ,
Defendant and Respondent.

A171108, A172072

(City and County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. CGC-21-596413)
Maher Memarzadeh sued Francisco Arturo Gutierrez for legal malpractice. For two years, Gutierrez unsuccessfully tried tovideorecord Memarzadeh’s deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.330, subd.(c); undesignated statutory references are to this code.) Despite multiple court orders and escalating sanctions, Memarzadeh failed to appear for a recorded deposition. In the end, the trial court granted Gutierrez’s motion for terminating sanctions and awarded costs.On appeal, Memarzadeh contends the court abused its discretion. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
This discovery disputetraversed a long and winding road.In June 2022, the parties’ counsel agreed Memarzadeh would be deposed on August 3. Gutierrez served a notice of deposition indicating he intended to videorecord the deposition and might use the recording at trial. Memarzadeh’s counsel responded that his client objected to being videotaped “on grounds of invasion of privacy” and proposed that the deposition be “recorded stenographically.” Gutierreznoted the Code of Civil Procedure permits videorecording of depositions and asked for the basis of any privacy objections. Memarzadeh’s counsel did not reply.
Because Memarzadeh failed to serve timely discovery responses in July 2022, Gutierrezserved a notice continuing the deposition to December 5. Again, the notice indicated Gutierrez intended to video record the deposition. Shortly after, Memarzadeh emailed Gutierrez’s attorney objecting to videorecording and argueddoing so would require his consent. He also said he was “afflicted by a medical condition that prohibits [him] from travel” and asked that “any discovery including deposition” be “informally postponed until at least late February 2023” and only be recorded stenographically.He also indicated he intended to substitute in new counsel. Gutierrez’s counsel sent him a link to the December deposition so he could appear remotely rather than travel, but he responded the same day reiterating his “privacy considerations.”
On December 2, 2022, Memarzadeh — now representing himself — filed an ex parte application opposing the videorecordingof the December 5 deposition. He again argued that he had not consented to the recording and thatit would infringe on his “constitutional right to privacy.” He also objected to using Zoom, arguing it would “expose [him] to unnecessary harm and injury” since the companymight obtain and disseminate his private information because he used the platform. The trial court denied the application.
Memarzadeh called into the December 5, 2022deposition. He stayed on the call for seconds, disconnected, and then called back — this pattern repeated for approximately one hour. He could not be sworn in, and Gutierrez’s counsel took a certificate of nonappearance.
On December 23, 2022, Gutierrez filed a motion to compel an in-person videotaped deposition. Before it was heard, Memarzadeh hired a new attorney who agreed to make his client available for a deposition via Zoom on February 27, 2023, and the parties agreed to continue the hearing on the motion. The notice of continuance indicated the depositionwould be videorecorded.
Days after the trial court continued the hearing, Memarzadeh switched attorneys again. The new attorney said he had a conflict on the previously agreed-to deposition date but did not respond to requests for a new date. Accordingly, Gutierrez’s counsel sent a Zoom link for the February 27 deposition. In response, Memarzadeh’s counsel objected to the deposition notice, citing his client’s “right of privacy” and the fact that his client was “still recovering from a medical condition which impairs his ability to attend a Zoom deposition without accommodations being made.” Gutierrez’s counsel appeared at the deposition; Memarzadeh and his attorney did not.
On March 22, 2023, Memarzadeh opposed Gutierrez’s motion to compel an in-person videotaped deposition. He argued that “a videotape of his deposition would impair his future job prospects due to the potential that a background check could unearth it.” And he indicated he was suffering from a “temporary medical condition,” which meant he could not “travel by plane or take any long extensive car trips,” and that he “suffers from nausea if required to stare at a screen or documents for any extended period of time.” Nevertheless, he offered to appear at a deposition on March 28 in his attorney’s San Francisco office. His opposition and declaration did not provide any medical documentation. After a hearing, the trial court granted Gutierrez’s motion to compel an in-person videotaped deposition at his attorney’s office no later than May 2, 2023, with some guidance about what to do if Memarzadeh provided evidence he could not travel.
After Memarzadeh provided a declaration stating he could not travel any sooner than June 1, 2023 due to health issues, Gutierrez served a notice continuingthe deposition to June 2. As before, and consistent with the trial court’s order, the notice stated the deposition would be videorecorded. About a week before the deposition, Memarzadeh’s counsel asked for it to be a “written deposition” due to his client’s “‘syncopal episodes,’” — i.e., fainting. Gutierrez’s counsel declined. Memarzadeh failed to appear at the deposition.
