Rankin v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation CA2/7 filed 8/4/26

Filed 8/4/26 Rankin v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

EDDIE RANKIN,

Plaintiff andAppellant,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION et al.,

DefendantsandRespondents.

B329895

(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV35345)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,Gail Killefer, Judge.Affirmed in part, reversedin part, and remanded withdirections.
Law Office of Lincoln W. Ellis and Lincoln W. Ellisfor Plaintiffand Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, R. Lawrence Bragg, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Neah Huynh, Martha Ehlenbach andGurpreet Sandhu, Deputy Attorneys General,for Defendants and Respondents.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Eddie Rankinsued the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and correctional officer Amir Kardouni, alleging civil rights violations by both defendants, battery by Kardouni, and negligence by CDCRrelating to Kardouni during Rankin’s former incarceration.Rankin appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to CDCR and Kardouni. The court determined CDCR was statutorily immune from suit, and Rankin had not demonstrated a triable issue of material fact as to Kardouni regardingthe alleged battery and civil rights violations.
We affirm the grant of summary judgment to CDCR. But we reverse the summary judgment for Kardouni because Rankin established genuine issues of material fact regardinghis battery and civil rights claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rankin’s Complaint
Rankin, through retained counsel, sued CDCR and Kardouni in October 2019. The Office of the Attorney Generalrepresented both defendants.
Rankin alleged that on September 29, 2018, he was incarcerated when he requested medical assistance. At that time, Rankin was “partially paralyzed from the waist down” and “needed the permission and assistance of CDCR to move to obtain medical assistance.” Rankin alleged that Kardouni responded to his request, insulted Rankin, lifted Rankin “up above waist level” and “dropped” him on the ground. Rankin alleged he “landed on his neck and his vertebra was fractured. This fracture resulted in [Rankin] becoming more paralyzed: losing control of his bladder, bowel, sexual organ and legs, and experiencing numbness in his hands.” According to Rankin, his injuriesrequired surgery; he“suffered damages including but not limited to mental pain and shock to his nervous system, anxiety, anguish, humiliation and emotional distress”;he would “continue to be required to receive medical care and treatment, and life assistance”; and he had lost or would “lose income, wages and other financial benefits.”
Rankin’s third amended complaint, filed November 2021, alleged six causes of action. As to both defendants, Rankin alleged a violation of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act;Civ. Code, § 52.1 et seq.) and a violation of the Ralph Civil Rights Act of 1976 (Ralph Act; § 51.7 et seq.). Rankin further alleged battery by Kardouni, and negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and negligent retention of Kardouni by CDCR. As relevant here, the complaint requested“general damages to compensate . . . [for] emotional distress, pain and suffering, and loss of pleasure and enjoyment of life”; compensatory damages; punitive damages; and statutory damages.

