P. v. Martin

Filed 9/13/17 P. v. Martin CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CENTIA RENEE MARTIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
B267500
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA091874)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Scott T. Millington, Morris B. Jones, and
Dudley Gray II, Judges. Affirmed.
Robert D. Bacon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Shawn McGahey Webb and Noah P. Hill,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________________

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INTRODUCTION
Following a trial at which Centia Renee Martin
represented herself and did not testify, a jury convicted Martin of
first degree murder and found true an allegation she personally
used a firearm during the commission of the offense. Martin
argues the trial court erred by initially denying her request under
Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 to represent herself.
Martin also contends the trial court violated her right to testify
by denying her request to play a video recording of her post-
arrest police interrogation in lieu of live direct testimony.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Martin’s
initial request to represent herself because her request was not
unequivocal. We also conclude the trial court did not violate
Martin’s right to testify because the court properly excluded the
video recording as inadmissible hearsay and Martin, despite
receiving every opportunity to testify at trial, chose not to do so.
Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Martin Meets a Client at a Building in Inglewood
Robert Crigler was 74 years old and lived in Arizona with
his long-time girlfriend, Madeleine Clark, but he spent two or
three days a week in Inglewood, California at a building he
managed. The building included an office and living quarters.
On Saturday, January 10, 2015, Crigler sent text messages
and made telephone calls to Martin and requested her services as
a topless maid, inviting her to come to his building in Inglewood

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that afternoon. When Martin arrived, she parked her SUV in the
building parking lot.
Crigler had plans the next day to meet a friend for brunch,
but Crigler did not show up, call the friend, or answer his phone
when his friend called him throughout the day. On Monday his
office manager, Elida Fino, arrived at the building and saw both
of Crigler’s cars in the parking lot and his office door open. Fino
noticed the lights were off and Crigler was not there, which Fino
found “odd.”
Meanwhile, Clark, who was concerned because she had not
heard from Crigler since Saturday evening, called Fino. Upon
hearing Fino had not seen Crigler, Clark asked Fino to check
Crigler’s living quarters. There was no answer when Fino
knocked. Fino asked one of the maintenance workers to lift a
ceiling tile in Crigler’s office and look down into the adjacent
living quarters. As the worker shined a flashlight into the
darkened unit, which was uncharacteristically messy, Martin
emerged from the bedroom and said, “Leave me alone. This is my
apartment. I live here.” Fino called the police.
When the police arrived, Martin came out of the living
quarters, and the officers conducted a brief protective sweep to
make sure no one else was present. Martin told the police she
worked as a topless maid and met Crigler online. She said
Crigler sometimes paid her for sex and gave her permission to
stay in the unit. Martin produced the keys to the unit and
showed the officers the text messages from Crigler on her phone.
She said Crigler had left the night before and did not say where
he was going. Based on the text messages and Martin’s
possession of keys to the unit, the police decided to leave and
allowed Martin to stay.

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The police returned the next morning to investigate
Crigler’s disappearance, but by then Martin had left. After a
more extensive search of the living quarters, the police found
what appeared to be blood stains on the sheets and on a towel
inside a fold-out couch, along with a shotgun with a broken stock.
They also noticed blood stains throughout the apartment,
including on a kitchen knife and on a bottle of cleaning solution,
and hair on the living room door frame. The officers eventually
discovered Crigler’s naked body, wrapped in a blood-stained
blanket in a storage container in the back room of the unit. They
found a board with a Home Depot label and pieces of wood from
the broken shotgun on top of Crigler’s body. The police also found
an orange bucket, a hammer, a box of nails, four bags of cement
mix, wooden shelves, and a plastic Home Depot shopping bag
with a receipt inside.
Video surveillance footage revealed that, while Crigler’s car
had remained in the building parking lot since he arrived
Saturday afternoon, Martin’s SUV left on Sunday and returned
approximately five hours later, at which point she removed some
items from her SUV, including what appeared to be an orange
Home Depot bucket. A store security system from a nearby
Home Depot store confirmed Martin had purchased a bucket,
nails, laminate wood boards, cement mix, and a hammer that
day.
An autopsy revealed Crigler had numerous deep
lacerations to his face and head consistent with having been
beaten with a shotgun, and he had a wide, gaping cut across his
neck. A fingerprint analysis determined Martin’s fingerprints
matched bloody fingerprints left on the shotgun. Aside from the