In June 2023, Gutierrez filed his first motion for terminating sanctions. The trial court set it for hearing on July 10. His counsel’s declaration described at length her efforts to obtain a videorecorded deposition and Memarzadeh’s obstructive behavior, including his failure to appear at three noticed depositions. In opposition, Memarzadeh argued that he suffers from “Syncopal Episodes,” which “are triggered by a videotape recording,” and “requests a reasonable accommodation.” He noted his willingness to “take a written deposition” or “sit for a deposition so long as it is not videotaped.” He attached declarations of physicians, which did not contain any diagnosis but averred “the episodes of syncope have occurred under stressful situations related to the presence of a camera” and his “condition causes him additional unusual and extreme stress well beyond what is reasonable during video recordings.” The declarations did notindicate whether the physicians were simply relaying what he had told them about alleged triggers. He also argued that terminating sanctions were unwarranted absent evidence that a lesser sanction would not produce compliance. Gutierrez’s replynoted the declarations’ lack of a diagnosis and the absence of an explanation about the failure to sit for a deposition before the alleged syncopal incidents.
On July 3, 2023 — one week before the hearing on Gutierrez’s first motion for terminating sanctions — Memarzadeh’s counsel filed an ex parte motion to continue the hearing, citing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship and his motion to be relieved as counsel. Gutierrez opposed the request, but the trial court reset the hearing to July 28. On July 14, Memarzadeh’s counsel filed a second ex parte motion to further continue the hearing, again citing a breakdown in his relationship with his client. Gutierrez opposed the second request, lamenting “Plaintiff’s dilatory tactics and games.” (Italics & boldface omitted.)Thecourt continued the hearingto August 31.
On July 26, 2023, Memarzadeh — again representing himself— moved for a protective order against an oral deposition and seeking an order that his deposition be taken by written examination. He argued a video recorded deposition would trigger various symptoms, including syncopal episodes, andattached various declarations of physicians and other medical records. As before, the declarations described his symptoms and indicated he should not “sit for an oral deposition,” but they did not contain a diagnosis regarding his syncope and suggestedthat they based their statement that video recording triggered his symptoms based solely on his report. Finally, he asserted a video recorded deposition would only promote Gutierrez’s arguments if he “were appealing to a race-driven jury to emphasize [Memarzadeh’s] facial aesthetics and color.” In his accompanying declaration, he averred a video recorded deposition would allow Gutierrez to “arbitrarily define and racially express [Memarzadeh’s] personal characteristics, [his] character, [his] general reputation, and [his] mode of living,” and “could interfere with the hiring process.” Gutierrez opposed the motion.
On August 29, 2023 — after a hearing in front of a temporary judge — the trial court accepted the temporary judge’sreport and recommendation,denied the motion for a protective order and written deposition, and ordered Memarzadeh to appear for an in-person video recorded deposition on September 15. The report recounted the lengthy history of the discovery dispute and Memarzadeh’s evidence, concluding he “hasn’t established that he should be deposed via written questions rather than orally.” The report noted that Memarzadeh’s evidence did not contain a “definitive diagnosis” and indicated Memarzadeh was “being further evaluated for syncopal issues.” And it concluded that, if he “cannot participate in the preparation for a trial on a case that he filed, he must file a motion to stay the entire case or dismiss it. He can’t avoid sitting for a deposition. It’s his allegations that are the cornerstone of this lawsuit. Presumably he’s planning to testify and be present at trial.” On August 29,Gutierrez filed a supplemental declaration in support of his firstmotion for terminating sanctions. It advised the trial court that another judge had denied Memarzadeh’s motion for a protective order and ordered him to appear for a deposition on September 15.
On August 31, 2023, atemporary judge heardGutierrez’s motion for terminating sanctions and indicated it would likely recommend denying the motion. It noted such a sanction should be issued only after employing an incremental approach of escalating lesser sanctions. It also noted the trial court recently ordered Memarzadeh to appear for a video recorded deposition and warned him that“if you continue to insist and disobey this August 28th Court order, then — I’m sorry, but then I may have to take that into consideration and recommend terminating sanctions.”