The Underlying Incident
As appropriate to our review of a grant of summary judgment, we view and recite the facts in the light most favorable to Rankin as the nonmoving party. (See Knapp v. Ginsberg (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 504, 509; Mackey v. Trustees of California State University (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 640, 647, fn. 3.)
Rankin was convicted of voluntary manslaughter andincarcerated by CDCR from 2002 until 2019. Rankin was shot during the commission of the offense, causing him to be partially paralyzed from the waist downbefore he entered CDCR custody. Rankin “could move his legs but could not stand on his legs without support. Rankin had control of his bowel and bladder movements and sexual functions.” Rankin used a walker to stand and he “needed assistance to travel significant distances.”At the time of the alleged incident, Rankin wore a yellow-green vest identifying him as a disabled inmate.
In 2013, Rankin was convicted of violating Penal Code section 4573.8 for possessing marijuana in prison. From 2013 to 2018, Rankin was found guilty of seven rule violations for possession and use of controlled substances or drug paraphernalia, including marijuana, morphine, methamphetamine, and alcohol.
In his summary judgment opposition, Rankin provided a declaration describing, and he was deposed regarding, the incidentat issue in this case. On September 29, 2018, Rankin was alone in his cell and felt unwell. Rankin requested medical care and Kardouni escorted him to see a medical provider at the Treatment and Triage Area (TTA). Afterwards, Rankin returned to his cell, where he requested medical care again.This time, Rankin “called for ‘man down’ . . . indicating it was an emergency situation.” Rankin sat on the floor of his cell to wait for care. Several registered nurses and correctional officers responded to Rankin’s cell to transport him for care.
Either before or after medical staff arrived, Kardouni entered Rankin’s cell.Kardouni and Rankin were the only two people in the cell. According to Rankin’s declaration, Kardouni called him a “ ‘little bitch’ ” and said, “ ‘if you want medical, crawl out of the cell.’ ” At his deposition, Rankin testified that Kardouni said, “You need to crawl out of the cell if you want any medical attention or we are going to come in and drag you out.”
Kardouni then threw a wooden stokes litter (a board used to lift apersonin a lying down position onto a wheeled gurney) onto the ground.Rankin’s declaration described that Kardouni lifted Rankin “above waist level and dropped [him] to the ground in the direction of the stokes litter.”At his deposition, Rankin stated Kardouni “grabbed me by [the] collar of my shirt and the waist hemming of my pants. [¶] And he picked me up and slammed me down on the [stokes litter].” Rankin landed on his neck,and in his deposition he described that “[w]ith my legs being so dead weight almost . . . the way he slammed me down, my legs just went back over my head as well.” Rankin described that “from that point, you know, I didn’t feel anything . . . as far as my lower limbs” or “from my neck down.”
Rankin was transported to TTA and then to the hospital, where he told hospital staff that his “injuries were due to being dropped to the floor by a CDCR corrections officer.” Records obtained from the hospital indicatedRankin was hospitalized from September 29 to October 9, 2018, where he received surgery to his spine. Rankin’s declaration attested he suffered serious injuries as a result of Kardouni’s actions, requiring surgery and leading to further paralysis, “losing control of [his] bladder, bowel, sexual organ and legs, and experiencing numbness in [his] hands.” At his deposition, Rankin denied that his injuries were caused by any other events before the incident on September 29.
Another inmate, Reginald Terry,was outside Rankin’s cell during the alleged incident. Terryheard Rankin “cry loudly for help,” saw the gurney arrive, and saw three correctional officers, including Kardouni,enter Rankin’s cell. Terry heard Rankin “scream in pain.” According to Terry, “[t]hen the officers brought Mr.Rankin out of the cell on a board . . . and they dropped him before putting him on the stretcher. . . . He cried in pain again. The nurse on duty stood there and did not intervene.” Terry saw Kardouni and other officers “laughing” at Rankin.Before the incident, Terry regularly assisted Rankin by pushing his wheelchair, and after Rankin returned from surgery, Terry observed Rankin “was constantly in pain,” “had less mobility,” and needed “much more [help] with going to the bathroom.”
After this incident, Rankin reported misconduct by Kardouni to CDCR, stating “Kardouni arrived to his cell and instead of rendering help, he used unnecessary force that resulted in him receiving a serious injury to his neck.” Rankin made a similar complaint to correctional health services during a mental health visit.

Summary Judgment Proceedings
Kardouni moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication in the alternative, arguing that Rankin could not establish the elements of his causes of action and that the evidence precluded a finding in his favor because “Officer Kardouni did not act violently against Plaintiff” and “Officer Kardouni did not cause Plaintiff harm.”Specifically, he argued Rankin’s allegations were inconsistent, unsupported, and self-serving.Kardouni further argued “there is no evidence of a neck fracture or any injury caused by an assault. Rather, [Rankin] had a progressive condition which caused an infection in his neck.”
In support, Kardouni attached an expert declaration from Dr. P. Kaloostian, a neurosurgeon. Dr. Kaloostian stated he reviewed Rankin’s complaint and his hospital and prison medical records and opined that“[t]here is no evidence of a fracture or any injury to the spine/spinal cord caused from an assault or a fall on September 29, 2018.” Rather, Rankin’s condition and symptoms were “consistent with an abscess compressing the spinal cord.”Dr. Kaloostiandeclared:

Records indicated that [Rankin] had fallen on two occasions (September 24 and September 29) . . . with the fall on the 24th starting his complaints of worsening neck and arm complaints.
Blood cultures were positive for E. Cloacae and [the hospital surgeon] noted intraoperatively an abscess compressing the spinal cord, with no evidence of a fracture.
Finally, the pre-operative MRI of his cervical spine noted anterior fluid collection at C4-5 consistent with an abscess compressing the spinal cord, without acute pathological conditions from trauma.
Therefore, based on the above reasons, Mr.Rankin suffered cervical radiculopathy/myelopathy from a progressive expansion of this anterior epidural abscess causing cord compression. . . .
As the epidural collection increases in size over time, it causes further cord compression, and thus weakness, which may relate to the patient falling on the 24th and then again on the 29th.
There is NO traumatic basis for Mr. Rankin’s cervical radiculopathy/myelopathy but rather all can be explained on the basis of progressive epidural abscess causing cord compression.