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DNA of Martin and Crigler, the police found no evidence of
anyone else’s DNA in the living quarters.
B. The Trial Court Denies Martin’s Initial Request
To Represent Herself But Grants the Request at the
Next Hearing
On February 10, 2015 the court held a pretrial hearing at
which Martin was represented by a deputy public defender. Over
Martin’s objection, the deputy public defender asked the court to
continue the matter because he had not received certain
discovery from the prosecutor. Following a discussion among the
court, the prosecutor, and the public defender about the
outstanding discovery, the court addressed Martin directly.
“The Court: Did you understand what was just said, Miss
Martin?
“Martin: I do understand what was just said, but I do not
agree with my attorney. All I want to know is do they have a
search warrant for searching my apartment.
“The Court: Well, that part of it is not before me as far as
the search warrant is concerned. However, you have the right to
have an effective representation in this case and this is
guaranteed by federal law.
“Martin: Yes, sir.
“The Court: The court is going to continue this matter over
your objection.
“Martin: I have a question. Can I fire my attorney? I do
want to fire my attorney right now.
“The Court: No, ma’am. You have a right to hire an
attorney if you so desire.
“Martin: I will represent myself.

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“The Court: It’s strictly up to you.
“Martin: I would like to represent myself.
“The Court: I will not take this up at this juncture.
“Martin: I would like to represent myself.
“The Court: The matter is continued.”
The court stated it was continuing the matter to March 5,
2015, at which point Martin asked the following:
“Martin: How can I get a new lawyer? How can I represent
myself?
“The Court: Just a moment. You can get a list of
attorneys—
“Martin: I want to represent myself.
“The Court: Well, that’s up to you.
“Martin: Yes. So how do I go about that?
“The Court: We’ll take that up on March the 5th. Thank
you.”
Nevertheless, the court recalled the case that afternoon,
noting Martin had indicated in the morning she wanted to
represent herself. The court confirmed that was “what [she]
would like to do” and gave her “some papers” to fill out “related to
[her] qualifications . . . and [her] ability to represent [herself] in
this matter.” After reviewing those papers, presumably a waiver
form, the court stated, “It appears that you understand the legal
ramifications of representing yourself. However, the court is not
satisfied at this juncture that you are qualified to represent
yourself simply because of the amount of discovery that’s still
outstanding. Counsel cannot turn over what he does not have.
The court will deny your motion for pro per status at this
juncture. That is without prejudice which means you can raise
that issue at the next court hearing. The motion is denied at this

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juncture.” Martin responded, “So can I get an explanation by
anybody like what happened? Why would you deny it?” The
court replied, “I just explained to you why I denied it.”
The next hearing was approximately three weeks later, on
March 5, 2015. A different judge presided, and Martin was
represented by a different public defender. The court and counsel
again discussed the discovery issue and Martin’s court-appointed
attorney, against Martin’s wishes, agreed to waive Martin’s right
to a speedy trial for purposes of a continuance. The deputy public
defender told the court, “We’re at a bit of an impasse, and I’m
asking the court to consider the work that needs to be done on
this very serious case, and I’ve asked Miss Martin to reconsider
waiving time because I do believe it’s in her best interest.”
Following additional discussion about the status of the
discovery, Martin’s court-appointed counsel raised the issue of
self-representation: “Your Honor, outstanding also at the last
hearing, I’d like to ask the court to perhaps inquire of Miss
Martin because I’m not sure what her position is today, is her
request of Faretta waiver and request to go pro per in this case.
So I want the record to be clear what her position is with regards
to that before making a decision. I don’t believe that Miss Martin
wants to go pro per, but I may be wrong.” At which point Martin
interjected, “I will. I will go pro per. Yes, I would like to go pro
per in this matter.” The court confirmed Martin’s desire to waive
her right to counsel, engaged in a colloquy advising her against
doing so, and, after “really trying to talk [her] out of this,” the
court granted her request to represent herself, noting she had “a
constitutional right to make this horrible mistake.” Martin
thereafter represented herself, including at the preliminary
hearing several months later and throughout trial.