On September 5, 2023, Memarzadeh filedobjections to, and an ex parte motion for relief from, the two trial court orders that he appear for an in-person video recorded deposition.He reiterated arguments about his health andconcerns that the video recording “would be accessible to the public” and would “negatively impact” his chances of “academic employment” and “academic freedom.” He alsoargued again that Gutierrez was not entitled to video record the deposition without his consent. Gutierrez’s opposition noted the long effort to depose Memarzadeh, his shifting and conflicting reasons for not being video recorded, and the fact that his arguments had previously been considered and rejected by the court. The trial court denied Memarzadeh’s motions on September 13.
On September 15, 2023, Memarzadeh failed to appear for the court-ordered deposition. He filed a declaration averring his absence was due to his health and because he was more than 75 miles from the deposition’s location.
On September 29, 2023, the temporary judge who heard the motion for terminating sanction issued hisreport and recommendedthat the trial court deny the motion. He also indicated that, while Memarzadeh’s “non-compliance with the court order is not in dispute,” Gutierrez had not requested lesser sanctions nor shown they would be ineffective. On November 16, the trial court adopted the recommendation.
On December 1, 2023, Gutierrez filed a second motion for terminating sanctions, or — in the alternative — issue, evidentiary, or monetary sanctions. Memarzadeh’s opposition repeated his earlier arguments — in the main, that video recording his deposition required his consent and that his health prevented it.
On February 2, 2024, atemporary judge issued itsreport and recommendation forGutierrez’s second motion for terminating sanctions. It recommended denyingthe request for terminating sanctions but issuingmonetary sanctions of $3,595.50 and contingent evidentiary sanctions should Memarzadeh fail to give his deposition. Specifically, it recommended that he be precluded from providing any testimony at trial if he failed to appear for a deposition by a date certain. The report recounted the lengthy but ultimately unsuccessful efforts to obtain his deposition. It also indicated that, while it was “extremely hesitant to discredit medical records,” “the rationale for [Memarzadeh’s] resistance to videotaping has shifted in ways that make the situation not entirely believable.”And the report noted that,although the submitted medical records indicated that the stress of a video recorded deposition could trigger symptoms, they did not “explain why having a videorecording will be any more stressful than a deposition already is — to say nothing of how stressful live testimony in front of a jury might be, or that they are based on actual experiences of videotaping.” “Absent that sort of clear medical explanation, and considering that the Court has now consistently rejected requests to be excused from videotaping because of medical reasons,” he should be ordered to comply with prior orders requiring a video recorded deposition. The report noted that a video recording could preserve Memarzadeh’s testimony for trial if testifying ultimately proved too stressful, provide a basis — if symptoms arose — for the court to reconsider its orders, and thatmedical personnel and breaks could be provided. On February 22, the court adopted the report and recommendation. Gutierrez noticed a deposition for March 14.
On March 4, 2024, Memarzadeh — once more represented by counsel—sought ex parte relief from the trial court’s order on Memarzadeh’s second motion for sanctionsand requested an order shortening time for a motion for reconsideration. As before, the application relied on Memarzadeh’s health and the written statements of his doctors. The court set the matter for March 18and stayed the depositionuntil March 19. Gutierrez opposed the request.
On March 18, 2024, atemporary judgeheard Memarzadeh’s motion for reconsideration. It observed that video recording the deposition was “critical” and a “huge deal,” since his credibility was key and the video could be used for impeachment. Italso rejected his contention that there was no difference between a video recording and a transcript as “nonsense.”His counsel argued Memarzadeh’s health concerns about “knowing he’s being videotaped” were such that he simply “won’t do it.”
On March 19, 2024, the temporaryjudge issued his report and recommendation on Memarzadeh’s ex parte. It recommended denying hisrequest to reconsider since he failed to “identify new or different facts, circumstances, or law.”It noted he refused Gutierrez’s offer to use the “recording function of Zoom rather than a distinct camera” because — in his view —“the problem is not just the camera, but the awareness that there is a recording of his statements.” It found his “alleged inability to sit for a videorecorded deposition to be not credible.” (Italics added.) On April 9, the trial court adopted the report and recommendation over Memarzadeh’s objections.
Gutierrez again noticed Memarzadeh’s video recorded deposition, this timeon April 22, 2024. Memarzadeh’s counsel objected that he was unavailable on that date, Gutierrez had no right to video record the deposition, and doing so would put his client “at extreme risk of severe, perhaps fatal, health risk.” Gutierrez continued the deposition to May 1, but Memarzadeh did not appear.