Rankin opposed Kardouni’s motion. As to the battery cause of action, Rankin argued there was evidence, in the form of Rankin’s declaration, that “Kardouni violently dropped or threw [him] in the direction of the stokes litter.” He also argued that physical harm is not required for battery. Rankin’s opposition argued that Terry’s declaration “confirm[ed] the battery” because Terry heard Rankin “scream in pain.” Citing Terry’s declaration, Rankin argued Kardouni’s actions “caused serious harm to plaintiff.”
As to his Bane Act cause of action, Rankin argued Kardouni “prevented [him] from exercising two protected rights: (1) [the] First Amendment right to free speech requesting medical care, and (2) [the] Constitutional right to adequate healthcare during incarceration.” Rankin further argued “Kardouni acted with malice, ridiculing [Rankin]’s disability while battering him,”and that Kardouni violated the Bane Act even if he did not use “physical violence,” because he “acted with threat, intimidation, and coercion, by calling [Rankin] ‘a little bitch’ and telling [him] ‘if you want medical, crawl out of the cell.’ ” For similar reasons, Rankin argued he raised a triable issue of fact on the Ralph Act cause of action because “a jury could find that Defendant Kardouni ridiculing [Rankin’s] disability, and violently battering [him], was motivated by animus against [his] disability.”
CDCR also moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication in the alternative. As relevant here, it argued it was immune from suit under Government Code section844.6 as to all causes of action.
Rankin opposed, arguing that Senate Bill No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) clarified thatCDCR was not immune from liability under the Bane Act and that CDCR wasliable for Bane Act violations under a respondeat superior theory. In a supplemental opposition, Rankin additionally argued that Senate Bill No. 2 did not create new law, but “clarified the original intent of the Bane Act” to eliminate immunity for public entities like CDCR.
The court granted Kardouni’s motion for summary judgment on February 1, 2023, on the ground that Rankin had not created a triable issue of material fact regarding whether he was harmed by Kardouni’s conduct. The trial court also granted summary judgment to CDCR, reasoning that Government Code section 844.6 governmental immunity barred Rankin’s claims. The court entered a judgment of dismissal.
Rankin timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Summary JudgmentStandard of Review
A trial court grants a motion for summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates there is no triable issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.(c).) “There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at p.850.)“The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which ‘set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.’ ” (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.)
A defendant moving for summary judgment must support the motion with evidence, such as “evidence thatconclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action” or otherwiseshow that “the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 855.)If the moving party makes a “prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact,” “the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Id. at p. 850.)In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must consider all of the evidence and all of the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, and must view the evidence and the inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Id. at p. 843.)
A party may also move for summary adjudication “as to one or more causes of action within an action . . . if th[at] party contends that the cause of action has no merit.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.(f)(1); see Noe v. Superior Court(2015) 237Cal.App.4th 316, 326 (Noe); Rehmani v. Superior Court (2012) 204Cal.App.4th 945, 950.) “A motion for summary adjudication may be made by itself or as an alternative to a motion for summary judgment and shall proceed in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.(f)(2); see Noe, at p. 326; Rehmani, at p. 950.) “A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1); see Noe, at p.326.)
We review a grant of summary judgment or summary adjudication de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party. (Noe, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p.327 [summary adjudication];Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 [summary judgment].) “ ‘To the extent issues on appeal from a summary judgment involve the interpretation of a statute, they are issues of law subject to independent review.’ ” (Smart Corner Owners Assn. v. CJUF Smart Corner LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 439, 458; accord, City of Malibu v. Santa Monica Mts. Conservancy (2002) 98Cal.App.4th 1379, 1383.)
Material Factual Disputes Preclude Summary Judgment for Kardouni
Battery
Rankin first challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on his battery claim. Rankin contends that he raised a triable issue of fact as to whether Kardouni fractured his vertebra or exacerbated his paralysis. Rankin further argues that even if he was “mistaken in his belief that his worsening paralysis was caused by the Kardouni battery, [he] had also alleged pain and suffering, [and] emotional distress.”
In the trial court, Kardouni argued Rankin could not establish the elements of his causes of action and that the evidence precluded a finding in Rankin’s favor because “Officer Kardouni did not act violently against Plaintiff” and “Officer Kardouni did not cause Plaintiff harm.” Although his argument is not entirely clear, we understand Kardouni as arguing that his expert’s declaration conclusively negated or “refuted” the causation element of Rankin’s battery cause of action for Rankin’s physical injuries.“The elements of civil battery are (1)defendant intentionally performed an act that resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person; (2) plaintiff did not consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to plaintiff.” (Brown v. Ransweiler (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 526-527; accord, Piedra v. Dugan (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495.)Here, as to the last element, Rankin’s complaint alleged he suffered a fractured vertebra because of the alleged battery, “result[ing] in [Rankin] becoming more paralyzed.”