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C. Martin Does Not Testify at Trial
Near the end of the prosecution’s case, the court advised
Martin it was her decision “whether or not to testify in this
matter” and explained the instruction the court would give if
Martin decided not to testify. Later, at a sidebar conference, the
court asked Martin if she was going to testify, and Martin
responded, “No, I’m ready to get this over with.” After Martin
concluded questioning her only witness, a character witness, she
told the court, “I have no other witnesses. Defense rests.”
Outside the presence of the jury, the following exchange
occurred:
“The Court: Again, I want to advise you, Ms. Martin, you
have the absolute constitutional right not to testify. You also
have the absolute constitutional right to testify in this matter. I
told you what I would read to the jury should you choose not to
testify. Are you telling me you do not want to testify?
“Martin: Because I’ve been my own lawyer throughout the
situation, I would rather my interrogation video from January
20th, which would be after the incident before I had a chance to
view all this case stuff, do all this work on the trial, to be entered
as my testimony. I will even allow [the prosecutor] to ask me
questions based on that as his [cross-examination].
“The Court: How do you get in your statements to the
detectives? As I indicated, under Evidence Code section 1220 an
admission is allowed as a hearsay exception by a party opponent.
How do you get it in? Tell me the exception you’re offering for the
truth of the matter asserted.”
Martin did not provide an exception but rather stated it
would not be fair to the jury or the prosecutor for her testify at
trial “because I’ve been on this case for eight months as the

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lawyer” and “I know it inside out.” The trial court ruled the video
was “not coming in unless you have an exception to the hearsay
rule. I haven’t heard it.” The trial court again asked Martin, “Do
you want to testify in this matter, yes or no?” Martin said, “No.”
D. Martin Is Convicted and Sentenced
The jury found Martin guilty of first degree murder and
found the firearm enhancement true. The trial court sentenced
Martin to a prison term of 25 years to life, plus 10 years for the
enhancement. Martin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Violate Martin’s Right To
Represent Herself Because Her Initial Request Was
Not Unequivocal
In Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806 the United
States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth Amendment a
criminal defendant “has a constitutional right to proceed without
counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.”
(Id. at p. 807; see id. at pp. 819-821 [“[t]he right to defend is given
directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if
the defense fails”].) At the same time, the defendant also has a
constitutional right to representation by counsel at all critical
stages of a criminal proceeding. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27
Cal.4th 1041, 1069; see ibid. [a criminal defendant’s right to
representation by counsel and right to represent himself or
herself are “mutually exclusive”]; People v. James (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 323, 328.) The right to representation by counsel “is
self-executing; the defendant need make no request for counsel in