On May 6, 2024, Gutierrez filed a third motion for terminating sanctions. Memarzadeh — once more self-represented — opposed,continuing to contend that Gutierrez was not entitled to video record the deposition andthat he could not comply because of his health. Gutierrez’s reply noted Memarzadeh disobeyed various court orders requiring him to appear for a video recorded deposition and continued to give different reasons for refusing to comply. He argued that no sanction would cause Memarzadeh to comply with the court’s orders.
On June 12, 2024 — after hearing the third motion —a discovery referee issued a report and recommendation. The referee recommended granting terminating sanctions and allowing Gutierrez to seek his costs. It noted Memarzadeh’s “medical excuses for non-appearance have been rejected by multiple judges,” he repeatedly disobeyed orders to appear for an “in-person videotaped deposition,” and his “abuse of the discovery process has resulted in escalating sanctions orders, both immediate monetary sanctions and contingent issue sanctions.” Despite the many orders, his “refusal to attend a video deposition is adamant. Sanctions have failed to change his mind.” It also noted his reasons for failing to appear varied over time, from privacy concerns, to worries that a recording could subject him to employment discrimination, to insisting mutual consent was necessary for a recording, to various health-based allegations. All rationales were without merit and repeatedly rejected. It also agreed with prior findings that he “has not demonstrated a health condition which precludes a video deposition.” It thus concluded he had willfully engaged in discovery abuse and, given that lesser sanctions had been employed and proven ineffective, terminating sanctions were warranted.
On June 24, 2024 — two years after the parties initially agreed to Memarzadeh’s deposition — the trial court adopted the referee’sreport and recommendation and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On July 11, Gutierrez sought $44,080.88 in costs. Memarzadeh — again represented by counsel — filed a motion to strike or tax costs. Gutierrez filed an opposition. Ultimately, the trial court awarded $30,551.
DISCUSSION
Memarzadeh challenges the trial court’s discovery orders, issuance of terminating sanctions, and award of costs. We address —and reject — each argument.
I.
Memarzadeh first argues the trial court abused its discretion by requiring a video recorded deposition. We disagree.
We review discovery orders for an abuse of discretion, including protective orders. (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1186; People ex rel. Harris v. Sarpas (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1552.) “The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason.” (Shamblin v. Brattain(1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478.) “Where there is a basis for the trial court’s ruling and it is supported by the evidence, a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion for that of the trial court.” (Lipton v. Superior Court(1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1599, 1612.)We also review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and resolve any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the ruling. (Morales v. City and County of San Francisco (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 43, 49.) If substantial evidence exists, it is of no consequence that the court believing other evidence or drawing other reasonable inferences might have reached a contrary conclusion. (Picerne Construction Corp. v. Castellino Villas (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1209.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring a video recorded deposition. Video recorded depositions are explicitly allowed by statute when requested. (§ 2025.330, subd. (c) [the “party noticing the deposition” may “record the testimony by audio or video technology if the notice of deposition stated an intention also to record the testimony by either of those methods”].) Here, all of Gutierrez’s notices indicated his intent tovideo record the deposition. Moreover, multiple judgesfound Memarzadehto be notcredible. (Fininen v. Barlow (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 185, 189–190 [we defer to credibility determinations].) And various temporary judges concluded video recorded depositions were critical — for example, doing so could capture nonverbal conduct that may aid credibility determinations. (See Myasnyankin v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 283, 292.) Given the court’s concerns with Memarzadeh’s credibility and the statutory basis for video recording depositions, the court did not abuse its discretionby requiring him to participate. (Lipton v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at p. 1612.)
In arguing to the contrary, Memarzadeh contends the trial court’s rulings violatedCalifornia Rules of Court, rule 1.100 — concerning accommodations for disabilities — and the Americans with Disabilities Actof 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.). But he did not raise either contention below and thereby forfeited them. (DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676.) Relying on McKenna v. Beesley (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 552, 571, fn. 19, he argues he nonetheless preserved the argument for our review. But there, the respondents did not contend that appellant forfeited the argument. (Ibid.) Here, Gutierrez does.
In any event, Memarzadeh’s arguments ignore the trialcourt’s factual findings. It repeatedly concludedthat he did “not demonstrate[] a health condition which precludes a video deposition.” Substantial evidence supports those findings. (Picerne Construction Corp. v. Castellino Villas, supra, 244Cal.App.4th at pp. 1208–1209.) Various judicial officers correctly noted his reasons for resisting the deposition varied over time —among them, from privacy concerns, to worries that a recording could subject him to employment discrimination, to insisting mutual consent was necessary for a recording, to various health-based allegations. Contrary to his arguments, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence or drawing other reasonable inferences might have reached a contrary conclusion about his health. (Id. at p. 1209.)