Based on a review of Rankin’s medical records, Dr. Kaloostian opined that “[t]here is no evidence of a fracture or any injury to [Rankin’s] spine/spinal cord caused from an assault or a fall on September 29, 2018. . . . [R]ather[,] all can be explained on the basis of progressive epidural abscess causing cord compression.”
The burden then shifted to Rankin to present evidence demonstrating a triable issue of material fact that Kardouni’s conduct caused the physical injuries Rankin alleged in his complaint. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) Rankin did not meet this burden. In opposition to summary judgment, Rankin relied on his declaration and Terry’s declaration to argue that “Kardouni violently dropped or threw [Rankin].” Rankin stated in his declaration that “Due to Kardouni’s battery of me, I landed on my neck and suffered serious injuries[,]which required surgery . . . . This resulted in me becoming more paralyzed: losing control of my bladder, bowel, sexual organ and legs, and experiencing numbness in my hands.” But Rankin did not introduce any expert declaration rebutting that of Dr. Kaloostian, let alone any other medical evidence that would permit a trier of fact to find he was injured in the manner alleged (i.e., “broken vertebra”) and that such injuries were caused by Kardouni’s conduct. “When the moving party produces a competent expert declaration showing there is no triable issue of fact on an essential element of the opposing party’s claims, the opposing party’s burden is to produce a competent expert declaration to the contrary.” (Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761-762; accord, Fernandez v. Alexander (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 770, 779.)
Rankin argues that although he “did not offer an expert opinion in opposition, no such opinion is required” due to the factual assertions in Rankin and Terry’s declarations. Citing Kaney v. Custance (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 201, Rankin asserts that “ ‘[i]f causation presents a question that is within the common knowledge of persons of ordinary education, then expert testimony is not required.’ ” Here, however, the issue of causationwith respect to Rankin’s physical injuries required interpretation of Rankin’s medical records, including surgical findings, and was outside the realm of common knowledge. (SeeWebster v. Claremont Yoga (2018) 26Cal.App.5th 284, 290 [plaintiff failed to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact without expert testimony, where defendant’s expert opined plaintiff’s neck injuries “ ‘were due to chronic degenerative disc disease and arthritic changes’ as opposed to ‘an acute or traumatic injury,’ ” because “the causation issue was complex” and “beyond the ability of a lay juror to determine”]; cf. Cobbs v. Grant (1972) 8 Cal.3d 229, 236 [“when a doctor relates the facts ...in support of his decision to operate, and where the facts are not commonly susceptible of comprehension by a lay juror, medical expert opinion is necessary to enable the trier of fact to determine [liability]”].)
Rankin further argues that Kardouni’s summary judgment motion “only attempted to refute the physical injury category of damages – Kardouni did not refute pain and suffering, [or] emotional distress.” In Rankin’s view, “[n]othing in Dr. Kaloostian’s declaration or Kardouni’s [motion for summary judgment] foreclosed Rankin’s evidence of unlawful and intentional battery . . . Kardouni’s [motion] only attempted to refute the physical injury category of damages [and] did not refute pain and suffering, [or] emotional distress.”
We agree Kardouniwas not entitled to summary judgment because he did not challenge the emotional distress or pain and suffering allegations in Rankin’s battery claim. “Where, as here, the plaintiff has the burden of proof [at trial] of a specific material fact, like causation, by a preponderance of the evidence, for the defendant to be entitled to summary judgment, the defendant must present evidence establishing that no reasonable trier of fact could find the underlying material fact in the plaintiff’s favor.” (Demara v. The Raymond Corp. (2017) 13Cal.App.5th 545, 555; see Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 851.)
Here, Rankin’s battery cause of action alleged that Rankin “suffered damages including but not limited to mental pain and shock to his nervous system, anxiety, anguish, humiliation and emotional distress.” And Rankin produced evidence, through his declaration and deposition testimony, that Kardouni “dropped” or “slammed” him on the ground in response to Rankin’s request for medical help. This evidence would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Kardouni intentionally engaged in harmful or offensive contact with Rankin.
Further, Rankin produced evidence that he experienced pain and emotional distress because of the alleged battery. Terry’s declaration described that Rankin “scream[ed] in pain” during the alleged incident. Rankin’s deposition testimony described that “[w]ith my legs being so dead weight almost . . . the way [Kardouni] slammed me down, my legs just went back over my head.” Rankin also produced evidence that he was already experiencing a medical emergency at the time, which necessitated hospitalization and surgery. From this evidence, a reasonable trier of fact could find that Rankin suffered pain and/or emotional distress because of Kardouni’s alleged actions in dropping or slamming Rankin to the ground from waist height during Rankin’s medical emergency. (See Capelouto v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1972) 7 Cal.3d 889, 895-896 [“even in the absence of any explicit evidence showing pain, the jury may infer such pain, if the injury is such that the jury in its common experience knows it is normally accompanied by pain”].)Because Kardouni’s summary judgment motion did not address pain and suffering and emotional distress, he was not entitled to summary judgment on Rankin’s battery cause of action.