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order to be entitled to legal representation. [Citation.] The right
to counsel persists unless the defendant affirmatively waives that
right.” (Koontz, at p. 1069.) Thus, “the federal Constitution
requires assiduous protection of the right to counsel,” and “courts
must draw every inference against supposing that the defendant
wishes to waive the right to counsel.” (People v. Marshall (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1, 20, 23, citing Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S.
387, 404.) The United States Supreme Court, however, “has not
extended the same kind of protection to the right of self-
representation.” (Marshall, supra, at p. 20.)
The right to self-representation has limits. (See Indiana v.
Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164, 171 [“Faretta itself and later cases
have made clear that the right of self-representation is not
absolute”]; People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 206 [“[t]he
autonomy and dignity interests underlying our willingness to
recognize the right of self-representation may be outweighed, on
occasion, by countervailing considerations of justice and the
state’s interest in efficiency”]; People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th
814, 825 [“[t]here are limits on the right to act as one’s own
attorney”].) Relevant here, a “court may deny a request for self-
representation that is equivocal [or] made in passing anger or
frustration.” (Butler, at p. 824; see People v. Watts (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 621, 629 [a request for self-representation “must be
unequivocal and must not be an ill-considered decision that is a
function of annoyance or frustration”]; see also U.S. v. Mendez-
Sanchez (9th Cir. 2009) 563 F.3d 935, 945-946 [“[b]ecause the
exercise of self-representation cuts off the exercise of the right to
counsel, often to individual detriment, we recognize the right only
when it is asserted without equivocation. . . . ‘[I]f [the defendant]
equivocates, he is presumed to have requested the assistance of

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counsel’”].) Courts require the defendant to make an unequivocal
request for self-representation “‘“in order to protect the courts
against clever defendants who attempt to build reversible error
into the record by making an equivocal request for self-
representation.”’” (People v. Weeks (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 882,
886, quoting People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 683,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45
Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)
To determine whether a defendant’s request for self-
representation is unequivocal, the court “should evaluate not only
whether the defendant has stated the motion clearly, but also the
defendant’s conduct and other words. Because the court should
draw every reasonable inference against waiver of the right to
counsel, the defendant’s conduct or words reflecting ambivalence
about self-representation may support the court’s decision to
deny the defendant’s motion.” (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p.
23; see People v. Ruffin (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 536, 545.) Indeed,
“the Faretta right is forfeited unless the defendant ‘“articulately
and unmistakably”’ demands to proceed in propria persona.”
(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 99; accord, People v. Boyce
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 703.) “[A]n insincere request or one made
under the cloud of emotion may be denied.” (Marshall, supra, at
p. 21; see People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 932 [“‘a
[Faretta] motion made out of a temporary whim, or out of
annoyance or frustration, is not unequivocal—even if the
defendant has said he or she seeks self-representation’”].) As
such, “courts have concluded that under some circumstances,
remarks facially resembling requests for self-representation were
equivocal, insincere, or the transitory product of emotion.”
(People v. Tena (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 598, 607.)

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Specifically, courts may properly deny a request for self-
representation as equivocal when made as an “impulsive
response” or an “equivocal, emotional reaction” to the denial of a
motion under People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to replace
appointed counsel. (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044,
1087; see People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 99 [single
reference to right of self-representation made immediately
following denial of Marsden motion indicated the defendant did
not make an unequivocal motion for self-representation]; People
v. Scott (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 [request for self-
representation was equivocal when made immediately after the
court denied the defendant’s Marsden motion and the defendant’s
comments suggested he asked to represent himself “only because
he wanted to rid himself of appointed counsel”]; see also People v.
Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 932-933 [request “for self-
representation during a renewed Marsden motion . . . out of
apparent annoyance or frustration with his first appointed
counsel” was evidence the defendant’s waiver of counsel was not
knowing and intelligent].) For example, the California Supreme
Court in Marshall held the defendant’s request to represent
himself was equivocal because he was displeased with his
appointed counsel over an order to give blood and tissue samples
and the defendant made the request to avoid giving the samples.
(See Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 25.) Similarly, the court in
Tena concluded the defendant’s requests for self-representation
were “impulsive reactions to his frustrated attempts to secure an
attorney who would subpoena the witnesses that he desired,
rather than unequivocal Faretta requests.” (Tena, supra, 156
Cal.App.4th at p. 608; see People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269,
296 [“defendant’s references to self-representation were