II.
Memarzadeh contends the trial court abused its discretion by ordering terminating sanctions. We disagree.
Section 2025.450, subdivision (d) “ ‘authorizes a trial court to impose’ ” a “ ‘terminating sanction under’ ” section 2023.030 if a party “ ‘deponent “fails to obey an order compelling attendance, testimony, and production.” ’ ” (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 690, 701.) “ ‘Section 2023.030 authorizes a trial court to impose’ ”“ ‘terminating sanctions against “anyone engaging in conduct that is a misuse of the discovery process.” ’ ” (Ibid.)“ ‘The discovery statutes evince an incremental approach to discovery sanctions, starting with monetary sanctions and ending with the ultimate sanction of termination.’ ” (Ibid.)“ ‘If a lesser sanction fails to curb misuse, a greater sanction is warranted: continuing misuses of the discovery process warrant incrementally harsher sanctions until the sanction is reached that will curb the abuse.’ ” (Id. at pp. 701–702.)Although “ ‘ “[a] decision to order terminating sanctions should not be made lightly,” ’ ” where “ ‘ “a violation is willful, preceded by a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in imposing” ’ ” the sanction. (Id. at p. 702.)
“ ‘We review the trial court’s order under the abuse of discretion standard and resolve all evidentiary conflicts most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.’ ” (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th atp. 702.)“ ‘The question before us “ ‘is not whether the trial court should have imposed a lesser sanction; rather, the question is whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing the sanction it chose.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) It“ ‘is appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.’ ” (Ibid.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by issuing terminating sanctions. (Creed-21 v. City of Wildomar, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at pp. 701–702.) The record demonstrates thatit gave Memarzadeh ample opportunity to sit for a video recorded deposition and comply with its discovery orders, but he refused. It waited two years after the parties initially agreed to his deposition before terminating the proceedings. Meanwhile, Memarzadeh failed to appear at several noticed depositions and defied multiple court orders. Moreover, the court issued lessermonetary and evidentiary sanctions before terminating sanctions,butboth proved ineffective. The court also warned Memarzadeh that terminating sanctions might issue if he continued to flout the court’s orders. Thus, the record revealsmultiple willful discovery violations, incremental sanctions to encourage compliance, and evidence that lesser sanctions had not and would not curb the abuse. On this record, the court thus did not abuse its discretion by issuing terminating sanctions. (Creed-21, at pp. 701–702.)
In arguing to the contrary, Memarzadeh contends he did not willfully disobey trial court orders because he missed the depositions for medical reasons. But the court repeatedly found otherwise and— as explained above— substantial evidence supports that finding. (Picerne Construction Corp. v. Castellino Villas, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1208–1209.)He also— relying on Societe Internationale v. Rogers (1958) 357 U.S. 197 and Gocolay v. New Mexico Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (10th Cir. 1992) 968 F.2d 1017 — contends terminating sanctions violated his due process rights. But in Rogers, aparty could not comply with a production order because foreignlaws prohibited it from doing so. (Rogers, at pp. 200–201, 211–212.)Here, Memarzadeh does not claim that foreign laws are the problem. In Gocolay,the partydeponent had a “physician’s diagnosis” that “predated the first deposition” attempt. (Gocolay, at p. 1021.) Here, the court found no credible diagnosis, and Memarzadeh’s reliance on a health condition only arose after other reasons failed to persuade the court.
III.
Memarzadeh challenges the trial court’s costs award on multiple grounds. Weset forth additional background andaddress each claim.
After the trial court dismissed Memarzadeh’s case, Gutierrez sought $44,080.88 in costs. Specifically, he sought $5,861.78 in filing and motion fees, $3,179.55 in process server fees, $21,344 in witness fees, $3,847.50 in court reporter fees, and $9,848.05 in “[o]ther” fees. Memarzadeh moved to tax the costs. He argued that the filing and motion fees were — by his calculations — inflated, the process server feeswere unreasonable, Gutierrez could not collect expert costs because he only made a “token” settlement offer, the reporter fees improperly included transcript costs, and the “other” costs were too vague to award. Gutierrez opposed andprovided redacted invoices to support his expenditures. At the hearing,Gutierrez explained that the experts reviewed discovery and provided opinions on Memarzadeh’s claimsand reports in preparation for trial.