Ralph Act and Bane Act Claims
Rankin argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on his Ralph Act and Bane Act claims against Kardouni. Rankin’s contention has merit.
Ralph Act
The Ralph Act, section 51.7, provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of political affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision (b) or(e) of Section 51.” (§ 51.7, subd. (b)(1).) As relevant here, section 51lists “physical disability” and “medical condition” as protected characteristics. (§ 51, subds. (c), (e)(1).)“ ‘[V]iolations of the Ralph Civil Rights Act cannot be accidental, as liability requires a showing that the defendant deliberately acted with “a prohibited discriminatory motive.” ’ ” (Doe v. Kachru (2025) 115Cal.App.5th 175, 208, fn. 12.)But “[n]othing in the statute requires that a plaintiff prove that the offending act was motivated by hate.” (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212Cal.App.4th 258, 269.)
Bane Act
“The Bane Act provides a civil cause of action against anyone who ‘interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.’ § 52.1, subd. (a); see § 52.1, subd. (b).) . . . ‘The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper means (i.e., “threats, intimidation or coercion”), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.’ ” (Simmons v. Superior Court (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1125; accord, AustinB. v. Escondido Union School Dist.(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 860, 883 (Austin B.).)“ ‘[T]he statute was intended to address only egregious interferences with constitutional rights, not just any tort. The act of interference with a constitutional right must itself be deliberate or spiteful.’” (Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395; accord, Simmons, at p.1125.)“The Bane Act does not require that ‘the offending “threat, intimidation or coercion” be “independent” from the constitutional violation alleged.’ ” (Murchison v. County of Tehama (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 867, 896; accord, Austin B., at pp.881-883.)
Kardouni Was Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Rankin’s Bane and Ralph Act Claims
As stated, Kardouni moved for summary judgment, in part, arguing that Rankin could not establish the elements of his causes of action and that the evidence precluded a finding in his favor because “Officer Kardouni did not act violently against Plaintiff.”Even assuming Kardouni shifted the summary judgment burden on these causes of action, Rankin’s evidence was sufficient to raise material factual disputes on the Bane Act and Ralph Act. Rankin argues he raised a materialfactualdispute as towhether Kardouni committed violence against him because of his disability, and whether Kardouni used threats, intimidation or coercion to interfere with Rankin’s constitutional rights to medical care, free speech, and freedom from unwarranted force.
As to the Ralph Act, Rankin’s declaration and deposition testimony statedthat Kardouni picked him up off the floor and “dropped” or “slammed” him to the ground from waist height. That is sufficient topermit a jury to find that Kardouni committed violenceagainst Rankin. (See AustinB., supra, 149Cal.App.4th at p. 880 [evidence that teacher “‘grabbed, yanked, compressed, stepped on’ and ‘slammed down’” on childrensupported violence within the meaning of the Ralph Act].)Rankin’s declaration attesting that he was wearing a vest identifying him as disabled and that Kardouni called Rankin a “little bitch” and told him to “crawl out of the cell” for medical help could also permit a jury to find thatKardouni’s violence was motivated by Rankin’s physical disability and/or medical condition as a partial paraplegic. (Cf. Gabrielle A. v. County of Orange (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1268, 1291 [affirming grant of summary judgment on Ralph Act claim where plaintiffs offered “no evidence to establish defendants discriminated against them” due to their medical conditions, “but claim . . . animus should be inferred”].)
As to the Bane Act, Rankin’s evidence could permit a jury to find that Kardouni interfered with or violated Rankin’s legal rights using threats, intimidation, or coercion.The evidence that Kardouni used force against Rankin—who was partially paralyzed andexperiencing a medical emergency—could permit the jury to find Kardouniviolated Rankin’s federal constitutional rights tomedical care while incarcerated (Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 103-104) and to freedom from unnecessary and wanton excessive force (Wilkins v. Gaddy (2010) 559 U.S. 34, 37-38).Based on the foregoing Ralph Act analysis, a jury could also find that Kardouni interfered with Rankin’s state law right under the Ralph Act to “ ‘be free from any violence . . . committed against their persons . . . because of their . . . disability.’ ” (Jones v. Kmart Corp. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 329, 337 [Bane Act violationcan be based on the state statutory rights under the Ralph Act].)Rankin’s evidence also raised a triable issue as to whether Kardouni used threats, intimidation, or coercion within the meaning of the Bane Act against Rankin. According to Rankin’s deposition testimony, Kardouni threatened to “drag [him] out” of the cell, and Rankin declared that Kardouni lifted and “dropped” him on the ground.(Cf. City and County of San Francisco v. Ballard (2006) 136Cal.App.4th 381, 408 [affirming sustaining of demurrer on section52.1 claim where plaintiffalleged defendant “threatened to impose $15 million in penalties on him” but “the record does not establish any conduct that rises to the level of a threat of violence or coercion”].)
The Attorney General argues that Kardouni was entitled to summary judgment on thesecauses of action because “Rankin’s inconsistent statements regarding the relevant events”means “his variable testimony that Officer Kardouni intentionally injured him is properly disregarded.” These inconsistent statements include: Rankin’s statement during a CDCR investigation that Kardouni “slammed [him] into the wall,” not the ground; a statement in a prison medical report that Rankin had an “unwitnessed fall”on the day of the alleged incident;Rankin’stestimony at his deposition that a nursebrought the stokes litter to the door of his cell; and Rankin’s varying recollections ofhis medical treatment history preceding the alleged incident.
“In reviewing motions for summary judgment . . . , courts have long tended to treat affidavits repudiating previous testimony as not constituting substantial evidence of the existence of a triable issue of fact.” (Alvis v. County of Ventura (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 536, 549; accord, Gharibian v. Wawanesa General Ins. Co. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 730, 739.) This rule applies only “ ‘ “[w]here . . . there is a clear and unequivocal admission by the plaintiff” ’ ” which is later contradicted by a subsequent declaration. (Ahn v. Kumho Tire U.S.A., Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 133, 144; accord, King v. Andersen (1966) 242Cal.App.2d 606, 610.) On our review of the entire record, Rankin’s declaration that Kardouni insulted him, picked him up, and dropped him was not clearly and unequivocally contradicted byany earlier statements such that it could not establish a triable issue of fact. (See Ahn, at p. 147[summary judgment should not “be granted based on what may appear, in isolation, to be clear and unequivocal admissions, when the purported admissions are credibly contradicted or explained by other credible evidence in the record, and all the evidence in the record shows there are triable issues of material fact”].) The Attorney General’s arguments regarding any inconsistencies in Rankin’s statements are more properly presented to a factfinder weighing the evidence.