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equivocal, born primarily of frustration regarding the granting of
counsel’s requests for continuances and his desire to avoid
further psychiatric examination”].)
Reviewing the entire transcript and considering Martin’s
statements in context, we conclude Martin’s initial request for
self-representation was not unequivocal.1 Rather, the record
supports the conclusion that Martin’s request arose from her
frustration and disagreement with her appointed counsel’s
request for a continuance, exacerbated by Martin’s preoccupation
with whether the police had obtained a warrant for the search of
her apartment.2 Notably, immediately after the trial court stated
1 ‘“In determining on appeal whether the defendant invoked
the right to self-representation, we examine the entire record
de novo.”’ (People v. Stanley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 932, quoting
People v. Dent (2003) 30 Cal.4th 213, 217-218; see People v.
Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 205 [“[w]e review a Faretta waiver
de novo, and examine the entire record to determine the validity
of a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel.”) Even if the trial
court’s stated reason for denying Martin’s request to represent
herself— the amount of discovery still outstanding—was
arguably improper, we may still affirm the court’s ruling if the
record shows the court properly denied the request on other
grounds. (People v. Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 218.)
2 Not only had Martin indicated “all [she] want[ed] to know”
at the February 10, 2015 hearing was whether the police had
obtained a warrant for the search of her apartment, at the next
hearing, when the court granted her request to represent herself,
Martin agreed to a 30-day continuance so she could learn “what’s
going on, the evidence against me, why they’re saying I did
something. What—everything they have. What search warrants
they have, what search warrants they don’t have.”

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it was going to continue the matter over her objection, Martin
asked if she could “fire” her attorney and stated she wanted to
“fire [her] attorney right now.” When the court said she could not
do that, Martin stated, “I will represent myself.” Immediately
after that, Martin asked, “How can I get a new lawyer? How can
I represent myself?” Thus, Martin vacillated in rapid succession
between wanting to fire her appointed counsel, represent herself,
and secure “a new lawyer.” Such impulsive responses to the
court’s ruling, and her appointed counsel’s role in securing that
ruling, show that her request for self-representation was not
unequivocal.
Nor does it matter, as Martin asserts in her reply brief,
that the trial court “did not think her request was equivocal, and
gave no indication of ever considering that it could be denied for
that reason.” The California Supreme Court rejected that
argument in Marshall, concluding the defendant’s apparent
request for self-representation “was ambivalent in the context of
that hearing,” notwithstanding that the trial court had described
the request as one for self-representation and made no express
finding the request was equivocal. (Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th
at p. 25; see Tena, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 607 [“[i]n
assessing [the defendant’s] remarks, we are not bound by [the
trial court’s] responses, and [its] failure to make express findings
on this matter does not oblige us to conclude that [the
defendant’s] Faretta rights were infringed”].)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Deny Martin Her Right To
Testify
Martin contends the trial court’s exclusion of the videotape
of her police interrogation “impermissibly diminished” her

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constitutional right to testify at trial in her defense. Martin
argues the ruling was an abuse of discretion and requires
reversal.
A criminal defendant has constitutional rights to testify on
his or her behalf and present witnesses and evidence in support
of a defense. (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 218.) These
rights, however, “are ‘subject to reasonable restrictions.’” (Ibid.)
Thus, the right to testify “‘may, in appropriate cases, bow to
accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process,’” and “[i]n applying its evidentiary rules a State must
evaluate whether the interests served by a rule justify the
limitation imposed on the defendant’s constitutional right to
testify.” (Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44, 55-56; accord,
People v. Mickel, at pp. 218-219; see U.S. v. Gallagher (9th Cir.
1996) 99 F.3d 329, 332 [“the right of a defendant to take the
stand in his own defense and present relevant testimony . . . is
not . . . without limitation”].)
In particular, a criminal defendant “must comply with
established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure
both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and
innocence.” (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302.)
‘“As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not
impermissibly infringe on the accused’s right to present a
defense.”’ (People v. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 218; see Taylor
v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400, 410 [“[t]he accused does not have
an unfettered right to offer testimony that is . . . otherwise
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence”]; accord, People v.
Noori (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 964, 978.) “[T]he routine
application of provisions of the state Evidence Code law does not
implicate a criminal defendant’s constitutional rights. [Citation.]