After the hearing, the trial court awarded $30,551 in costs. Ittaxed the entirety of Gutierrez’s“other” costs and a portion of the filing fees but awarded the remainder. As to Gutierrez’s expert costs, it concluded that hemade a valid settlement offer.
Memarzadeh first contends that the trial court erred by concluding that the settlement offer was valid. We disagree.
Section 998 provides that if a defendant makes a settlement offer “which is rejected,” and “ ‘the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award,’ ” “the plaintiff . . . ‘shall pay thedefendant’s costs from the time of the offer,’ and may be required to pay some postoffer expert witness costs.” (Madrigal v. Hyundai Motor America (2025) 17 Cal.5th 592, 602–603.)But the decision to award expert costs is discretionary, anda “ ‘token or nominal offer’ ” may not satisfy the requirements of section 998. (Martinez v. Brownco Construction Co. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1014, 1026; Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692, 697–698.) We review a trial court’s costs award — and its ruling on the validity of asection 998 offer — for abuse of discretion. (State of California ex. rel. Rapier v. Encino Hospital Medical Center (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 811, 839; Elrod, atp. 700.)
Memarzadeh’s argumentsfail to persuade. (Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel, Inc., supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 700[where defendant “obtains a judgment more favorable than its offer, the judgment constitutes prima facie evidence”the offer was valid, and the burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate otherwise].) He begins by contending that Gutierrez’s $40,000 offer was a “token” one because he alleged$485,000 in damages, but he fails to support thosefactual assertions with record citationsandtherebyforfeits them. (Audish v. Macias (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 740,751.) Moreover, he does not present any authority suggesting such an offer is invalid. (Ibid. [we may disregard conclusory argument not supported by authority].) He alsorelies on Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 918 and Najera v. Huerta (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 872, 878–879 to argue the offer was invalid because Gutierrez “made [it]. . . earlyin the litigation” when Memarzadeh “had every reason to believe his lawsuit would be successful.” But in Licudine and Najera, the court focused not only on the time the offer was made, but the information and opportunity the offeree had to evaluate the offer. (Licudine, at pp. 926–928; Najera, at pp. 878–879.) Memarzadeh does not contend he had inadequate information here.
Next — relying on Michelson v. Camp (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 955, 976—Memarzadeharguesthe trial court erred by awarding expert costs becausetheinvoicesGutierrez provided were redacted and did not state what “services the experts provided.” ButGutierrez provided that information at the hearing. The experts reviewed discovery and provided opinions on Memarzadeh’s claims and reports in preparation for trial. Between the invoices and the hearing, Gutierrez “explained” the hours the experts expended and what they had done. (Id. at p. 976.) In any event, Campconcerned Government Code section 68092.5’s limitation on expert witness fees to reasonable and customary hourly rates. (Camp, at pp. 975–976.) Here, the redacted billing statements alone provided the expert’s hourly rate and hours they expended.
Next, Memarzadehargues the trial court abused its discretion by awarding expert costs because the award is“highly unjust.”Not so. The case was delayed and ultimately dismissed because Memarzadeh abused the discovery process for years. In the meantime, Gutierrez incurred the cost of preparing for trial — including retaining experts. Memarzadeh fails to demonstrate why awarding costs for expertsin such circumstances constitutes an abuse of discretion. (Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685 [appellant must “affirmatively demonstrate error through reasoned argument, citation to the appellate record, and discussion of legal authority”].)
Finally, Memarzadeh contends that the trial court erred by awarding “the other categories of costs”(capitalizations omitted) because Gutierrez did not justify themWe are unpersuaded. (Bullock v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 685.) He begins by arguing the court double counted Gutierrez’s initial filing fee, but hedoes not provide record citations to supporthis claim and thereby forfeits it. (Audish v. Macias, supra, 102Cal.App.5th at p. 751.) He also arguesthat the “service of process fees were not reasonable and necessary” (capitalizations omitted) and that “ ‘court reporter fees’ should have been taxed as not reasonable or necessary” (capitalizations omitted), but he fails to provide any authority supporting his arguments and the claim thus fails. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Gutierrezshall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)

_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

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TUCHER, P. J.

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PETROU, J.

A171108, A172072; Memarzadeh v. Gutierrez