Rankin’s Claims Against CDCR are Barred by Government Code Section 844.6
The trial court determined CDCR was entitled to summary judgment because all of Rankin’s causes of actionwere barred by statutory immunity. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849 [defendant meets summary judgment burden by showing “ ‘there is a complete defense to [a] cause of action’ ”].) According to Rankin, effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended the Bane Act (section 52.1) to remove statutory immunity for public entities. Rankin contends these amendments clarify existing law and/or are retroactive and thus CDCR cannot assert immunity under Government Code section 844.6 for Kardouni’s alleged Bane Act and Ralph Act violations arising in 2018.

The Bane Act, Government Code Section 844.6, and Senate Bill No. 2
“[S]overeign immunity is the rule in California” and “governmental liability is limited to exceptions specifically set forth by statute.” (Cochran v. Herzog Engraving Co. (1984) 155Cal.App.3d 405, 409; accord, Towery v. State of California (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 226, 232 (Towery); see Gov. Code, § 815 [“Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”].)
Government Code section 844.6 specifically addresses injuries to prisoners and provides that, with specific statutory exceptions not implicated here, “a public entity is not liable for... [a]n injury to any prisoner.” (Gov. Code, § 844.6, subd.(a)(2).) Our Supreme Court has explained if a specific immunity statute applies, it “ ‘cannot be abrogated by a statute which simply imposes a general legal duty or liability.’ ” (Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 635 (Creason).)
Several courts have held that section 52.1 Bane Act claims against public entities were barred by, among other statutes, section 844.6. (See, e.g., Towery, supra, 14Cal.App.5th at p. 234 [Gov. Code section 844.6 clearly “applicab[le] to a claim against a public entity under [another] statute, such as Civil Code section 52.1, that simply creates a general legal duty”]; O’Toole v. Superior Court (2006) 140Cal.App.4th 488, 504 [“Civil Code section 52.1 contains no indicia reflecting an intent that public employees may be sued despite a statutory immunity that would otherwise apply.”], superseded by statute as stated in Wiley v. Kern High School Dist. (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 765, 778 (Wiley).) Towery reasoned that if the Legislature had “intended to exclude claims under Civil Code section 52.1 from the public entity immunity provided by [Government Code] section 844.6 . . . it could have explicitly said so when enacting the Bane Act, either by including such a provision in that act or by amending [Government Code] section844.6.” (Towery, at p. 237.)
Effective 2022, Senate Bill No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended the Bane Act to add:

The state immunity provisions provided in Sections 821.6, 844.6, and 845.6 of the Government Code shall not apply to any cause of action brought against any peace officer or custodial officer . . . or directly against a public entity that employs a peace officer or custodial officer, under this section. (§ 52.1, subd.(n).)

The legislative counsel’s digest for Senate Bill No. 2 states, “Existing law [] allows an individual whose exercise or enjoyment of rights has been interfered with to prosecute a civil action for damages on their own behalf. [¶] The bill would eliminate certain immunity provisions for peace officers and custodial officers, or public entities employing peace officers or custodial officers sued under the act.” (Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No.2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) 4 Stats. 2021, Summary Dig. at <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB2> [as of Aug. 4, 2026]; see Wiley, supra, 107Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-781.) The legislative findings to the bill state: “Civil courts provide a vital avenue for individuals harmed by violations of the law by peace officers to find redress and accountability. But . . . broad interpretations of California law immunities and restrictive views on the cause of action under the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act[] too often lead to officers escaping accountability in civil courts, even when they have broken the law or violated the rights of members of the public. The civil court process should ensure that peace officers are treated fairly, but that they can be held accountable for violations of the law that harm others, especially the use of excessive force.” (Sen. Bill No. 2 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) § 2(f) at <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB2> [as of Aug. 4, 2026].)
Applicability of Senate Bill No. 2 to Rankin’s Causes of Action Predating the Amendment
Rankin argues that section 52.1 as amended retroactively operates to remove public entity immunity for Bane Act and Ralph Act violations preceding its enactment. Specifically, Rankin argues that Senate Bill No. 2 clarified the original intent of the Bane Act and the Ralph Act “follows the same statutory scheme” as the Bane Act. Rankin’s argument is not persuasive.
“Generally, statutes operate prospectively only.” (Myers v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 828, 840; see§3 [“No part of [this Code] is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.”].) “ ‘[I]t is an established canon of interpretation that statutes are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such was the legislative intent.’ ” (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207; see McClung v. Employment Development Dept. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 475 (McClung) [noting a “strong presumption against retroactivity”].) “[U]nless there is an ‘express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application.’ ” (Myers, at p. 841.) “‘[A] statute that is ambiguous with respect to retroactive application is construed . . . to be unambiguously prospective.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, the plain text of Senate Bill No. 2 does not state the amended immunity provisions are retroactive. (See§ 52.1;Wiley, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 780 [concluding section 52.1 as amended by Senate Bill No. 2 has no “expressly retroactive” language and is “ambiguous” as to retroactivity at best].) The legislative history of the bill also “discloses no extrinsic evidence of intended retroactive impact. To our knowledge, no prior draft bill included any retroactive language. The Legislature only explained that ‘[t]he bill would eliminate certain immunity provisions for peace officers . . . sued under the act.’ [Citation.] This is not a clear expression of retroactive intent because it does not expressly include preenactment conduct.” (Id. at pp. 780-781; see Souvannarath v. Hadden (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1115, 1126, fn. 9 [legislative counsel’s digest is “recognized as a primary indication of legislative intent”].) Rankin presents no persuasive argument addressing Wiley’s conclusion that Senate Bill No. 2’s text and legislative history reflect no intent to apply its amendments retroactively.