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Instead, because the trial court merely excluded some
evidence . . . and did not preclude defendant from presenting a
defense, any error would be one of state evidentiary law only.”
(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 957.) We review a trial
court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence, including
questions of hearsay, for abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725; see People v. Jones, at p. 956 [“a trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude a hearsay statement . . . will
not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of
discretion”].)
Martin does not challenge the court’s ruling the videotape
was hearsay, nor does she offer any potentially applicable
hearsay exception. Instead, Martin argues that the trial court
erred in “taking the hearsay rule too literally” and that the
court’s refusal to allow her to play the interrogation tape (then
allow the prosecution to cross-examine her) in lieu of testifying on
direct examination violated her constitutional right to testify.
Martin offers no support for the proposition that a defendant’s
right to testify includes the right to play a recording of a police
interrogation. She argues only, without citation to authority,
that “of all the competing principles implicated by [Martin’s]
request, the overriding one is her constitutional right to testify.”
Although not mentioned by the parties, the California
Supreme Court has provided guidance on this issue, and it
supports the trial court’s ruling. For example, in People v.
Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287 the defendant argued the trial
court’s exclusion of a tape recording of his post-arrest police
interrogation violated his constitutional rights to due process, a
fair sentencing hearing, and a reliable penalty phase
determination. (Id. at p. 317). The Supreme Court disagreed,

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concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
the tape as inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at pp. 318-319.)3 In People
v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72 the Supreme Court held the trial
court did not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights by
excluding as hearsay the defendant’s videotaped police interview.
The Supreme Court stated, “[T]he circumstance that defendant
made his statements during a postarrest police interrogation,
when he had a compelling motive to minimize his culpability for
the murder and to play on the sympathies of his interrogators,
indicated a lack of trustworthiness.” (Jurado, at pp. 128-130; see
People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 704-705 [trial court
properly excluded hearsay tape recording of the defendant’s
police interrogation made shortly after arrest]; see also People v.
Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 780 [“a state is generally not
required to admit evidence in a form inadmissible under state
law,” and the “same lack of reliability that makes the statements
excludable under state law makes them excludable under the
federal Constitution”].)
Martin could have taken the stand and told the jury her
version of the events. (See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th
557, 605 [“[d]efendant was free to present . . . information” that
would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay “by taking the stand
3 Martin’s offer to submit to cross-examination did not cure
the hearsay problem. The defendant in Williams testified at
trial, and the court still properly excluded the tape recording.
(Williams, supra, at 40 Cal.4th at pp. 297-299; see People v.
Anderson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 851, 877-878 [citing Williams
and rejecting the argument that the hearsay rule did not apply
because the defendant testified at trial and subjected himself to
cross-examination].)

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himself”].) The trial court gave Martin every opportunity to
testify and tell the jury the same (or different) things she told the
police in her interview, so the jury could evaluate her testimony
live and under oath.4 Martin chose not to do so. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion or violate Martin’s constitutional
rights in excluding the videotape as hearsay.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
PERLUSS, P. J. ZELON, J.
4 On appeal Martin suggests for the first time “[i]t would
have been proper to require her to affirm orally in open court the
content of her recorded statements after taking the witness oath
and before the video was played and before she submitted to
cross-examination.” Because Martin did not raise this possibility
in the trial court, however, she has forfeited the argument. (See
People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 821.) In any event, the
procedure Martin proposes would not have changed the fact that
her post-arrest statements were out-of-court statements, nor
would it have cured the hearsay problems that playing the out-of-
court statements by Martin and the interviewing officer would
have raised.

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