Co. of LA v. Seneca Ins. Co.

Filed 9/27/02 County of Los Angeles v. Seneca Ins. Co. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
SENECA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Appellant.
B152761
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BS070972)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Robert
M. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Nunez & Bernstein and E. Alan Nunez for Defendant and Appellant.
Steve Cooley, District Attorney, Brent Riggs and Fred Klink, Deputy District
Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________
Seneca Insurance Company appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor
of the County of Los Angeles for enforcement of forfeiture of a bail bond posted by
Seneca on behalf of criminal defendant Seung Hyun Noh. Seneca contends that the bond
was exonerated by operation of law when the trial court failed to remand Noh to custody
following his guilty plea without stating reasons for permitting Noh to continue on bail as

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purportedly required by Penal Code section 1166 (section 1166).1 As we read section
1166, it is limited to situations where a verdict has been rendered and has no application
to convictions by plea. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in failing to
make findings under section 1166 and affirm the summary judgment against Seneca.
BACKGROUND
Seneca issued a bail bond to secure Noh’s release pending the resolution of
criminal charges against him in Los Angeles Superior Court case No. KA045412. On
May 23, 2000, Noh pleaded guilty to receiving stolen property. Bail was allowed to
stand, but no mention was made of the factors enumerated in section 1166. Noh failed to
appear for his scheduled sentencing on June 21, 2000, and bail was declared forfeited. In
November, Seneca moved to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bond, arguing that the
trial court had failed to comply with section 1166. On December 30, 2000, Seneca’s
motion was denied. Seneca appealed and secured a ruling reversing the trial court’s
order. (See People v. Seneca Ins. Co. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1358 (Seneca I).) The
Supreme Court later granted review. (Mar. 13, 2002, S104487.)
While the appeal in Seneca I was pending, Seneca filed a request to toll time to
vacate forfeiture in the event of Noh’s surrender or arrest. Defendant did not surrender or
appear within the tolling period.
1 Section 1166 provides: “If a general verdict is rendered against the defendant, or
a special verdict is given, he or she must be remanded, if in custody, or if on bail he or
she shall be committed to the proper officer of the county to await the judgment of the
court upon the verdict, unless, upon considering the protection of the public, the
seriousness of the offense charged and proven, the previous criminal record of the
defendant, the probability of the defendant failing to appear for the judgment of the court
upon the verdict, and public safety, the court concludes the evidence supports its decision
to allow the defendant to remain out on bail. When committed, his or her bail is
exonerated, or if money is deposited instead of bail it must be refunded to the defendant
or to the person or persons found by the court to have deposited said money on behalf of
said defendant.”

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On August 10, 2001, Los Angeles Superior Court case No. BS070972 was filed.
In that case, the trial court granted a clerk’s application for entry of judgment and
summary judgment on forfeited bond based on Noh’s failure to appear in case
No. KA045412. Judgment was entered on August 14. On August 23, 2001, Seneca filed
the notice from which the instant appeal has been taken. (Seneca II.)
DISCUSSION
Seneca contends that notwithstanding the express language of section 1166
referencing a conviction by verdict, the legislative history of the statute demonstrates that
it should be interpreted to include convictions by plea. County argues that section 1166
means what it says and that it applies only to situations in which there has been a verdict.
The issue will be decided by our Supreme Court. (See People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 1286 (Second Dist., Div. Six), review granted Mar. 13, 2002, S103451
[holding that section 1166 does not include conviction by plea] (Ranger); Seneca I,
supra, 94 Cal.App.4th 1358 (Second Dist., Div. Three), review granted Mar. 13, 2002,
S104487 [disagreeing with Ranger, supra, and noting that Ranger did not examine
pertinent legislative history]; People v. Ranger Ins. Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 818 (Sixth
Dist.), review granted May 15, 2002, S105702 [disagreeing with Seneca I and noting that
legislative history should not be considered where a statute is clear and unambiguous].)
Pending resolution by the Supreme Court, we find no ambiguity in the statute. We
are also well aware that, at least in Los Angeles County Superior Court, the parties
typically expect that a defendant will not be remanded to custody following a guilty plea.
Finally, even assuming section 1166 does apply to a plea, the statute does not contain a
requirement that specific findings be made on its enumerated factors, and there is no
reason to presume that the trial court did not perform the official duty of considering
these factors in determining whether or not to revoke bail. (Cf. In re Podesto (1976) 15
Cal.3d 921, 938 [trial court should state reasons for denial of bail on appeal].)
County argues that, because Seneca I presents the identical facts and identical
issue as the appeal in Seneca II (i.e., whether the bond was exonerated as a matter of law
on May 23, 2000, when Noh entered his guilty plea and bail was allowed to stand),

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Seneca II should be dismissed. We recognize the anomaly presented by separate
resolution of the two appeals, noting that Seneca I emanates from the criminal
prosecution and Seneca II from the civil summary judgment. (We further recognize the
irony of Seneca, by virtue of pursuing Seneca II following its success in Seneca I, now
standing on the brink of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.) But we see no reason
to dismiss Seneca II. We expect that the Supreme Court will grant review in due course
in this case and ultimately remand it with directions to conduct further proceedings in
accordance with that court’s resolution of the section 1166 issue. Until that time, we
conclude that summary judgment was properly entered against Seneca here.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MALLANO, J.
We concur:
SPENCER, P. J.
VOGEL (MIRIAM A.), J.

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