Rankin argues instead that “public entity immunity against Bane Act claims was judicially[]created, [without] clear statutory direction.” Although not entirely clear, we understand Rankin as arguing that the intent behind Senate Bill No. 2 was to abrogate the judicially “incorrect interpretation of the Bane Act” and to “make express the original legislative intent of the Bane Act.” Rankin cites Senate Bill No. 2 legislative analyses and summaries, which state that the Bane Act “has been severely narrowed by judicial interpretations that have created additional hurdles,” such as Towery, supra, 14Cal.App.5th 226. (Italics omitted.)
“[A] statute that merely clarifies, rather than changes, existing law does not operate retrospectively even if applied to transactions predating its enactment. . . . Our consideration of the surrounding circumstances can indicate that the Legislature made material changes in statutory language in an effort only to clarify a statute’s true meaning. [Citations.] Such a legislative act has no retrospective effect because the true meaning of the statute remains the same.” (Western Security Bank v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 232, 243 (Western Security Bank).) “One such circumstance is when the Legislature promptly reacts to the emergence of a novel question of statutory interpretation: ‘ “An amendment which in effect construes and clarifies a prior statute must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the original act, where the amendment was adopted soon after the controversy arose concerning the proper interpretation of the statute.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
But Rankin presents no persuasive argument that Senate Bill No. 2 was a clarification of the Bane Act’s original meaning, whether in response to Towery or other judicial interpretations of section 52.1. In Western Security Bank, for instance, the amendments at issue “simply clarified and confirmed the state of the law” as originally intended. (Western Security Bank, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 252.) This was because the bill expressly indicated the Legislature’s “ ‘intent . . . to abrogate the holding’ ” of a recent Court of Appeal decision, and the Legislature enacted the bill as an urgency statute with immediate effect. (Id. at p.245.) Here, by contrast, the Legislature did not enact Senate Bill No. 2 until more than five years after Towery. This is not a case where “the Legislature act[ed] promptly to correct a perceived problem with a judicial construction of a statute.” (Id. at p. 246.)
Rankin points to legislative committee statements that Senate Bill No. 2 would “address and clarify a number of recent negative court decisions.” (Italics omitted.) This is not evidence of legislative intent to clarify the Bane Act itself. Further, “statements in the legislative history to the effect that the proposed amendment would only ‘clarify’ the law’s original meaning . . . may have been intended only to demonstrate that clarification was necessary, not as positive assertions that the law always provided for . . . liability [as amended]. We see no indication the Legislature even thought about giving, much less expressly intended to give, the amendment retroactive effect to the extent the amendment did change the law. Specifically, we see no clear and unavoidable intent to have the statute retroactively impose liability for actions not subject to liability when taken.” (McClung, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 476.)
As to Rankin’s Ralph Act claim, CDCR retains governmental immunity under Government Code section 844.6. Senate Bill No. 2 did not amend the Ralph Act (section 51.7), section 52.1’s amended immunity provisions do not reference section 51.7, and Rankin identifies no other basis for his argument regarding the Ralph Act. (See Gates v. Superior Court (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 481, 512-513 [section 51.7 liability does not override governmental immunities such as section 844.6]; see alsoCreason, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 635 [“If a specific immunity statute applies, it ‘cannot be abrogated by a statute which simply imposes a general legal duty or liability’ ”].)
Accordingly, CDCR has a complete defense, governmental immunity, to Rankin’s causes of action.

DISPOSITION

The judgment in favor of CDCR is affirmed. The judgment in favor of Kardouni is reversed, and on remand the trial court is directed to vacate its order granting Kardouni’s motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order denying the motion. The parties shall bear their costs on appeal.

MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:

FEUER, J.

STONE, J.